Bruce Waller

Last updated
Bruce N. Waller
BornAug. 20, 1946
DiedFeb. 8, 2023 (Age 76)
NationalityAmerican
Education University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill PhD 1979
Institutions Youngstown State University
Notable ideas
Free will
Moral responsibility (action theory)
Website www.brucenwaller.com OOjs UI icon edit-ltr-progressive.svg

Bruce Waller was a contemporary American philosopher notable for his theories about the nature of free will and its implications for human society. [1] [2] He was a philosophy professor at Youngstown State University from 1990 until he retired in 2019. [1] [3] Waller died on February 8, 2023, at the age of 76. [4] [5] [6]

Contents

Philosophy

Waller is a determinist who believes that everything that happens, had to happen, and could not have happened otherwise, and that all events are necessitated to happen by the process of cause and effect, that is, that past, present, and future consist of an essentially unbreakable chain of circumstances of which no single link in such a chain could possibly be avoided or altered. [7] Since he believes that determinism and moral responsibility are mutually incompatible, he has sometimes been identified as an incompatibilist. [2] [8] [9]

In Against Moral Responsibility (2011), he noticed, despite growing scientific evidence for determinism, [10] that people cling steadfastly to the free-will based idea of moral responsibility. [2] Moral responsibility assumes that humans are active causal agents who can choose to do one of two different alternatives, and therefore are morally deserving of praise or blame or reward or punishment for their choices. [11] He views praise and blame and other related notions as being illogical in a scientific sense and impossible to justify; for example, it does not make sense to blame a person for doing what they did, if they couldn't have helped it, he argues. [9] [10] Waller's explanation of the entrenchment of a belief in moral responsibility in the popular consciousness is partly that there are systems of interlocking beliefs connecting free will and praise and blame and belief in a just world, and that these beliefs, taken together, reinforce the validity of punishment and serve as underpinnings of the criminal justice system. He argues that this current worldview is incorrect and should be examined critically. [2]

Waller argues that belief in free will and moral responsibility brings a slew of problems, particularly a miserable world for the less fortunate. [12] In particular, it leads to multiple "doses" of unfairness: [12]

  1. poor initial developmental luck for the less fortunate [12]
  2. belief that they were somehow responsible for their bad luck [12]
  3. widening social inequalities [12]

That there is no ultimate free will does not nullify human freedom of choice, according to Waller. [1] In his 2015 book Restorative Free Will, he made a case that even while everything is determined, humans have the cognitive capacity to generate options to cope with specific situations, and further, that humans must use this capacity by choosing the best options. [1] He argues that this sense of free will, meaning freedom of choice without external constraint, is consistent with determinism, and his view has been gaining critical traction among scholars and in the media. [1] In his view, "we should focus on our ability, in any given setting, to generate a wide range of options for ourselves, and to decide among them without external constraint." [13] Accordingly, in Waller's view, it is proper to discourage people from being lazy, but wrong to blame them for their laziness since the reason for their laziness can be found in a deterministic assessment of the "blind lottery of biology and environment", that is, it's not their fault. [12]

Critics of Waller's view have maintained that if people abandon their notions of free will and moral responsibility, that people may be unable to restrain themselves and they may misbehave, or engage in criminality or vice, since they will know that whatever they will do, that they will be held as blameless. [2] In contrast, Waller argues that jettisoning moral responsibility will not permit people to behave immorally or without any consideration of consequences; rather, he argues that a better world will result. [2] He explained that accountability will continue regardless, and he illustrated the point with an example: "If I borrow a large sum of money from a friend, and then hit financial hardship and am unable to repay the loan, it is not as if I am suddenly relieved of my moral obligation to repay." [8] Waller disagrees with scholars such as Clemson's Ryan Lake, who argues that a belief in determinism prevents people from feeling "true apology" or sincere regret since that requires taking or accepting responsibility for one's failings. [8] Waller disagrees, saying that apologies and regret are still consistent with a deterministic world. [2] In short, abolishing ultimate moral responsibility will not have the dire consequences which some critics hypothesize, according to Waller. [2]

Waller believes no one deserves harmful treatment, including convicted criminals, although he realizes that some people must be locked behind bars for pragmatic reasons of public safety. [2] He believes punishment should be minimized since it often backfires, and sometimes encourages subsequent harmful behavior. [2] He believes that an acceptance of determinism would bring about the positive outcome of making people less punishment-oriented and less retributive, and that human responses to the problem of crime would become more practical and beneficial overall. [14]

Waller's account of free will still leads to a very different view of justice and responsibility than most people hold today. No one has caused himself: No one chose his genes or the environment into which he was born. Therefore no one bears ultimate responsibility for who he is and what he does. ... And when the threat of punishment is necessary as a deterrent, it will in many cases be balanced with efforts to strengthen, rather than undermine, the capacities for autonomy ...

