Alexei Navalny

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Alexei Navalny
Алексей Навальный
Alexey Navalny 2017.jpg
Navalny in 2017
Leader of Russia of the Future
Assumed office
28 March 2019
Preceded byHimself (as leader of Progress Party)
Leader of Progress Party
In office
17 November 2013 19 May 2018
Personal details
Alexei Anatolievich Navalny

(1976-06-04) 4 June 1976 (age 44)
Butyn, Odintsovsky District, Moscow Oblast, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union
Political party Russia of the Future (since 2018)
Other political
Progress Party (2013–18)
Yabloko (2000–07)
Spouse(s)Yulia Navalnaya
Children2 [1]
Alma mater Peoples' Friendship University of Russia
Finance University under the Government of the Russian Federation
Yale University
Occupation Lawyer, activist, politician
Known forLeader of the Progress Party
Anti-corruption campaigner
Awards Yale World Fellow (2010)

Alexei Anatolievich Navalny (Russian: Алексе́й Анато́льевич Нава́льный, Russian pronunciation:  [ɐlʲɪkˈsʲej ɐnɐˈtolʲjɪvʲɪtɕ nɐˈvalʲnɨj] ; born 4 June 1976) is a Russian politician and anti-corruption activist. He gained prominence in Russia, and in Russian and international media, as a critic of corruption, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his government. He has organized demonstrations promoting reform and attacking political corruption, Putin and Putin's political allies; he has run for a political office on the same platform. In 2012, The Wall Street Journal described him as "the man Vladimir Putin fears most". [2]


Navalny was a Russian Opposition Coordination Council member and the leader of the political party Progress Party. [3] In September 2013, he ran in the Moscow mayoral election, supported by the RPR-PARNAS party. He came in second, with 27% of the vote, losing to incumbent mayor Sergei Sobyanin, a Putin appointee - he has claimed that the authorities committed election fraud and that he actually received more votes. [4]

Navalny came to prominence via his blog hosted by LiveJournal, but later switched to YouTube where he has 3.15 million subscribers and Twitter where he has more than 2.1 million followers. [5] [6] He has used his blog, YouTube and Twitter channels to publish videos and documents about corruption by Russian state officials, to organize political demonstrations, and to promote his campaigns for office. He has also been active in other media: most notably, in a 2011 radio interview he described Russia's ruling party, United Russia, as a "party of crooks and thieves", which soon became a popular epithet. [7] He created the Anti-Corruption Foundation in 2011.

Navalny has been arrested several times by Russian authorities. [8] He received two suspended sentences for alleged embezzlement in two separate cases, one in July 2013, and another in December 2014, for five-year and 3.5-year terms of imprisonment, respectively. [9] [10] [11] [12] Both cases are considered to be fabrications in retaliation for his political activity [13] [14] and violated Navalny's right to a fair trial, according to rulings by the European Court of Human Rights. The Memorial Human Rights Center considered Navalny as a political prisoner. [15] In February 2014, Navalny was placed under house arrest and restricted from communicating with anyone but his family. [16]

In March 2017, Alexei Navalny and his Anti-Corruption Foundation created a documentary He Is Not Dimon to You , accusing Dmitry Medvedev, the former prime minister and president of Russia, of corruption. [17]

In December 2016, Navalny started his campaign to run for President of Russia during the 2018 election, but was barred by Russia's Central Electoral Commission in December 2017 and the Supreme Court of Russia rejected his appeal and upheld the ban. [18] [19] [13] He and his supporters have been detained and arrested multiple times, and have become victims of attacks on numerous occasions during the campaign. In May 2018, he was sentenced to 30 days in prison after being arrested for attending an unsanctioned protest against Putin in Moscow; he condemned the verdict. [20]

Early life and career

Navalny is of Russian and Ukrainian descent. [21] His father is from Zalissia, a village near the border of Belarus in Ivankiv Raion, Kiev Oblast, Ukraine. Navalny grew up in Obninsk about 100 km southwest of Moscow, but spent his childhood summers with his grandmother in Ukraine, accruing a proficiency in the Ukrainian language. [21] [22] His parents, Anatoly Navalny and Lyudmila Navalnaya, own a basket-weaving factory in the village of Kobyakovo, Moscow Oblast, which they have run since 1994. [23]

Navalny graduated from the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia in 1998 with a law degree. He then studied securities and exchanges at the Finance University under the Government of the Russian Federation. [24] [25] Navalny received a scholarship to the Yale World Fellows program at Yale University in 2010. [26] [27]

Anti-corruption investigations

Navalny arrested during the 2017 Russian protests on 26 March 2017 FEV 1921.jpg
Navalny arrested during the 2017 Russian protests on 26 March 2017

In 2008, Navalny spent around 300,000 rubles on stocks of five oil and gas companies: Rosneft, Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, and Surgutneftegaz, thus becoming an activist shareholder. [28] As such, he began to aim at making the financial properties of these companies transparent. This is required by law, but there are allegations that some of the top managers of these companies are involved in thefts and are obscuring transparency. [29] Other activities deal with wrongdoings by Russian police, such as Sergei Magnitsky's case, improper usage of state's budget funds, quality of state services and so on.

In November 2010, Navalny published [30] confidential documents about Transneft's auditing. According to Navalny's blog, about $4 billion were stolen by Transneft's leaders during the construction of the Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean oil pipeline. [31] [32]

In December 2010, Navalny announced the launch of the RosPil project, which seeks to bring to light corrupt practices in the government procurement process. [33] The project takes advantage of existing procurement regulation that requires all government requests for tender to be posted online. Information about winning bids must be posted online as well. The name RosPil is a pun on the slang term "raspil" (wikt:ru:распил) for a corruption practice of appropriating the money allocated from the state budget.

In May 2011, Navalny launched RosYama (literally "Russian Hole"), a project that allowed individuals to report potholes and track government responses to complaints. [34]

In August 2011, Navalny publicized papers related to a scandalous real estate deal [35] between Hungarian and Russian governments. [36] [37] According to the papers, Hungary sold a former embassy building in Moscow for US$21 million to an offshore company of Viktor Vekselberg, who immediately resold it to the Russian government for $111 million. Irregularities in the paper trail implied a collusion. Three Hungarian officials responsible for the deal were detained in February 2011. [38] It is unclear whether any official investigation was conducted on the Russian side.

