Gough v Neary & Cronin

Last updated
Gough v Neary & Cronin
Coat of arms of Ireland.svg
Court Supreme Court of Ireland
Full case nameAlison Gough and Michael Neary and Basil Cronin
Decided3 July 2003
Citation(s)[2003] 3 IR 92; [2003] IESC 39; [2004] 1 ILRM 35
Transcript(s) https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2003/39.html
Case history
Appealed fromHigh Court
Appealed toSupreme Court
Court membership
Judges sittingHardiman J, Geohgean J, McCracken J.
Case opinions
Claim for personal injury was not statute barred.
Decision byJustice Hardiman, Justice Geoghegan, Justice McCracken.
Concurrence2 concur
Concur/dissent1 dissent
DissentJustice Hardiman.
Keywords
Medical Negligence

Unnecessary Statute Barred

Damages

Gough v Neary & Cronin [2003] IESC 39; [2003] IR 92; [2004] 1 ILRM 35 [1] is an Irish Supreme Court case in which the court ruled that a claim against a gynecologist for performing an unnecessary hysterectomy was no longer legally enforceable owing to a prescribed period of limitation having lapsed under the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 1991. However, the claim could still be brought under tort; this case highlighted that the three year limit for personal injury starts when the individual realizes the injury was due to negligence, rather than the date of the occurrence of the injury. [2] [3] Thus, the period that a person could file a claim was, in practical terms, extended.

Contents

Background

Facts of the case

On 27 October 1992, the appellant, Ms Alison Gough, received an emergency hysterectomy at the hands of Dr. Michael Neary after the birth of her son through C-section. Evidence provided that this procedure was unnecessary, given the circumstances. [1] Ms Gough instituted proceedings six years later on the 21st of December 1998 after hearing various media reports that there was a local consultant in trouble of some unspecified sort and later in the year, reading reports dealing with other patients of the defendants hospital in the same situation. She claimed that in addition to the procedure being performed unnecessarily, alternative treatments available were either not attempted or attempted inadequately. [1]

There were two named defendants in the case, Dr Michael Neary, the obstetrician and gynecologist who performed the C-section and subsequent hysterectomy and Basil Cronin, a trustee of the Our Lady of Lourdes National Hospital in Drogheda, where the event took place. [1] The main defense pleaded was that the proceedings should be statute barred based on the three year time limit contained within the Statute of Limitations Act, 1957. [1]

History in lower courts

Johnson J heard Ms Gough's case in the High Court on in April and May 2002. Subsequently, the judgement was released on the 15th of November 2002, finding in favor of the Ms Gough. Judge Johnson gave an ex-tempore judgement at the end of the evidence hearing on the 23rd of April in relation to the Statute of Limitations. Both of the defendant's defense claims were ruled against, with Ms Gough being awarded €273,223.27 in damages. The damages were calculated as €150,000 for pain and suffering to date and €100,000 for future pain and suffering. [1]

On the 18th of December 2002, the defendants filed an appeal against the decision which was limited to the defense under the Statute of Limitations and the award handed down by the High Court. [1]

Appeal argument

The main argument of the appeal to the Supreme Court rested on the three-year time limit contained within the Statute of Limitations 1957 with regards to bringing a personal injury claim. However, Miss Gough relied on the terms of the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act, 1991 and in particular on section 2(1). [1] This piece of legislation provides that it is not the date of occurrence of the injury which kick-starts the time limit but rather the date of knowledge of various circumstances such as being aware that "the injury was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty" and "knowledge that any acts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence, nuisance or breach of duty is irrelevant." [4]

Holding of the Supreme Court

Hardiman J, Geoghegan J, and McCracken J resided over the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Judgement of Hardiman J

Hardiman J provided that a more suitable argument would have been to rely on section 71 of the original 1957 Act, which provides an exception to the three year time limit on bringing a claim of personal injury where fraud or "equitable negligence" can be proved. [1]

Given that instead Ms Gough relied on the amended version of the Act, Hardiman J conducted an analysis of English precedent, specifically the case of Dobbie v. Medway Health Authority [5] to attain whether the time limit set out in section 2(1) of the amended act began to run when knowledge was attained that the injury was unnecessary or negligent. [6]