Philosopher Stephen Cave in The Atlantic , 2016 [1]

Publications

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Free will</span> Ability to make choices without constraints

Free will is the notional capacity or ability to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Determinism</span> Philosophical view that events are pre-determined

Determinism is the philosophical view that events are completely determined by previously existing causes. Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have developed from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and considerations. Like eternalism, determinism focuses on particular events rather than the future as a concept. The opposite of determinism is indeterminism, or the view that events are not deterministically caused but rather occur due to chance. Determinism is often contrasted with free will, although some philosophers claim that the two are compatible. 

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Incompatibilism</span> View of free will and determinism as incompatible and precluding each other

Incompatibilism is the view that a deterministic universe is completely at odds with the notion that persons have free will, the latter being defined as the capacity of conscious agents to choose a future course of action among several available physical alternatives. Thus, incompatibilism implies that there is a dichotomy between determinism and free will, where philosophers must support at most one or the other, not both. The incompatibilist view is pursued further in at least three different ways: libertarians deny that the universe is deterministic, hard determinists deny that any free will exists, and pessimistic incompatibilists deny both that the universe is determined and that free will exists.

Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent.

Indeterminism is the idea that events are not caused, or are not caused deterministically.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Libertarianism (metaphysics)</span> Term in metaphysics

Libertarianism is one of the main philosophical positions related to the problems of free will and determinism which are part of the larger domain of metaphysics. In particular, libertarianism is an incompatibilist position which argues that free will is logically incompatible with a deterministic universe. Libertarianism states that since agents have free will, determinism must be false and vice versa.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hard determinism</span> View that free will does not exist

Hard determinism is a view on free will which holds that determinism is true, that it is incompatible with free will, and therefore that free will does not exist. Although hard determinism generally refers to nomological determinism, it can also be a position taken with respect to other forms of determinism that necessitate the future in its entirety.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ted Honderich</span> Canadian-British philosopher (born 1933)

Ted Honderich is a Canadian-born British professor of philosophy, who was Grote Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic, University College London.

Moral agency is an individual's ability to make moral choices based on some notion of right and wrong and to be held accountable for these actions. A moral agent is "a being who is capable of acting with reference to right and wrong."

<i>Beyond Freedom and Dignity</i> 1971 book by B.F. Skinner

Beyond Freedom and Dignity is a 1971 book by American psychologist B. F. Skinner. Skinner argues that entrenched belief in free will and the moral autonomy of the individual hinders the prospect of using scientific methods to modify behavior for the purpose of building a happier and better-organized society.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Harry Frankfurt</span> American philosopher (1929–2023)

Harry Gordon Frankfurt was an American philosopher. He was a professor emeritus of philosophy at Princeton University, where he taught from 1990 until 2002. Frankfurt also taught at Yale University, Rockefeller University, and Ohio State University.

Prevenient grace is a Christian theological concept that refers to the grace of God in a person's life which precedes and prepares to conversion. The concept was first developed by Augustine of Hippo (354–430), was affirmed by the Second Council of Orange (529) and has become part of Catholic theology. It is also present in Reformed theology, through the form of an effectual calling leading some individuals irresistibly to salvation. It is also in Arminian theology, according to which it is dispensed universally in order to enable people to respond to the offer of salvation, though it does not ensure personal acceptance.

Moral luck describes circumstances whereby a moral agent is assigned moral blame or praise for an action or its consequences, even if it is clear that said agent did not have full control over either the action or its consequences. This term, introduced by Bernard Williams, has been developed, along with its significance to a coherent moral theory, by Williams and Thomas Nagel in their respective essays on the subject.

In philosophy, moral responsibility is the status of morally deserving praise, blame, reward, or punishment for an act or omission in accordance with one's moral obligations. Deciding what counts as "morally obligatory" is a principal concern of ethics.

Frankfurt cases were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">R. Jay Wallace</span>

R. Jay Wallace is a Professor of Philosophy and Judy Chandler Webb Distinguished Chair for Innovative Teaching and Research at the University of California, Berkeley. His areas of specialization include moral philosophy and philosophy of action. He is most noted for his work on practical reason, moral psychology, and meta-ethics.

Free will in antiquity is a philosophical and theological concept. Free will in antiquity was not discussed in the same terms as used in the modern free will debates, but historians of the problem have speculated who exactly was first to take positions as determinist, libertarian, and compatibilist in antiquity. There is wide agreement that these views were essentially fully formed over 2000 years ago. Candidates for the first thinkers to form these views, as well as the idea of a non-physical "agent-causal" libertarianism, include Democritus, Aristotle, Epicurus, Chrysippus, and Carneades.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Augustinian theodicy</span> Type of Christian theodicy designed in response to the evidential problem of evil

The Augustinian theodicy, named for the 4th- and 5th-century theologian and philosopher Augustine of Hippo, is a type of Christian theodicy that developed in response to the evidential problem of evil. As such, it attempts to explain the probability of an omnipotent (all-powerful) and omnibenevolent (all-loving) God amid evidence of evil in the world. A number of variations of this kind of theodicy have been proposed throughout history; their similarities were first described by the 20th-century philosopher John Hick, who classified them as "Augustinian". They typically assert that God is perfectly (ideally) good, that he created the world out of nothing, and that evil is the result of humanity's original sin. The entry of evil into the world is generally explained as consequence of original sin and its continued presence due to humans' misuse of free will and concupiscence. God's goodness and benevolence, according to the Augustinian theodicy, remain perfect and without responsibility for evil or suffering.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Agent causation</span> Idea in philosophy

Agent causation, or Agent causality, is an idea in philosophy which states that a being who is not an event—namely an agent—can cause events. Agent causation contrasts with event causation, which occurs when an event causes another event. Whether agent causation as a concept is logically sound is itself a topic of philosophical debate.

