| Ackley School District v. Hall | |
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| Argued December 2–3, 1884 Decided January 19, 1885 | |
| Full case name | Ackley School District v. Hall |
| Citations | 113 U.S. 135 ( more ) 5 S. Ct. 371; 28 L. Ed. 954 |
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Ackley School District v. Hall, 113 U.S. 135 (1885), was a suit to recover principal and interest claimed to be due the defendant on negotiable bonds issued by the plaintiff. [1]
Municipal bonds issued under the authority of law for the payment at all events to a named person or order a fixed sum of money at a designated tune therein limited, being endorsed in blank, is a negotiable security. Its negotiability is not affected by a provision of the statute under which it was issued that it should be "payable at the pleasure of the district at any time before due."
A security is a tradable financial asset. The term commonly refers to any form of financial instrument, but its legal definition varies by jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions the term specifically excludes financial instruments other than equities and fixed income instruments. In some jurisdictions it includes some instruments that are close to equities and fixed income, e.g., equity warrants. In some countries and languages the term "security" is commonly used in day-to-day parlance to mean any form of financial instrument, even though the underlying legal and regulatory regime may not have such a broad definition.
An act of the Legislature of Iowa entitled "An act to authorize independent school districts to borrow money and issue bonds therefor for the purpose of erecting and completing schoolhouses, legalizing bonds heretofore issued, and making school orders draw six percent interest in certain cases" is not in violation of the provision in the Constitution of that state which declares that "every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title.
By an Act of the General Assembly of the State of Iowa approved April 6, 1868, it is provided that independent school districts shall have power and authority to borrow money for the purpose of erecting and completing school houses by issuing negotiable bonds of the independent district, to run any period not exceeding ten years, drawing a rate of interest not exceeding ten percent, which interest may be paid semiannually, which indebtedness shall be binding and obligatory on the independent school district for the use of which said loan shall have been made.
The Independent School District of Ackley, Hardin County, Iowa, promises to pay to Foster Brothers, or order at the Hardin County Bank at Eldora, Iowa, on the first day of May, 1872, five hundred dollars for value received, with interest at the rate of ten percent per annum, said interest payable semiannually, on the first day of May and November in each year thereafter at the Hardin County Bank at Eldora, on the presentation and surrender of the interest coupons hereto attached
Ackley is a city in Franklin and Hardin Counties in the U.S. state of Iowa. The population was 1,589 at the 2010 census.
Hardin County is a county located in the U.S. state of Iowa. As of the 2010 census, the population was 17,534. The county seat is Eldora. The county was named in honor of Col. John J. Hardin, of Illinois, who was killed in the Mexican–American War.
This bond is issued by the board of school directors by authority of an election of the voters of said school district held on the 23d day of August, 1869, in conformity with the provisions of chapter 98, acts 12, General Assembly of the State of Iowa.
In testimony whereof the said Independent School District, by the board of directors thereof, have caused the same to be signed by the President and secretary, this first day of November, 1869.
Treasurer of Independent School District, Ackley, Hardin County, Iowa, will pay the holder hereof, on the 1st day of November, 1874 at the Hardin County Bank at Eldora, Iowa, twenty-five dollars, for interest due on school house bond No. 8.
The defendant,...who is averred to be a citizen of New York, became the holder of eight of these obligations with interest coupons attached, each one being endorsed in blank by Foster Brothers, the original payees. This suit was brought to recover the amount due thereon, without any averment in the pleadings as to the citizenship of the payees. The district made defense upon various grounds. The case was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and there was a general finding for the plaintiff, upon which a judgment was entered against the district. To that finding and judgment the defendant excepted (but without preserving, by bill of exceptions, the evidence upon which the court acted), and brought this writ of error.
Judgment was affirmed.
Quincy v. Jackson, 113 U.S. 332 (1885), was a writ of error brought to reverse a judgment by the court below by Jackson, a relator, who recovered a judgment against the City of Quincy, Illinois, for the sum of $9,546.24, with costs of suit.
Findlay v. McAllister, 113 U.S. 104 (1885), was a suit brought against Thomas McAllister and 14 other defendants, to recover damages as follows:
A negotiable instrument is a document guaranteeing the payment of a specific amount of money, either on demand, or at a set time, with the payer usually named on the document. More specifically, it is a document contemplated by or consisting of a contract, which promises the payment of money without condition, which may be paid either on demand or at a future date. The term can have different meanings, depending on what law is being applied and what country and context it is used in.
In banking, a post-dated cheque is a cheque written by the drawer (payer) for a date in the future.
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), is an opinion of the United States Supreme Court which further developed the “fruit-and-tree” metaphor established in Lucas v. Earl. Horst is the leading case that applies the assignment of income doctrine to income from property.