Hardiman provided that there was a difference between finding out that the procedure was unnecessary and finding out that the procedure was negligent. The judge argued that section 2(1) of the amended 1991 Act provided that knowledge of negligence was irrelevant, as was knowledge that the procedure was unnecessary, what was relevant was the injured persons knowledge that "the injury was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence…". [1] Hardiman J came to the conclusion that section 2(1) does not extend to circumstances where some aspect of the complained impairment had been concealed or had been due to negligence. According to the learned judge such instances are covered under section 71 of the 1957 Act. The Judge concluded by providing that whether the Ms Gough recovered under section 2(1) of the 1991 Amendment Act or under section 71 of the 1957 Act was a substantially important question and not just one of technicality. For these reasons, the judge provided that he would allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court on the basis that the claim was statute barred. [1]

Dissent of Justice Geoghegan

Geoghegan J issued a judgement in dissent of Hardiman J's view. Justice Geoghegan argued that the English legislation while similar in wording to the Irish legislation, is of a different meaning. [1] Therefore, the judge provided that it would be "unsafe" to attach such significance to English case law. [1] The judge conducted an application of the meaning of the word 'knowledge' contained within section 3 and section 2 of the 1991 (Amendment) Act. During this application Geoghegan J conducts a review of some of the English case law relied upon. [1] In doing so, concluding that the relevant "knowledge" in this case included firstly, knowledge that the operation was unnecessary and secondly, that knowledge did not exist more than three years before the commencement of the action. [1] Thus, Geoghegan ruled that the plea of statute bar must fail and he went on to dismiss the appeal.

The Second portion of Geoghegan J's judgement deals with the amount of damages awarded. The appellant, Dr. Neary had submitted that the award of €250,000 for damages was excessive and that the court should intervene. The Judge applied a proportionality test to arrive at a figure for damages, providing that an award of €250,000 for general damages was disproportionately high. Justice Geoghegan reduced the award for general damages from €250,000 to €200,000 with the already established special damages amount remaining at €23,223.27, awarding Ms Gough a total of €223,223.27. [1]

Judgement of McCracken J

Justice McCracken had the shortest out of the three judgments of the Supreme Court in this case. Upon a reading of both Hardiman J and Geoghegan J's prior judgments, McCracken J allowed the appeal, affirming that Ms Gough's claim is not statute barred under the 1991 Act. [1]

In line with Justice Geoghegan, McCracken also reduced the sum of damages by €50,000. [1]

Ruling

By a majority of 2-1, the court ruled that Allison Gough's claim was not statute barred and she was awarded €200,000 in general damages and €23,223.27 in special damages.

Subsequent developments

Following the judgement of the case, approximately 35 women who experienced the same procedure at the hands of Dr. Neary were promised compensation for their suffering. [7]

Related Research Articles

At common law, damages are a remedy in the form of a monetary award to be paid to a claimant as compensation for loss or injury. To warrant the award, the claimant must show that a breach of duty has caused foreseeable loss. To be recognized at law, the loss must involve damage to property, or mental or physical injury; pure economic loss is rarely recognized for the award of damages.

Negligence is a failure to exercise appropriate care expected to be exercised in similar circumstances.

Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine in common law and Roman-Dutch law jurisdictions under which a court can infer negligence from the very nature of an accident or injury in the absence of direct evidence on how any defendant behaved in the context of tort litigation. Although specific criteria differ by jurisdiction, an action typically must satisfy the following elements of negligence: the existence of a duty of care, breach of appropriate standard of care, causation, and injury. In res ipsa loquitur, the existence of the first three elements is inferred from the existence of injury that does not ordinarily occur without negligence.

A statute of limitations, known in civil law systems as a prescriptive period, is a law passed by a legislative body to set the maximum time after an event within which legal proceedings may be initiated. In most jurisdictions, such periods exist for both criminal law and civil law such as contract law and property law, though often under different names and with varying details.