In May 2012, Navalny accused Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov of corruption, stating that companies owned by Roman Abramovich and Alisher Usmanov had transferred tens of millions of dollars to Shuvalov's company, allowing Shuvalov to share in the profit from Usmanov's purchase of the British steel company Corus. [39] [40] Navalny posted scans of documents to his blog showing the money transfers. [40] Usmanov and Shuvalov stated the documents Navalny had posted were legitimate, but that the transaction had not represented a violation of Russian law. Shuvalov stated, "I unswervingly followed the rules and principles of conflict of interest. For a lawyer, this is sacred". [39]

In July 2012, Navalny posted documents on his blog allegedly showing that Alexander Bastrykin, head of the Investigative Committee of Russia, owned an undeclared business in the Czech Republic. The posting was described by the Financial Times as Navalny's "answering shot" for having had his emails leaked during his arrest in the previous month. [41]

In March 2017, Navalny launched the campaign "He Is Not Dimon To You", accusing Dmitry Medvedev, the Prime Minister, of corruption. The authorities either ignored the report produced by Navalny, or commented that the report was issued by a "convicted criminal" and is not worth commenting on. On 26 March, Navalny organized a series of anti-corruption rallies in different cities across Russia. In some cities, the rallies were sanctioned by the authorities, but in others, including Moscow and Saint Petersburg, they were not allowed. The Moscow police said that 500 people had been detained, but according to the human rights group OVD-Info, 1,030 people were detained in Moscow alone, including Navalny himself. [42] [43] [44] On 27 March, he was fined 20,000 rubles minimum for organizing an illegal protest, and jailed for 15 days for resisting arrest. [44]

Political activity


In 2000, following the announcement of a new law that would raise the electoral threshold for State Duma elections, Navalny joined the Russian United Democratic Party Yabloko. According to Navalny, the law was stacked against Yabloko and Union of Right Forces, and he decided to join, even though he was not "a big fan" of either organization. [28] In 2001, he was listed as a member of the party. [28] In 2002, he was elected to the regional council of the Moscow branch of Yabloko. [45] In 2003, he headed the Moscow subdivision of the election campaign of the party for the parliamentary election held in December. In April 2004, Navalny became Chief of staff of the Moscow branch of Yabloko, which he remained until February 2007. In 2004, he also became Deputy Chief of the Moscow branch of the party. From 2006 to 2007, he was a member of the Federal Council of the party. [46]

In August 2005, Navalny was incorporated into Social Council of Central Administrative Okrug of Moscow, created prior to the Moscow City Duma election held later that year, in which he took part as a candidate. In November, he was one of the initiators of Youth Public Chamber, intended to help younger politicians take part in legislative initiatives. [46]

At the same time, in 2005, Navalny started another youth social movement, named "DA! – Democratic Alternative". [note 1] The project was not connected to Yabloko (nor any other political party). Within the movement, Navalny participated in a number of projects. In particular, he was one of the organizers of the movement-run political debates, which soon got resonance in media. [46] Navalny also organized television debates via state-run Moscow channel TV Center; two initial episodes showed high ratings, but the show was suddenly canceled. According to Navalny, authorities prohibited some people from receiving TV coverage. [46]

In late 2006, Navalny appealed to the Moscow City Hall, asking to grant the permission to conduct the nationalist 2006 Russian March. He, however, added that Yabloko condemned "any ethnic or racial hatred and any xenophobia" and called on police to oppose "any Fascist, Nazi, xenophobic manifestations". [note 2] Navalny was an observer during the organizing committee meetings; he was named as an organizer for the march in media, which he denied. [46]

In July 2007, Navalny resigned from the post of Deputy Chief of the Moscow branch of the party. [46] By then, he had founded a nationalist movement, "The People" (see below). During a party council in December 2007, Navalny publicly demanded "the immediate resignation of party chairman and all his deputies, and the re-election of at least 70% of the Bureau". [46] He was consequently expelled from Yabloko "for causing political damage to the party; in particular, for nationalist activities". [48] Navalny declared the actual rationale behind his exclusion was his demand of resignation by Grigory Yavlinsky, who was the leader of the party at the moment. [49]

"The People" movement

On 23 June 2007, Navalny co-founded a new political movement, named "The People", which upheld the positions of "democratic nationalism", defined as a fight for democracy and the rights of ethnic Russians; [46] according to a Navalny's biographer, Navalny differentiates the ethnic and social aspects of the term, highlighting the latter. [50] (In Russian, "nation" is commonly defined as a social term, while "nationality" is seen as related to ethnicity.)

In June 2008, the movement joined forces with two other Russian nationalist movements, Movement Against Illegal Immigration (MAII) and Great Russia, to form a new coalition, Russian National Movement. Navalny declared the movement would participate in the next parliamentary elections, planning to get a great share of votes; he added, "up to 60% of the population upholds spontaneous nationalism, but it is not legally effectuated". [51] Later the same month, the MAII and The People signed a cooperation agreement; at the procedure, he defined the "new political nationalism" as democratic, "fundamentally and statistically", adding, "we can teach blatant liberals a thing or two". He also declared he wanted to distance the coalition from the skinheads, calling for close collaboration with the leftists and the liberals for fair elections the coalition "would win", and demanded political liberalization and early parliamentary elections in Russia. [52]

In 2011, Navalny admitted the movement "The People" did not establish itself as a working structure. [53]

Involvement in 2011 parliamentary election and 2011–13 Russian protests

Navalny at the courthouse, 6 December 2011 Naval'nyi 6 dekabria 2011 goda v sude.jpg
Navalny at the courthouse, 6 December 2011

In December 2011, after parliamentary elections and accusations of electoral fraud, [54] around 6,000 people gathered in Moscow to protest over the contested result, and some 300 were arrested including Navalny. After a period of uncertainty, Navalny was produced at court and thereafter sentenced to the maximum 15 days "for defying a government official". Alexei Venediktov, editor-in-chief of Echo of Moscow radio station, called the arrest "a political mistake: jailing Navalny transforms him from an online leader into an offline one". [55] Navalny was kept in the same prison as several other activists, including Ilya Yashin and Sergei Udaltsov, the unofficial leader of the Vanguard of Red Youth, a radical Russian communist youth group. Udaltsov has gone on hunger strike to protest against the conditions. [56]

Navalny at Moscow rally, 10 March 2012 Moscow rally 10 March 2012 5.JPG
Navalny at Moscow rally, 10 March 2012

Navalny was arrested on 5 December, convicted and sentenced to 15 days in jail. Since his arrest, his blog has become available in English. [57]

In a profile published the day after his release, BBC News described Navalny as "arguably the only major opposition figure to emerge in Russia in the past five years". [58]

On his release on 20 December, Navalny called on Russians to unite against Putin, who Navalny said would try to snatch victory in the presidential election, which was held on 4 March 2012. [59]

Navalny told reporters on his release that it would be senseless for him to run in the presidential elections because the Kremlin would not allow them to be fair. But he said that if free elections were held, he would "be ready" to run. [59] On 24 December, he helped lead a demonstration much larger than the post-election one (50,000 strong, in one Western-media account[ who? ]), telling to the crowd, "I see enough people to take the Kremlin right now". [60]

In March 2012, after Putin was elected president, Navalny helped lead an anti-Putin rally in Moscow's Pushkin Square, attended by between 14,000 and 20,000 people. After the rally, Navalny was detained by authorities for several hours, then released. [61]

On 8 May, the day after Putin was inaugurated, Navalny and Udaltsov were arrested after an anti-Putin rally at Clean Ponds, and were each given 15-day jail sentences. [62] Amnesty International designated the two men prisoners of conscience. [63] On 11 June, Moscow prosecutors conducted a 12-hour search of Navalny's home, office and a search of the apartment of one of Navalny's relatives. The searches were undertaken, according to the RT television network, as part of a broader investigation into the clashes between opposition activists and riot police that happened on 6 May. [64] Soon afterwards, some of Navalny's personal emails were posted online by a pro-government blogger. [41]


Narodnyi al'ians logo.png
Logo of the People's Alliance, used in 2012–2014
Progress Party logo.svg
Logo of Progress Party, used since 2014

