R v Chaulk

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R v Chaulk
Supreme court of Canada in summer.jpg
Hearing: May 29, 30, 1990
Judgment: December 20, 1990
Full case nameRobert Matthew Chaulk and Francis Darren Morrissette v. Her Majesty The Queen
Citations [1990] 3 SCR 1303
RulingChaulk appeal allowed; new trial ordered
Court membership
Chief Justice: Brian Dickson
Puisne Justices: Jean Beetz, Willard Estey, William McIntyre, Julien Chouinard, Antonio Lamer, Bertha Wilson, Gerald Le Dain, Gérard La Forest
Reasons given
MajorityLamer J, joined by Dickson, La Forest and Cory JJ
ConcurrenceWilson J
ConcurrenceGonthier J
DissentMcLachlin J, joined by L'Heureux-Dubé J
DissentSopinka J
Laws applied
R v Oakes , [1986] 1 SCR 103; R v Whyte, [1988] 2 SCR 3

R v Chaulk, [1990] 3 SCR 1303 is a leading decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on the interpretation and constitutionality of section 16(4) of the Criminal Code , which provides for a mental disorder defence. Two accused individuals challenged the section as a violation of their right to the presumption of innocence under section 11(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter"). The Court upheld the section and provided a basis on which to interpret the section.

Contents

Background

On September 3, 1985, 15-year-old Robert Chaulk and 16-year-old Francis Morrissette burglarized a home in Winnipeg, and then stabbed and bludgeoned its sole occupant to death. One week later, they turned themselves in, making full confessions.

The only defence raised was insanity within the meaning of section 16 of the Criminal Code. Expert evidence was given at trial that Chaulk and Morrissette suffered from a paranoid psychosis which made them believe they had the power to rule the world and that the killing was a necessary means to that end. They believed they were above the ordinary law and thought they had a right to kill the victim because he was "a loser".

They were both convicted of murder by a jury in the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench, which was upheld on appeal.

The major questions to the Supreme Court were:

  1. whether section 16(4) of the Criminal Code, which provides that, "Every one shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to be and to have been sane," infringes the presumption of innocence guaranteed in section 11(d) of the Charter and if so, it is justifiable under section 1 of the Charter;
  2. whether the meaning of the term "wrong" in section 16(2) of the Code should be restricted to "legally wrong";
  3. whether section 16(3) of the Code provides an alternative defence if the conditions of section 16(2) were not met; and
  4. whether the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to split its case by presenting its evidence with respect to the sanity of the accused in rebuttal.

They were convicted of murder, but have appealed the decision on the basis of an error in instruction on the definition of the word "appreciate" and "wrong".

Opinion of the Court

There were three opinions:

The accused were convicted of first degree murder. The only defence raised at trial was insanity, but this defence was rejected by the jury. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. This appeal is to determine (1) whether section 16(4) of the Criminal Code, which provides that, "Every one shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to be and to have been sane", infringes the presumption of innocence guaranteed in section 11(d) of the Charter; and, if so, whether section 16(4) is justifiable under section 1 of the Charter; (2) whether the meaning of the word "wrong" in section 16(2) of the Code should be restricted to "legally wrong"; (3) whether section 16(3) of the Code provides an alternative defence if the conditions of section 16(2) were not met; and (4) whether the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to split its case by presenting its evidence with respect to the sanity of the accused in rebuttal.

Reasoning

Lamer CJC explained that there is a presumption of criminal capacity. For a minor child, the reverse is true. For a child over age 14, the presumption of incapacity is rebuttable. A claim of insanity undermines the voluntariness of either the actus reus or the mens rea . It can also provide an excuse to criminal conduct, where intention is present. The defence can be raised in a number of ways, therefore. For example, the defence can plead insanity to show a lack of capacity to understand right and wrong, or to show a cognitive breakdown leading to an irresistible impulse to act.

The focus is on incapacity to form a mental element – a mentally disordered person does not have the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong.