Abilities are powers an agent has to perform various actions. They include common abilities, like walking, and rare abilities, like performing a double backflip. Abilities are intelligent powers: they are guided by the person's intention and executing them successfully results in an action, which is not true for all types of powers. They are closely related to but not identical with various other concepts, such as disposition, know-how, aptitude, talent, potential, and skill.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Stephen Cave (June 2016). "There's No Such Thing as Free Will: But we're better off believing in it anyway". The Atlantic. Retrieved June 10, 2016. ... Bruce Waller, a philosophy professor at Youngstown State University. In his new book, Restorative Free Will, he writes that we should focus on our ability, in any given setting, to generate a wide range of options for ourselves, and to decide among them without external constraint ...
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Review by Simon Wigley of the Department of Philosophy, Bilkent University (February 2, 2016). "Review - The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility by Bruce N. Waller". Metapsychology. Retrieved June 10, 2016. (Volume 20, Issue 5) ... In this book Bruce Waller sets out to explain why the belief in moral responsibility is stronger than the arguments for it permit. From Waller's own point of view the practice of praising and blaming is fundamentally unfair ...
  3. Graig Graziosi, October 28, 2015, Jambar magazine, It’s A Trap: Academic Adjuncts Face A Catch-22, Retrieved September 30, 2018, "...Bruce Waller, the chair of the department of philosophy and religious studies,..."
  4. "Bruce Waller Obituary (1946 - 2023) - Lowellville, OH - Mahoning Matters". Legacy.com. Retrieved 2023-02-10.
  5. "Bruce N. Waller, Boardman, Ohio". WKBN.com. 2023-02-10. Retrieved 2023-02-10.
  6. Weinberg, Justin (2023-02-13). "Bruce Waller (1946-2023)". Daily Nous. Retrieved 2023-04-12.
  7. Cave, Stephen (2016-05-17). "There's No Such Thing as Free Will". The Atlantic. Retrieved 2023-04-12.
  8. 1 2 3 Ryan Lake of Clemson University (March 2015). "The Limits of a Pragmatic Justification of Praise and Blame" (PDF). Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics. Archived from the original (PDF) on March 28, 2016. Retrieved June 10, 2016. March, 2015. Volume 3, Issue 1 ... To use an example of Bruce Waller's—if I borrow a large sum of money from a friend, and then hit financial hardship and am unable to repay the loan, it is not as if I am suddenly relieved of my moral obligation to repay. ... ... So let's grant for the sake of argument that incompatibilists like Waller and Pereboom and Kane are right ...
  9. 1 2 "Misdirection in the Free Will Problem". American Philosophical Quarterly. July 1997. Retrieved June 10, 2016. Vol. 34, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), pp. 357-366 ... Bruce Waller (1990) makes a similar case that determinism destroys our moral responsibility ...
  10. 1 2 "Book Review". The Philosophical Quarterly. October 8, 2015. Retrieved June 10, 2016. ... Bruce Waller has written an important and interesting book ... moral responsibility is widespread ... deeply entrenched in our institutions and practices, it is theoretically and pragmatically indefensible ...[ dead link ]
  11. Note: philosophers describe notions such as praise and blame using the term desert in the sense that people are described as deserving praise or blame.
  12. 1 2 3 4 5 6 James B. Miles (March 28, 2015). The Free Will Delusion: How We Settled for the Illusion of Morality. Troubador Publishing Ltd. ISBN   9781784628321 . Retrieved June 10, 2016. ... While it is right to encourage people to not be lazy ... morally wrong to blame a person for their laziness ... Bruce Waller makes similar observations ...
  13. "Free will and Determinism - a philosophical and religious perspective". Daily Times. 2020-05-17. Retrieved 2023-04-12.
  14. 1 2 Tamler Sommers of the University of Houston (2010). "Experimental Philosophy and Free Will" (PDF). Philosophy Compass. Retrieved June 10, 2016. ... 5/2 (2010): 199–212, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00273 (see page 204:) ... argues that acceptance of determinism would deeply undermine our sense of moral worth and might even lead to an 'unprincipled nihilism'. On the optimistic end of the spectrum, Waller (1990) ... argue that it would have few negative effects and would have the positive effect of making us less retributive. ...
  15. Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and the Desire to Be a God.
  16. "The Injustice of Punishment". Routledge & CRC Press. Retrieved 2021-01-05.