On 26 June 2012, it was announced Navalny's comrades would establish a new political party based on e-democracy; Navalny declared he did not plan to participate in this project at the moment. [65] On 31 July, they filed a document to register an organizing committee of the future party; the party was named "The People's Alliance". [66] The party was declared to be centrist; one of the then-current leaders of the party and Navalny's ally Vladimir Ashurkov explained this was intended to help the party get a large share of voters. However, at the moment, the party did not have a comprehensive ideology. The party would limit the number of its members to 500. Navalny said the concept of political parties was "outdated", and added his participation would make maintaining the party more difficult. However, he "blessed" the party and discussed its maintenance with its leaders. They, in turn, stated they wanted to eventually see Navalny as a member of the party. [67] The party planned to use the activity of its members in media and the Internet as a massive advantage. Ashurkov said he expected the party to get an official registration during spring 2013. [68]

On 15 December 2012, the party held its founding congress; Navalny expressed support to the party, saying, "The People's Alliance is my party", but again refused to join it, citing the criminal cases against him. The party announced it planned reforms on judiciary and law enforcements, a partial transition of presidential powers to the parliament, and limiting migration into the country. [69] On 10 April 2013, the party filed documents for the official registration of the party. [70] On 30 April, the registration of the party was suspended. [71] The party held the second congress to correct the violations proclaimed by the Ministry of Justice. On 5 July, the party was declined registration; according to Izvestia , not all founders of the party were present during the congress, even though the papers were signed by their autographs. [72] Navalny reacted to that with a tweet saying, "[...] A salvo of all guns". [73] (On the same day, he also spoke his last words before the Kirovles trial.) Following the mayoral election, on 15 September, Navalny declared he would join and, possibly, head the party. [74] On 17 November, the party held another founding congress; [75] Navalny was elected as the leader of the party. [76]

Navalny meeting with supporters in Sokolniki Park in Moscow, 25 August 2013 Alexey Navalny meeting in Sokolniki 2013-08-25 3755.jpg
Navalny meeting with supporters in Sokolniki Park in Moscow, 25 August 2013

In November 2013, registered party "Homeland" led by Andrei Bogdanov changed its name to "The People's Alliance"; on 30 November, Ministry of Justice recognized the renaming as legal. [77] On 8 January 2014, Navalny's party filed documents for registration for the second time. [78] On 20 January, registration of the party was suspended; [79] according to Russian laws, no two parties can share a name. [80] On 8 February 2014, Navalny's party changed its name to "Progress Party". [81] On 25 February, the party was registered. [82] At that moment it had six months to register regional branches in at least in half the federal subjects of Russia; the time period could be prolonged if the party was appealing from a court judgment of denial of registration of a branch in at least one subject. [note 3] According to Dmitri Krainev, member of the main board of the party, the party had 15 registered regional branches on 22 August, and the party informed the Ministry of Justice the term would be prolonged, citing suspension of registration or trials regarding registration of regional branches. On 24 September, it informed the ministry about another prolongation of the term. On 26 September, the party declared it registered 43 regional branches. [84] An unnamed source of Izvestia in the ministry said registrations completed after the six-months term would not be taken in consideration, adding, "Yes, trials are taking place in some regions [...] they cannot register new branches in other regions during the trials, because the main term is over". Navalny's blog countered, "Our answer is simple. A six-month term for registration has been legally prolonged ad interim prosecution of appeals of denials and registration suspensions". [84]

Navalny's election campaign in 2013 Electoral headquarters of Alexey Navalny 01.jpg
Navalny's election campaign in 2013

On 2 October 2014, the party filed documents of registration of 44 regional branches; according to Krainev, from that moment, the party should have been added to the list of structures eligible for participation in elections. The party tried to appoint candidates for municipal elections in two towns in Moscow Oblast, but was rejected the right to do so, because it was not added to the said list. After that, the party tried to challenge the non-inclusion in the list in courts; however, the standing has been supported by every next court the party addressed, with the latest being Moscow City Court on 30 March 2015. [85] On 1 February, the party held a convention, where Navalny stated the party was preparing for the 2016 elections, declaring the party would maintain its activity across Russia, saying, "We are unabashed to work in remote lands where the opposition does not work. We can even [work] in Crimea". The candidates the party would appoint were to be chosen via primary elections; however, he added, party's candidates may be removed from elections. [86] On 17 April, the party initiated a coalition of democratic parties. [87]

On 28 April 2015, the party was deprived of registration by the Ministry of Justice, which stated the party had not registered the required number of regional branches within six months after the official registration. [88] Krainev claimed the party could be only eliminated by the Supreme Court, and he added not all trials of registration of regional branches were over, calling the verdict "illegal twice". He added, the party would refer to the European Court of Human Rights, and expressed confidence the party would be restored and admitted to elections. [89] The next day, the party officially challenged the verdict. [90]

Moscow mayoral candidacy

On 30 May 2013, Sergey Sobyanin, the mayor of Moscow, argued an elected mayor is an advantage for the city compared to an appointed one, [91] and on 4 June, he announced he would meet the President Vladimir Putin and ask him for a snap election, mentioning the Muscovites would agree the governor elections should take place in the city of Moscow and the surrounding Moscow Oblast simultaneously. [92] On 6 June, the request was granted, [93] and the next day, the Moscow City Duma appointed the election on 8 September, the national voting day. [94]

Navalny in front of his electorate, asking Muscovites to vote for him in August 2013 Aleksei Naval'nyi 2.jpg
Navalny in front of his electorate, asking Muscovites to vote for him in August 2013

On 3 June, Navalny announced he would run for the post. [95] To become an official candidate, he would need either seventy thousand signatures of Muscovites or to be pegged for the office by a registered party, and then to collect 110 signatures of municipal deputies from 110 different subdivisions (three quarters of Moscow's 146). Navalny chose to be pegged by a party, RPR-PARNAS (which did peg him, but this move sharpened relations within the party; after one of its three co-chairmen and the original founder, Vladimir Ryzhkov, had left the party, he said this had been one of the signs the party was "being stolen from him" [96] ). Among the six candidates who were officially registered as such, only two (Sobyanin and Communist Ivan Melnikov) were able to collect the required number of the signatures themselves, and the other four were given a number of signatures by the Council of Municipal Formations, following a recommendation by Sobyanin, [97] to overcome the requirement (Navalny accepted 49 signatures, and other candidates accepted 70, 70, and 82). [98]

On 17 July, Navalny was registered as one of the six candidates for the Moscow mayoral election. [99] However, on 18 July, he was sentenced for a five-year prison term for the embezzlement and fraud charges that were declared in 2012. Several hours after his sentencing, he pulled out of the race and called for a boycott of the election. [100] However, later that day, the prosecution office requested the accused should be freed on bail and travel restrictions, since the verdict had not yet taken legal effect, saying they had previously followed the restrictions, Navalny was a mayoral candidate, and an imprisonment would thus not comply with his rule for equal access to the electorate. [101] On his return to Moscow after being freed pending an appeal, he vowed to stay in the race. [102] The Washington Post has speculated that his release was ordered by the Kremlin in order to make the election and Sobyanin appear more legitimate. [4]

Ratings of Sobyanin and Navalny
among those who said they would vote,
according to Synovate Comcon polls
29 August–2 September60.1%21.9% [103]
22–28 August63.9%19.8% [104]
15–21 August62.5%20.3% [105]
8–14 August63.5%19.9% [106]
1–7 August74.6%15.0% [106]
25–31 July76.2%16.7% [107]
18–24 July76.6%15.7% [108]
11–16 July76.2%14.4% [109]
4–10 July78.5%10.7% [109]
27 June–3 July77.9%10.8% [109]