"Wrong" means more than legally wrong or knowing the law of the land; it means morally wrong as well. This decision overruled Schwartz v R. [1] The test requires that the defence establish that due to the mental illness, the accused could not appreciate that his conduct: "conformed to normal and reasonable standards of society" "breaches a standard of moral conduct" "would be condemned."

Lamer addresses the floodgates question. First, the presence of a mental disorder is required before this analysis is even undertaken. Second, moral standards are not judged on the personal standards of the accused. The mental disorder must inhibit the accused from appreciating society's standards of morality. The accused cannot substitute its own moral code and say that he was acting according to that code.

Rationale

A trial judge must instruct the trier of fact that "appreciate that the act was wrong" means that because of the mental disorder, the accused could not understand or comprehend society's moral condemnation of the conduct.

Dissent

There were two dissenting opinions:

Aftermath

Robert Chaulk was subsequently found not guilty by reason of insanity in a new trial. After four months of treatment, Robert Chaulk was found sane and released.

In 1999, Robert Chaulk was accused of stabbing two of his neighbours to death on New Year's Day. [2]

Related Research Articles

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">M'Naghten rules</span> Guideline governing legal pleas of insanity

The M'Naghten rule is any variant of the 1840s jury instruction in a criminal case when there is a defence of insanity:

that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and ... that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.

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Forensic psychiatry is a subspeciality of psychiatry and is related to criminology. It encompasses the interface between law and psychiatry. According to the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, it is defined as "a subspecialty of psychiatry in which scientific and clinical expertise is applied in legal contexts involving civil, criminal, correctional, regulatory, or legislative matters, and in specialized clinical consultations in areas such as risk assessment or employment." A forensic psychiatrist provides services – such as determination of competency to stand trial – to a court of law to facilitate the adjudicative process and provide treatment, such as medications and psychotherapy, to criminals.

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Criminal law of Canada</span>

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R v Parks, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 871 is a leading Supreme Court of Canada decision on the criminal automatism defence.

R v Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 is a leading Supreme Court of Canada decision on the use of the defence of automatism in a criminal trial.

R v Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 is a leading constitutional decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on certain rights of the mentally ill in their criminal defence. The case concerned a constitutional challenge of the common law rule permitting the Crown to adduce evidence of an accused's insanity and section 542(2) of the Criminal Code, which allowed for the indeterminate detention of an accused who is found not guilty by reason of "insanity". The Court held that both the common law rule and the Code provision were unconstitutional. As a result, the Court created a new common law rule that was constitutional, and Parliament created new laws of what to do with individuals who were found not criminally responsible by reason of a mental disorder. The parties to the case were the appellant, Swain, the respondent, the Crown, and the following interveners: the Attorney General of Canada, the Lieutenant Governor's Board of Review of Ontario, the Canadian Disability Rights Council, the Canadian Mental Health Association, and the Canadian Association for Community Living.

R v Andrews, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 870 is a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on the freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is a companion case to R v Keegstra. The Court upheld the criminal provision that prohibits communicating statements that wilfully promote hatred.

Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the insanity defense used by Arizona.

R v Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, is a case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court found that the "public interest" basis for pre-trial detention under section 515 of the Criminal Code violated section 11(e) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the right not to be denied reasonable bail, as it authorized detention on vague and imprecise grounds, and could not be saved by section 1.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Guilt (law)</span> State of being responsible for a crime per the states rules

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Insanity in English law</span> Defense strategy in English criminal law

Insanity in English law is a defence to criminal charges based on the idea that the defendant was unable to understand what he was doing, or, that he was unable to understand that what he was doing was wrong.

By Reason of Insanity is a 1982 Canadian short courtroom drama television film written by David McLaren and directed by Donald Shebib which examines the use of insanity pleas in murder cases. The film was produced by Alan Burke and made for the anthology series For the Record.

References

  1. [1977] 1 SCR 673
  2. "Robert Chaulk accused of double murder". CBC News . January 5, 1999. Retrieved January 19, 2015.