Medical malpractice is professional negligence by act or omission by a health care provider in which the treatment provided falls below the accepted standard of practice in the medical community and causes injury or death to the patient, with most cases involving medical error. Claims of medical malpractice, when pursued in US courts, are processed as civil torts. Sometimes an act of medical malpractice will also constitute a criminal act, as in the case of the death of Michael Jackson.

In some common law jurisdictions, contributory negligence is a defense to a tort claim based on negligence. If it is available, the defense completely bars plaintiffs from any recovery if they contribute to their own injury through their own negligence.

The High Court of Ireland is a court which deals at first instance with the most serious and important civil and criminal cases. When sitting as a criminal court it is called the Central Criminal Court and sits with judge and jury. It also acts as a court of appeal for civil cases in the Circuit Court. It also has the power to determine whether or not a law is constitutional, and of judicial review over acts of the government and other public bodies.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Personal injury</span> Legal term for an injury to a person

Personal injury is a legal term for an injury to the body, mind, or emotions, as opposed to an injury to property. In common law jurisdictions the term is most commonly used to refer to a type of tort lawsuit in which the person bringing the suit has suffered harm to their body or mind. Personal injury lawsuits are filed against the person or entity that caused the harm through negligence, gross negligence, reckless conduct, or intentional misconduct, and in some cases on the basis of strict liability. Different jurisdictions describe the damages in different ways, but damages typically include the injured person's medical bills, pain and suffering, and diminished quality of life.

Volenti non fit iniuria is a Roman legal maxim and common law doctrine which states that if someone willingly places themselves in a position where harm might result, knowing that some degree of harm might result, they are not able to bring a claim against the other party in tort or delict. Volenti applies only to the risk which a reasonable person would consider them as having assumed by their actions; thus a boxer consents to being hit, and to the injuries that might be expected from being hit, but does not consent to his opponent striking him with an iron bar, or punching him outside the usual terms of boxing. Volenti is also known as a "voluntary assumption of risk".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Tort reform</span> Legal reforms aimed at reducing tort litigation

Tort reform consists of changes in the civil justice system in common law countries that aim to reduce the ability of plaintiffs to bring tort litigation or to reduce damages they can receive. Such changes are generally justified under the grounds that litigation is an inefficient means to compensate plaintiffs; that tort law permits frivolous or otherwise undesirable litigation to crowd the court system; or that the fear of litigation can serve to curtail innovation, raise the cost of consumer goods or insurance premiums for suppliers of services, and increase legal costs for businesses. Tort reform has primarily been prominent in common law jurisdictions, where criticism of judge-made rules regarding tort actions manifests in calls for statutory reform by the legislature.

Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court limited the scope of the Texas Healthcare Liability Act (THCLA). The effective result of this decision was that the THCLA, which held Case Management and Utilization Review decisions by Managed Care entities like CIGNA and Aetna to a legal duty of care according to the laws of The State of Texas could not be enforced in the case of Health Benefit plans provided through private employers, because the Texas statute allowed compensatory or punitive damages to redress losses or deter future transgressions, which were not available under ERISA § 1132. The ruling still allows the State of Texas to enforce the THCLA in the case of Government-sponsored (Medicare, Medicaid, Federal, State, Municipal Employee, etc., Church-sponsored, or Individual Health Plan Policies, which are saved from preemption by ERISA. The history that allows these Private and Self-Pay Insurance to be saved dates to the "Interstate Commerce" power that was given the federal Government by the Supreme Court. ERISA, enacted in 1974, relied on the "Interstate Commerce" rule to allow federal jurisdiction over private employers, based on the need of private employers to follow a single set of paperwork and rules for pensions and other employee benefit plans where employers had employees in multiple states. Except for private employer plans, insurance can be regulated by the individual states, and Managed Care entities making medical decisions can be held accountable for those decisions if negligence is involved, as allowed by the Texas Healthcare Liability Act.

Limitation periods in Irish law are set out in a variety of statutes and in judicial decisions but primarily the limitations applying to civil actions are set out in the Statute of Limitations, 1957 and the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act, 1991. These statutes impose a limit on the right of action so that after a prescribed period any action will be time barred. A list of cause of actions affected are listed under part two of the Statute of Limitations 1957.