Clawson v. United States, 113 U.S. 143 (1885), was a case regarding a Utah territorial statute which authorized an appeal by a defendant in a criminal action from a final judgment of conviction, which provides that an appeal shall stay execution upon filing with the clerk a certificate of a judge that in his opinion there is probable cause for the appeal, and further provides that after conviction, a defendant who has appealed may be admitted to bail as of right when the judgment is for the payment of a fine only, and as matter of discretion in other cases, does not confer upon a defendant convicted and sentenced to pay a fine and be imprisoned the right, after appeal and filing of certificate of probable cause, to be admitted to bail except within the discretion of the court.
Dakota County v. Glidden, 113 U.S. 222 (1885), was a motion to dismiss a suit issued in aid of a railroad. Judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant brought a writ of error to reverse it. Subsequently, to the judgment, Dakota County, Nebraska settled with the plaintiff and other bondholders, by giving them new bonds bearing a less rate of interest, and the old bonds, which were the cause of action in this suit, were surrendered and destroyed. These facts were brought before this Court by affidavits and transcripts from the county records, accompanied by a motion to dismiss the writ of error.
Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U.S. 756 (1885), was a motion to dismiss a lawsuit on county bonds issued in aid of a railroad. Judgment below for the plaintiff. The defendant brought a writ bf error to reverse it. Subsequently, to the judgment, the county settled with the plaintiff and other bondholders, by giving them new bonds bearing a less rate of interest, and the old bonds, which were the cause of action in this suit, were surrendered and destroyed. Fraud and collusion was alleged in the handling of a will which transferred ownership of property in Crittenden County, Arkansas. These facts were brought before this Court by affidavits and transcripts from the county records, accompanied by a motion to dismiss the writ of error.
Anderson County Commissioners v. Beal, 113 U.S. 227 (1885), was a United States Supreme Court case.
Spaids v. Cooley, 113 U.S. 278 (1885), was regarding a lawsuit brought to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia on December 13, 1876, by Chauncey D. Spaids against Dennis N. Cooley to recover 593.70, with interest from July 1, 1868. The declaration contained the common money counts and nothing more. There were two pleas, one denying indebtedness and the other averring that the alleged cause of action did not accrue within three years before the suit. The plaintiff's reply joins issue on the first plea and as to the second plea avers that the defendant promised to pay the debt named in the declaration within three years next before the commencement of the suit. At the trial, the jury found "the issue in favor of the defendant", and there was a judgment accordingly at special term. The plaintiff appealed to the general term, which affirmed the judgment, and he brought the case here by a writ of error.
Sully v. Drennan, 113 U.S. 287 (1885), was an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Iowa remanding to the state court a case which had been removed from the state into the circuit court. The suit was brought originally in the district court of the state by James N. Drennan and others, taxpayers of Prairie Township, in the County of Mahaska.
Avegno v. Schmidt, 113 U.S. 293 (1885), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that title to property confiscated during the American Civil War was properly held by the mortgagor.
Chase v. Curtis, 113 U.S. 452 (1885), was a suit brought under the provisions of §12 of the Act of the Legislature of New York of February 17, 1848, as amended June 7, 1875, where trustees of corporations formed for manufacturing, mining, mechanical, or chemical purposes are made liable for debts of the company on failure to file the reports of capital and of debts required by that section, is penal in its character, and must be construed with strictness as against those sought to be subjected to its liabilities. Suit was brought to recover from the trustees of such a corporation the amount of a judgment against the corporation, the judgment roll is not competent evidence to establish a debt due from the corporation to the plaintiff.
A claim in tort against a corporation formed under that act, as amended, is not a debt of the company for which the trustees may become liable jointly and severally under the provisions of the Act. In a proceeding to enforce a liability created by a state statute, the courts of the United States give to a judgment of a state court the same effect, either as evidence or as cause of action, which is given to it in like proceedings in the courts of the state whose laws are invoked in the enforcement.
The complaint in this action, after alleging that the plaintiff in error was a citizen of Pennsylvania, and the defendants citizens of New York, proceeded as follows:
"Wherefore the plaintiffs demand judgment against the above-named defendants in the sum of $40,828.97, with interest on $40,500.00 from the 30th day of July, 1874, and on $328.97 from the 3d day of October, 1874, besides the costs and disbursements of this action."
To this complaint the defendants severally demurred on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained and judgment rendered in favor of the defendants dismissing the complaint, to reverse which this writ of error is prosecuted.
