Indo-Pakistani War of 1965

Last updated

Indo–Pakistani War of 1965
Part of the Indo–Pakistani wars and conflicts
Kashmir region 2004.jpg
Geopolitical map of Kashmir provided by the United States CIA, c. 2004
DateAugust – 23 September 1965


Flag of India.svg  India Flag of Pakistan.svg  Pakistan
Commanders and leaders
Flag of India.svg Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
(President of India)
Flag of India.svg Lal Bahadur Shastri
(Prime Minister of India)
Flag of Indian Army.svg Gen. J. N. Chaudhuri
(Chief of the Army Staff)
Flag of Indian Army.svg Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh
(GOC-in-C, Western Command)
Flag of Indian Army.svg Lt. Gen. P. O. Dunn
(GOC, I Corps)
Flag of Indian Army.svg Lt. Gen. Joginder Dhillon
(GOC, XI Corps)
Flag of Indian Army.svg Lt. Gen. Kashmir Katoch
(GOC, XV Corps)
Ensign of the Indian Air Force.svg AM Arjan Singh Aulakh
(Chief of the Air Staff)
Naval Ensign of India.svg Adm. Bhaskar Soman
(Chief of the Naval Staff)
Flag of the President of Pakistan.svg Ayub Khan
(President of Pakistan)
Flag of the Pakistani Army.svg Gen Musa Khan Hazara
(Cdr-in-Chief, Army)
Flag of the Pakistani Army.svg Lt.Gen Bakhtiar Rana
(Commander, I Corps)
Flag of the Pakistani Army.svg Lt.Gen Attiqur Rahman
(Commander, IV Corps)
Flag of the Pakistani Army.svg MGen A.H. Malik
(GOC, 12th Infantry Division)
Flag of the Pakistani Army.svg MGen Yahya Khan
(GOC, 7th Infantry Division)
Pakistani Air Force Ensign.svg AM Nur Khan
(Cdr-in-Chief, Air Force)
Naval Jack of Pakistan.svg VAdm A.R. Khan
(Cdr-in-Chief, Navy)
Naval Jack of Pakistan.svg RAdm S.M. Ahsan
((Cdr. Eastern Naval Command )
Naval Jack of Pakistan.svg Cdre S.M. Anwar
( OTC, 25th Destroyer Sqn )

700,000 Infantry (Whole Army) [1]
700+ aircraft [2]
720 Tanks [1]


628 Artillery [3]

Effective strength on the West Pakistan Border [4]

  • 9 Infantry divisions (4 under-strength)
  • 3 Armored brigades

260,000 Infantry (Whole Army) [1]
280 aircraft [2]
756 Tanks [3]

552 Artillery [3]

  • 72x105mm How [3]
  • 234X25pdr [3]
  • 126x155mm How [3]
  • 48x8" How [3]
  • 72x3.7" How [3]
  • POK Lt Btys [3]

Effective strength on the West Pakistan Border [4]

  • 6 Infantry divisions
  • 2 Armored divisions
Casualties and losses

Neutral claims [5] [6]

  • 3,000 men [5]
  • 150 [7] –190 tanks [5]
  • 60–75 aircraft [5]
  • 540 km2 (210 mi2) of territory lost (primarily in Kashmir) [8] [9]

Indian claims

  • 35 [10] –59 aircraft lost [11] In addition, Indian sources claim that there were 13 IAF aircraft lost in accidents, and 3 Indian civilian aircraft shot down. [12]
  • 520 km2 (200 mi2) territory lost [13]

Pakistani claims

  • 8,200 men killed or captured [13]
  • 110 [14] –113 [13] aircraft destroyed
  • 500 tanks captured or destroyed [13]
  • 2602, [15] 2575 km2 [13] territory gained
    1600 square miles territory gained according to Husain Haqqani

Neutral claims [5]

Pakistani claims

  • 19 aircraft lost [14]

Indian claims

  • 5259 men killed or captured [13]
  • 43 [17] −73 aircraft destroyed [13]
  • 471 tanks destroyed [13]
  • 1,735 km2 (670 mi2) territory gained [13]

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was a culmination of skirmishes that took place between April 1965 and September 1965 between Pakistan and India. The conflict began following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against Indian rule. India retaliated by launching a full-scale military attack on West Pakistan. The seventeen-day war caused thousands of casualties on both sides and witnessed the largest engagement of armored vehicles and the largest tank battle since World War II. [18] [19] Hostilities between the two countries ended after a United Nations-mandated ceasefire was declared following diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and the United States, and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration. [20] Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in Kashmir and along the border between India and Pakistan. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir since the Partition of India in 1947, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001–2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan. Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and armoured units, with substantial backing from air forces, and naval operations. Many details of this war, like those of other Indo-Pakistani Wars, remain unclear. [21]

Pakistan federal parliamentary constitutional republic in South Asia

Pakistan, officially the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, is a country in South Asia. It is the world’s sixth-most populous country with a population exceeding 212,742,631 people. In area, it is the 33rd-largest country, spanning 881,913 square kilometres. Pakistan has a 1,046-kilometre (650-mile) coastline along the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman in the south and is bordered by India to the east, Afghanistan to the west, Iran to the southwest, and China in the northeast. It is separated narrowly from Tajikistan by Afghanistan's Wakhan Corridor in the northwest, and also shares a maritime border with Oman.

India Country in South Asia

India is a country in South Asia. It is the seventh-largest country by area, the second-most populous country, and the most populous democracy in the world. Bounded by the Indian Ocean on the south, the Arabian Sea on the southwest, and the Bay of Bengal on the southeast, it shares land borders with Pakistan to the west; China, Nepal, and Bhutan to the north; and Bangladesh and Myanmar to the east. In the Indian Ocean, India is in the vicinity of Sri Lanka and the Maldives; its Andaman and Nicobar Islands share a maritime border with Thailand and Indonesia.

Operation Gibraltar was the codename given to the strategy of Pakistan to infiltrate Jammu and Kashmir, and instigate the locals in starting a rebellion against Indian sovereignty.

India had the upper hand over Pakistan when the ceasefire was declared. [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] Although the two countries fought to a standoff, the conflict is seen as a strategic and political defeat for Pakistan, [29] [23] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] as it had neither succeeded in fomenting insurrection in Kashmir [35] nor had it been able to gain meaningful support at an international level. [30] [36] [37] [38]

Internationally, the war was viewed in the context of the greater Cold War, and resulted in a significant geopolitical shift in the subcontinent. [39] Before the war, the United States and the United Kingdom had been major material allies of both India and Pakistan, as their primary suppliers of military hardware and foreign developmental aid. During and after the conflict, both India and Pakistan felt betrayed by the perceived lack of support by the western powers for their respective positions; those feelings of betrayal were increased with the imposition of an American and British embargo on military aid to the opposing sides. [39] [40] As a consequence, India and Pakistan openly developed closer relationships with the Soviet Union and China, respectively. [40] The perceived negative stance of the western powers during the conflict, and during the 1971 war, has continued to affect relations between the West and the subcontinent. In spite of improved relations with the U.S. and Britain since the end of the Cold War, the conflict generated a deep distrust of both countries within the subcontinent which to an extent lingers to this day. [41] [42] [43]

Cold War Geopolitical tension after World War II between the Eastern and Western Bloc

The Cold War was a period of geopolitical tension between the Soviet Union with its satellite states, and the United States with its allies after World War II. The historiography of the conflict began between 1946 and 1947. The Cold War began to de-escalate after the Revolutions of 1989. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 was the end of the Cold War. The term "cold" is used because there was no large-scale fighting directly between the two sides, but they each supported major regional conflicts known as proxy wars. The conflict split the temporary wartime alliance against Nazi Germany and its allies, leaving the USSR and the US as two superpowers with profound economic and political differences.

Pre-war escalation

A declassified US State Department letter that confirms the existence of hundreds of "infiltrators" in the Indian-administered part of the disputed Kashmir region. Dated during the events running up to the 1965 war. 1965 Infiltrators.jpg
A declassified US State Department letter that confirms the existence of hundreds of "infiltrators" in the Indian-administered part of the disputed Kashmir region. Dated during the events running up to the 1965 war.

Since the Partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan and India remained in contention over several issues. Although the Kashmir conflict was the predominant issue dividing the nations, other border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of Kutch, a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat. The issue first arose in 1956 which ended with India regaining control over the disputed area. [44] Pakistani patrols began patrolling in territory controlled by India in January 1965, which was followed by attacks by both countries on each other's posts on 8 April 1965. [44] [45] Initially involving border police from both nations, the disputed area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed forces. In June 1965, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict, which came later in 1968, saw Pakistan awarded 350 square miles (910 km2) of the Rann of Kutch, as against its original claim of 3,500 square miles (9,100 km2). [46]

Kashmir conflict India–Pakistan conflict over the Kashmir region

The Kashmir conflict is a territorial conflict primarily between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region. The conflict started after the partition of India in 1947 as a dispute over the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and escalated into three wars between India and Pakistan and several other armed skirmishes. China has also been involved in the conflict in a third-party role. Both India and Pakistan claim the entirety of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. India controls approximately 55% of the land area of the region and 70% of its population, Pakistan controls approximately 30% of the land, while China controls the remaining 15%. India administers Jammu, the Kashmir Valley, Ladakh, and the Siachen Glacier. Pakistan administers Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. China administers the mostly uninhabited Shaksgam Valley, and the Aksai Chin region.

Rann of Kutch large area of salt marshes in Gujarat, India, and Sindh, Pakistan

The Rann of Kutch (Sindhi: ڪڇ جو رڻ} is a large area of salt marshes located mostly in Gujarat, India and the southern tip of Sindh, Pakistan. It is divided into two main parts: Great Rann of Kutch and Little Rann of Kutch.