Navalny's campaign was based mainly on fundraising: out of 103.4 million rubles (approximately $3.09 million as of the election day [rates 1] ), the total size of his electoral fund, 97.3 million ($2.91 million) were transferred by individuals throughout Russia; [111] such a number is unprecedented in Russia. [112] It achieved a high profile through an unprecedentedly large campaign organization that involved around 20,000 volunteers who passed out leaflets and hung banners, as well as several campaign rallies a day around the city; [113] they were the main driving force for the campaign. [114] The New Yorker described the resulted campaign as "a miracle", along with Navalny's release on 19 July, the fundraising campaign, and the personality of Navalny himself. [115] The campaign received very little television coverage and did not utilize billboards. Thanks to Navalny's strong campaign (and Sobyanin's weak one [113] ), his result grew over time, weakening Sobyanin's, and in the end of the campaign, he declared the runoff election (to be conducted if none of the candidates receives at least 50% of votes) was "a hair's breadth away".

The largest sociological companies predicted (Levada Center was the only one not to have made any predictions; the data it had on 28 August, however, falls in line with other companies') Sobyanin would win the election, scoring 58% to 64% of the vote; they expected Navalny to receive 15–20% of the vote, and the turnout was to be 45–52%. [116] The final results of the voting showed Navalny received 27.24% of the vote, more than candidates appointed by the parties that received second, third, fourth, and fifth highest results during the 2011 parliamentary elections, altogether. Navalny fared better in the center and southwest of Moscow, which have higher income and education levels. [4] However, Sobyanin received 51.37% of the vote, which meant he won the election. The turnout was 32.03%. [117] The companies explained the differences arose from the fact Sobyanin's electorate did not vote, feeling their candidate was guaranteed to win. [116] Navalny's campaign office's measures predicted Sobyanin would score 49–51%, and Navalny would get 24–26% of votes. [116]

Navalny's meeting at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow, 9 September 2013 Alexey Navalny's meeting at Bolotnaya Square 2013-09-09 5075.jpg
Navalny's meeting at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow, 9 September 2013

Many experts said the election had been fair, that the number of irregularities had been much lower than those of other elections held within the country, and that the irregularities had had little effect on the result. [118] [119] Dmitri Abyzalov, leading expert of Center of Political Conjuncture, added low turnout figures provide a further sign of fairness of the election, because that shows they were not overestimated. [118] However, according to Andrei Buzin, co-chairman of the GOLOS Association, State Departments of Social Security added people who did not originally want to vote to lists of those who would vote at home, with the number of such voters being 4.5% of those who voted, and added this did cause questions if Sobyanin would score 50% if this did not take place. [119] Dmitry Oreshkin, leader of the "People's election commission" project (who did a separate counting based on the data from election observers; their result for Sobyanin was 49.7%), said now that the runoff election was only 1.5% away, all details would be looked at very closely, and added it was impossible to prove "anything" juridically. [120]

Percentages of Muscovites who voted for Navalny during the election Msk2013.Naval'nyi.svg
Percentages of Muscovites who voted for Navalny during the election

On 9 September, the day following the election, Navalny publicly denounced the tally, saying, "We do not recognize the results. They are fake". Sobyanin's office rejected an offer of a vote recount. [121] On 12 September, Navalny addressed the Moscow City Court to overturn the result of the poll; the court rejected the assertion. Navalny then challenged the decision in the Supreme Court of Russia, but the court ruled that the election results were legitimate. [122]

RPR-PARNAS and democratic coalition

Following the mayoral election, Navalny was offered a position of a fourth co-chairman of RPR-PARNAS. [123] However, Navalny made no public reaction.

In early 2014, Russia's political landscape changed dramatically: Following the Euromaidan demonstrations and civil unrest in Kiev, which resulted in establishment of a new pro-EU president and government, a countering wave of protests and civil unrest started in Southern and Eastern Ukraine, and in Crimea, a "volunteer force of self-defense of Crimea" announced a referendum, the question for which eventually was, whether Crimea should join the Russian Federation or not. (Later, Putin publicly declared the self-defense forces were composed of Russian military.) Following the referendum, Crimea de facto became a part of Russia. The sociological center marked the fact Putin's rating was skyrocketing: it was just 29% (among all respondents, including those who were unsure or would not vote) in January 2014, but rose to 49% in April 2014, a figure that would transform to 81% if those who were unsure or not willing to vote were excluded. [124]

On 14 November 2014, the two remaining RPR-PARNAS co-chairmen, Boris Nemtsov and former Prime Minister of Russia Mikhail Kasyanov, declared it was the right moment to create a wide coalition of political forces, who favor the "European choice"; Navalny's Progress Party was seen as one of the potential participants. [125] However, on 27 February 2015, Nemtsov was shot dead. Prior to his assassination, Nemtsov worked on a project of a coalition (in which Navalny and Khodorkovsky would become co-chairmen of RPR-PARNAS; Navalny declared merging parties would invoke bureaucratic difficulties and question the legitimacy of party's right to participate in federal elections without signatures collecting [126] ); the murder accelerated the work, and on 17 April, Navalny declared a wide discussion had taken place among Progress Party, RPR-PARNAS, and other closely aligned parties, which resulted in an agreement of formation of a new electoral bloc between the two leaders. [87] Soon thereafter, it was signed by four other parties and supported by Khodorkovsky's Open Russia foundation. [127] Electoral blocs are not present within the current law system of Russia, so it would be realized via means of a single party, RPR-PARNAS, which is not only eligible for participation in statewide elections, but is also currently not required to collect citizens' signatures for the right to participate in the State Duma elections scheduled for September 2016 thanks to the regional parliament mandate previously taken by Nemtsov. The candidates RPR-PARNAS would appoint were to be chosen via primary elections. [128]

Protesters marching along Moscow's Tverskaya Street, 26 March 2017 FEV 1795.jpg
Protesters marching along Moscow's Tverskaya Street, 26 March 2017

The coalition claimed to have collected enough citizens' signatures for registration in the four regions it originally aimed for. However, in one region, the coalition would declare some signatures and personal data have been altered by malevolent collectors; [129] signatures in the other regions have been rejected by regional election commissions. [130] [131] [132] Сomplaints have been issued to the Central Election Commission of Russia, after which the coalition has been registered as a participant in a regional election in one of the three contested regions, Kostroma Oblast. According to a source of "close to the Kremlin", the presidential administration saw coalition's chances as very low, yet was wary, but the restoration in one region occurred so PARNAS could "score a consolation goal". [133] According to the official election results, the coalition scored 2.28% of votes, not enough to overcome the 5% threshold; the party admitted the election was lost. [134]

Presidential election 2018

On 13 December 2016 Navalny announced his entry into the presidential race. [135] [136]

On 8 February 2017, the Leninsky district court of Kirov repeated its sentence of 2013 (which was previously annulled after the decision of ECHR, which ruled that Russia had violated Navalny's right for a fair trial, see the Kirovles case) and charged him with a five-year suspended sentence. [137] This sentence, if it comes into force and remains valid, might prohibit the future official registration of Navalny as a candidate. Navalny announced that he will pursue the annulment of the sentence that clearly contradicts the decision of ECHR. Moreover, Navalny announced that his presidential campaign will proceed independently of courts decisions. He referred to the Russian Constitution (Article 32), which deprives only two groups of citizens of the right to be elected: those recognized by court as legally unfit and those kept in places of confinement by a court sentence. According to Freedom House and The Economist , Navalny was the most viable contender to Vladimir Putin in the 2018 election. [138] [13]

