Macartney Embassy

Last updated

Lord Macartney's embassy, 1793 LordMacartneyEmbassyToChina1793.jpg
Lord Macartney's embassy, 1793

Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its borders. There is therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce.

Qianlong Emperor, Second Edict to King George III of Great Britain, 1792 [31]

Despite this dismissal, Qianlong had noted the military superiority implied by several gifts: six brass cannon, a flintlock with an advanced firing mechanism and a model of HMS Royal Sovereign. The gifts that might really have shifted Chinese perceptions were steel and steam: locomotives and steel rails would dramatically increase the productivity of Britain in a few years time. The flexibility of steel swords was noted by courtiers, but the model steam engine was not unpacked. [32] Instead it was given to Dinwiddie to show off in India. China would not acquire advanced steel production until several decades into Mao Zedong's premiership in the People's Republic of China period.

Chinese soldier, by William Alexander ChineseSoldierByWilliamAlexander1793.JPG
Chinese soldier, by William Alexander

Although ultimately unsuccessful in its primary objectives, the circumstances surrounding the mission provided ample opportunity for both British and Chinese parties to feel totally satisfied about the compromises and concessions they had made. The failure of the primary objectives was not due to Macartney's refusal to kowtow in the presence of the Emperor, as is sometimes believed. It was also not a result of the Chinese reliance on tradition in dictating foreign policy, but rather a result of competing world views which were uncomprehending and to some extent incompatible. After the conclusion of the embassy, Qianlong sent a letter to King George III, explaining in greater depth the reasons for his refusal to grant the several requests presented to the Chinese emperor by Macartney. The requests had included a call for the relaxation of the restrictions on trade between Britain and China, the acquisition by Britain of "a small unfortified island near Chusan for the residence of British traders, storage of goods, and outfitting of ships"; and the establishment of a permanent British embassy in Beijing. However, Qianlong's letter's continuing reference to all Europeans as "barbarians", his assumption of all nations of the earth as being subordinate to China, and his final words commanding King George III to "...Tremblingly obey and show no negligence!" [31] used the standard imperial sign off as if the king were a Chinese subject.

Historians both in China and abroad long presented the failure of the mission to achieve its goals as a symbol of China's refusal to change and inability to modernize. They explain the refusal first on the fact that interaction with foreign kingdoms was limited to neighbouring tributary states. Furthermore, the worldviews on the two sides were incompatible, China holding entrenched beliefs that China was the "central kingdom". However, after the publication in the 1990s of a fuller range of archival documents concerning the visit, these claims have been challenged. One historian characterized the emperor and his court as "clearly clever and competent political operators", and concluded that they acted within the formal Qing claims to universal rule; they reacted prudently to reports of British expansion in India by placating the British with unspecified promises in order to avoid military conflicts and loss of trade. [33] Qianlong also said that he could have revoked Britain's existing privileges due to the king's behavior, but he would not. He said he felt sympathy for England because it is remote and ignorant of the great Chinese civilization. This angered the king and the public in England. [34]

Critics in England said the problem with the embassy was that it "acknowledged the inferiority of its country [England]". Macartney himself became ridiculed, with caricatures showing him debasing himself before the Emperor. Macartney became more hostile and negative towards China in his later writings, saying China's power was an illusion and that Qing China would decline and eventually collapse. Macartney predicted that China might collapse within his lifetime. [35]

The Macartney Embassy is historically significant for many reasons, most of them visible only in retrospect. While to a modern sensibility it marked a missed opportunity by both sides to explore and understand each other's cultures, customs, diplomatic styles, and ambitions, it also prefigured increasing British pressure on China to accommodate its expanding trading and imperial network. The mutual lack of knowledge and understanding on both sides would continue to plague the Qing dynasty as it encountered increasing foreign pressure and internal unrest during the 19th century.