Gujarat State in India

Gujarat is a state on the western coast of India with a coastline of 1,600 km (990 mi) – most of which lies on the Kathiawar peninsula – and a population in excess of 60 million. It is the fifth largest Indian state by area and the ninth largest state by population. Gujarat is bordered by Rajasthan to the northeast, Daman and Diu to the south, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Maharashtra to the southeast, Madhya Pradesh to the east, and the Arabian Sea and the Pakistani province of Sindh to the west. Its capital city is Gandhinagar, while its largest city is Ahmedabad. The Gujarati-speaking people of India are indigenous to the state. The economy of Gujarat is the fifth-largest state economy in India with 11.62 lakh crore (US$170 billion) in gross domestic product and a per capita GDP of 156,000 (US$2,300). Gujarat ranks fifteenth among Indian states in human development index.

After its success in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan, believed the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir as the Indian military had suffered a loss to China in 1962 [21] in the Sino-Indian War. Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs. Pakistan attempted to ignite the resistance movement by means of a covert infiltration, codenamed Operation Gibraltar. [47] The Pakistani infiltrators were soon discovered, however, their presence reported by local Kashmiris, [48] and the operation ended unsuccessfully.

Indian Army Land based branch of the Indian Armed Forces

The Indian Army is the land-based branch and the largest component of the Indian Armed Forces. The President of India is the Supreme Commander of the Indian Army, and it is commanded by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), who is a four-star general. Two officers have been conferred with the rank of field marshal, a five-star rank, which is a ceremonial position of great honour. The Indian Army originated from the armies of the East India Company, which eventually became the British Indian Army, and the armies of the princely states, which finally became the national army after independence. The units and regiments of the Indian Army have diverse histories and have participated in a number of battles and campaigns across the world, earning many battle and theatre honours before and after Independence.

Sino-Indian War conflict

The Sino-Indian War, also known as the Indo-China War and Sino-Indian Border Conflict, was a war between China and India that occurred in 1962. A disputed Himalayan border was the main pretext for war, but other issues played a role. There had been a series of violent border incidents after the 1959 Tibetan uprising, when India had granted asylum to the Dalai Lama. India initiated a Forward Policy in which it placed outposts along the border, including several north of the McMahon Line, the eastern portion of the Line of Actual Control proclaimed by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1959.

The war

On 5 August 1965 between 26,000 and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri locals headed for various areas within Kashmir. Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, crossed the cease fire line on 15 August. [21]

Line of Control demarcation line between India and Pakistan over the disputed region of Kashmir

The term Line of Control (LoC) refers to the military control line between the Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir—a line which does not constitute a legally recognized international boundary, but serves as the de facto border. Originally known as the Cease-fire Line, it was redesignated as the "Line of Control" following the Simla Agreement, which was signed on 3 July 1972. The part of the former princely state that is under Indian control is known as the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistani-controlled part is divided into Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit–Baltistan. The northernmost point of the Line of Control is known as NJ9842. The India–Pakistan border continues from the southernmost point on the LoC.

Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. By the end of August, however, both sides had relative progress; Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Poonch and India had captured the Haji Pir pass, 8 km into Pakistan administered Kashmir. [49]

On 1 September 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called Operation Grand Slam, with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Ayub Khan calculated that "Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place" [50] [51] [52] although by this time Operation Gibraltar had failed and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass. [50] [53] At 3:30 hours, on 1 September 1965, the entire Chhamb area came under massive artillery bombardment. Pakistan had launched operation Grand Slam and India's Army Headquarter was taken by surprise. [54] Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India responded by calling in its air force to blunt the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, its air force attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. India's decision to open up the theatre of attack into Pakistani Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the operation to defend Punjab. Operation Grand Slam therefore failed, as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture Akhnoor; it became one of the turning points in the war when India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south. In the valley, another area of strategic importance was Kargil. Kargil town was in Indian hands but Pakistan occupied high ground overlooking Kargil and Srinagar-Leh road. However, after the launch of a massive anti-infiltration operation by the Indian army, the Pakistani infiltrators were forced out of that area in the month of August. [55]

India crossed the International Border on the Western front on 6 September [56] On 6 September, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Niranjan Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Icchogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross the Ichhogil Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. These developments brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore. However, the Pakistani counterattack took Khem Karan from Indian forces which tried to divert the attention of Pakistanis from Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages.

The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade; they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. One unit of the Indian Jat Regiment, 3 Jat, had also crossed the Icchogil canal and captured [57] the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal. The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armoured division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point. Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders had no information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment [58] to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3 Jat on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements.

On 8 September 1965, a company of 5 Maratha Light Infantry was sent to reinforce a Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC) post at Munabao – a strategic hamlet about 250 kilometres from Jodhpur. Their brief was simple. To hold the post and to keep Pakistan's infantry battalions from overrunning the post at bay. But at Maratha Hill (in Munabao) – as the post has now been christened – the Indian company could barely manage to thwart the intense attack for 24 hours. A company of 3 Guards with 954 heavy mortar battery ordered to reinforce the RAC post at Munabao could never reach. The Pakistani Air Force had strafed the entire area, and also hit a railway train coming from Barmer with reinforcements near Gadra road railway station. On 10 September, Munabao fell into Pakistani hands, and efforts to capture the strategic point did not succeed. [59]

On the days following 9 September, both nations' premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armoured Division, labeled the "pride of the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs, was forced back by the Pakistani 6th Armoured Division at Chawinda and was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses of nearly 100 tanks.

The Pakistanis followed up their success by launching Operation Windup, which forced the Indians back farther. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armoured Division, pushed an offensive towards Khem Karan, with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar.

The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division never made it past Khem Karan, however, and by the end of 10 September lay disintegrated by the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar (lit. meaning – "Real Answer", or more appropriate English equivalent – "Fitting Response"). The area became known as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town), because of the large number of US-made Pakistani Patton tanks. Approximately 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or abandoned, with only 32 Indian tanks destroyed or damaged. The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division less 5th Armoured Brigade was next sent to Sialkot sector behind Pakistani 6th Armoured Division where it didn't see action as 6th Armoured Division was already in process of routing Indian 1st Armoured Division which was superior to it in strength.

The hostilities in the Rajasthan sector commenced on 8 September. Initially Pakistan Desert Force and the Hur militia (followers of Pir Pagaro) was placed in a defensive role, a role for which they were well suited as it turned out. The Hurs were familiar with the terrain and the local area and possessed many essential desert survival skills which their opponents and their comrades in the Pakistan Army did not. Fighting as mainly light infantry, the Hur inflicted many casualties on the Indian forces as they entered Sindh. The Hurs were also employed as skirmishers, harassing the Indians LOC, a task they often undertook on camels. As the battle wore on the Hurs and the Desert Force were increasingly used to attack and capture Indian villages inside Rajasthan. [60]

The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 758.9 miles² (1,920 km²) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 mile² (550 km²) of Indian territory. [61] The territory occupied by India was mainly in the fertile Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors, [62] [63] while Pakistani ground gains were primarily in deserts opposite Sindh and in the Chumb sector near Kashmir. [63] Pakistan claims that it held 1600 square miles of Indian territory, while lost 450 square miles of its own territory. [64] [65] [66] [67]

Aerial warfare

The war saw aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) engaging in combat for the first time since independence. Although the two forces had previously faced off in the First Kashmir War during the late 1940s, that engagement was very limited in scale compared to the 1965 conflict.

The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunters, Indian-manufactured Folland Gnats, de Havilland Vampires, EE Canberra bombers and a squadron of MiG-21s. The PAF's fighter force comprised 102 F-86F Sabres and 12 F-104 Starfighters, along with 24 B-57 Canberra bombers. During the conflict, the PAF claimed it was out-numbered by around 5:1. [68]

The PAF's aircraft were largely of American origin, whereas the IAF flew an assortment of British and Soviet aeroplanes. It has been widely reported that the PAF's American aircraft were superior to those of the IAF.[ citation needed ]

The F-86 was vulnerable to the diminutive Folland Gnat, nicknamed "Sabre Slayer." [69] The Gnat is credited by many independent and Indian sources as having shot down seven Pakistani Canadair Sabres [lower-alpha 1] in the 1965 war. [70] [71] while two Gnats were downed by PAF fighters. The PAF's F-104 Starfighter of the PAF was the fastest fighter operating in the subcontinent at that time and was often referred to as "the pride of the PAF". However, according to Sajjad Haider, the F-104 did not deserve this reputation. Being "a high level interceptor designed to neutralise Soviet strategic bombers in altitudes above 40,000 feet," rather than engage in dogfights with agile fighters at low altitudes, it was "unsuited to the tactical environment of the region." [72] In combat the Starfighter was not as effective as the IAF's far more agile, albeit much slower, Folland Gnat fighter. [73] [74] Yet it zoomed into an ongoing dogfight between Sabres and Gnats, at supersonic speed, successfully broke off the fight and caused the Gnats to egress. An IAF Gnat, piloted by Squadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand, landed at an abandoned Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur, as he lacked the fuel to return to his base, and was captured by the Pakistan Army. According to the pilot, he got separated from his formation due to a malfunctioning compass and radio. [75] [76] This Gnat is displayed as a war trophy in the Pakistan Air Force Museum, Karachi. Sqn Ldr Saad Hatmi who flew the captured aircraft to Sargodha, and later tested and evaluated its flight performance, was of view that Gnat was no "Sabre Slayer" when it came to dog fighting. [76] The Pakistan Air Force had fought well in countering the much large Indian Air Force and supported the ground forces. [77]

Captured Indian Folland Gnat on display at the PAF Museum Karachi. PAF gallery.jpg
Captured Indian Folland Gnat on display at the PAF Museum Karachi.