On 26 March 2017, Navalny organized a series of anti-corruption rallies in different cities across Russia. This appeal was responded to by the representatives of 95 Russian cities, and four cities abroad: London, Prague, Basel and Bonn. [139]

On 27 April 2017, Navalny was attacked by unknown assailants outside his office in the Anti-Corruption Foundation. They sprayed a mixture of brilliant green, possibly with other components into his face (see Zelyonka attack). He reportedly lost 80 percent of the sight in his right eye. [140] [141] Navalny accused the Kremlin of orchestrating the attack. [142] [143]

On 7 July 2017, he was released from jail after spending 25 days of imprisonment. Before that, he was arrested in Moscow for participating in protests and was sentenced to 30 days in jail for organizing illegal protests. [144]

On 6 September 2017, Human Rights Watch accused Russian police with systematic interference with Navalny's presidential campaign. "The pattern of harassment and intimidation against Navalny's campaign is undeniable," said Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. "Russian authorities should let Navalny's campaigners work without undue interference and properly investigate attacks against them by ultra-nationalists and pro-government groups." [145]

On 21 September 2017, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe invited Russian authorities, in connection with the Kirovles case, "to use urgently further avenues to erase the prohibition on Mr Navalnyy's standing for election". [146]

On 2 October 2017, Navalny was sentenced to 20 days in jail for calls to participate in protests without approval from state authorities. [147]

In December 2017, Russia's Central Electoral Commission barred Navalny from running for President in 2018, citing Navalny's corruption conviction. The European Union said Navalny's removal cast "serious doubt" on the election. Navalny called for a boycott of the 2018 presidential election, stating his removal meant that millions of Russians were being denied their vote. [19]

Navalny filed an appeal against the Russian Supreme Court's ruling on 3 January 2018. [148] On 6 January, the Supreme Court of Russia rejected his appeal. [149]

Navalny led protests on 28 January 2018 to urge a boycott of Russia's 2018 presidential election. Navalny was arrested on the day of the protest and then released the same day, pending trial. OVD-Info reported that 257 people were arrested throughout the country. According to Russian news reports, police stated Navalny was likely to be charged with calling unauthorized demonstrations. [150] Two of Navalny's associates were given brief jail terms for urging people to attend unsanctioned opposition rallies. Navalny stated on 5 February 2018 the government was accusing Navalny of assaulting an officer during the protests. [151] Navalny was among 1600 people detained during 5 May protests prior to Putin's inauguration; Navalny was charged with disobeying police. [152] On 15 May, he was sentenced to 30 days in jail. [153] Immediately after his release on 25 September 2018, he was arrested and convicted for organising illegal demonstrations and sentenced to another 20 days in jail.

Moscow City Duma elections 2019

During the 2019 Moscow City Duma election Navalny supported independent candidates, most of whom were not allowed to participate in the elections, which led to mass street protests. In July 2019, Navalny was arrested, first for ten days, and then, almost immediately, for 30 days. On the evening of 28 July, he was hospitalized with severe damage to his eyes and skin. At the hospital, he was diagnosed with an "allergy," although this diagnosis was disputed by Anastasia Vasilieva, an ophthalmologist who previously treated Navalny after a chemical attack by an alleged protester in 2017. [154] Vasilieva questioned the diagnosis and suggested the possibility that Navalny's condition was the result of "the damaging effects of undetermined chemicals". [155] On 29 July 2019, Navalny was discharged from hospital and taken back to prison, despite the objections of his personal physician who questioned the hospital's motives. [156] [154] Supporters of Navalny and journalists near the hospital were attacked by the police and many were detained. [155]

Criminal cases

Kirovles case


Navalny in court as part of the Kirovles trial Aleksei Naval'nyi v zale Leninskogo suda Kirova.JPG
Navalny in court as part of the Kirovles trial

On 30 July 2012, the Investigative Committee charged Navalny with embezzlement. The committee stated that he had conspired to steal timber from Kirovles, a state-owned company in Kirov Oblast, in 2009, while acting as an adviser to Kirov's governor Nikita Belykh. [39] [157] Investigators had closed a previous probe into the claims for lack of evidence. [158] Navalny was released on his own recognizance but instructed not to leave Moscow. [159]

Navalny described the charges as "weird" and unfounded. [158] He stated that authorities "are doing it to watch the reaction of the protest movement and of Western public opinion [...] So far they consider both of these things acceptable and so they are continuing along this line". [39] His supporters protested before the Investigative Committee offices. [157]

In April 2013, Loeb&Loeb LLP issued "An Analysis of the Russian Federation's prosecutions of Alexei Navalny", a paper detailing Investigative Committee accusations. The paper concludes that "the Kremlin has reverted to misuse of the Russian legal system to harass, isolate and attempt to silence political opponents". [160] [161]

Conviction and release

People's gathering after the verdict to Navalny, 18 July 2013 Mass protest in Moscow 18 June 2013 - Tverskaya street.jpg
People's gathering after the verdict to Navalny, 18 July 2013

The Kirovles trial commenced in the city of Kirov on 17 April 2013. [162] On 18 July, Navalny was sentenced to five years in jail for embezzlement. [9] He was found guilty of misappropriating about 16 million rubles [163] ($500,000) worth of lumber from a state-owned company. [164] The sentence read by the judge Sergey Blinov was textually the same as the request of the prosecutor, with the only exception that Navalny was given five years, and the prosecution requested six years. [165]

"Enough of fake cases". The protest against the verdict in Moscow, 18 July 2013 Girls (9319552964).jpg
"Enough of fake cases". The protest against the verdict in Moscow, 18 July 2013

Later that evening, the Prosecutor's Office appealed Navalny and Ofitserov jail sentences, arguing that until the higher court affirmed the sentence, the sentence was invalid. The next morning, the appeal was granted. Navalny and Ofitserov were released on 19 July, awaiting the hearings of the higher court. [166] The prosecutor's requested decision was described as "unprecedented" by experts.[ who? ] [167]


The prison sentence was suspended by a court in Kirov in 16 October 2013, still being a burden for his political future. [12]

Review of the sentence

On 23 February 2016, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Russia had violated Navalny's right to a fair trial, and ordered the government to pay him 56,000 euros in legal costs and damages. [168]

On 16 November 2016, Russia's Supreme Court overturned the 2013 sentence, sending the verdict back to the Leninsky District Court in Kirov for review. [169]

On 8 February 2017, the Leninsky district court of Kirov repeated its sentence of 2013 and charged Navalny with a five-year suspended sentence. [137] Navalny announced that he will pursue the annulment of the sentence that clearly contradicts the decision of ECHR.

