United States v. Dixon

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United States v. Dixon
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued December 2, 1992
Decided June 28, 1993
Full case nameUnited States v. Alvin Dixon and Michael Foster
Citations509 U.S. 688 ( more )
113 S. Ct. 2849; 125 L. Ed. 2d 556; 1993 U.S. LEXIS 4405
Case history
PriorOn Writ of Certiorari to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Holding
The court overruled the same-conduct test from Grady v. Corbin and held that subsequent convictions for offenses that contained the same elements were violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
Byron White  · Harry Blackmun
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
David Souter  · Clarence Thomas
Case opinions
MajorityScalia (Parts I, II and IV), joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas
PluralityScalia (Parts III and V), joined by Kennedy
Concur/dissentRehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Thomas
Concur/dissentWhite, joined by Stevens; Souter (part I)
Concur/dissentBlackmun
Concur/dissentSouter, joined by Stevens
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. V; Double Jeopardy Clause
This case overturned a previous ruling or rulings
Grady v. Corbin (1990)

United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court concerning double jeopardy. The case overruled Grady v. Corbin (1990) and revived the traditional Blockburger standard. The case held that subsequent convictions for offenses that contained the same elements were violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Contents

Background

Alvin Dixon was arrested for murder in the District of Columbia and released on bail, on the condition that he not commit any criminal offense, or he would be held in contempt of court. While awaiting trial, Dixon was arrested and indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and was found guilty of contempt and sentenced to 180 days in jail. Dixon moved to dismiss this indictment on double jeopardy grounds because he argued that the prosecution was secondary to his first offense.

Michael Foster's wife obtained a civil protection order against him due to domestic attacks. The order required that he not molest, assault, or in any manner threaten or physically abuse her. Later his wife sought to have him held in contempt for violation of that order. Foster also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that his double jeopardy rights were violated because his contempt charges arose out of the original prosecution.

Opinion of the Court

The court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited the subsequent prosecutions of Foster for assault and Dixon for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, but did not prohibit the subsequent prosecutions of Foster for threatening to injure another or for assault with intent to kill.

See also


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