The two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses during the war and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either country. The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19 of its own, while the IAF claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes and lost 59. [78] According to PAF, It flew 86 F-86 Sabres, 10 F-104 Starfighters and 20 B-57 Canberras in a parade soon after the war was over. Thus disproving the IAF's claim of downing 73 PAF fighters, which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani front-line fighter force. [79] Indian sources have pointed out that, despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft, Pakistan sought to acquire additional aircraft from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and China within 10 days of the beginning war.[ citation needed ]

The two air forces were rather equal in the conflict, because much of the Indian air force remained farther east to guard against the possibility of China entering the war. [80] According to the independent sources, the PAF lost some 20 aircraft while the Indians lost 60–75. [5] [6] Pakistan ended the war having depleted 17 percent of its front line strength, while India's losses amounted to less than 10 percent.[ citation needed ] Moreover, the loss rate had begun to even out, and it has been estimated that another three week's fighting would have seen the Pakistani losses rising to 33 percent and India's losses totalling 15 percent.[ citation needed ] Air superiority was not achieved, and were unable to prevent IAF fighter bombers and reconnaissance Canberras from flying daylight missions over Pakistan. Thus 1965 was a stalemate in terms of the air war with neither side able to achieve complete air superiority. [80] However, according to Kenneth Werrell, the Pakistan Air Force "did well in the conflict and probably had the edge". [81] When hostilities broke out, the Pakistan Air Force with around 100 F-86s faced an enemy with five times as many combat aircraft; the Indians were also equipped with comparatively modern aircraft inventory. Despite this, Werrell credits the PAF as having the advantage of a "decade's experience with the Sabre" and pilots with long flight hours experience. One Pakistani fighter pilot, MM Alam, was credited with the record of downing five Indian aircraft in less than a minute, becoming the first known flying ace since the Korean War. [81] However, his claims were never confirmed by the PAF and is disputed by Indian sources [82] [83] [84] and some PAF officials. [85] [86] [87]

Tank battles

The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II. At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, as well as better equipment overall. [88] Pakistani armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns. [89] The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-made Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13, PT-76, and M3 Stuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a greater number and more modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian artillery, according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik. [90]

At the outbreak of war in 1965, Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76 mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions – the latter being in the process of formation.

Destroyed Sherman Tank Destroyed Patton Tank (1965 Indo-Pak War).jpg
Destroyed Sherman Tank

The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black Elephant' Armoured Division, which consisted of the 17th Horse (The Poona Horse), also called 'Fakhr-i-Hind' ('Pride of India'), the 4th Horse (Hodson's Horse), the 16th Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions. There was also the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions.

Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armour, [91] Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India, which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector, whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive on Amritsar; [92] [93] they were sometimes employed in a faulty manner, such as charging prepared defences during the defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar.

After India breached the Madhupur canal on 11 September, the Khem Karan counter-offensive was halted, affecting Pakistan's strategy substantially. [50] Although India's tank formations experienced some results, India's attack at the Battle of Chawinda, led by its 1st Armoured Division and supporting units, was brought to halt by the newly raised 6th Armoured Division (ex-100th independent brigade group) in the Chawinda sector. Pakistan claimed that Indians lost 120 tanks at Chawinda. [94] compared to 44 of its own [95] But later, Indian official sources confirmed India lost only 29 tanks at Chawinda. [96] [97] Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role such as India's 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and Pakistan's 25th Cavalry at Chawinda.

The Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, performed better than the overly complex[ need quotation to verify ] Pattons. [93]

Naval operations did not play a prominent role in the war of 1965. On 7 September, a flotilla of the Pakistan Navy under the command of Commodore S.M. Anwar, carried out a bombardment of the Indian Navy's radar station coastal down of Dwarka, which was 200 miles (320 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Operation Dwarka, as it is known, is a significant naval operation of the 1965 war [98] [99] [100] contested as a nuisance raid by some. [101] [102] The attack on Dwarka led to questions being asked in India's parliament [103] and subsequent post-war modernization and expansion of the Indian Navy, with an increase in budget from Rs. 35 crores to Rs. 115 crores. [104]

According to some Pakistani sources, one submarine, PNS Ghazi, kept the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant besieged in Bombay throughout the war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, and wished to restrict the war to a land-based conflict. [105] Moreover, they note that the Vikrant was in dry dock in the process of refitting. Some Pakistani defence writers have also discounted claims that the Indian Navy was bottled up in Bombay by a single submarine, instead stating that 75% of the Indian Navy was under maintenance in harbour. [106]

Covert operations

The Pakistan Army launched a number of covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases. [107] On 7 September 1965, the Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory. According to Chief of Army Staff General Muhammad Musa, about 135 commandos were airdropped at three Indian airfields (Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur). The daring attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster". [107] Only 22 commandos returned to Pakistan as planned, 93 were taken prisoner (including one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt), and 20 were killed in encounters with the army, police or civilians.[ citation needed ] The reason for the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide maps, proper briefings and adequate planning or preparation. [108]

Despite failing to sabotage the airfields, Pakistan sources claim that the commando mission affected some planned Indian operations. As the Indian 14th Infantry Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the Pakistan Air Force found the road filled with transport, and destroyed many vehicles. [109]

India responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured Pakistani spies or paratroopers. [110] Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors spread that India had retaliated with its own covert operations, sending commandos deep into Pakistan territory, [108] but these rumors were later determined to be unfounded. [111]

Assessment of losses

India and Pakistan make widely divergent claims about the damage they inflicted on each other and the amount of damage suffered by them. The following summarizes each nation's claims.

Indian claims [112] Pakistani claims [113] Independent Sources [21] [114]
Casualties  3,000 Indian soldiers, 3,800 Pakistani soldiers
Combat flying effort4,073+ combat sorties2,279 combat sorties
Aircraft lost59 IAF (official), 43 PAF. [11] In addition, Indian sources claim that there were 13 IAF aircraft lost in accidents, and 3 Indian civilian aircraft shot down. [12] 19 PAF, 104 IAF20 PAF, 60–75 IAF; Pakistan claims India rejected neutral arbitration. [122] [123]
Aerial victories17 + 3 (post war)30 
Tanks destroyed128 Indian tanks, 152 Pakistani tanks captured, 150 Pakistani tanks destroyed. Officially 471 Pakistani tanks destroyed and 38 captured [124] 165 Pakistan tanks[ dubious ][ citation needed ]
Land area won1,500 sq mi (3,900 km2) of Pakistani territory250 sq mi (650 km2) of Indian territoryIndia held 1,840 km2 (710 sq mi) of Pakistani territory and Pakistan held 210 sq mi (540 km2) of Indian territory

Neutral assessments

There have been several neutral assessments of the losses incurred by both India and Pakistan during the war. Most of these assessments agree that India had the upper hand over Pakistan when ceasefire was declared. Some of the neutral assessments are mentioned below 

The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy—on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.

This time, India's victory was nearly total: India accepted cease-fire only after it had occupied 740 square miles, though Pakistan had made marginal gains of 210 square miles of territory. Despite the obvious strength of the Indian wins, both countries claim to have been victorious.

The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time United Nations intervened on September 22, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat.

The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts.

In three weeks the second Indo-Pak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.

India won the war. It held on to the Vale of Kashmir, the prize Pakistan vainly sought. It gained 1,840 km2 (710 sq mi) of Pakistani territory: 640 km2 (250 sq mi) in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan's portion of the state; 460 km2 (180 sq mi) of the Sailkot sector; 380 km2 (150 sq mi) far to the south of Sindh; and most critical, 360 km2 (140 sq mi) on the Lahore front. Pakistan took 540 km2 (210 sq mi) of Indian territory: 490 km2 (190 sq mi) in the Chhamb sector and 50 km2 (19 sq mi) around Khem Karan.

Although both sides lost heavily in men and material, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, India had the better of the war. New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated.

India's strategic aims were modest – it aimed to deny Pakistani Army victory, although it ended up in possession of 720 square miles (1,900 km2) of Pakistani territory for the loss of just 220 square miles (570 km2) of its own.

A brief but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease-fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by Indian Army. Another UN-sponsored cease-fire left borders unchanged, but Pakistan's vulnerability had again been exposed.

The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate.

Again India appeared, logistically at least, to be in a superior position but neither side was able to mobilize enough strength to gain a decisive victory.

Conflict resumed again in early 1965, when Pakistani and Indian forces clashed over disputed territory along the border between the two nations. Hostilities intensified that August when the Pakistani army attempted to take Kashmir by force. The attempt to seize the state was unsuccessful, and the second India-Pakistan War reached a stalemate.


The United States and the Soviet Union used significant diplomatic tools to prevent any further escalation in the conflict between the two South Asian nations. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexei Kosygin, hosted ceasefire negotiations in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Agreement, agreeing to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than 25 February 1966.

With declining stockpiles of ammunition, Pakistani leaders feared the war tilting in India's favor. Therefore, they quickly accepted the ceasefire in Tashkent. [134] Despite strong opposition from Indian military leaders, India bowed to growing international diplomatic pressure and accepted the ceasefire. [134] On 22 September, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day.

India's Prime Minister, Shastri, suffered a fatal heart attack soon after the declaration of the ceasefire. As a consequence, the public outcry in India against the ceasefire declaration transformed into a wave of sympathy for the ruling Indian National Congress. [135]

India and Pakistan accused each other of ceasefire violations; India charged Pakistan with 585 violations in 34 days, while Pakistan countered with accusations of 450 incidents by India. [136] In addition to the expected exchange of small arms and artillery fire, India reported that Pakistan utilized the ceasefire to capture the Indian village of Chananwalla in the Fazilka sector. This village was recaptured by Indian troops on 25 December. On 10 October, a B-57 Canberra on loan to the PAF was damaged by 3 SA-2 missiles fired from the IAF base at Ambala. [137] A Pakistani Army Auster AOP was shot down on 16 December, killing one Pakistani army captain; on 2 February 1967, an AOP was shot down by IAF Hunters.

The ceasefire remained in effect until the start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

Public perceptions

The ceasefire was criticised by many Pakistanis who, relying on fabricated official reports and the controlled Pakistani press, believed that the leadership had surrendered military gains. The protests led to student riots. [138] Pakistan State's reports had suggested that their military was performing admirably in the war – which they incorrectly blamed as being initiated by India – and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as having forfeited the gains. [139] Some recent books written by Pakistani authors, including one by ex-ISI chief Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed Durrani initially titled The Myth of 1965 Victory, [140] reportedly exposed Pakistani fabrications about the war, but all copies of the book were bought by Pakistan Army to prevent circulation because the topic was "too sensitive". [141] [142] The book was published with the revised title History of Indo Pak War 1965, published by Services Book Club, a part of the Pakistan military and printed by Oxford University Press, Karachi. A few copies of the book have survived. [143] A version was published in India as Illusion of Victory: A Military History of the Indo-Pak War-1965 by Lexicon Publishers. [144] Recently a new Pakistani impression has been published in 2017.