Yves Rocher case and home arrest


In 2008, Oleg Navalny made an offer to Yves Rocher Vostok, the Eastern European subsidiary of Yves Rocher between 2008 and 2012, to accredit Glavpodpiska, which was created by Navalny, with delivering duties. On 5 August, the parties signed a contract. To fulfill the obligations under the agreement, Glavpodpiska outsourced the task to sub-suppliers, AvtoSAGA and Multiprofile Processing Company (MPC). In November and December 2012, the Investigating Committee interrogated and questioned Yves Rocher Vostok. On 10 December, Bruno Leproux, general director of Yves Rocher Vostok, filed to the Investigative Committee, asking to investigate if the Glavpodpiska subscription company had damaged Yves Rocher Vostok, and the Investigative Committee initiated a case. [170]

The prosecution claimed Glavpodpiska embezzled money by taking duties and then redistributing them to other companies for lesser amounts of money, and collecting the surplus: 26.7 million rubles ($540,000) from Yves Rocher Vostok, and 4.4 million rubles from the MPC. The funds were claimed to be subsequently legalized by transferring them on fictitious grounds from a fly-by-night company to Kobyakovskaya Fabrika Po Lozopleteniyu, a willow weaving company founded by Navalny and operated by his parents. [171] [172] [173] Navalnys denied the charges. The brothers' lawyers claimed, the investigators "added phrases like 'bearing criminal intentions' to a description of regular entrepreneurial activity". According to Oleg Navalny's lawyer, Glavpodpiska did not just collect money, it controlled provision of means of transport, execution of orders, collected and expedited production to the carriers, and was responsible before clients for terms and quality of executing orders. [170]

Yves Rocher denied that they had any losses, as did the rest of the witnesses, except the Multiprofile Processing Company CEO Sergei Shustov, who said he had learned about his losses from an investigator and believed him, without making audits. Both brothers and their lawyers claimed Alexei Navalny did not participate in the Gladpodpiska operations, and witnesses all claimed they had never encountered Alexei Navalny in person before the trial. [170]

Home arrest and limitations

Following the imputed violation of travel restrictions, Navalny was placed under house arrest and prohibited from communicating with anyone other than his family, lawyers, and investigators on 28 February 2014. [16] [174] Navalny claimed the arrest was politically motivated, and he filed a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights. On 7 July, he declared the complaint had been accepted and given priority; the court compelled the Government of Russia to provide answers to a questionnaire.

The home arrest, in particular, prohibited usage of Internet; however, new posts were released under his social media accounts after the arrest was announced. A 5 March post claimed the accounts were controlled by his Anti-Corruption Foundation teammates and his wife Yulia. On 13 March, his LiveJournal blog was blocked in Russia, because, according to the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor), "functioning of the given web page breaks the regulation of the juridical decision of the bail hearing of a citizen, against who a criminal case has been initiated". [175] Navalny's associates started a new blog,, and the LiveJournal blog was eventually abolished, with the last post published on 9 July.

The home arrest was eased a number of times: On 21 August, Navalny was allowed to communicate with his co-defendants; [176] a journalist present in the courthouse at the moment confirmed Navalny was allowed to communicate with "anyone but the Yves Rocher case witnesses". [177] On 10 October, his right to communicate with the press was confirmed by another court, and he was allowed to make comments on the case in media (Navalny's plea not to prolong the arrest was, however, rejected). [178] On 19 December, he was allowed to mail correspondence to authorities and international courts. Navalny again pleaded not to prolong the arrest, but the plea was rejected again. [179]


The verdict was announced on 30 December 2014. Alexei Navalny was given 3.5 years of suspended sentence, and Oleg Navalny was sentenced to 3.5 years in prison and was arrested after the verdict was announced; [180] both had to pay a fine of 500,000 rubles and a compensation to the Multiprofile Processing Company of over 4 million rubles. [181] In the evening, several thousands protesters gathered in the center of Moscow. Navalny broke his home arrest to attend the rally and was immediately arrested by the police and brought back home. [182]

Both brothers filed complaints to the European Court of Human Rights: Oleg's was communicated and given priority; Alexei's was reviewed in the context of the previous complaint related to this case and the Government of Russia had been "invited to submit further observations". [183] The second instance within the country confirmed the verdict, only releasing Alexei from the responsibility to pay his fine. Both prosecutors and defendants were not satisfied with this decision. [181]


On 17 October 2017, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Navalny's conviction for fraud and money laundering "was based on an unforeseeable application of criminal law and that the proceedings were arbitrary and unfair." The Court found that the domestic court's decisions had been arbitrary and manifestly unreasonable. ECHR found the Russian courts' decisions violated articles 6 and 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. [184] [185] On 15 November 2018, the Grand Chamber upheld the decision. [186]


After the Yves Rocher case, Navalny had to pay a compensation of 4.4 million rubles. He declared the case was "a frame up", but he added he would pay the sum as this could affect granting his brother parole. [187] On 7 October 2015, Alexei's lawyer announced the defendant willingly paid 2.9 million and requested an installment plan for the rest of the sum. [188] The request was granted, except the term was contracted from the requested five months to two, [189] and a part of the sum declared paid (900,000 rubles; arrested from Navalny's banking account) was not yet received by the police; the prosecutors declared that may happen because of inter-process delays. [190]

Later that month, Kirovles sued Navalny for the 16.1 million rubles declared pecuniary injury; Navalny declared he had not expected the suit, as Kirovles did not initiate it during the 2012–13 trial. [191] On 23 October, a court resolved the said sum should be paid by the three defendants. [191] The court denied the defendants' motion 14.7 million had already been paid by that point; the verdict and the payment sum were justified by a ruling by a Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. [192] Navalny declared he could not cover the requested sum; he called the suit a "drain-dry strategy" by authorities. [191]

Other cases

In late December 2012, Russia's federal Investigative Committee asserted that Allekt, an advertising company headed by Navalny, defrauded the Union of Right Forces (SPS) political party in 2007 by taking 100 million rubles ($3.2 million) payment for advertising and failing to honor its contract. If charged and convicted, Navalny could be jailed for up to 10 years. "Nothing of the sort happened – he committed no robbery", Leonid Gozman, a former SPS official, was quoted as saying. Earlier in December, "the Investigative Committee charged [...] Navalny and his brother Oleg with embezzling 55 million rubles ($1.76 million) in 2008–2011 while working in a postal business". Navalny, who denied the allegations in the two previous cases, sought to laugh off news of the third inquiry with a tweet stating "Fiddlesticks [...]". [8]

In April 2020 Yandex search engine started artificially placing negative commentary about Navalny on the top positions in its search results for his name. [193] Yandex declared this was part of an "experiment" and returned to presenting organic search results. [194] [195] [196]

Political views

In February 2011, in an interview with the radio station, Navalny called the main Russian party, United Russia, a "party of crooks and thieves". [7] In May 2011, the Russian government began a criminal investigation into Navalny, widely described in Western media as "revenge", and by Navalny himself as "a fabrication by the security services". [7] [197] [198] Meanwhile, "crooks and thieves" became a popular nickname for the party. [199]

On 4 June 2012, Navalny was ordered by Moscow's Lyublinsky District Court to pay 30,000 rubles ($900) as compensation for "moral harm" to United Russia State Duma Deputy Vladimir Svirid, after Svirid filed charges against Navalny for comments he made in an article written for Esquire magazine about the United Russia party: "In United Russia, there are people I come across that I generally like. But if you have joined United Russia, you are still a thief. And if you are not a thief, then you are a crook, because you use your name to cover the rest of the thieves and crooks." Svirid had originally sought one million rubles in the case. [200]

