Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.

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Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued January 14, 1991
Decided May 13, 1991
Full case nameGilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
Docket no. 90-18
Citations500 U.S. 20 ( more )
111 S. Ct. 1647; 114 L. Ed. 2d 26; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 2529
Case history
Prior895 F.2d 195
Holding
Petitioner's statutory claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are subject to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act pursuant to the parties' agreement.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
Byron White  · Thurgood Marshall
Harry Blackmun  · John P. Stevens
Sandra Day O'Connor  · Antonin Scalia
Anthony Kennedy  · David Souter
Case opinions
MajorityWhite, joined by Rehnquist, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter
DissentStevens, joined by Marshall
Laws applied
Federal Arbitration Act

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), is a 1991 case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of an arbitration clause to compel arbitration of statutory Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 claims. [1] A regional brokerage house, Interstate Johnson Lane later became part of Wachovia Securities.

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References

  1. Duston, Robert L. (1991). "Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: A Major Step Forward for Alternative Dispute Resolution, or a Meaningless Decision?". The Labor Lawyer. 7 (4): 823–848. ISSN   8756-2995.