Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. | |
---|---|
Argued November 12, 1969 Decided June 1, 1970 | |
Full case name | Sandra Adickes, Petitioner v. S. H. Kress & Company |
Citations | 398 U.S. 144 ( more ) 90 S. Ct. 1598; 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 |
Case history | |
Prior | Cert. to the United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit |
Holding | |
A party moving for summary judgment carries the burden of proof to establish a lack of factual controversy. | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Harlan, joined by Burger, Stewart, White, Blackmun |
Concurrence | Black |
Dissent | Douglas |
Dissent | Brennan (in part) |
Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |
Laws applied | |
Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 420 U.S.C. §1983 |
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), was a United States Supreme Court case where the majority ruling, written by Justice Harlan, asserted that the burden of showing a lack of factual controversy rests upon the party asserting the summary judgment. It was later challenged by Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), but the case was not officially overruled. [1] While the issue before the Supreme Court was a fairly technical matter, the subject matter regarded the violation of white teacher Sandra Adickes' civil rights in the segregated South, after being refused service at a restaurant because she wished to eat with her black students.
The case centered around a series of incidents on August 14, 1964, in segregated Hattiesburg, Mississippi. The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on July 2 had on paper outlawed segregation but in practice had yet to catch up, especially in the deeply segregated South. [2]
Plaintiff Sandra Adickes was a white schoolteacher at the Mississippi Freedom School. The Freedom School movement was part of a broad attempt to increase education for black people across the South; at the time the average black Mississippian had only a 6th grade education. The School relied greatly on liberal white teachers from the North, of which Adickes was one. She had spent the first half of 1964 training in New York to become a Freedom School teacher. She arrived in Mississippi on July 4 in the majority black Hattiesburg. Despite its large black population, its white residents had been on a prolonged offensive of harassment and intimidation, especially against supposed Northern agitators. Already that summer, three people had been beaten in Hattiesburg alone by segregationists. Throughout Mississippi, a campaign of church bombings and killings had marked the last few years; just the summer before Medgar Evers had been assassinated. [2]
With the passage of the Civil Rights act and the nominal end of segregation, Adickes's black students were very excited to finally engage in such simple pleasures as being able to see a movie, visit the library, and go to the local Holiday Inn. Adickes determined to take the students on a field trip to show the civic opportunities now afforded to them. She chose the local library, which was funded by black taxpayer money yet had refused to admit blacks, and then to afterwards take the students to lunch. Thus on August 14, Adickes took six students to the Hattiesburg Public Library. Upon entering, they were told that no library cards would be offered to them, and that the library trustees would rather close the library than racially integrate it. Adickes refused to leave, and the library called police, the chief of which arrived and closed the library. [2]
Adickes then took the students to lunch. Lunch counters had proved a previously explosive topic of the Civil Rights movement, such as in the Greensboro sit-ins. They chose to eat at defendant S. H. Kress & Co.'s lunch counter. The party sat down across two booths, and the black students were served. However, the restaurant refused to serve Adickes, saying that they would not be serving whites who came in with blacks, even though they were required to serve blacks. Testimony from the store manager says that the entrance of the Adickes party immediately soured the atmosphere of the lunch counter, and that a group gathered outside, and patrons inside started milling around, clearly agitated by Adickes. The manager believed mob violence was imminent, and claims that was why he refused to serve Adickes. A police officer entered the lunch counter at some point during this, and went into the back of the store. The group left soon after, without eating their food. Upon exiting, Adickes was arrested by that same officer, on the obviously trumped up charge of vagrancy (Adickes was hardly an itinerant, and earned a $2,200 salary as a teacher). She was bailed out of prison a few hours later by a group of lawyers. [2]
Adickes filed a lawsuit in federal court in New York, alleging two counts: (1) Kress had deprived her of the right under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment not to be discriminated against on the basis of race, and (2) that both the refusal of service and her subsequent arrest were the product of a conspiracy between Kress and Hattiesburg police. The first count went to trial and was ruled in favor of Kress; the second count was dismissed before trial on a motion for summary judgment. Adickes appealed the case. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari . [3]
The Court addressed two issues upon review of this case:
The summary judgement issue was the major issue, and regarded interpretation of rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules have since been amended as a result of Adickes and the later Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986). [2]
Adickes kept summary judgment an "extraordinary remedy", which meant that summary judgement remained a not widely used tool. The drafters of the original Rules of Civil Procedure had not intended summary judgement to be widely used, as summary judgement prevents a jury from ever hearing the case. The finding in Celotex was seen as a partial reversal, and opened up the floodgates of summary judgement. Despite winning at the Supreme Court, Adickes did not take the case to trial again. [2]
In law, a summary judgment is a judgment entered by a court for one party and against another party summarily, i.e., without a full trial. Summary judgments may be issued on the merits of an entire case, or on discrete issues in that case. The formulation of the summary judgment standard is stated in somewhat different ways by courts in different jurisdictions. In the United States, the presiding judge generally must find there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In England and Wales, the court rules for a party without a full trial when "the claim, defence or issue has no real prospect of success and there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial."
Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County was one of the five cases combined into Brown v. Board of Education, the famous case in which the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1954, officially overturned racial segregation in U.S. public schools. The Davis case was the only such case to be initiated by a student protest. The case challenged segregation in Prince Edward County, Virginia.
Gebhart v. Belton, 33 Del. Ch. 144, 87 A.2d 862, aff'd, 91 A.2d 137, was a case decided by the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1952 and affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in the same year. Gebhart was one of the five cases combined into Brown v. Board of Education, the 1954 decision of the United States Supreme Court which found unconstitutional racial segregation in United States public schools.
The Enforcement Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, Third Enforcement Act, Third Ku Klux Klan Act, Civil Rights Act of 1871, or Force Act of 1871, is an Act of the United States Congress which empowered the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus to combat the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and other terrorist organizations. The act was passed by the 42nd United States Congress and signed into law by United States President Ulysses S. Grant on April 20, 1871. The act was the last of three Enforcement Acts passed by the United States Congress from 1870 to 1871 during the Reconstruction Era to combat attacks upon the suffrage rights of African Americans. The statute has been subject to only minor changes since then, but has been the subject of voluminous interpretation by courts.
The Greensboro sit-ins were a series of nonviolent protests in February to July 1960, primarily in the Woolworth store—now the International Civil Rights Center and Museum—in Greensboro, North Carolina, which led to the F. W. Woolworth Company department store chain removing its policy of racial segregation in the Southern United States. While not the first sit-in of the civil rights movement, the Greensboro sit-ins were an instrumental action, and also the best-known sit-ins of the civil rights movement. They are considered a catalyst to the subsequent sit-in movement, in which 70,000 people participated. This sit-in was a contributing factor in the formation of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).
Clyde Kennard was an American Korean War veteran and civil rights leader from Hattiesburg, Mississippi. In the 1950s, he attempted several times to enroll at the all-white Mississippi Southern College to complete his undergraduate degree started at the University of Chicago. Although the United States Supreme Court had ruled in 1954 that segregation of public schools was unconstitutional, the college rejected him. Kennard was among the thousands of local activists in the 1940s and 1950s who pressed for their rights.
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), is a United States Supreme Court case based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It held that a state government cannot employ "breach of the peace" statutes against protesters engaging in peaceable demonstrations that may potentially incite violence.
Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (1956), was a case heard before a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama on Montgomery and Alabama state bus segregation laws. The panel consisted of Middle District of Alabama Judge Frank Minis Johnson, Northern District of Alabama Judge Seybourn Harris Lynne, and Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Rives. The main plaintiffs in the case were Aurelia Browder, Claudette Colvin, Susie McDonald, and Mary Louise Smith. Jeanetta Reese had originally been a plaintiff in the case, but intimidation by segregationists caused her to withdraw in February. She falsely claimed she had not agreed to the lawsuit, which led to an unsuccessful attempt to disbar Fred Gray for supposedly improperly representing her.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court. Written by Associate Justice William Rehnquist, the decision of the Court held that a party moving for summary judgment need show only that the opposing party lacks evidence sufficient to support its case. A broader version of that doctrine was later formally added to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Vernon Ferdinand Dahmer, Sr. was a leader in the Civil Rights Movement and president of the Forrest County chapter of the NAACP in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. He was murdered by the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan for his work on recruiting African Americans to vote.
