BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings

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BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings
Royal Arms of the United Kingdom (Privy Council).svg
Court Privy Council
Full case nameBP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v President, Councillors and Ratepayers of the Shire of Hastings (Victoria)
Decided27 July 1977
Citations
Court membership
Judges sitting
Case opinions
(3:2) a term should be implied in the contract to permit the assignment of the rights within the BP group.
— Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Simon and Lord Keith
Keywords
General contractual principles, Construction and interpretation of contracts, Implied terms

BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings is a leading judgment of the Privy Council which summarised the test for whether a term should implied 'in fact' into a contract, to give effect to the intentions of the contracting parties. [1] While the formulation of the test is not without criticism, it is usually accepted as setting out the tests for the implication of a term into a contract.

Contents

Background

In 1963, BP reached an agreement with the Government of Victoria for the establishment of the Westernport Refinery and construction of port facilities at Crib Point, in Western Port, Victoria ("the Refinery Agreement"). [2] The Parliament of Victoria, on the same day it ratified the Refinery Agreement, amended the Local Government Act 1958 to allow local councils to agree on the rates payable for industrial land. [3] In 1964 the Shire of Hastings and BP entered into a Rating Agreement, which set out the rates payable for the following 40 years, and was approved by the Governor ("the Rating Agreement"). [4] [ dead link ]

BP decided to restructure its Australian operations and on 15 December 1969 wrote to the Shire of Hastings stating "I hope I may assume that there will be no difficulty over transferring" the rights and privileges including the Rating Agreement to BP Australia Ltd. [1] That the Rating Agreement would transfer was apparently so obvious to BP that it did not wait to hear the position of the Shire of Hastings before transferring the assets to BP Australia Ltd. Under the Rating Agreement the rates would have been $50,000; however, the Shire of Hastings said the Rating Agreement no longer applied and assessed the rates in excess of $150,000. [5]

The first set of appeals

An appeal against the assessment by BP to the County Court was dismissed, as was an appeal to the Supreme Court of Victoria. The Supreme Court held that under the Local Government Act the Shire of Hastings could only validly make an agreement with a particular ratepayer for specified land, and not any person who might subsequently become the ratepayer. While the Rating Agreement applied, if at all, by statutory force, it was regarded by the parties and the court as simply a contract between the parties. [6]

BP could have sought leave to appeal the decision to the High Court of Australia [7] or to the Privy Council, [8] but did not do so. [1] Instead it took steps for BP to resume its occupation of the refinery site in September 1973. The Shire of Hastings again assessed the rates as in excess of $150,000. [1]

The decision of the County Court

BP refinery was unsuccessful in its appeal to the County Court, where the judge held:

In the end I have come to the conclusion that not only is this a personal contract, as the Supreme Court has already decided, but that there was a fundamental condition of continuing occupancy by the appellant. A reading of the whole of the agreement leads, in my opinion, to the finding that it contemplates that [BP Refinery] will continuously occupy the site and therefore be liable for rates. I am further of the view that the actions of the parties and the correspondence amounted to an agreement that the agreement was at an end or, if it did not, [BP Refinery] was in fundamental breach and the [Shire of Hastings] rescinded the contract by its letter of 9 February 1970, inelegantly expressed though it may have been. [1]

The decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria

BP appealed to the Supreme Court of Victoria. On 5 May 1976, the Full Court dismissed the appeal, holding that

  1. it was an implied condition of the rating agreement that it should continue in operation only so long as BP should be the occupier of the refinery site and rateable as such; so that on BP going out of occupation on 1 January 1970, the rating agreement came to an end;
  2. if the agreement had not come to an end by the operation of such an implied term, the letter from BP and the Shire of Hastings amounted to "a mutual acquiescence between the appellant and the Shire that [the rating agreement] was to be treated as discharged"; and
  3. it was unnecessary to determine the third – "wider and more difficult" – point argued on behalf of the Shire of Hastings, namely, that there had been a repudiation or fundamental breach of the rating agreement by BP, the rating agreement having allegedly imposed on BP an obligation to remain in occupation of the site and to maintain, operate and use the refinery for the purpose, inter alia, of enabling the rates to be calculated. [1]

The Appeal to the Privy Council

The majority decision

The majority of the Privy Council, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Simon and Lord Keith, cited with approval a passage from the judgement in Prenn v Simmonds in which Lord Wilberforce said "In order for the agreement ... to be understood, it must be placed in its context. The time has long passed when agreements, even those under seal, were isolated from the matrix of facts in which they were set and interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations." [9]