On 4 April 2013, Navalny announced his intention to run for the presidency. [201] Navalny described his presidential program as "not to lie and not to steal". [202]

In 2008, during the Russo-Georgian War, Navalny called Georgians "rodents" (Russian : грызуны) and called for imposing of a complete blockade on Georgia and eviction of all Georgian nationals from Russia. He further stated that he very much wanted to strike the Georgian General Staff with a cruise missile. [203] In response to criticism, in 2013 Navalny said that he regretted calling Georgians rodents but stood by everything else he said at the time. [204]

In 2011, Navalny stated he considered himself a "nationalist democrat". [205] International media have often commented on his ambiguous but non-condemnatory stance toward ethnic Russian nationalism. [206] [207] The BBC noted in a profile of Navalny that his endorsement of a political campaign called "Stop feeding the Caucasus" and his willingness to speak at ultra-nationalist events "have caused concern among liberals". He also has been a co-organizer of the "Russian March", [208] which Radio Free Europe describes as "a parade uniting Russian nationalist groups of all stripes". [209]

Early in 2012, Navalny stated on Ukrainian TV, "Russian foreign policy should be maximally directed at integration with Ukraine and Belarus… In fact, we are one nation. We should enhance integration." [210] During the same broadcast Navalny said that he did not intend "to prove that the Ukrainian nation does not exist. God willing, it does". He added, "No one wants to make an attempt to limit Ukraine's sovereignty". [210] [211] In October 2014, Navalny stated "I do not see any kind of difference at all between Russians and Ukrainians", he admitted that his views might provoke "horrible indignation" in Ukraine. [212] In 2015, he declared, "I do not take Ukrainians for a special sort of Russians and [I] do not deny the Ukrainian nation from its political subjectivity". [213]

He also said that Russian government should stop "sponsoring the war" in Donbass. [212] Navalny has strongly criticized Vladimir Putin's policies in Ukraine: "Putin likes to speak about the 'Russian world' but he is actually making it smaller. In Belarus, they sing anti-Putin songs at football stadiums; in Ukraine they simply hate us. In Ukraine now, there are no politicians who do not have extreme anti-Russian positions. Being anti-Russian is the key to success now in Ukraine, and that is our fault". [214]

In March 2014, Navalny declared that he did not support Russia's annexation of Crimea. According to The Moscow Times , "Navalny suggested that Kiev should grant Crimea greater autonomy while remaining part of Ukraine, guarantee the right to speak Russian in Ukraine, keep Ukraine out of NATO, and let the Russian Black Sea fleet remain in the peninsula free of charge". [215] In October 2014, Navalny stated in an interview by Echo of Moscow that he would not return Crimea to Ukraine if he were to become the president of Russia but that "a normal referendum" should be held in Crimea to decide what country the peninsula belongs to. [212]


Political activities

Navalny, his wife Yuliya and Russian opposition politician Ilya Yashin, 12 June 2013 Yulia Navalny, Alexey Navalny and Ilya Yashin at Moscow rally 2013-06-12 2.JPG
Navalny, his wife Yuliya and Russian opposition politician Ilya Yashin, 12 June 2013

In October 2010, Navalny was the decisive winner of on-line "Mayor of Moscow elections" held by Kommersant and He received about 30,000 votes, or 45%, with the closest rival being "Against all candidates" with some 9,000 votes (14%), followed by former First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Boris Nemtsov with 8,000 votes (12%) out of a total of about 67,000 votes. [216]

The reaction to Navalny's mayoral election result in 2013 was mixed: Nezavisimaya Gazeta declared, "The voting campaign turned a blogger into a politician", [114] and following an October 2013 Levada Center poll that showed Navalny made it to the list of potential presidential candidates among Russians, receiving a rating of 5%, Konstantin Kalachev, the leader of the Political Expert Group, declared 5% was not the limit for Navalny, and unless something extraordinary happened, he could become "a pretender for a second place in the presidential race". [217] On the other hand, The Washington Post published a column by Milan Svolik that stated the election was fair so the Sobyanin could show a clean victory, demoralizing the opposition, which could otherwise run for street protests. [218] Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov stated on 12 September, "His momentary result cannot testify his political equipment and does not speak of him as of a serious politician". [219]

When referring to Navalny, Putin never actually pronounced his name, referring to him as a "mister" or the like; [219] Julia Ioffe took it for a sign of weakness before the opposition politician, [220] and Peskov later stated Putin never pronounced his name in order not to "give [Navalny] a part of his popularity". [221] In July 2015, Bloomberg's sources "familiar with the matter" declared there was an informal prohibition from the Kremlin for senior Russian officials from mentioning Navalny's name. [222] Peskov rejected the assumption there is such a ban; however, in doing so, he did not mention Navalny's name either. [223]

Approval ratings

Rally concert in support of Navalny, 6 September 2013 Rally-concert in support of Alexey Navalny 2013-09-06 4708.jpg
Rally concert in support of Navalny, 6 September 2013

According to polls conducted by the Levada Center in 2013, Navalny's recognition among the Russian population stood at 37%. [224] Out of those who were able to recognize Navalny, 14% would either "definitely" or "probably" support his presidential run. [225]

The same pollster showed Navalny's presidential ratings in March and April 2014 were 1% and "<1%". [124]

The Levada Center also conducted another survey, which was released on the 6 April 2017, showing Navalny's recognition among the Russian population at 55%. Out of those who recognized Navalny, 4% would "definitely" vote for him and 14% would "probably" vote for him in the presidential election. [226] However, in a poll conducted by the same pollster between 21 and 24 April 2017, which did not name any candidates but asked respondents to volunteer a candidate on their own, Navalny only got the preferences of 1% of those who were polled. [227]

Criminal cases

Within Russia, reaction to Navalny's criminal cases varied with political views of commentators: Those who supported Navalny and/or his activities generally declared he was not guilty, while his political opponents generally claimed the opposite.

During and after the Kirovles trial, a number of prominent people expressed support to Navalny and/or condemned the trial. The last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev called it "proof that we do not have independent courts". [228] Former Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin stated that it was "looking less like a punishment than an attempt to isolate him from social life and the electoral process". [229] [230] It was also criticized by novelist Boris Akunin, [230] and jailed Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who called it similar to the treatment of political opponents during the Soviet era. [229]

Other prominent Russians had different reactions: Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the nationalist LDPR, called the verdict "a direct warning to our 'fifth column'", and added, "This will be the fate of everyone who is connected with the West and works against Russia". [229] Duma Vice-Speaker Igor Lebedev stated that he did not understand the "fuss about an ordinary case". He added, "If you are guilty before the law, then whoever you were – a janitor, a homeless man or a president – you have to answer for your crimes in full accordance with the Criminal Code." [231]

A variety of officials from the Western countries condemned the verdict. United States Department of State Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf stated that the United States was "very disappointed by the conviction and sentencing of opposition leader Aleksey Navalniy". [232] The spokesperson for European Union High Representative Catherine Ashton said that the outcome of the trial "raises serious questions as to the state of the rule of law in Russia". [229] [233] Andreas Schockenhoff, Germany's Commissioner for German-Russian Coordination, stated, "For us, it's further proof of authoritarian policy in Russia, which doesn't allow diversity and pluralism". [234] Western media were also critical: in particular, The New York Times proclaimed in response to the verdict, "President Vladimir Putin of Russia actually seems weak and insecure". [228]