<i>Landeros v. Flood</i> Court case in California

Landeros v. Flood was a 1976 court case in the state of California involving child abuse and alleged medical malpractice.

A v Hoare, [2008] UKHL 6, is a leading tort case in British law, decided by the House of Lords in 2008.

<i>Commonwealth v Verwayen</i> Judgement of the High Court of Australia

Commonwealth v Verwayen, also known as the Voyager case, is a leading case involving estoppel in Australia. Bernard Verwayen sued the Australian government for damages caused by a collision between two ships of the Australian Navy. A representative of the Government initially indicated to Bernard Verwayen that the Government would not raise the statute of limitations as a defence to their negligence. In court however, the Government relied on this defence. While the decision of the High Court was split, a majority of judges found that the Government could not rely on this statement as a defence. Justices Toohey and Gaudron came to this conclusion on the basis that the Government had waived their right to rely on this defence. However, Justices Deane and Dawson came to this conclusion under the doctrine of estoppel, which provides that a defendant can not contradict a previous representation or promise made that has established an assumed state of legal affairs. This case is most frequently referred to in relation to its influence on the doctrine of estoppel.

The civil liability of a recreational diver may include a duty of care to another diver during a dive. Breach of this duty that is a proximate cause of injury or loss to the other diver may lead to civil litigation for damages in compensation for the injury or loss suffered.

<i>Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.</i>

Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc, was a California torts case in which the Supreme Court of California dealt with the torts regarding product liability and warranty breaches. The primary legal issue of the case was to determine whether a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. The case was originally heard in a San Diego district court where the verdict was against the manufacturer. This verdict was appealed by the manufacturer to the Supreme Court of California which was presided by Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., and the opinion was delivered by Judge Roger J Traynor.

<i>March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd</i> Judgement of the High Court of Australia

March v Stramare Pty Ltd Pty Ltd was a High Court of Australia case decided in 1991 on Australian tort law. The case considered the conditions required for causation to be established in tort law, the limitations of the "but for" test and the significance of an intervening act by a third party in determining causation. In this case, the High Court held that, although it was useful in clarifying the facts of the case, the but-for test was not the exclusive test in determining causation as it posed difficulties in attributing responsibility for damages in two key types of cases. The first was in cases when attributing responsibility in cases where the damage was caused by the negligence of more than one party, and the second was in cases where the damage resulted from an intervening act. Instead, the court favoured a case-by-case basis approach in attributing legal responsibility for causation, which took both common sense principles and public policy concerns into consideration when coming to a decision.

<i>DB v The Minister for Health</i> Irish Supreme Court case

DB v The Minister for Health[2003] 3 IR 12, is an Irish Supreme Court case in which the Supreme Court highlighted that the literal approach should always be used first when it comes to interpreting statutes. The Court also highlighted in this case that the only time the purposive approach should be used is if the literal approach leads to ambiguity or lack of clarity.

<i>A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison</i> Irish Supreme Court case

In A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison[2006] IESC 45; [2006] 4 IR 88; [2006] 2 ILRM 481, the Supreme Court of Ireland ruled that a finding that criminal legislation is unconstitutional need not render existing convictions void.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 "Gough v. Neary & Anor [2003] IESC 39 (3 July 2003)". www.bailii.org. Retrieved 2019-11-20.
  2. "Gynaecologist loses appeal over medical negligence verdict". The Irish Times. Retrieved 2019-11-20.
  3. "Victims of former doctor Michael Neary win compensation fight". Independent.ie. 11 November 2013. Retrieved 2019-11-20.
  4. Book (eISB), electronic Irish Statute. "electronic Irish Statute Book (eISB)". www.irishstatutebook.ie. Retrieved 2019-11-22.
  5. [1994] 1 WLR 1234.
  6. "Dobbie v Medway Health Authority [1994] EWCA Civ 13 (11 May 1994)". www.bailii.org. Retrieved 2019-11-21.
  7. "Victims of former doctor Michael Neary win compensation fight". Independent.ie. 11 November 2013. Retrieved 2019-12-15.