Intelligence failures

Strategic miscalculations by both India and Pakistan ensured that the war ended in a stalemate.

Indian miscalculations

Indian military intelligence gave no warning of the impending Pakistan invasion. The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result.

The "Official War History – 1965", drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India in 1992, was a long suppressed document that revealed other miscalculations. According to the document, on 22 September when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to delay accepting the ceasefire. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank losses. It was determined later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India held twice the number of tanks as Pakistan. By this time, the Pakistani Army had used close to 80% of its ammunition.

Air Chief Marshal (retd) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the "Supremo Syndrome", a patronizing attitude sometimes held by the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military. [112]

Pakistani miscalculations

The Pakistani Army's failures started with the supposition that a generally discontented Kashmiri people, given the opportunity provided by the Pakistani advance, would revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. The Kashmiri people, however, did not revolt. Instead, the Indian Army was provided with enough information to learn of Operation Gibraltar and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani Army regulars.

Telegram from the Embassy of the United States in Karachi: "Continuing propaganda regarding achievements of Pak forces seems to have convinced most that only Pak forbearance saved the Indians from disaster." Mcconaughy20oct1965a.jpg
Telegram from the Embassy of the United States in Karachi: "Continuing propaganda regarding achievements of Pak forces seems to have convinced most that only Pak forbearance saved the Indians from disaster."

The Pakistani Army also failed to recognize that the Indian policy makers would order an attack on the southern sector in order to open a second front. Pakistan was forced to dedicate troops to the southern sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead using them to support penetrating into Kashmir.

"Operation Grand Slam", which was launched by Pakistan to capture Akhnoor, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, was also a failure. Many Pakistani commentators criticised the Ayub Khan administration for being indecisive during Operation Grand Slam. These critics claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew the importance of Akhnoor to India (having called it India's "jugular vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two nations into an all-out war. Despite progress being made in Akhnoor, General Ayub Khan relieved the commanding Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik and replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24-hour lull ensued the replacement, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Akhnoor and successfully oppose a lackluster attack headed by General Yahya Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue", asserted the Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command. Later, Akhtar Hussain Malik criticised Ayub Khan for planning Operation Gibraltar, which was doomed to fail, and for relieving him of his command at a crucial moment in the war. Malik threatened to expose the truth about the war and the army's failure, but later dropped the idea for fear of being banned. [145]

Some authors have noted that Pakistan might have been emboldened by a war game  – conducted in March 1965, at the Institute of Defence Analysis, USA. The exercise concluded that, in the event of a war with India, Pakistan would win. [146] [147] Other authors like Stephen P. Cohen, have consistently commented that the Pakistan Army had "acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military ... the 1965 war was a shock". [148]

Pakistani Air Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of PAF during the war, Nur Khan, later said that the Pakistan Army, and not India, should be blamed for starting the war. [149] [150] However propaganda in Pakistan about the war continued; the war was not rationally analysed in Pakistan, [151] [152] with most of the blame being heaped on the leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures that persisted until the debacle of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

Involvement of other nations

The United States and the United Kingdom had been the principal suppliers of military materiél to India and Pakistan since 1947. Both India and Pakistan were Commonwealth republics. While India had pursued a policy of nominal non-alignment, Pakistan was a member of both CENTO and SEATO and a purported ally of the West in its struggle against Communism. [153] Well before the conflict began, however, Britain and the United States had suspected Pakistan of joining both alliances out of opportunism to acquire advanced weapons for a war against India. They had therefore limited their military aid to Pakistan to maintain the existing balance of power in the subcontinent. [154] In 1959, however, Pakistan and the United States had signed an Agreement of Cooperation under which the United States agreed to take "appropriate action, including the use of armed forces" in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request. [155] By 1965, American and British analysts had recognised the two international groupings, CENTO and SEATO, and Pakistan's continued alliance with the West as being largely meaningless. [156]

Following the start of the 1965 war, both the United States and Britain took the view that the conflict was largely Pakistan's fault, and suspended all arms shipments to both India and Pakistan. [24] While the United States maintained a neutral stance, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, condemned India for aggression after its army advanced towards Lahore; his statement was met with a furious rebuttal from India. [157]

Internationally, the level of support which Pakistan received was limited at best. [36] [158] [159] Iran and Turkey issued a joint communiqué on 10 September which placed the blame on India, backed the United Nations' appeal for a cease-fire and offered to deploy troops for a UN peacekeeping mission in Kashmir. [160] Pakistan received support from Indonesia, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in the form of six naval vessels, jet fuel, guns and ammunition and financial support, respectively. [161]

Since before the war, the People's Republic of China had been a major military associate of Pakistan and a military opponent of India, with whom it had fought a brief war in 1962. China had also become a foreign patron for Pakistan and had given Pakistan $60 million in development assistance in 1965. [162] During the war, China openly supported the Pakistani position. It took advantage of the conflict to issue a strongly worded ultimatum to India condemning its "aggression" in Tibet and hinting at nuclear retaliation by China (China had exploded its first nuclear device the previous year). [159] Despite strong fears of Chinese intervention on the side of Pakistan, the Chinese government ultimately exercised restraint. [163] This was partly due to the logistical difficulties of a direct Chinese military intervention against India and India's improved military strength after its defeat by China in 1962. [158] China had also received strong warnings by the American and Soviet governments against expanding the scope of the conflict by intervening. [159] In the face of this pressure, China backed down, extending the deadline for India to respond to its ultimatum and warning India against attacking East Pakistan. [38] Ultimately, Pakistan rejected Chinese offers of military aid, recognising that accepting it would only result in further alienating Pakistan internationally. [159] International opinion considered China's actions to be dangerously reckless and aggressive, and it was soundly rebuked in the world press for its unnecessarily provocative stance during the conflict. [159]

India's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement yielded little support from its members. [164] Support given by Indonesia to Pakistan was seen as a major Indian diplomatic failure, as Indonesia had been among the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement along with India.[ citation needed ] Despite its close relations with India, the Soviet Union was more neutral than other nations during the war, inviting both nations to peace talks under its aegis in Tashkent. [165] [ need quotation to verify ]



Despite the declaration of a ceasefire, India was perceived as the victor due to its success in halting the Pakistan-backed insurgency in Kashmir. [31] In its October 1965 issue, the TIME magazine quoted a Western official assessing the consequences of the war [166]  

Now it's apparent to everybody that India is going to emerge as an Asian power in its own right.

In light of the failures of the Sino-Indian War, the outcome of the 1965 war was viewed as a "politico-strategic" victory in India. The Indian premier, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was hailed as a national hero in India. [167]

While the overall performance of the Indian military was praised, military leaders were criticised for their failure to effectively deploy India's superior armed forces so as to achieve a decisive victory over Pakistan. [168] In his book War in the modern world since 1815, noted war historian Jeremy Black said that though Pakistan "lost heavily" during the 1965 war, India's hasty decision to call for negotiations prevented further considerable damage to the Pakistan Armed Forces. He elaborates [169]  

India's chief of army staff urged negotiations on the ground that they were running out ammunition and their number of tanks had become seriously depleted. In fact, the army had used less than 15% of its ammunition compared to Pakistan, which had consumed closer to 80 percent and India had double the number of serviceable tanks.

In 2015, Marshal of the Indian Air Force Arjan Singh, the last surviving armed force commander of the conflict, gave his assessment that the war ended in a stalemate, but only due to international pressure for a ceasefire, and that India would have achieved a decisive victory had hostilities continued for a few days more: [170]

For political reasons, Pakistan claims victory in the 1965 war. In my opinion, the war ended in a kind of stalemate. We were in a position of strength. Had the war continued for a few more days, we would have gained a decisive victory. I advised then prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri not to agree for ceasefire. But I think he was under pressure from the United Nations and some countries.

As a consequence, India focussed on enhancing communication and coordination within and among the tri-services of the Indian Armed Forces. Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering preceding the war, India established the Research and Analysis Wing for external espionage and intelligence. Major improvements were also made in command and control to address various shortcomings and the positive impact of these changes was clearly visible during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 when India achieved a decisive victory over Pakistan within two weeks.

China's repeated threats to intervene in the conflict in support of Pakistan increased pressure on the government to take an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons. [171] Despite repeated assurances, the United States did little to prevent extensive use of American arms by Pakistani forces during the conflict, thus irking India. [172] At the same time, the United States and United Kingdom refused to supply India with sophisticated weaponry which further strained the relations between the West and India. [173] These developments led to a significant change in India's foreign policy – India, which had previously championed the cause of non-alignment, distanced itself further from Western powers and developed close relations with the Soviet Union. By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Union emerged as the biggest supplier of military hardware to India. [174] From 1967 to 1977, 81% of India's arms imports were from the Soviet Union. [175] After the 1965 war, the arms race between India and Pakistan became even more asymmetric and India was outdistancing Pakistan by far. [176]


At the conclusion of the war, many Pakistanis considered the performance of their military to be positive. 6 September is celebrated as Defence Day in Pakistan, in commemoration of the successful defence of Lahore against the Indian army. The performance of the Pakistani Air Force, in particular, was praised.

However, the Pakistani government was accused by analysts of spreading disinformation among its citizens regarding the actual consequences of the war. [177] In his book Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies, S.M. Burke writes [125]  

After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of India. Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her adversary, despite her economic and political problems, had been determinedly building up her strength.

Pakistani commentator Haidar Imtiaz remarked: [178]

The myth of ‘victory’ was created after the war had ended, in order to counter Indian claims of victory on the one hand and to shield the Ayub regime and the army from criticism on the other.