Sanford Rose Leigh, also known as Sandy Leigh was an activist during the Civil Rights Movement and the director of the largest project in Mississippi Freedom Summer, the Hattiesburg Project.
Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964), is a United States Supreme Court decision that reversed the breach of peace and criminal trespass convictions of five African Americans who were refused service at a lunch counter of a department store. The Court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the breach of peace convictions, and reversed the criminal trespass convictions for the reasons stated in another case that was decided that same day, Bouie v. City of Columbia, which held that the retroactive application of an expanded construction of a criminal statute was barred by due process of ex post facto laws.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), is a United States Supreme Court case articulating the standard for a trial court to grant summary judgment. Summary judgment will lie when, taking all factual inferences in the non-movant's favor, there exists no genuine issue as to a material fact and the movant deserves judgment as a matter of law. Because courts almost always cite Liberty Lobby in their opinions for the standard regarding motions for summary judgment, Liberty Lobby is the most cited Supreme Court case.
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), is a United States Supreme Court case in which a sharply divided Court held that the plaintiff, whom the local police chief had named an "active shoplifter," suffered no deprivation of liberty resulting from injury to his reputation. In the case, the court broke from precedents and restricted the definition of the constitutional right to privacy "to matters relating to 'marriage procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education".
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961), was a landmark case argued by Thurgood Marshall before the US Supreme Court. On December 11, 1961, the court unanimously ruled that Louisiana could not convict peaceful sit-in protesters who refused to leave dining establishments under the state's "disturbing the peace" laws.
This is a timeline of the civil rights movement in the United States, a nonviolent mid-20th century freedom movement to gain legal equality and the enforcement of constitutional rights for people of color. The goals of the movement included securing equal protection under the law, ending legally institutionalized racial discrimination, and gaining equal access to public facilities, education reform, fair housing, and the ability to vote.
Scheck v. Burger King Corp. (756 F. Supp. 543 was a case of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in which it considered motions for summary judgement brought by defendant Burger King Corporation concerning four counts raised by Plaintiff Scheck who alleged that defendant "breached an implied non-competition agreement, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing an implied contract created by promissory estoppel and the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act" which plaintiff alleged incorporates the proceeding three claims. Burger King moved for summary judgement on the basis that Scheck's claims were insufficient "as a matter of law", were barred by the Massachusetts Statute of Frauds, or were released by the plaintiff as a direct result of two releases executed by Scheck in 1985 and 1986, respectively. The case invoked legal questions concerning the covenant of good faith and fair dealing related to legal protection of the territory rights of franchisees.
The Charleston sit-ins were a series of peaceful protests during the sit-in movement of the civil rights movement of the 1960s in Charleston, South Carolina. Unlike at other sit-ins in the South where the protestors were mainly college students, the protestors in Charleston were mainly high school stuents. The earliest such protest was a sit-in at a lunch counter by Charleston high school students, but similar protests continued thereafter.
Sandra L. Adickes is best known for the role in the Mississippi Freedom School of 1964, her situation as the plaintiff in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., and her activism during the Vietnam War and with the New York City teachers' union. She is also the author of several books including To be Young was Very Heaven and Legacy of a Freedom School.
Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S., was a United States Supreme Court case that maintained the illegality of race-based segregation in public places. Ten African American student protesters were arrested and convicted in Greenville, South Carolina for attempting to purchase food at an S.H. Kress lunch counter. After the African American students arrived at the restaurant and sat at the lunch counter, the manager abruptly closed the store and instructed the protesters to leave. The manager and police argued that the protesters violated a state trespassing ordinance and were not arrested because of their race. While the Supreme Court of South Carolina maintained the students' guilt, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision, citing that a "violation of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be saved by attempting to separate the mental urges of the discriminators."