Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.

Last updated

Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 12–13, 1965
Decided December 6, 1965
Full case nameWalker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.
Citations382 U.S. 172 ( more )
86 S. Ct. 347; 15 L. Ed. 2d 247; 1965 U.S. LEXIS 2340; 147 U.S.P.Q. 404
Argument Oral argument
Case history
Prior335 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1964)
Holding
That enforcement of a fraudulently procured patent violated the antitrust laws and provided a basis for a claim of treble damages if it caused a substantial anticompetitive effect.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Earl Warren
Associate Justices
Hugo Black  · William O. Douglas
Tom C. Clark  · John M. Harlan II
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Potter Stewart
Byron White  · Abe Fortas
Case opinion
MajorityClark, joined by unanimous
Laws applied
15 U.S.C.   §§ 1–7;
15 U.S.C.   §§ 12–27;
29 U.S.C.   §§ 52–53

Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), was a 1965 decision of the United States Supreme Court that held, for the first time, that enforcement of a fraudulently procured patent violated the antitrust laws and provided a basis for a claim of treble damages if it caused a substantial anticompetitive effect.

Contents

Background

Food Machinery sued Walker for patent infringement for aeration equipment for sewage treatment systems. Walker filed a counterclaim for treble damages under the antitrust laws, asserting that Food Machinery had "illegally monopolized interstate and foreign commerce by fraudulently and in bad faith obtaining and maintaining . . . its patent ... well knowing that it had no basis for . . . a patent." Walker alleged that Food Machinery had fraudulently sworn to the Patent Office (in an oath that the patent statute requires of applicants) that it neither knew nor believed that its invention had been in public use in the United States for more than one year prior to filing its patent application when, in fact, Food Machinery was itself a party to such prior use. Walker further asserted that the existence of the patent damaged Walker by depriving it of business that it would have otherwise enjoyed. [1]

The district court granted Food Machinery's motion to dismiss the counterclaim, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, on the grounds that no affirmative claim for relief existed based on fraud on the patent office. It was only a defense to an infringement claim. [2]

Ruling of Supreme Court

Majority opinion

Tom C. Clark Official portrait of Associate Justice Tom C. Clark, Supreme Court of the United States (cropped).jpg
Tom C. Clark

In an opinion by Justice Tom C. Clark, the Court reversed. It held: "We have concluded that the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are present. In such event the treble damage provisions of § 4 of the Clayton Act would be available to an injured party."

The Court began by stating that proof that Food Machinery intentionally misrepresented facts to the patent office "would be sufficient to strip Food Machinery of its exemption from the antitrust laws" when it brought an infringement suit. By the same token, however, "Food Machinery's good faith would furnish a complete defense." This defense would apply to "an honest mistake as to the effect of prior installation upon patentability." [3]

But while there can be liability it is not automatic. To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a part of trade or commerce under § 2 of the Sherman Act:

[I]t would then be necessary to appraise the exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the relevant market for the product involved. Without a definition of that market there is no way to measure Food Machinery's ability to lessen or destroy competition. It may be that the device—knee-action swing diffusers—used in sewage treatment systems does not comprise a relevant market. There may be effective substitutes for the device which do not infringe the patent. This is a matter of proof . . . . [4]

Nonetheless, Walker is entitled to an opportunity to prove its case:

The trial court dismissed its suit not because Walker failed to allege the relevant market, the dominance of the patented device therein, and the injurious consequences to Walker of the patent's enforcement, but rather on the ground that the United States alone may "annul or set aside" a patent for fraud in procurement. The trial court has not analyzed any economic data. Indeed, no such proof has yet been offered because of the disposition below. In view of these considerations, as well as the novelty of the claim asserted and the paucity of guidelines available in the decided cases, this deficiency cannot be deemed crucial. Fairness requires that on remand Walker have the opportunity to make its § 2 claims more specific, to prove the alleged fraud, and to establish the necessary elements of the asserted § 2 violation. [5]

Concurring opinion

John Marshall Harlan II John Marshall Harlan II.jpg
John Marshall Harlan II

Justice John Marshall Harlan II concurred. He wrote separately to emphasize the limits of the holding. No treble damage case would be established, he said, if:

  1. the antitrust claimant merely showed that the patent was obvious;
  2. there was fraudulent procurement, but the defendant had no knowledge of the fraud;
  3. the antitrust claimant failed to prove the remaining elements of a § 2 charge. [6]

Justice Harlan insisted that:

[T]o hold, as we do not, that private antitrust suits might also reach monopolies practiced under patents that for one reason or another may turn out to be voidable under one or more of the numerous technicalities attending the issuance of a patent, might well chill the disclosure of inventions through the obtaining of a patent because of fear of the vexations or punitive consequences of treble-damage suits. Hence, this private antitrust remedy should not be deemed available to reach § 2 monopolies carried on under a nonfraudulently procured patent. [7]

Subsequent developments

One of the points not developed in detail in the Walker Process opinion was what "the fraudulent procurement of a patent" means. [8] Because most Walker Process claims are brought by defendants accused of patent infringement, most such cases are now appealed to the Federal Circuit (since that court's formation in 1982), and thus that court has been enormously influential in subsequent developments of the Walker Process doctrine. [9] Another issue is what is enforcement—must there be an actual infringement suit or is a threat to a competitor or its customer sufficient? [10]

Pre-Federal Circuit cases

In Beckman Instrument, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc. [11] the Fifth Circuit held Beckman's patent claiming a polarographic cell for making quantitative analysis of blood invalid because of fraud on the Patent Office (later renamed the Patent & Trademark Office). The district court had upheld the patent as valid, although not infringed. [12] But the Fifth Circuit reversed because Beckman knew about a similar Stow device but decided not to disclose its existence to the Patent Office. The Fifth Circuit ruled that "Beckman had an 'uncompromising duty' of disclosure of the Stow reference to the Patent Office." According to the Fifth Circuit, the Stow device anticipated Beckman's device, so that the Beckman patent was invalid on two grounds: anticipation and fraudulent failure to disclose Stow when prosecuting the patent. [13] The court did not say whether Stow was closer than the prior art that the Patent Office considered, but it was close enough to anticipate. The Fifth Circuit said that there is a clear duty to disclose known prior art that is close to the claimed invention: ""[Ilt is clear that Beckman's patent employees understood the significance of Stow's invention and knew that it presented a serious threat to the validity of the patent they were trying to secure." [14] One of the things Beckman did to avoid the effect of Stow was to tailor its claims so that they did not directly cover the Stow device, but the court said this did not relieve Beckman of its duty of disclosure.

In Monsanto Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co. , [15] the Third Circuit addressed issues not discussed in Walker Process when invalidating a patent for fraud. Monsanto had persuaded the Patent Office to withdraw an obviousness rejection of a patent on a herbicide by submitting test data showing that the claimed compound (3,4-DCPA) had surprisingly superior herbicidal efficacy compared to compounds with a very similar molecular structure. Monsanto had tested a number of these compounds, some of which did have similar efficacy to that of 3,4-DCPA and some of which did not. Monsanto intentionally submitted to the Patent Office only the data showing lack of similar efficacy.

The Third Circuit rejected the argument that Monsanto was only putting its best foot forward and was therefore innocent of fraud. The court held that omitting such highly material information in a submission to the Office was equivalent to an affirmative misrepresentation that products with similar efficacy did not exist:

[A]n examination of the report permits, if not compels, the misleading inference that it constituted a complete and accurate analysis of all the testing instead of an edited version thereof. Concealment and nondisclosure may be evidence of and equivalent to a false representation, because the concealment or suppression is, in effect, a representation that what is disclosed is the whole truth. [16]

The court added, "Monsanto was obliged to disclose more information as to the herbicidal properties of related compounds to the Patent Office than it did." The reason is that "what is at issue is not merely a contest between the parties but a public interest" that spurious patents should not issue.

Federal Circuit case law on elements of Walker Process claim

The Federal Circuit decided, in Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., [17] that the falsity triggering a Walker Process claim must be "material," meaning that the patent being enforced "would not have issued but for the misrepresentation or omission" that is challenged as fraudulent. In addition, the Federal Circuit held that "knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts to the Patent Office" must be alleged, as Walker alleged in the Walker Process case, [18] and it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. [19] These two elements of guilty knowledge and strong proof have been supplemented by the further two elements that the patentee must have acted with specific intent to deceive the PTO, and that the PTO justifiably relied on the misrepresentation or omission. [20] In addition to imposing these requirements, in 1998 the Federal Circuit announced that it would no longer follow the law of regional circuits in Walker Process cases, but would instead establish a uniform "patent case" rule for judging conduct before the PTO, based on Federal Circuit precedent. [21]