A book titled Indo-Pakistan War of 1965: A Flashback, [179] produced by the Inter-Services Public Relations of Pakistan, is used as the official history of the war, which omits any mention of the operations Gibraltar and Grand Slam, and begins with the Indian counter-offensive on the Lahore front. The Pakistan Army is claimed to have put up a "valiant defense of the motherland" and forced the attack in its tracks. [178]

Most observers agree that the myth of a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army was badly dented in the war, as critical breakthroughs were not made. [180] Several Pakistani writers criticised the military's ill-founded belief that their "martial race" of soldiers could defeat "Hindu India" in the war. [181] [182] Rasul Bux Rais, a Pakistani political analyst wrote [183]  

The 1965 war with India proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defences in a blitzkrieg fashion nor could she sustain an all-out conflict for long.

Historian Akbar S Zaidi notes that Pakistan "lost terribly in the 1965 war". [184]

The Pakistan airforce on the other hand gained a lot of credibility and reliability among Pakistan military and international war writers for successful defence of lahore and other important areas of Pakistan and heavy retaliation to India on the next day. The alertness of the airforce was also related to the fact that some pilots were scrambled 6 times in less than an hour on indication of Indian air raids. The Pakistan airforce along with the army is celebrated on Defence day and Airforce day in commemoration of this in Pakistan (6 and 7 September respectively). [185] [186]

Moreover, Pakistan had lost more ground than it had gained during the war and, more importantly, failed to achieve its goal of capturing Kashmir; this result has been viewed by many impartial observers as a defeat for Pakistan. [32] [33] [34]

Many senior Pakistani officials and military experts later criticised the faulty planning of Operation Gibraltar, which ultimately led to the war. The Tashkent declaration was also criticised in Pakistan, though few citizens realised the gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the war. Political leaders were also criticised. Following the advice of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's foreign minister, Ayub Khan had raised very high expectations among the people of Pakistan about the superiority – if not invincibility – of its armed forces, [187] but Pakistan's inability to attain its military aims during the war created a political liability for Ayub. [188] The defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions in the war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition. [189]

One of the farthest reaching consequences of the war was the wide-scale economic slowdown in Pakistan. [190] [191] The war ended the impressive economic growth Pakistan had experienced since the early 1960s. Between 1964 and 1966, Pakistan's defence spending rose from 4.82% to 9.86% of GDP, putting a tremendous strain on Pakistan's economy. By 1970–71, defence spending comprised a whopping 55.66% of government expenditure. [192] According to veterans of the war, the war greatly cost Pakistan economically, politically, and militarily. [193] Nuclear theorist Feroze Khan maintained that the 1965 war was a last conventional attempt to snatch Kashmir by military force, and Pakistan's own position in the international community, especially with the United States, began to deteriorate from the point the war started, while on the other hand, the alliance with China saw improvements. [193] Chairman joint chiefs General Tariq Majid claims in his memoirs that Chou En-Lai had longed advised the government in the classic style of Sun Tzu: "to go slow, not to push India hard; and avoid a fight over Kashmir, 'for at least, 20–30 years, until you have developed your economy and consolidated your national power'." [193] General Majid maintained in Eating Grass that the "sane, philosophical and political critical thinking" was missing in Pakistan, and that the country had lost extensive human resources by fighting the war. [193]

Pakistan was surprised by the lack of support from the United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation. The US turned neutral in the war when it cut off military supplies to Pakistan (and India); [21] an action that the Pakistanis took as a sign of betrayal. [194] After the war, Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support.

Another negative consequence of the war was growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh), [148] particularly for West Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir. [195] Bengali leaders accused the central government of not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir. [196] In fact, despite some Pakistan Air Force attacks being launched from bases in East Pakistan during the war, India did not retaliate in that sector, [197] although East Pakistan was defended only by an understrengthed infantry division (14th Division), sixteen planes and no tanks. [198] Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was critical of the disparity in military resources deployed in East and West Pakistan, calling for greater autonomy for East Pakistan, an action that ultimately led to the Bangladesh Liberation War and another war between India and Pakistan in 1971.

Pakistan celebrates "Defence Day" every year to commemorate 6 September 1965 to pay tribute to the soldiers killed in the war. [199] However, Pakistani journalists, including Taha Siddiqui [200] and Haseeb Asif [201] have criticized the celebration of Defence Day.


National awards

Gallantry awards

For bravery, the following soldiers were awarded the highest gallantry award of their respective countries, the Indian award Param Vir Chakra and the Pakistani award Nishan-e-Haider:


Battle honours

After the war, a total of 16 battle honours and 3 theatre honours were awarded to units of the Indian Army, the notable amongst which are: [206]

See also


  1. Licence-built North American F-86 Sabres with Canadian engines.

Related Research Articles

Since the partition of British India in 1947 and creation of dominions of India and Pakistan, the two countries have been involved in a number of wars, conflicts and military stand-offs. The Kashmir issue has been the main cause of all major conflicts between the two countries with the exception of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 where conflict originated due to turmoil in erstwhile East Pakistan.

Indian Air Force Air warfare branch of Indias military

The Indian Air Force (IAF) is the air arm of the Indian Armed Forces. Its complement of personnel and aircraft assets ranks fourth amongst the air forces of the world. Its primary mission is to secure Indian airspace and to conduct aerial warfare during armed conflict. It was officially established on 8 October 1932 as an auxiliary air force of the British Empire which honoured India's aviation service during World War II with the prefix Royal. After India gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1947, the name Royal Indian Air Force was kept and served in the name of Dominion of India. With the government's transition to a Republic in 1950, the prefix Royal was removed after only three years.

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 Military confrontation between India and Pakistan alongside the Bangladesh Liberation War

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was a military confrontation between India and Pakistan that occurred during the liberation war in East Pakistan from 3 December 1971 to the fall of Dacca (Dhaka) on 16 December 1971. The war began with preemptive aerial strikes on 11 Indian air stations, which led to the commencement of hostilities with Pakistan and Indian entry into the war of independence in East Pakistan on the side of Bengali nationalist forces. Lasting just 13 days, it is one of the shortest wars in history.

The Battle of Lahore or the Lahore Front were a series of battles in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 fought in around Lahore. The battle ended with an Indian victory. Indian forces halted their assault on Lahore once they had reached captured the village of Burki. The rationale for this was that a ceasefire was to be signed soon, and had India captured Lahore, It would likely have been returned in ceasefire negotiations.

Battle of Chawinda

The Battle of Chawinda was a part of the Sialkot Campaign in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. It was one of the largest tank battles in history since the Battle of Kursk in World War II.

Asghar Khan Pakistani Air Force air marshal

Mohammad Asghar Khan, was a Pakistani politician and an autobiographer, later a dissident serving for the cause of pacifism, peace, and the human rights.

Frontier Force Regiment of the Pakistani Army

The Frontier Force Regiment is one of six infantry regiments of the Pakistan Army. They are popularly known as the "Piffers" (a reference to the former PIF or as the "FF". The regiment takes its name from the historic North-West Frontier.

Operation Chengiz Khan was the code name assigned to the preemptive strikes carried out by the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) on the forward airbases and radar installations of the Indian Air Force (IAF) on the evening of 3 December 1971, and marked the formal initiation of hostilities of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. The operation targeted 11 of India's airfields and also included artillery strikes on Indian positions in Kashmir. The targets were the Indian Airbases of Amritsar, Ambala, Agra, Awantipur, Bikaner, Halwara, Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Pathankot, Bhuj, Srinagar and Uttarlai and air defence radars at Amritsar and Faridkot.

History of the Indian Air Force

The history of the Indian Air Force began with its establishment in 1932 and continues up to the present day.

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 saw the Indian and Pakistani Air Forces engaged in large-scale aerial combat against each other for the first time since the Partition of India in 1947. The war took place during the course of September 1965 and saw both air forces conduct defensive and offensive operations over Indian and Pakistani airspace. The aerial war saw both sides conducting thousands of sorties in a single month. Both sides claimed victory in the air war; Pakistan claimed to have destroyed 104 enemy aircraft against its own losses of 19, while India claimed to have destroyed 73 enemy aircraft and lost 35 of its own. Despite the intense fighting, the conflict was effectively a stalemate.

Defence Day defence day of Pakisyani

Defence Day is celebrated in Pakistan as national day to commemorate the sacrifices made by Pakistani soldiers in defending its borders. The date of 6 September marks the day in 1965 when Indian troops crossed the international border to launch an attack on Pakistani Punjab, in a riposte to Pakistan's Operation Grand Slam targeting Jammu. The Pakistani narrative holds that it was an unprovoked surprise attack by India, which was repulsed by the Pakistan Army despite its smaller size and fewer armaments. The narrative has been criticised by Pakistani commentators as representing false history.

Air Commodore Mukhtar Ahmad Dogar was the Pakistan Air Force bomber pilot and aerial warfare specialist who was the first military person to receive the Pakistani military award Sitara-e-Jurat. A World War II veteran, he is most known for his participation in Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 when he had intercepted the IAF fighter jets. A founding and former member of what is known now as Special Service Wing, Dogar is known to be instrument in creation of a special forces unit for the Pakistan Air Force called the Special Service Wing (SSW).

Battle of Chamb

The Battle of Chamb, 1971 was a battle in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. The Pakistani Army invaded Chamb on the same principle as the Battle of Chamb (1965). The Pakistan Army's primary objective was to capture the town of Chamb and surrounding areas which had strategic importance for both Pakistan and India. Previously, in 1965, the Pakistani Army was able to reach further beyond Chamb and was threatening Akhnur, a vital medium-sized town. India had captured Hajipir pass and made substantial progress in the Hajipir pass area in 1965, a key strategic location which the Pakistani Army had captured at the end of the 1947-48 Kashmir War. The Hajipir pass connects Uri and Poonch. Pakistan regained possession of the Hajipir pass as a result of the Tashkent Declaration, an area the country still controls today.

The Battle of Burki (Barki) was a battle fought by Indian infantry and Pakistani armour in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Barki is a village that lies south-east of Lahore near the border with Punjab, India. and is connected with Lahore by the Bridge of Ichogil canal. During the fighting, the relative strengths of the two sides were fairly even and Indian infantry clashed with Pakistani forces that were entrenched in pillboxes, dug-outs and slit trenches that had been carved into the canal banks. The Pakistanis were supported with a large number of tanks, as well as fighter jets. The battle resulted in an Indian victory.