The verdict in the case of Yves Rocher caused similar reactions. According to Alexei Venediktov, the verdict was "unfair", Oleg Navalny was taken "hostage", while Alexei was not jailed to avoid "furious reaction" from Putin, which was caused by the change of measure of restraint after the Kirovles trial. [235] A number of deputies appointed by United Russia and LDPR found the verdict too mild. [236] Experts interrogated by BBC Russian Service expressed reactions close to the political positions their organizations generally stand on. [237] The spokesperson for EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini stated the same day that the sentence was likely to be politically motivated. [182]

Public opinion varied over time: According to Levada Center, 20% of people thought the Kirovles case had been caused by an actual violation of law, while 54% agreed the rationale beyond the case was his anti-corruption activity in May 2011. In May 2013, the shares of people who held these opinions were 28% and 47%, correspondingly; however, in September 2013, the shares were 35% and 45%. The organization suggested this had been caused by corresponding coverage in media. [238] By September 2014, the percentages had undergone further changes, and equaled 37% and 38%. [239] The center also stated the share of those who found the result of another criminal case against him was unfair and Navalny was not guilty dropped from 13% in July 2013 to 5% in January 2015, and the number of those who found the verdict was too tough also fell from 17% to 9%. The share of those who found the verdict to be either fair or too mild was 26% in July 2013, and has exceeded 35% since September 2013. [239]

Awards and honors

Navalny was named "Person of the Year 2009" by Russian business newspaper Vedomosti . [240]

Navalny was a World Fellow at Yale University's World Fellows Program, aimed at "creating a global network of emerging leaders and to broaden international understanding" in 2010. [241]

In 2011, Foreign Policy magazine named Navalny to the FP Top 100 Global Thinkers, along with Daniel Domscheit-Berg and Sami Ben Gharbia of Tunisia, for "shaping the new world of government transparency". [242] FP picked him again in 2012. [243] He was listed by Time magazine in 2012 as one of the world's 100 most influential people, the only Russian on the list. [244] In 2013, Navalny came in at No. 48 among "world thinkers" in an online poll by the UK magazine Prospect . [245]

In 2015, Alexei and Oleg Navalny were chosen to receive the "Prize of the Platform of European Memory and Conscience 2015". According to the Platform's statement, "The Members of the Platform have voted this year for the Navalny brothers, in recognition of their personal courage, struggle and sacrifices for upholding fundamental democratic values and freedoms in the Russian Federation today. By the award of the Prize, the Platform wishes to express its respect and support to Mr Oleg Navalny whom the Platform considers a political prisoner and to Mr Alexei Navalny for his efforts to expose corruption, defend political pluralism and opposition to the mounting authoritarian regime in the Russian Federation". [246]

In June 2017, Navalny was included Time magazine's list of the World's 25 Most Influential People on the Internet. [247]


Navalny and his wife Yulia Aleksei i Iuliia Naval'nye posle odnogo iz zasedanii suda.JPG
Navalny and his wife Yulia

Navalny is married to Yulia Navalnaya and has two children. [58]

See also


  1. The Russian word "да" (da) means "yes".
  2. Argued as following: "It is clearly stated in the preamble of our declaration that the Yabloko Party thoroughly and sharply opposes any national and racial discord and any xenophobia. However, in this case, when we know [...] that the Constitution guarantees to us the right to gather peacefully and without a weapon, we see that in these conditions the prohibition of the Russian March as it was announced, provokes the organizers to some activities that could end not so well. Thus we appeal to the Moscow City Hall [...] for permission". [47]
  3. Article 15, section 7: "Terms, as provided by sections 4 and 6 of the present article, are prolonged if a territorial body has passed a verdict of suspension of state registration of a regional branch of a political party, as provided by section 5.1 of the present article, or a verdict of denial of state registration of a regional branch of a political party has been challenged to a court and, as of the day of expiration of the said terms, has not gone into effect." [83] The following section is given as in force as on 2 April 2012 (the section had not changed by 1 May 2015).
Exchange rates used in the article
  1. According to the exchange rates [110] set by the Central Bank of Russia for 8 September 2013.

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He Is Not Dimon to You or Don't call him "Dimon" is a 2017 Russian documentary film about the corruption of the Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Medvedev.

The Anti-Corruption Foundation is a Russian nonprofit organization based in Moscow established in 2011 by activist and politician Alexei Navalny. Its main goal is to investigate and to expose corruption cases among high-ranking Russian government officials. Its distinguishing feature is that it is funded by private donations from Russian citizens. Among other activities, the foundation publishes movies on YouTube about corruption of Russian officials, such as Chaika and He Is Not Dimon to You.

2017–2018 Russian protests protests in Russia against Vladimir Putins policies during 2k17 and 2k18

The 2017–2018 Russian protests were a long series of countrywide street protest actions and demonstrations in the Russian Federation, with the major requirements of:

Leonid Volkov (politician) Russian politician

Leonid Mikhailovich Volkov is a Russian politician of the unregistered Progress Party, member of the Russian opposition, and chief of staff for Alexei Navalny's campaign for the 2018 presidential election. He is also a former deputy of the Yekaterinburg City Duma.

The Russian opposition figure and anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny announced his intention to run for President of Russia in the 2018 election on 13 December 2016. The primary themes of his campaign have been focusing on domestic issues, including combating corruption in Russia and improving the economy. Commentators have noted that Navalny's campaign is unprecedented in modern Russia as politicians usually do not start campaigning until a few months before the election.

Anastasia Vashukevich, also known as Nastya Rybka, is a Belarusian escort, model, blogger and author who, while fearing death in a Thai jail, claimed to have evidence linking Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska and Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Prikhodko to Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

Russia of the Future Russian political party

Russia of the Future, originally the Progress Party and formerly known as the People's Alliance, is a political party in Russia founded on 15 December 2012 by member of the Russian opposition Leonid Volkov and later refounded on 19 May 2018 by Russian government critic and anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny, who is also an opposition activist and founder of Russian non-profit organisation the Anti-Corruption Foundation.

2019 Moscow City Duma election Election held in Moscow, Russia

Election to the 7th convocation of the Moscow City Duma took place on the United Voting Day on 8 September 2019. The elections were held in a first-past-the-post system: 45 deputies were elected in 45 single-member constituencies. The term of the new Duma will be five years.

2019 Moscow protests 2019 Moscow City Duma elections protests

Starting from July 2019 numerous approved and unapproved rallies in Moscow began, caused by the situation with the 2019 Moscow City Duma elections. Widespread public protests were triggered by numerous authorities' violations, claimed by the independent opposition candidates, during the registration procedure. Rallies on Sakharov Avenue on 20 July and 10 August 2019 became the largest political rallies in Russia since the 2011–2013 protests. The July 27 rally established a record on number of detainees: 1373 people were detained. The subsequent appeals of the MCEC's decisions to the CEC by the independent candidates didn't lead to any results.

Maxim Katz Russian political and public figure

Maxim Evgenievich Katz is a Russian political and public figure, co-founder of the Urban Projects Foundation, author of the YouTube channel of the same name, Russian champion in sports poker, former deputy of the municipal assembly of the Moscow region Schukino from Party "Yabloko".


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Michnik, Adam; Navalny, Alexei (2015). Диалоги[Dialogues] (in Russian). Novoye Izdatel'stvo. ISBN   978-5-98379-198-5.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)