The statute on which the action is founded is as follows:
"SECTION 1. The twelfth section of the 'Act to authorize the formation of corporations for manufacturing, mining, mechanical, or chemical purposes,' passed February 17, 1848, as said section was amended by chapter 657 of the Laws of 1871, is hereby further amended, so that section 12 shall read as follows:"
"§ 12. Every such company shall, within twenty days from the first day of January, if a year from the time of the filing of the certificate of incorporation shall then have expired, and if so long a time shall not have expired, then within twenty days from the first day of January in each year after the expiration of a year from the time of filing such certificate, make a report, which shall be published in some newspaper published in the town, city, or village, or, if there be no newspaper published in said town, city, or village, then in some newspaper published nearest the place where the business of the company is carried on, which shall state the amount of capital, and of the proportion actually paid in, and the amount of its existing debts, which report shall be signed by the president and a majority of the trustees, and shall be verified by the oath of the president or secretary of said company, and filed in the office of the clerk of the county where the business of the company shall be carried on, and if any of said companies shall fail so to do, all the trustees of the company shall be jointly and severally liable for all the debts of the company then existing, and for all that shall be contracted before such report shall be made. But whenever under this section a judgment shall be recovered against a trustee severally, all the trustees of the company shall contribute a ratable share of the amount paid by such trustee on such judgment, and such trustee shall have a right of action against his co-trustees, jointly or severally, to recover from them their proportion of the amount so paid on such judgment, provided that nothing in this act contained shall affect any action now pending.It is finally insisted that a judgment against the corporation, although founded upon a tort, becomes ipso facto a debt by contract, being a contract of record or a specialty in the nature of a contract. But we have already seen that the settled course of decision in the New York Court of Appeals rejects the judgment against the corporation as either evidence or ground of liability against the trustees, and founds the latter upon the obligation of the corporation on which the judgment itself rests. And it was decided by this Court in the case of Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285, that a liability for a tort, created by statute, although reduced to judgment by a recovery for the damages suffered, did not thereby become a debt by contract in the sense of the Constitution of the United States forbidding state legislation impairing its obligation, for the reason that the term 'contract' is used in the Constitution in its ordinary sense as signifying the agreement of two or more minds, for considerations proceeding from one to the other, to do or not to do certain acts. Mutual assent to its terms is of its very essence."
The same definition applies in the present instance, and excludes the liability of the defendants, as trustees of the corporation, for its torts, although reduced to judgment.
The court found no error in the judgment of the circuit court, and it was accordingly affirmed.
Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885), was a case involving several judgments of the United States Court of Claims in four cases against the United States for the payment of United States bonds known as "five-twenty bonds."
Gumbel v. Pitkin, 113 U.S. 545 (1885), was a case brought in error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana to dismiss a writ of error.
Boyer v. Boyer, 113 U.S. 689 (1885), was a suit in error brought in a state court of Pennsylvania for an injunction restraining the commissioners of Schuylkill County from levying a county tax for the year 1883 upon certain shares in the Pennsylvania National Bank, an association organized under the National Banking Act. The suit proceeds upon the ground that such levy violates the act of Congress prescribing conditions upon state taxation of national bank shares in this, that "other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens" of that county is exempted by the laws of Pennsylvania from such taxation. A demurrer to the bill was sustained and the suit was dismissed. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, that judgment was affirmed on the ground that the laws of the state under which the defendants sought to justify the taxation were not repugnant to the act of Congress.
United States v. Indianapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co., 113 U.S. 711 (1885), regarded a suit that was brought to foreclose mortgages given to secure bonds issued by the Indianapolis and St. Louis Railroad Company. A final decree of foreclosure having been passed, the mortgaged property was sold, and the sale was confirmed by the court. The United States intervened by petition, and asked that certain sums, alleged to be due to the government on account of taxes, be first paid out of the proceeds.
Looney v. District of Columbia, 113 U.S. 258 (1885), was a U.S. Supreme Court case testing whether a government contractor could sue for outstanding payment when those debts had already been sold off to other parties. The court ruled a street contractor could not both sell the debts at a discount as a security and also sue District of Columbia for the difference in what they were owed.
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is an act in India dating from the British colonial rule, that is still in force largely unchanged.
Civil procedure in South Africa is the formal rules and standards that courts follow in that country when adjudicating civil suits. The legal realm is divided broadly into substantive and procedural law. Substantive law is that law which defines the contents of rights and obligations between legal subjects; procedural law regulates how those rights and obligations are enforced. These rules govern how a lawsuit or case may be commenced, and what kind of service of process is required, along with the types of pleadings or statements of case, motions or applications, and orders allowed in civil cases, the timing and manner of depositions and discovery or disclosure, the conduct of trials, the process for judgment, various available remedies, and how the courts and clerks are to function.
The United States Reports are the official record of the rulings, orders, case tables, in alphabetical order both by the name of the petitioner and by the name of the respondent, and other proceedings of the Supreme Court of the United States. United States Reports, once printed and bound, are the final version of court opinions and cannot be changed. Opinions of the court in each case are prepended with a headnote prepared by the Reporter of Decisions, and any concurring or dissenting opinions are published sequentially. The Court's Publication Office oversees the binding and publication of the volumes of United States Reports, although the actual printing, binding, and publication are performed by private firms under contract with the United States Government Publishing Office.