Their Lordships do not think it necessary to review exhaustively the authorities on the implication of a term in a contract which the parties have not thought fit to express. In their view, for a term to be implied, the following conditions (which may overlap) must be satisfied:

  1. it must be reasonable and equitable;
  2. it must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, so that no term will be implied if the contract is effective without it;
  3. it must be so obvious that "it goes without saying";
  4. it must be capable of clear expression;
  5. it must not contradict any express term of the contract. [1]

The test for the implications of terms was not controversial, citing three well known cases for its authority

In applying these principles, the majority took into account the surrounding circumstances, including that:

The majority held that the term found by the Supreme Court of Victoria, that the agreement would end once BP ceased to be liable to pay rates on the property, was not necessary to give business efficacy to the Rating Agreement and that it was wholly unreasonable and inequitable to limit the ability of the BP group to make changes in its corporate structure. The identity of the particular member of the BP group could not have been of the least importance to the Shire of Hastings.

Instead they found implied an entirely different term, said to make the Rating Agreement accord with the Refinery Agreement to permit the assignment of the rights within the BP group.

The majority found that what was obvious to the County Court, the judges of the Supreme Court and indeed two of their colleagues, was wrong and that those judges had missed what should have been obvious. [13]

The dissenting judgement

Lord Wilberforce and Lord Morris dissented. The difference of opinion was not on the question of principle, but rather on the application of those principles. Their Lordships noted that:

Significance

The decision has been adopted and applied in numerous decisions, both in Australia and England.

In Australia

In England

Criticism of the test

The criterion of "necessity" has been described as "elusive" and "somewhat protean". [22] [23] It has been suggested that "there is much to be said for abandoning" the concept of necessity. [24] As for the projected 40-year life of the refinery, it closed in 1985. [25]

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References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings [1977] UKPC 13; [1977] UKPCHCA 1 , (1977) 180  CLR  266, Privy Council (on appeal fromVic,Australia).
  2. Westernport (Oil Refinery) Act 1963 (Vic).
  3. Local Government (Decentralized Industries) Act 1963 (Vic), inserting section 390A.
  4. "Victorian Government Gazette No 48, 3 June 1964". p. 1837.
  5. "BP wins rate appeal to Privy Council". Canberra Times . AAP. 29 July 1977. p. 3 via Trove.
  6. BP Australia Ltd v The Shire of Hastings [1973] VicRp 17 , [1973] VR 194, Supreme Court (Vic,Australia).
  7. Constitution (Cth) s 73.
  8. Gleeson, Murray (18 June 2008). "The Privy Council - an Australian Perspective" (PDF). High Court of Australia.
  9. Prenn v. Simmonds [1971] 3 All ER 237; [1971] 1 WLR 1381.
  10. The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64 at p. 68.
  11. Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co [1918] 1 KB 592 at p. 605.
  12. Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206 at p. 227.
  13. Ash, D. (29 January 2016). "Adversarial anniversaries – 29 January".
  14. Secured Income Real Estate (Australia) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd [1979] HCA 51 , (1979) 144 CLR 596, High Court (Australia) at p. 605-6 per Mason J.
  15. Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW [1982] HCA 24 , (1982) 149 CLR 337 at p. 345 per Mason J, High Court (Australia).
  16. Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW [1982] HCA 24 , (1982) 149 CLR 337 at p. 403-4 per Brennan J, High Court (Australia).
  17. Hospital Products Ltd v US Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 64 , (1984) 156 CLR 41, High Court (Australia).
  18. Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd [1995] HCA 24 , (1995) 185 CLR 410, High Court (Australia).
  19. 1 2 Philips Electronique Grand Public SA v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [1995] EMLR 472 at p. 481–82
  20. Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10, Privy Council (on appeal from Belize).
  21. Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd [2015] UKSC 7 , Supreme Court (UK).
  22. This is a reference to Proteus, the shape-shifting old man of the sea from Greek mythology who would change his shape to avoid having to yield a true prophecy.
  23. Crossley v Faithful & Gould Holdings Ltd [2004] EWCA 293 , [2004] 4 All ER 447; [2004] ICR 1615 at 1627 [36], Court of Appeal (England and Wales).
  24. Peel, E.; Treitel, G. H. (2011). The Law of Contract (13th ed.). Sweet & Maxwell. p. 231 [6–043]. ISBN   978-1847039217.
  25. Westernport (Oil Refinery) (Further Agreement) Act 1985 (Vic).