Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State

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Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued November 4, 1981
Decided January 12, 1982
Full case nameValley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State
Citations454 U.S. 464 ( more )
102 S. Ct. 752; 70 L. Ed. 2d 700; 1982 U.S. LEXIS 22
Case history
Prior619 F.2d 252 (reversed)
Holding
The Court decided that the taxpayers did not meet the requirements of the first prong of the double nexus test put forth in Flast as they did not argue a violation of Art. 1 Sec. 8 (taxing and spending) occurred.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall  · Harry Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell Jr.  · William Rehnquist
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Case opinions
MajorityRehnquist, joined by Burger, White, Powell, O'Connor
DissentBrennan, joined by Marshall, Blackmun
DissentStevens
Laws applied
U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Art. III;

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the court refused to expand the Flast v. Cohen exception to the taxpayer standing rule.

Contents

The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had disposed of surplus property by conveying it, without charge, to a church-related college.

Plaintiffs sought standing as taxpayers, and alternatively as citizens, claiming that the conveyance of property injured their right to a government that does not establish a religion.

Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion, upheld the Flast test for taxpayer standing, ruling that plaintiffs lacked standing as taxpayers because they did not challenge an exercise of the Spending Clause. He also rejected the theory of standing as citizens. He held that the court is not merely a forum for "public grievances" brought by "concerned bystanders"; if it were, he reasoned, "the concept of 'standing' would be quite unnecessary".

Justice Brennan, in his dissent, criticized the general prohibition on taxpayer standing established by Frothingham v. Mellon , arguing that standing should not be denied "simply because many people suffer the same injury" or because the injury is indirect. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, called "the difference between a disposition of funds pursuant to the Spending Clause and a disposition of realty pursuant to the Property Clause", "a tenuous distinction".

See also

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  2. The party is not directly harmed by the conditions by which they are petitioning the court for relief but asks for it because the harm involved has some reasonable relation to their situation, and the continued existence of the harm may affect others who might not be able to ask a court for relief. In the United States, this is the grounds for asking for a law to be struck down as violating the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, because while the plaintiff might not be directly affected, the law might so adversely affect others that one might never know what was not done or created by those who fear they would become subject to the law. This is known as the "chilling effects" doctrine.
  3. The party is granted automatic standing by act of law. Under some environmental laws in the United States, a party may sue someone causing pollution to certain waterways without a federal permit, even if the party suing is not harmed by the pollution being generated. The law allows the plaintiff to receive attorney's fees if they substantially prevail in the action. In some U.S. states, a person who believes a book, film or other work of art is obscene may sue in their own name to have the work banned directly without having to ask a District Attorney to do so.

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We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. The question may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act. ... The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.

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References

    American Constitutional Law: Powers and Liberties. Massey