Air Force Day (Pakistan)

Air Force Day is celebrated in Pakistan as a national day on 7 September, after the annual celebration of the Defence Day. Airshows and other programs mark the Pakistan Air Force's (PAF) role in defending the nation in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965.

No. 31 Squadron IAF, nicknamed the Lions, is a Ground Attack squadron of the Indian Air Force, equipped with Su-30MKI aircraft operating from Jodhpur Air Force Station.

20th Lancers is an armoured regiment in the Armoured Corps of the Indian Army. The regiment distinguished itself in operations with its defence of Chhamb in Jammu and Kashmir during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War winning one Maha Vir Chakra.

Adampur Airport Indian Air Force base in Western Sector

Adampur Air Force Station,Jalandhar is located at Adampur Town of Jalandhar district in Northern India, It is situated on Jalandhar-Hoshiarpur main Highway and 23 kilometers northeast of Jalandhar, Punjab. It is the second largest military airbase of India. It lies within 100 km of Indo-Pak Border and home to No. 47 Squadron IAF and No. 223 Squadron IAF.

2019 Jammu and Kashmir airstrikes Operation Swift Retort

On 27 February 2019, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) conducted six surprise airstrikes at multiple locations in Indian-Administered Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The airstrikes were part of PAF military operation codename Operation Swift Retort and were conducted in retaliation of Indian Air Force (IAF) airstrike in Balakot just a day before on 26 February.


