Ryan named his book after a comment attributed to Lieutenant General Frederick Browning before the operation, who reportedly said to Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, "I think we may be going a bridge too far."[1] But Antony Beevor disputes this, saying that Browning had supported the operation, especially in view of receiving more resources. Secondly he did not appear to have encountered Montgomery that day.[2]
Drawing on a wide variety of sources, Ryan documented his account of the 1944 battle with pictures and maps. He included a section on the survivors, "Soldiers and Civilians – What They Do Today".
He addressed tactical mistakes made in planning the operation. Popular accounts of World War II tended to overlook the battle or to accept Field Marshal Montgomery's spin on it as being a "partial success".[3]
Following the June 6, 1944 D-Day Battle of Normandy, the Allies quickly advanced throughout France and Belgium at a rate far faster than planned. This was partly due to Hitler's "no retreat" orders, which his top generals disagreed with. The rapid advance caused the Allies to overrun their supply lines. Nonetheless, the German army was disintegrating and retreating in the West, and the Dutch underground reported this too commanders. Both Field Marshal Montgomery and George Patton repeatedly urged Eisenhower for a single-prong attack into the heart of Germany either from the north (led by Montgomery) or from the south (led by Patton). Eisenhower initially rebuffed these requests. The German command did not understand why the Allies stopped at the Belgium-Dutch border when they were so vulnerable to a route.
Eisenhower wanted to engage well-trained airborne units whose missions had been repeatedly canceled. The paratroopers were eager to "get into the battle before the war was over". Utilizing the airborne troops--at the time, the largest ever assembled (35,000)--Eisenhower approved Montgomery's daring plan (Operation Market Garden) to surprise the Germans by quickly seizing key bridges in Holland along a 64-mile corridor, with the prize being the bridge at Arnhem spanning the Rhine River--a formidable barrier. The airborne troops ("Market") were to be supported by XXX Armoured Corps ground forces ("Garden") who would race along the path using the bridges, ideally reaching the men at Arnhem in two days. The British paratroopers (led by Major-General Roy Urquhart) could not hold the Arnhem bridge more than two to four days without ground support. If successful, the Allies could invade the industrial Ruhr, continue to Berlin, and end the war quickly.
During the time Eisenhower hesitated on the single-prong attack, the Germans reassembled their demoralized units, including two SS Panzer divisions led by General der Waffen-SSWilhelm Bittrich to be stationed at Arnhem. The Allies were so jubilant and confident in the plan, they overlooked the intelligence that showed the Germans were not nearly as weak as they had thought.
The operation started on September 17, 1994 with an armada of planes (about 20 miles long) carrying the paratroopers and their supplies. The troops had been sequestered for secrecy. The airborne planes were guarded by fighters and bombers who could knock out enemy aircraft and anti-aircraft guns. Heavy equipment, such as jeeps and artillery pieces were packed in gliders towed by "tugs", which would release the gliders at drop zones. The first troops would mark the drop zones. The trip across the English channel had a small number of incidents: Some gliders' tow ropes became entangled or got too close to their tugs and had to release early. Rescue ships saved most of those crews. In Holland anti-aircaft guns downed some aircraft. Glider landings faired more poorly. Significant amounts of heavy equipment were lost when gliders overturned in soft ground or hit the woods. Gliders were often too close for safety.
Communication between units immediately became a problem due to problems with radio equipment, such as incorrectly programmed frequencies.
↑Beevor, Antony (2019). Arnhem. Penguin. p.31. ISBN978-0-670-91867-6. Browning had strenuously supported Comet, which included Arnhem. Now, he was to command three and a half airborne divisions to do the same job, not just one and a half, so he was unlikely to oppose the field marshal on the subject. And the suggestion that on 10 September Browning had said to Montgomery that Arnhem might be going 'a bridge too far' is highly improbable, since they do not appear to have met that day.
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