The Federal Circuit separated the affirmative defense aspect of a Walker Process claim from the antitrust counterclaim aspect by renaming the former "inequitable conduct," and for a time allowing a lesser standard of proof for inequitable conduct than Walker Process antitrust claims. In Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, [22] the Federal Circuit held that the same intent evidence that established a defense of inequitable conduct did not support an antitrust counterclaim. The Federal Circuit declared, "To demonstrate Walker Process fraud, a claimant must make higher threshold showings of both materiality and intent than are required to show inequitable conduct." [23] It then held that the intent evidence against patentee Dippin' Dots was sufficient to support a conclusion of inequitable conduct but was insufficient for Walker Process fraud. [24] However, the Federal Circuit subsequently raised the legal standards for proving inequitable conduct so as to make it approximately equivalent to that for Walker Process fraud, in Therasense v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. [25] One commentator remarked that this change has led to a "virtual alignment of inequitable conduct and Walker Process  fraud that was accomplished by Therasense." [26]

In reacting to the surge in the pleading of inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud, the Federal Circuit remarked that "the habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague." [27] This has suggested to some commentators that this reaction caused the Federal Circuit to tighten up the requirements for Walker Process and inequitable conduct claims and to favor greater leniency for patentees, as is described above. [28]

Handgards case

In Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., [29] the Ninth Circuit decided that the enforcement of a knowingly invalid patent could give rise to antitrust liability. [30]

A similar type of claim is enforcing a valid patent against a defendant that the plaintiff knows is not infringing the patent. [31]

Criminal prosecution

In United States v. Union Camp Corp., the government brought a criminal case against a company that filed a patent infringement action against another company under a patent that it knew was invalid, because it had publicly sold the patented product more than a year before the filing of the patent application. [32]

It has been suggested that "a conspiracy to procure a patent by means of fraud constitutes, independently of the Sherman Act, a violation of the general federal conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371)." [33]

In United States v. Markham, [34] the defendant was indicted and convicted under the federal false statement statute (18 U.S.C. § 1001) for fraudulent patent procurement—"attempt[ing] to conceal from the Patent Office the true inventor of the process for which a patent was sought." [35] In that case one Klein, a business partner of the defendant Markham, invented a process for building houses. Markham and Klein fell out, and Markham filed a patent application falsely naming two other men as the inventors rather than Klein. [36] When the facts eventually came out, Markham was indicted and convicted; the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. [37]

Related Research Articles

Copyright misuse is an equitable defence to copyright infringement in the United States based upon the doctrine of unclean hands. The misuse doctrine provides that the copyright holder engaged in abusive or improper conduct in exploiting or enforcing the copyright will be precluded from enforcing his rights against the infringer. Copyright misuse is often comparable to and draws from the older and more established doctrine of patent misuse, which bars a patentee from obtaining relief for infringement when he extends his patent rights beyond the limited monopoly conferred by the law.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Patent infringement</span> Breach of the rights conferred by a patent

Patent infringement is the commission of a prohibited act with respect to a patented invention without permission from the patent holder. Permission may typically be granted in the form of a license. The definition of patent infringement may vary by jurisdiction, but it typically includes using or selling the patented invention. In many countries, a use is required to be commercial to constitute patent infringement.

In United States patent law, patent misuse is a patent holder's use of a patent to restrain trade beyond enforcing the exclusive rights that a lawfully obtained patent provides. If a court finds that a patent holder committed patent misuse, the court may rule that the patent holder has lost the right to enforce the patent. Patent misuse that restrains economic competition substantially can also violate United States antitrust law.

In United States patent law, inequitable conduct is a breach of the applicant's duty of candor and good faith during patent prosecution or similar proceedings by misrepresenting or omitting material information with the specific intent to deceive the United States Patent and Trademark Office. A claim of inequitable conduct is a defense to allegations of patent infringement. Even in an instance when a valid patent suffers infringement, a court ruling on an allegation of infringement may exercise its power of equitable discretion not to enforce the patent if the patentee has engaged in inequitable conduct.

Under United States patent law a prosecution disclaimer is a statement made by a patent applicant during examination of a patent application which can limit the scope of protection provided by the resulting patent. It is one type of file-wrapper estoppel, the other being prosecution history estoppel.

Dennis Jacobs is a senior United States circuit judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

<i>Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.</i>

Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, is a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in which the court appeared to overrule or drastically limit many years of U.S. Supreme Court precedent affirming the patent exhaustion doctrine, for example in Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell.

Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), is a case decided by the United States Supreme Court in which the Court reaffirmed the validity of the patent exhaustion doctrine. The decision made uncertain the continuing precedential value of a line of decisions in the Federal Circuit that had sought to limit Supreme Court exhaustion doctrine decisions to their facts and to require a so-called "rule of reason" analysis of all post-sale restrictions other than tie-ins and price fixes. In the course of restating the patent exhaustion doctrine, the Court held that it is triggered by, among other things, an authorized sale of a component when the only reasonable and intended use of the component is to engage the patent and the component substantially embodies the patented invention by embodying its essential features. The Court also overturned, in passing, that the exhaustion doctrine was limited to product claims and did not apply to method claims.