Although the Macartney Embassy returned to London without obtaining any concession from China, the mission could be termed a success in that it brought back detailed observations of a great empire. Macartney predicted that Indo-British forces could destroy the Chinese in all frontiers in a military conflict, but warned that such an offensive would be against the interests of British trade. He also rightly observed that the empire's internal stability was weak, and there could be a breaking up of the power of China, throwing the international commerce into confusion. [36] The painter William Alexander accompanied the embassy, and published numerous engravings based on his watercolours. Sir George Staunton was charged with producing the official account of the expedition after their return. This multi-volume work was taken chiefly from the papers of Lord Macartney and from the papers of Sir Erasmus Gower, who was Commander of the expedition. Sir Joseph Banks was responsible for selecting and arranging engraving of the illustrations in this official record. [37]

Members

The Macartney Embassy comprised about a hundred people, including:

See also

Notes

  1. Rowe 2010, pp. 141–144.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 Peyrefitte 2013.
  3. Waley-Cohen 2000, p. 102.
  4. 1 2 Black 1994, p. 476.
  5. Bivins 1999, p. 461.
  6. Bivins 2000, p. 17.
  7. 1 2 Platt, Stephen (2018). Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China's Last Golden Age. New York: Penguin Random House LLC. pp. 3–13. ISBN   9780307961730.
  8. Platt, Stephen (2018). Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and The End of China's Last Golden Age. New York: Penguin Random House LLC. p. 35. ISBN   9780307961730.
  9. Stone & Leeson 2017, p. 8.
  10. Robbins 1908 , pp. 175–176 reports that they had recently completed their studies at the "Chinese College", and that Staunton had found them with the assistance of Cardinal Antonelli of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith.
  11. "Gifts of hope and glory". China Daily. 16 March 2007. Archived from the original on 18 October 2016. Retrieved 28 May 2015 via HighBeam Research.
  12. Kitson 2013, pp. 135–142.
  13. Harlow & Madden 1953, p. 48.
  14. 1 2 Waley-Cohen 2000, p. 103.
  15. Hevia 1995, pp. 57–58.
  16. Kitson 2013, p. 147.
  17. Hevia 1995, pp. 66–67.
  18. Hevia 1995, p. 77.
  19. Platt, Stephen (2018). Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China's Last Golden Age. New York: Penguin Random House. pp. 19–20. ISBN   9780307961730.
  20. Hevia 1995, pp. 91.
  21. Hevia 1995, pp. 92–93.
  22. Heshen
  23. Symons 2004, pp. 57–60.
  24. Chayet 2004, pp. 33–34.
  25. Elliott & Chia 2004, pp. 75–77.
  26. Elliott & Chia 2004, p. 82.
  27. Hevia 1995, p. 80.
  28. Hevia 1995, p. 79.
  29. Platt, Stephen (2018). Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China's Last Golden Age. New York. pp. 35–36.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  30. Platt, Stephen (2018). Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China's Last Golden Age. New York: Penguin Random House LLC. p. 37.
  31. 1 2 "Qianlong Letter to George III (1792)". University of California, Santa Barbara. Retrieved 30 January 2014.
  32. Harrison, H. Chinese and British diplomatic gifts in the Macartney Embassy of 1793. https://ora4-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:4d8b8ce8-ae73-4daf-99ac-0321959a8645
  33. Harrison (2017), p. 680.
  34. Platt, Stephen (2018). Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China's Last Golden Age. New York: Penguin Random House LLC. p. 44.
  35. Platt, Stephen (2018). Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China's Last Golden Age. Penguin Random House LLC. pp. 47–48.
  36. Keay, John (2009). China: A History. HarperCollins.
  37. Banks, Joseph. Papers of Sir Joseph Banks; Section 12: Lord Macartney's embassy to China; Series 62: Papers concerning publication of the account of Lord Macartney's Embassy to China, ca 1797. Archived 19 June 2009 at the Wayback Machine State Library of New South Wales.]
  38. "Sketches by Captain Parish on the Voyage from England to China in 1793-4 [sic] with Lord Macartney's Embassy". Yale Center for British Art.
  39. Lockwood 2019, p. 435.
  40. Sample, Joseph Clayton (2004). Radically decentered in the Middle Kingdom: interpreting the Macartney embassy to China from a contact zone perspective (Retrospective Theses and Dissertations). Iowa State University. doi: 10.31274/rtd-180813-8774 .

References

Further reading

Macartney Embassy
Traditional Chinese 馬加爾尼 使團
Simplified Chinese 马加尔尼 使团
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu Pinyin Mǎjiā'ěrní Shǐtuán
Yue: Cantonese
Jyutping Maa5gaa1ji5nei4 Si3tyun4