  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Rakshak, Bharat. "Page 15" (PDF). Official History. Times of India. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 June 2011. Retrieved 14 July 2011.
  2. 1 2 T. V. Paul 1994, p. 107.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 SIngh, Lt.Gen Harbaksh (1991). War Despatches. New Delhi: Lancer International. p. 7. ISBN   978-81-7062-117-1.
  4. 1 2 Rakshak, Bharat. "Page 14" (PDF). Official History. Times of India. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 June 2011. Retrieved 14 July 2011.
  5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Thomas M. Leonard (2006). Encyclopedia of the developing world. Taylor & Francis. pp. 806–. ISBN   978-0-415-97663-3 . Retrieved 14 April 2011.
  6. 1 2 "Indo-Pakistan Wars". Archived from the original on 8 May 2009.
  7. Tucker, Spencer (2004). Tanks: An Illustrated History of Their Impact. ABC-CLIO. p. 172. ISBN   978-1-57607-995-9.
  8. 1 2 3 Praagh, The Greater Game, 2003 & p-294.
  9. 1 2 3 Jamal, Shadow War 2009, p. 86.
  10. Van Creveld, 2012, pp. 286–287.
  11. 1 2 "Official History of IAF in 65 War" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 September 2012. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
  12. 1 2 "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 27 September 2013. Retrieved 11 February 2014.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  13. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Nordeen, Lon O. (1985), Air Warfare in the Missile Age, Smithsonian Institution Press, pp. 149–151, ISBN   978-0-87474-680-8
  14. 1 2 1965 War: A Different Legacy: ALL THINGS PAKISTAN. (6 September 1965). Retrieved on 2011-04-14.
  15. 1965 War Archived 7 January 2016 at the Wayback Machine . Pakistan army (1 September 2009). Retrieved on 2011-04-14.
  16. Tucker, Spencer (2004). Tanks: An Illustrated History of Their Impact. p. 172. ISBN   9781576079959.
  17. The Sunday Tribune – Spectrum. Retrieved on 14 April 2011.
  18. David R. Higgins 2016.
  19. Rachna Bisht 2015.
  20. Lyon, Peter (2008). Conflict between India and Pakistan: an encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 82. ISBN   978-1-57607-712-2 . Retrieved 30 October 2011.
  21. 1 2 3 4 5 "Indo-Pakistani War of 1965". Global Security.
  22. Dijink, Gertjan (2002). National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain. Routledge. ISBN   9781134771295. The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts.
  23. 1 2 McGarr, Paul. The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945–1965. Cambridge University Press, 2013. p. 331. ISBN   978-1-139-02207-1. "Satisfied that it had secured a strategic and psychological victory over Pakistan by frustrating its attempt to seize Kashmir by force, when the UN resolution was passed, India accepted its terms ... with Pakistan's stocks of ammunition and other essential supplies all but exhausted, and with the military balance tipping steadily in India's favour."
  24. 1 2 3 Pakistan :: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Library of Congress Country Studies, United States of America. April 1994. Retrieved 2 October 2010. "Losses were relatively heavy—on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan."
  25. Hagerty, Devin (2005). South Asia in world politics. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 26. ISBN   978-0-7425-2587-0. Quote: The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time the United Nations intervened on 22 September, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat.
  26. Wolpert, Stanley (2005). India (3rd ed. with a new preface. ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press. p. 235. ISBN   978-0-520-24696-6. Quote: India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.
  27. Kux, Dennis (1992). India and the United States : Estranged democracies, 1941–1991. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. p. 238. ISBN   978-0-7881-0279-0. Quote: India had the better of the war.
  28. "Asia: Silent Guns, Wary Combatants". Time. 1 October 1965. Retrieved 30 August 2013. Quote: India, by contrast, is still the big gainer in the war. Alternate link
  29. Kux, Dennis (2006). India-Pakistan Negotiations: Is Past Still Prologue?. US Institute of Peace Press. p. 30. ISBN   9781929223879. The conflict was short, but nasty. After seventeen days, both sides accepted a UN Security Council call for a cease-fire. Although the two militaries fought to a standoff, India won by not losing.
  30. 1 2 Small, Andrew (2015). The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics. Oxford University Press. p. 17. ISBN   978-0-19-021075-5. "... the war itself was a disaster for Pakistan, from the first failed attempts by Pakistani troops to precipitate an insurgency in Kashmir to the appearance of Indian artillery within range of Lahore International Airport."
  31. 1 2 Conley, Jerome (2001). Indo-Russian military and nuclear cooperation: lessons and options for U.S. policy in South Asia. Lexington Books. ISBN   978-0-7391-0217-6.
  32. 1 2 Profile of Pakistan  U.S. Department of State, Failure of U.S.'s Pakistan Policy  – Interview with Steve Coll
  33. 1 2 Speech of Bill McCollum Archived 4 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine in United States House of Representatives 12 September 1994
  34. 1 2 South Asia in World Politics By Devin T. Hagerty, 2005 Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN   0-7425-2587-2, p. 26
  35. McGarr, Paul. The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945–1965. Cambridge University Press, 2013. p. 315. ISBN   978-1-139-02207-1. "... after some initial success, the momentum behind Pakistan's thrust into Kashmir slowed, and the state's inhabitants rejected exhortations from the Pakistani insurgents to join them in taking up arms against their Indian "oppressors." Pakistan's inability to muster support from the local Kashmiri population proved a disaster, both militarily and politically."
  36. 1 2 Small, Andrew (2015). The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics. Oxford University Press. pp. 17–19. ISBN   978-0-19-021075-5. "Mao had decided that China would intervene under two conditions—that India attacked East Pakistan, and that Pakistan requested Chinese intervention. In the end, neither of them [were] obtained."
  37. McGarr, Paul. The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945–1965. Cambridge University Press, 2013. pp. 325–327. ISBN   978-1-139-02207-1.
  38. 1 2 Riedel, Bruce (2013). Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back. Brookings Institution Press. pp. 66–68. ISBN   978-0-8157-2408-7.
  39. 1 2 Riedel, Bruce (2013). Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back. Brookings Institution Press. pp. 67–70. ISBN   978-0-8157-2408-7.
  40. 1 2 McGarr, Paul. The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945–1965. Cambridge University Press, 2013. pp. 324–326. ISBN   978-1-139-02207-1.
  41. McGarr, Paul. The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945–1965. Cambridge University Press, 2013. pp. 350–353. ISBN   978-1-139-02207-1."In retrospect, it is clear that the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 represented a watershed in the West's association with the subcontinent."
  42. McGarr, Paul. The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945–1965. Cambridge University Press, 2013. pp. 360–363. ISBN   978-1-139-02207-1."By extending the Cold War into South Asia, however, the United States did succeed in disturbing the subcontinent's established politico-military equilibrium, undermining British influence in the region, embittering relations between India and Pakistan and, ironically, facilitating the expansion of communist influence in the developing world."
  43. Riedel, Bruce (2013). Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back. Brookings Institution Press. pp. 69–70. ISBN   978-0-8157-2408-7. "The legacy of the Johnson arms cut-off remains alive today. Indians simply do not believe that America will be there when India needs military help ... the legacy of the U.S. "betrayal" still haunts U.S.-Pakistan relations today."
  44. 1 2 Brecher, Michael; Wilkenfeld, Jonathan (November 1997). A study of crisis. University of Michigan Press. pp. 171–172. ISBN   978-0-472-10806-0 . Retrieved 3 November 2011.
  45. Press Trust of India, Islamabad bureau (14 September 2009). "Pak's intrusions on borders triggered 1965 war: Durrani". Times of India. Retrieved 3 November 2011.
  46. Bhushan, Chodarat. "Tulbul, Sir Creek and Siachen: Competitive Methodologies" Archived 21 April 2006 at the Wayback Machine . South Asian Journal. March 2005, Encyclopædia Britannica and Open Forum – UNIDIR Archived 27 March 2006 at the Wayback Machine
  47. Defence Journal. September 2000
  48. Mankekar, D. R. (1967). Twentytwo fateful days: Pakistan cut to size. Manaktalas. pp. 62–63, 67. Retrieved 8 November 2011.
  50. 1 2 3 "Underestimating India". Indian Express. 4 September 2009. Retrieved 21 December 2011.
  51. "Pakistan's Endgame in Kashmir – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace". Retrieved 21 December 2011.
  52. "Indian Air Force :: Flight of the Falcon". 28 August 2010. Retrieved 21 December 2011.
  53. "1965 – last chance to get Kashmir by force – Bhutto". Retrieved 21 December 2011.
  54. R. D. Pradhan (1 January 2007). 1965 War, the Inside Story: Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War. Atlantic Publishers & Dist. p. 12. ISBN   978-81-269-0762-5.
  55. R. D. Pradhan (1 January 2007). 1965 War, the Inside Story: Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War. Atlantic Publishers & Dist. p. 10. ISBN   978-81-269-0762-5.
  57. Brigadier Desmond E Hayde, "The Battle of Dograi and Batapore", Natraj Publishers, New Delhi, 2006
  58. The Tribune, Chandigarh, India – Opinions. Retrieved on 14 April 2011.
  59. Army cries out for a second railway line between Barmer and Jaisalmer Archived 5 June 2011 at the Wayback Machine . Hindustan Times (17 December 2009). Retrieved on 2011-04-14.
  60. History of Indo-Pak War of 1965. Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed (ret). ISBN   969-8693-01-7
  61. "Delhi plans carnival on Pakistan war- Focus on 1965 conflict and outcome".
  62. The Story of My Struggle By Tajammal Hussain Malik 1991, Jang Publishers, p. 78
  63. 1 2 Arif, General K. M. (2001). Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947–1997. Oxford University Press. p. 88. ISBN   978-0-19-579396-3.
  64. Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of misunderstanding By Husain Haqqani page 115
  65. Nordeen, Lon O. (2002). Air warfare in the missile age (2 ed.). Smithsonian Institution Press. ISBN   978-1-58834-083-2.
  66. "Illustrated Weekly of Pakistan". Illustrated Weekly of Pakistan. 1966.
  67. Grover, Verinder; Arora, Ranjana (1998). 50 Years of Indo-Pak Relations: Chronology of events, important documents, 1947–1997. Deep and Deep Publications. p. 43. ISBN   9788176290593.
  68. John Fricker, "Pakistan's Air Power", Flight International issue published 1969, p. 89, retrieved: 3 November 2009
  69. See the main article Sabre Slayer for the complete list on this issue including sources.
  70. Rakshak, Bharat. "Indian Air Force Combat Kills, Indo Pakistan War 1965." Archived 5 November 2006 at the Wayback Machine History. Retrieved 4 November 2010.
  71. Spick 2002, p. 161.
  72. Ahmad Faruqui, "The right stuff" Archived 29 March 2010 at the Wayback Machine , Dawn News , 14 September 2009, Retrieved: 1 November 2009. Also published as "The Debt Owed" on 16 September 2009 by []
  73. Edward V. Coggins; Ed Coggins (15 May 2000). Wings That Stay on. Turner Publishing Company. pp. 164–. ISBN   978-1-56311-568-4 . Retrieved 14 April 2011.
  74. Mike Spick (5 August 2002). The Illustrated Directory of Fighters. Zenith Imprint. pp. 161–. ISBN   978-0-7603-1343-5 . Retrieved 14 April 2011.
  75. "1965 War, Chapter 3." Archived 6 July 2013 at the Wayback Machine Retrieved: 4 November 2010.
  76. 1 2 Air Commodore M. Kaiser Tufail. "Run ... It's a 104". Jang News. Archived from the original on 19 March 2007.
  77. Dr Shah Alam (11 April 2012). Pakistan Army: Modernisation, Arms Procurement and Capacity Building. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd. p. 41. ISBN   978-93-81411-79-7.
  78. Archived 5 November 2006 at the Wayback Machine
  79. John Fricker, "Pakistan's Air Power", Flight International issue published 1969, pp. 89–90. , . Retrieved: 3 November 2009
  80. 1 2 The Encyclopedia of 20th Century Air Warfare Edited by Chris Bishop (amber publishing 1997, republished 2004 pages 384–387 ISBN   1-904687-26-1)
  81. 1 2 Werrell, Kenneth (2013). Sabres Over MiG Alley: The F-86 and the Battle for Air Superiority in Korea. Naval Institute Press. p. 188. ISBN   978-1-61251-344-7.
  82. 30 Seconds Over Sargodha – The Making of a Myth: 1965 Indo-Pak Air War, Chapter 5 Archived 7 February 2010 at the Wayback Machine , Bharat Rakshak
  83. Pakistan's Sabre Ace by Jon Guttman, Aviation History, Sept 1998.
  84. Singh, Pushpindar (1991). Fiza ya, Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force. Himalayan Books. p. 30. ISBN   978-81-7002-038-7.
  85. War of attrition
  86. Flight of the Falcon
  87. Haider, Sayed Sajad (2009). Flight of the Falcon. Vanguard Books. ISBN   978-969-402-526-1.
  88. A history of the Pakistan Army Archived 7 September 2006 at the Wayback Machine  – Defence Journal, Pakistan
  89. 90mm M36 GUN MOTOR CARRIAGE "Jackson" Post W.W.II, the M36 was employed by the US Army in Korea and was distributed to friendly nations including France, where it was used in Indo-China (Vietnam), Pakistan.
  90. The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965 A Strategic and Operational Analysis Archived 7 October 2007 at the Wayback Machine Major A.H. Amin, 30 December 2001 Orbat
  91. Seidenman Harrison, Selig (1978). The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy. Free Press. p. 269.
  92. Hagerty, Devin T. The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia. MIT Press. p. 70.
  93. 1 2 Heginbotham, Stanley J; Wriggins, William Howard (1971). India and Japan: The Emerging Balance of Power in Asia. Columbia University East Asian Institute. p. 254.
  94. Zaloga, Steve; Laurier, Jim (1999). The M47 and M48 Patton tanks. p. 35. ISBN   978-1-85532-825-9.
  95. Steven J. Zaloga (1999). The M47 and M48 Patton Tanks. Osprey Publishing. p. 35. ISBN   978-1-85532-825-9.
  96. Singh, Lt. Gen.Harbaksh (1991). War Despatches. New Delhi: Lancer International. p. 159. ISBN   978-81-7062-117-1.