United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that a patentee who has granted a single license to a competitor to manufacture the patented product may lawfully fix the price at which the licensee may sell the product.

A post-sale restraint, also termed a post-sale restriction, as those terms are used in United States patent law and antitrust law, is a limitation that operates after a sale of goods to a purchaser has occurred and purports to restrain, restrict, or limit the scope of the buyer's freedom to utilize, resell, or otherwise dispose of or take action regarding the sold goods. Such restraints have also been termed "equitable servitudes on chattels".

Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278 (2013), was a United States Supreme Court patent decision in which the Court unanimously affirmed the decision of the Federal Circuit that the patent exhaustion doctrine does not permit a farmer to plant and grow saved, patented seeds without the patent owner's permission. The case arose after Vernon Hugh Bowman, an Indiana farmer, bought transgenic soybean crop seeds from a local grain elevator for his second crop of the season. Monsanto originally sold the seed from which these soybeans were grown to farmers under a limited use license that prohibited the farmer-buyer from using the seeds for more than a single season or from saving any seed produced from the crop for replanting. The farmers sold their soybean crops to the local grain elevator, from which Bowman then bought them. After Bowman replanted the crop seeds for his second harvest, Monsanto filed a lawsuit claiming that he infringed on their patents by replanting soybeans without a license. In response, Bowman argued that Monsanto's claims were barred under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, because all future generations of soybeans were embodied in the first generation that was originally sold.

Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942), is a patent misuse decision of the United States Supreme Court. It was the first case in which the Court expressly labeled as "misuse" the Motion Picture Patent/Carbice tie-in defense to a charge of patent infringement and created the present blanket remedy in infringement cases of unenforceability of the misused patent. The decision re-emphasized that misuse can be found without finding an antitrust violation.

United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963), was a 1963 decision of the Supreme Court, holding that the defendant Singer violated the antitrust laws by conspiring with two European competitors to exclude Japanese sewing machine competition from the US market. Singer effectuated the conspiracy by agreeing with the two European competitors to broaden US patent rights and concentrate them under Sanger's control in order to more effectively exclude the Japanese firms. A further aspect of the conspiracy was to fraudulently procure a US patent and use it as an exclusionary tool. This was the first Supreme Court decision holding that exclusionary use of a fraudulently procured patent could be an element supporting an antitrust claim.

<i>Monsanto Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co.</i>

Monsanto Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592, is a 1972 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit interpreting what conduct amounts to fraudulent procurement of a patent.

Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318 was a 2010 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, that sought to narrow the defense of patent misuse to claims for patent infringement. Princo held that a party asserting the defense of patent misuse, absent a case of so-called per se misuse, must prove both "leveraging" of the patent being enforced against it and a substantial anticompetitive effect outside the legitimate scope of that patent right. In so ruling, the court emphasized that the misuse alleged must involve the patent in suit, not another patent.

Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, is a 2015 en banc decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, on remand from a 2014 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court reversing a previous Federal Circuit decision in the case. This is the most recent in a string of decisions in the case that concern the proper legal standard for determining patent infringement liability when multiple actors are involved in carrying out the claimed infringement of a method patent and no single accused infringer has performed all of the steps. In the 2015 remand decision, the Federal Circuit expanded the scope of vicarious liability in such cases, holding that one actor could be held liable for the acts of another actor "when an alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented method and establishes the manner or timing of that performance." In addition, the court held that where multiple "actors form a joint enterprise, all can be charged with the acts of the other[s], rendering each liable for the steps performed by the other[s] as if each is a single actor."

<i>National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co.</i>

National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255, is one of the earliest or the earliest federal court decision to hold that it is patent misuse for a patentee to require licensees not to use a competitive technology. Such provisions are known as "tie-outs."

The reverse doctrine of equivalents is a legal doctrine of United States patent law, according to which a device that appears to literally infringe a patent claim, by including elements or limitations that correspond to each element or limitation of the patent claim, nonetheless does not infringe the patent, because the accused device operates on a different principle. That is, "it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way." It has been said that "the purpose of the 'reverse' doctrine is to prevent unwarranted extension of the claims beyond a fair scope of the patentee's invention."

Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), is a much cited 1944 decision of the United States Supreme Court dealing with fraud on the Patent Office. A widely quoted statement in the Court's opinion is: "The public welfare demands that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud." Although the fraud occurred in the late 1920s, the facts became public only much later in the Government's antitrust trial in United States v. Hartford-Empire Co.

References

The citations in this article are written in Bluebook style. Please see the talk page for more information.

  1. ↑ 382 U.S. at 173-74.
  2. ↑ 335 F. 2d 315 (7th Cir. 1964).
  3. ↑ 382 U.S. at 177.
  4. ↑ 382 U.S. at 177-78]
  5. ↑ 382 U.S. at 178.
  6. ↑ 382 U.S. at 179.
  7. ↑ 382 U.S. at 180.
  8. ↑ The quoted phrase appears at 382 U.S. at 176.
  9. ↑ All appeals from judgments in patent infringement cases go to the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
  10. ↑ Some lower courts have suggested, in dicta, that threats of enforcement are enough. See, e.g., Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1344, 1352-53 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that a Walker Process claimant "must at least be able to allege facts that indicate that the defendant has enforced, or has sought to enforce, or has threatened to enforce its fraudulently obtained patent against the plaintiff itself").
  11. ↑ 428 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1970).
  12. ↑ 160 U.S.P.Q. 619 (W.D. Tex. 1967).
  13. ↑ The Fifth Circuit has been criticized for "misapprehend[ing] the effect of a finding of fraud on the Patent Office." If Stow anticipated, then the patent is invalid for anticipation by Stow. But intentional deception of the Patent Office, it is said, does not invalidate a patent. Rather, it renders the patent permanently unenforceable for non-purgeable misuse. See Donald R. Dunner, James B, Gambrell, and Irving Kayton, Patent Law (1969-70), in [1970] Ann. Surv. Am. L. 395, 425 n.140 (1970).
  14. ↑ 428 F.2d at 565.
  15. ↑ 456 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1972).
  16. ↑ 456 F.2d at 599.
  17. ↑ 141 F.3d 1059, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
  18. ↑ 382 U.S. at 177.
  19. ↑ Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071.
  20. ↑ Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069-70; accord C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998). As to specific intent see American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that in a Walker Process claim based on attempt to monopolize, "a specific intent, greater than an intent evidenced by gross negligence or recklessness, is an indispensable element").
  21. ↑ Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1067-68.
  22. ↑ 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
  23. ↑ Dippin' Dots, 476 F.3d at 1346.
  24. ↑ Dippin' Dots, 476 F.3d at 1349. The Federal Circuit said it was not enough for the jury to disbelieve the patentee's explanations; there must be affirmative evidence of intent to deceive.
  25. ↑ 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
  26. ↑ Gideon Mark and T. Leigh Anenson, Inequitable Conduct And Walker Process Claims After Therasense And The America Invents Act, 16 U. Pa. J. Bus. Law 361, 402 (2014).
  27. ↑ Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See also Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Limiting the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13 Va. J.L. & Tech. 1, 8 (2008).
  28. ↑ See, e.g., Wasserman, at 13.
  29. ↑ 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979).
  30. ↑ See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, 743 F.2d 1282, 1289 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding treble damage jury verdict).
  31. ↑ See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (applying the Handgards bad faith standard to situation where patentee knew there was no infringement but nonetheless enforced patent).
  32. ↑ 1969 Trade Cas. ¶ 72,689 (E.D. Va. 1969) (consent decree). In that case the company's patent counsel warned the company's president of the problem and suggested caution against suing another company that had hired an ex-employee of the patentee who knew the facts. The company and its officials pleaded nolo contendere. For the indictment, see United States v. Union Camp Corp., Crim. Action No. 4558 (E.D. Va. Nov. 30, 1967). For the complaint in the related civil action, alleging fraudulent procurement, see United States v. Union Camp Corp., Civ. No. 5005A, (E.D. Va. Nov. 4, 1968). The criminal case also involved a mandamus action in the Fourth Circuit. Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1967) (mandamus denied).
      The facts concerning this case are summarized in a paper titled The Antitrust Consequences of Fraudulent Procurement and Enforcement of Patents, contained in 15 Antitrust Bull. 663 (1970) and in Patent Law Revision, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Pursuant to S. Res. 32 on S. 643, S. 1253 and S. 1255, Part 2 and Appendix (May 13, 1971) at 506.
  33. ↑ See id. at 507.
  34. ↑ 537 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1976).
  35. ↑ 537 F.2d at 188-89.
  36. ↑ 537 F.2d at 192-95.
  37. ↑ 537 F.2d at 197.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.