Hashim Safi Al Din

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Hashim Safi Al Din
Hachem Safieddine.jpg
Head of Hezbollah's Executive Council
Assumed office
July 2001
Personal details
Born1964 (age 59–60)
Deir Qanoun En Nahr
Nationality Lebanese
Political party Hezbollah

Hashim Safi Al Din (also transliterated Hashem Safieddine) (born 1964) is a Lebanese Shia cleric, senior Hezbollah official and a maternal cousin of the secretary general of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah. [1] He is the head of Hezbollah's Executive Council and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, [2] [3] and generally considered the "number two" in Hezbollah. [4]

Contents

Early life

Hashim Safi Al Din was born in 1964 in Deir Qanoun En Nahr, southern Lebanon, to a respected Shia family. [5] He is a maternal cousin of Hassan Nasrallah. [6] His brother, Abdallah Safi Al Din, is Hezbollah's representative to Iran. [5]

Hashim Safi Al Din studied theology in Najaf, Iraq, and in Qum, Iran, together with Nasrallah, [7] until he was recalled to Lebanon by Hassan Nasrallah in 1994. [2] David A. Daoud (4 June 2017). "State Department Blacklists Hashem Saffiedine". Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Archived from the original on 6 June 2017.</ref>

Career

In 1995, Hashim Safi Al Din was promoted to the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Assembly), the highest council in Hezbollah. [2] He was also appointed head of the Jihad Council. [2] The Executive Council, of which he is president, oversees Hezbollah's political, social, and educational activities. [3] [8]

Al Din is among three major leaders of Hezbollah, the other two are Hassan Nasrallah and Naim Qassem. [9] He is also regarded as second only to Nasrallah. [7]

In 2006, Al Din was reportedly promoted by Iran as a possible successor to Hassan Nasrallah for the post of Secretary-General of Hezbollah. [2] [10]

Al Din is one of six clerics who are members of the shura council of Hezbollah. [11] He is also the head of the executive council of the group (also known as Shura Tanfiziyah), [12] to which he was elected in the general assembly meeting in July 2001. [13] [14] In addition, he is one of nine members of the deciding consultative council (Shura al-Qarar), which is the top body of the group. [15]

In October 2008, Al Din was elected to succeed Nasrallah as secretary general of Hezbollah in the general meeting. [16] [17] His appointment as heir apparent to Nasrallah was supported by Iranians. [15] In 2009, Al Din was again elected to the Shura Council. [18] He was appointed as Hezbollah's military commander of Southern Lebanon region in November 2010. [19]

In 2017, Al Din was designated a terrorist by the U.S. Department of State. [5] The same year in May, he was subject to the sanctions imposed by the U.S. and some of Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in addition to nine other senior Hezbollah figures. [20]

Personal life

In June 2020, his son, Sayyed Reza Hashim Safi Al Din married Zeinab Soleimani, daughter of former Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani. [6]

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References

  1. ↑ "Lebanon: Hezbollah's Rising Star". Stratfor . 17 November 2009. Retrieved 15 March 2013.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 David A. Daoud (4 June 2017). "State Department Blacklists Hashem Saffiedine". Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Archived from the original on 6 June 2017.
  3. 1 2 "State Department Terrorist Designations of Hashem Safieddine and Muhammad al-Isawi". United States Department of State. 19 May 2017. Archived from the original on 6 June 2017.
  4. ↑ Tal Beeri (8 June 2022). "Hashem Safi al-Din – Head of Hezbollah's Executive Council (and Hassan Nasrallah's Designated Successor?)". Alma Research and Education Center. Retrieved 15 January 2023.
  5. 1 2 3 "Senior Hezbollah figure Hashem Safi al-Din publicly stated Hezbollah participates in the campaign in south Syria". Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 29 July 2018.
  6. 1 2 Ahmad Rafat (7 July 2020). "A Marriage of Convenience Bolsters Iran's Mideast Presence". Kayhan Life. Retrieved 7 July 2020.
  7. 1 2 "Sayyed Nasrallah re-elected for another term". The Weekly Middle East Reporter. 5 December 2009. Retrieved 24 March 2013.
  8. ↑ John Davison (21 May 2017). Mark Potter (ed.). "Hezbollah calls U.S. administration 'mentally impeded' during Trump Saudi visit". Sayyed Hashem Safieddine, president of the Iran-backed Shi'ite group's executive council, said Washington would not be able to do any real harm to Hezbollah.
  9. ↑ "IRGC-Hezbollah Captagon Ring Compromised by War Over Profits". Middle East Transparent. 27 April 2012. Archived from the original on 21 September 2013. Retrieved 22 March 2013.
  10. ↑ Shmuel Bar (29 October 2006). "Lebanese Hizballah – Political, Ideological and Organizational Highlights" (PDF). National Defense University. Archived from the original (PDF) on 6 June 2017. According to reports from Iran, the Iranians have already appointed him the head of the Executive Council and Nassrallah's cousin as his successor
  11. ↑ Barry Rubin, ed. (2010). Guide to Islamist Movements. New York; London: M.E. Sharpe. p. 329. ISBN   978-0-7656-1747-7.
  12. ↑ Dominique Avon; Anaïs-Trissa Khatchadourian; Jane Marie Todd (2012). Hezbollah: A History of the "Party of God". Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press. p. 215. ISBN   978-0-674-06752-3.
  13. ↑ Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh (2004). In The Path of Hizbullah. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. p. 45. ISBN   978-0-8156-3053-1.
  14. ↑ "Hezbollah (part I)" (PDF). Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. July 2003. Retrieved 7 February 2013.
  15. 1 2 Shmuel Bar (29 October 2006). "Lebanese Hizballah – Political, Ideological and Organizational Highlights" (PDF). Center for Complex Operations. Archived from the original (PDF) on 21 September 2013. Retrieved 7 February 2013.
  16. ↑ Dudi Cohen (13 October 2008). "Nasrallah replacement chosen". Ynetnews. Retrieved 7 February 2013.
  17. ↑ "Kuwaiti daily reports extension of Nasrallah mandate". Now Lebanon. 1 November 2008. Archived from the original on 6 June 2020. Retrieved 15 March 2013.
  18. ↑ Shimon Shapira (17 December 2009). "Has Hizbullah Changed?" (PDF). Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. Retrieved 7 February 2013.
  19. ↑ Larbi Sadiki (21 June 2011). "Hezbollah and the Arab revolution". Al Jazeera . Retrieved 7 February 2013.
  20. ↑ Zeina Karam; Bassem Mroue (15 November 2018). "Militant or poet? US sanctions Hezbollah leader's son". Associated Press . Beirut. Retrieved 3 March 2022.
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