Secretary of the Navy
President Harry S. Truman tapped Matthews in early 1949 to become Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) when the previous SECNAV,John L. Sullivan,resigned in protest when Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Louis A. Johnson canceled the heavy attack aircraft carrier USS United States (CVA-58),which had just begun construction.
A lawyer and banker by background,Matthews had worked closely with SECDEF Johnson on political fundraising for Truman during the 1948 presidential campaign. With limited understanding of national defense issues and a near-nonexistent understanding of or familiarity with either the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Marine Corps,Matthews entered the SECNAV post in May 1949. [2] In fact,when asked about his lack of Navy experience when named to the post in 1949,Matthews replied,"Well,I do have a rowboat at my summer home." [3]
Matthews assumed office at a time of internal turmoil in the Department of Defense resulting from significant post-World War II funding reductions and controversial decisions on pre-Korean War defense priorities by the Truman administration as outlined and executed by SECDEF Johnson. One of the most contentious was that of service unification and the roles and missions of each of the U.S. armed services. In order to fund his postwar domestic spending agenda,Truman had advocated a policy of defense program cuts for the armed forces at the end of the war,and the Republican Party majority in the Congress,anxious to enact numerous tax cuts,approved of Truman's plan to "hold the line" on defense spending. In addition,Truman's previous experience in the Senate during World War II had left him with lingering suspicions that large sums had been,and were continuing to be,wasted in the Pentagon.
Impressed by U.S. advances in nuclear weapons development,both Truman and Johnson had initially believed that the atomic bomb had rendered all conventional military forces,particularly naval forces (e.g.,the Navy and the Marine Corps),largely irrelevant to the modern battlefield,thus justifying cuts to all but strategic nuclear forces that largely resided in the U.S. Air Force's Strategic Air Command (SAC). Matthews also subscribed to this view and it became the cornerstone of postwar U.S. defense policy prior to the establishment of the communist nation of East Germany by the Soviet Union in its occupation zone of Germany in 1949 and the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in 1950.
One of the key events of Matthews' time at the Department of the Navy prior to the start of the Korean War was the so-called "Revolt of the Admirals" in 1949,an intense controversy between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force over funding and strategic roles,of which the cancellation of the supercarrier USS United States and the resignation of former SECNAV Sullivan had been a catalyst. The Air Force,its senior leadership consisting of mainly bomber generals who had led the then-U.S. Army Air Forces' strategic bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan during World War II,wanted total control of the strategic nuclear bombing role and control of all U.S. military aircraft as well. It argued that the Navy's aircraft carriers were obsolete and the Air Force did not want the Navy (to include that portion of Naval Aviation organic to the Marine Corps) to have its own "competing" air force. The Navy wanted to continue Naval Aviation in both the Navy and Marine Corps and build much larger aircraft carriers to handle the larger,heavier and more powerful jet fighter and heavy attack (e.g.,nuclear bomber) aircraft coming into service. Such a carrier,the Navy argued,could also play a strategic role in nuclear deterrence. The flush-deck carriers planned (known as "supercarriers") were the forerunner of the modern nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.
In the post-World War II period prior to the Korean War,the Air Force wanted funding to focus on the massive Convair B-36 bomber for the Strategic Air Command (SAC). In the restrictive defense funding environment following World War II demobilization,this focus on the B-36 would be at the expense of aircraft carriers and Naval Aviation,as well as the Marine Corps and its amphibious assault role which Truman,Johnson and Matthews all saw as obsolete. [4] Top Navy and Marine Corps leaders publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the Defense Department's plans and policies in this regard,and several senior admirals,including the Navy's top admiral,ADM Louis E. Denfeld,the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),were forced by Matthews to resign and retire,or did so in protest.
The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) condemned the dismissal of ADM Denfield,who accepted cancellation of the supercarrier,but testified critically on defense planning and the administration of defense unification as it applied to the Navy and Marine Corps. Following Denfield's congressional testimony,Matthews fired Denfeld as CNO on 27 October 1949,explaining that he and Denfeld disagreed widely on strategic policy and unification. However,the HASC concluded that Denfeld's removal was a political reprisal by Matthews because of his testimony and therefore a challenge to effective representative government. [5]
Matthews' perceived vindictiveness towards much of the U.S. Navy's uniformed senior leadership during his tenure as SECNAV led to a perception by both the American public and the U.S. Congress of the Navy's civilian leadership woes,a perception that also did not go totally unnoticed by the news media of the period. As The Washington Daily News reported at the time,"Secretary of the Navy Matthews does not have the confidence of the Navy and can not win it...Moreover,Mr. Matthews has forfeited the confidence of Congress by firing Admiral Denfeld." [6]
Matthews served as SECNAV from 1949 through the first year of the Korean War. During his two years in office,the federal government had to suddenly reverse previous policy and massively increase defense spending to meet international crises on the Korean peninsula and in Europe,this following nearly four years of significant cutbacks in the U.S. military,especially in conventional (e.g.,non-strategic / non-nuclear strike) forces. All of the U.S. armed forces were under major strain as they simultaneously tried to meet the demands of a hot war in Asia and an intensive defense build-up in support of NATO in Western Europe.
Matthews actions as Secretary of the Navy were always aligned with those of his immediate superior,the Secretary of Defense,Louis Johnson,and when he was initially appointed as SECDEF,Johnson met President Truman's needs,especially in the realm of:(1) imposing economy measures on the U.S. military following the end of World War II and (2) placing a near total reliance on the strategic nuclear forces of the U.S. Air Force over the conventional forces of the U.S. Navy,the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army. But by September 1950,with the Korean War in full swing,the fiscal situation with respect to defense spending had totally reversed and the need for robust conventional forces had become readily apparent.
As a result,Louis Johnson became a political liability to the Truman Administration and he resigned as SECDEF at President Truman's request on 19 September 1950,the President replacing him with retired General of the Army George C. Marshall. [7]
As a protégéof SECDEF Johnson,Matthews was similarly perceived as a liability in a now radically changed budgetary and national defense environment. Under political pressure from the Truman administration,Matthews also resigned as Secretary of the Navy in July 1951 to become Ambassador to Ireland,the home of his ancestors. [8] Matthews was replaced as SECNAV by Dan A. Kimball,who had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air (i.e.,the Navy's civilian leadership advocate for Naval Aviation) under SECNAV Sullivan and who had been elevated to Under Secretary of the Navy following Sullivan's resignation and Matthews' appointment as SECNAV. [9] [10]