  97. Rakshak, Bharat. "Operations in Sialkot Sector pg32" (PDF). Official History. Times of India. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 June 2011. Retrieved 12 July 2011.
  98. ": PAKISTAN NAVY :. A Silent Force to Reckon with ... [a 4 dimensional force]". Archived from the original on 5 December 2011. Retrieved 21 December 2011.
  99. Pakistan Intelligence, Security Activities & Operations Handbook By IBP USA
  100. India's Quest for Security: defence policies, 1947–1965 By Lorne John Kavic, 1967, University of California Press, pp 190
  101. Working paper, Issue 192, Australian National University. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1989, ISBN   0-7315-0806-8, 9780-7315-0806-8
  102. India's Foreign Policy, Ghosh Anjali, Dorling Kindersley Pvt Ltd, ISBN   978-81-317-1025-8
  103. Hiranandani, G. M. (January 2000). Transition to triumph: history of the Indian Navy, 1965–1975. Lancer Publishers. pp. 33–39. ISBN   978-1-897829-72-1 . Retrieved 3 November 2011.
  104. South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China By Lowell Dittmer, pp 77
  105. THE INDIAN END OF THE TELESCOPE India and Its Navy by Vice Admiral Gulab Hiranandani, Indian Navy (Retired), Naval War College Review, Spring 2002, Vol. LV, No. 2
  106. Iqbal F Quadir  – Pakistan's Defence Journal
  107. 1 2 "SSG in the 1965 War". Defence Journal. Archived from the original on 27 September 2011. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
  108. 1 2 The Fighter Gap by Shoab Alam Khan in Defence Journal
  109. Defence Journal: The Way it was Extracts from Pakistan Army Brigadier (Retd) ZA Khan's book
  110. Ending the Suspense 17 September 1965, TIME magazine
  111. Remembering Our Warriors Brig (Retd) Shamim Yasin Manto S.I.(M), S.Bt, Q&A session: ("How would you assess the failures and successes of the SSG in the 1965 War?") Archived 3 May 2013 at the Wayback Machine February 2002, Defence Journal
  112. 1 2 3 4 "Ceasefire & After". Archived from the original on 16 July 2012. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
  113. "Grand Slam – A Battle of Lost Opportunities". Archived from the original on 5 August 2012. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
  114. "onwar". onwar. Archived from the original on 28 July 2012. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
  115. "Part I-Section 4: Ministry of Defence (Army Branch)". The Gazette of India. 9 October 1965. pp. 520–522.
  116. "Part I-Section 4: Ministry of Defence (Army Branch)". The Gazette of India. 16 October 1965. pp. 538–540.
  117. "Part I-Section 4: Ministry of Defence (Army Branch)". The Gazette of India. 6 November 1965. pp. 571–573.
  118. "Part I-Section 4: Ministry of Defence (Army Branch)". The Gazette of India. 13 November 1965. pp. 587–588.
  119. "Part I-Section 4: Ministry of Defence (Army Branch)". The Gazette of India. 27 November 1965. pp. 624–626.
  120. "Part I-Section 4: Ministry of Defence (Army Branch)". The Gazette of India. 1 January 1966. pp. 4–6.
  121. "Part I-Section 4: Ministry of Defence (Army Branch)". The Gazette of India. 29 January 1966. pp. 59–61.
  122. Group Captain Cecil Chaudhry, SJ – Chowk: India Pakistan Ideas Archived 11 May 2005 at the Wayback Machine . Chowk (9 December 2007). Retrieved on 2011-04-14.
  123. Singh, Pushpindar (1991). Fiza ya, Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force. Himalayan Books. ISBN   978-81-7002-038-7.
  124. "IAF war kills in 1965 war" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 27 November 2010. Retrieved 29 December 2011.
  125. 1 2 Hagerty, Devin (2005). South Asia in world politics. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN   978-0-7425-2587-0.
  126. Dijkink, Gertjan. National identity and geopolitical visions: maps of pride and pain. Routledge, 1996. ISBN   978-0-415-13934-2.
  127. India by Stanley Wolpert. Published: University of California Press, 1990
  128. "India and the United States estranged democracies", 1941–1991, ISBN   1-4289-8189-6, DIANE Publishing, Pg 238
  129. Johnson, Robert (2005). A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947. Reaktion Books. ISBN   978-1-86189-257-7.
  130. William M. Carpenter, David G. Wiencek (2005). Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new security environment. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN   978-0-7656-1553-4.
  131. John Keay (2003). India: A History. Grove Press. ISBN   978-0-275-97779-5.
  132. Uk Heo, Shale Asher Horowitz (2000). Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN   978-0-8021-3797-5.
  133. Source
  134. 1 2 Fortna, Virginia (2004). Peace time: cease-fire agreements and the durability of peace. Princeton University Press. ISBN   978-0-691-11512-2.
  135. Dilger, Robert (2003). American transportation policy. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN   978-0-275-97853-2.
  136. A Cease-Fire of Sorts 5 November 1965  TIME
  137. "The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965", Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 2005
  138. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War By Victoria Schofield Published 2003, by I.B.Tauris ISBN   1-86064-898-3 pp112
  139. CONTROVERSY: Why Gohar Ayub is wrong about 1965 – Khalid Hasan quoting Pakistan author Husain Haqqani: "The Pakistani people were told by the state that they had been victims of aggression and that the aggression had been repelled with the help of God. ... official propaganda convinced the people of Pakistan that their military had won the war." Daily Times, 10 June 2005
  140. Can the ISI change its spots? By Akhtar Payami, Dawn (newspaper) 7 October 2006
  141. Army attempts to prevent book sales by Amir Mir Archived 26 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine Gulf News 1 October 2006 Musharraf buys all copies of sensitive '65 war Daily News & Analysis
  142. Inside Story of Musharraf-Mahmood Tussle, Hassan Abbas, Sep. 26, 2006  – (Belfer Center for International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School of Government)
  143. Catalogue of the National Defence University Library, Islamabad, Title: History of Indo Pak War-1965 Author: Mahmud Ahmed Lt Gen Retd
  144. Illusion of Victory: A Military History of the Indo-Pak War-1965, Mahmud Ahmed, Lexicon Publishers, 2002 – India
  145. Musharraf, the 'poor man's Ataturk' By Khalid Hasan 19 September 2004 Daily Times
  146. The Crisis Game: Simulating International Conflict by Sidney F. Giffin
  147. 1965 decided fate of the subcontinent An Impending Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, by Susmit Kumar, Ph.D.
  148. 1 2 Stephen Philip Cohen (2004). The Idea of Pakistan. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN   978-0-8157-1502-3. Pages 103, 73–74
  149. Noor Khan for early end to army rule  – Pakistan Daily The Nation Archived 21 October 2007 at the Wayback Machine
  150. A word from Pak: 1965 was 'wrong' The Times of India 6 September 2005
  151. Editorial: The army and the people Daily Times 1 June 2007
  152. The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971 Analysis and reappraisal after the 1965 War by Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin
  153. Riedel, Bruce (2013). Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back. Brookings Institution Press. p. 55. ISBN   978-0-8157-2408-7.
  154. Dimitrakis, Panagiotis (2012). Failed Alliances of the Cold War: Britain's Strategy and Ambitions in Asia and the Middle East. Tauris & Co. pp. 39–44. ISBN   978-1-84885-974-6. "Defence aid was restricted to the extent that Pakistan would be able to present only a limited defence in the event of communist aggression ... Western strategists sought to keep Pakistan ... in a position where it did not feel itself powerful enough to initiate a confrontation with India."
  155. United States – Pakistan Alliance. Library of Congress Country Studies, United States of America. April 1994. Retrieved 29 October 2010.
  156. Dimitrakis, Panagiotis (2012). Failed Alliances of the Cold War: Britain's Strategy and Ambitions in Asia and the Middle East. Tauris & Co. pp. 53–55. ISBN   978-1-84885-974-6.
  157. Dimitrakis, Panagiotis (2012). Failed Alliances of the Cold War: Britain's Strategy and Ambitions in Asia and the Middle East. Tauris & Co. pp. 55–58. ISBN   978-1-84885-974-6.
  158. 1 2 Butt; Schofield, Usama; Julian (2012). Pakistan: the U.S., geopolitics and grand strategies. Pluto Press. p. 156. ISBN   978-0-7453-3206-2.
  159. 1 2 3 4 5 McGarr, Paul. The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945–1965. Cambridge University Press, 2013. pp. 330–331. ISBN   978-1-139-02207-1.
  160. Dimitrakis, Panagiotis (2012). Failed Alliances of the Cold War: Britain's Strategy and Ambitions in Asia and the Middle East. Tauris & Co. p. 58. ISBN   978-1-84885-974-6.
  161. Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology, By Anas Malik page 84
  162. Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology, By Anas Malik page 85
  163. Dimitrakis, Panagiotis (2012). Failed Alliances of the Cold War: Britain's Strategy and Ambitions in Asia and the Middle East. Tauris & Co. p. 57. ISBN   978-1-84885-974-6.
  164. M. J. Akbar (17 November 2014). "High priest of modern India". [The Economic Times. Retrieved 17 November 2014.
  165. T. V. Paul 1994, p. 119.
  166. Silent Guns, Wary Combatants, TIME magazine, 1 October 1965
  167. The 1965 war with Pakistan  Encyclopædia Britannica
  168. Sunday Times, London. 19 September 1965
  169. Black, Jeremy (2005). War in the modern world since 1815. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN   978-0-7425-2587-0.
  170. "1965 war: We achieved air superiority in three days, says Air Force Marshal Arjan Singh". Economic Times. 4 October 2015. Retrieved 28 October 2015.
  171. Perkovich, George (26 February 2002). India's nuclear bomb: the impact on global proliferation. University of California Press, 1999. ISBN   978-0-520-23210-5.
  172. Title: India and the United States estranged democracies, 1941–1991, ISBN   1-4289-8189-6, DIANE Publishing
  173. Brzoska, Michael (1994). Women's and Gender History in Global Perspective. Univ of South Carolina Press, 1994. ISBN   978-0-87249-982-9.
  174. Sharma, Ram (1999). India-USSR relations. Discovery Publishing House, 1999. ISBN   978-81-7141-486-4.
  175. Duncan, Peter (1989). The Soviet Union and India. Routledge. ISBN   978-0-415-00212-7.
  176. Zeev, Maoz (1990). Paradoxes of war: on the art of national self-entrapmen. Routledge. ISBN   978-0-04-445113-6.
  177. Declassified telegram sent to the US Department of State
  178. 1 2 Haidar Imtiaz, 1965: How Pakistan won the war of propaganda, The Nation, 12 September 2015.
  179. Inter-Services Public Relations (2015) [first published 1966], Indo-Pakistan War of 1965: A Flashback (PDF) (Third ed.), Government of Pakistan, Department of Films and Publications
  180. Pakistan And Its Three Wars by Vice Adm (Retd) Iqbal F Quadir  – Defence Journal, Pakistan
  181. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat Richard H. Shultz, Andrea Dew: "The Martial Races Theory had firm adherents in Pakistan and this factor played a major role in the under-estimation of the Indian Army by Pakistani soldiers as well as civilian decision makers in 1965."
  182. An Analysis The Sepoy Rebellion of 1857–59 by AH Amin The army officers of that period were convinced that they were a martial race and the Hindus of Indian Army were cowards. This myth was largely disproved in 1965
  183. Rais, Rasul Bux (1986). The Indian Ocean and the superpowers: economic, political and strategic perspectives. Routledge. ISBN   978-0-7099-4241-2.
  184. "Pakistan Lost Terribly in 1965 War With India: Pak Historian". NDTV. 2015.
  185. "Pakistan's Air Power", Flight International , issue published 5 May 1984 (page 1208). Can be viewed at archives Retrieved: 22 October 2009
  186. Fricker, John (1979). Battle for Pakistan: The Air War of 1965. I. Allan. ISBN   978-0-7110-0929-5.
  187. Dr. Ahmad Faruqui Archived 14 December 2004 at the Wayback Machine
  188. Hassan Abbas (2004). Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror. M.E. Sharpe. p. 52. ISBN   978-0-7656-1497-1.
  189. Ali, Mahmud. (24 December 2003) South Asia | The rise of Pakistan's army. BBC News. Retrieved on 2011-04-14.
  190. Embassy of Pakistan Archived 16 May 2006 at the Wayback Machine
  191. Second opinion: The insidious logic of war Khaled Ahmed's Urdu Press Review Daily Times 3 June 2002
  192. Greg Cashman, Leonard C. Robinson (2007). An introduction to the causes of war: patterns of interstate conflict from World War I to Iraq. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN   978-0-7425-5510-5.
  193. 1 2 3 4 Khan, Feroz Hassan. "The Reluctant Phase". Eating grass : the making of the Pakistani bomb. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. pp. 45–48 [48]. ISBN   978-0-8047-7601-1 . Retrieved 21 February 2013.
  194. Richard N. Haass "Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy", 1998, Council on Foreign Relations, ISBN   0-87609-212-1 pp172
  195. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age By Peter Paret, 1986, Oxford University Press, ISBN   0-19-820097-8 pp802
  196. Rounaq Jahan (1972). Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. Columbia University Press. ISBN   978-0-231-03625-2. Pg 166–167
  197. Reflections on two military presidents By M.P. Bhandara 25 December 2005, Dawn
  198. The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971 Yahya Khan as Army Chief-1966-1971 by Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin
  199. September 6: A day to remember the sacrifices of Pakistan's martyrs, Dawn, 6 September 2018
  200. Taha Siddiqui Dear Pakistanis, this Defence Day, please stop celebrating hate, Al Jazeera, 6 September 2018
  201. It's Defence Day In Pakistan, But I Don't Know What We're Celebrating, Huffington Post, 6 September 2018.
  202. Singh, Patwant (19 December 2003). "Last salute to the lion of 1965". The Indian Express. Retrieved 12 October 2018.
  203. "Unique Achievements". Bengal Sappers Officers Association. Archived from the original on 15 September 2008.
  204. 1 2 Cardozo, Major General Ian (retd.) (2003), Param Vir: Our Heroes in Battle, New Delhi: Roli Books, pp. 101–103, ISBN   978-81-7436-262-9
  205. "Major Raja Aziz Bhatti". Nishan-i-Haider recipients. Pakistan Army. Retrieved 25 September 2013.
  206. Singh, Sarbans (1993). Battle Honours of the Indian Army 1757 – 1971. New Delhi: Vision Books. pp. 242–256. ISBN   978-81-7094-115-6 . Retrieved 3 November 2011.