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In law, provocation is when a person is considered to have committed a criminal act partly because of a preceding set of events that might cause a reasonable person to lose self control. This makes them less morally culpable than if the act was premeditated (pre-planned) and done out of pure malice. It "affects the quality of the actor's state of mind as an indicator of moral blameworthiness."
In criminal law, criminal negligence is a surrogate mens rea required to constitute a conventional as opposed to strict liability offense. It is not, strictly speaking, a mens rea because it refers to an objective standard of behaviour expected of the defendant and does not refer to their mental state.
Culpable homicide is a categorisation of certain offences in various jurisdictions within the Commonwealth of Nations which involves the illegal killing of a person either with or without an intention to kill depending upon how a particular jurisdiction has defined the offence. Unusually for those legal systems which have originated or been influenced during rule by the United Kingdom, the name of the offence associates with Scots law rather than English law.
Malice aforethought is the "premeditation" or "predetermination" required as an element of some crimes in some jurisdictions and a unique element for first-degree or aggravated murder in a few. Insofar as the term is still in use, it has a technical meaning that has changed substantially over time.
Commander K. M. Nanavati vs. State of Maharashtra was a 1959 Indian court case where Commander Kawas Manekshaw Nanavati, a Naval Commander, was tried for the murder of Prem Ahuja, his wife's lover. Commander Nanavati, accused under section 302, was initially declared not guilty by a jury, but the verdict was dismissed by the Bombay High Court and the case was retried as a bench trial. This was not the last jury trial in India, as is popularly believed. Nanavati was finally pardoned by Vijayalakshmi Pandit, newly appointed Governor of Maharashtra and sister of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.
The Homicide Act 1957 is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. It was enacted as a partial reform of the common law offence of murder in English law by abolishing the doctrine of constructive malice, reforming the partial defence of provocation, and by introducing the partial defences of diminished responsibility and suicide pact. It restricted the use of the death penalty for murder.
Murder is an offence under the common law of England and Wales. It is considered the most serious form of homicide, in which one person kills another with the intention to cause either death or serious injury unlawfully. The element of intentionality was originally termed malice aforethought, although it required neither malice nor premeditation. Baker, chapter 14 states that many killings done with a high degree of subjective recklessness were treated as murder from the 12th century right through until the 1974 decision in DPP v Hyam.
In English law, provocation was a mitigatory defence which had taken many guises over generations many of which had been strongly disapproved and modified. In closing decades, in widely upheld form, it amounted to proving a reasonable total loss of control as a response to another's objectively provocative conduct sufficient to convert what would otherwise have been murder into manslaughter. It does not apply to any other offence. It was abolished on 4 October 2010 by section 56(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, but thereby replaced by the superseding—and more precisely worded—loss of control.
In the English law of homicide, manslaughter is a less serious offence than murder, the differential being between levels of fault based on the mens rea or by reason of a partial defence. In England and Wales, a common practice is to prefer a charge of murder, with the judge or defence able to introduce manslaughter as an option. The jury then decides whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of either murder or manslaughter. On conviction for manslaughter, sentencing is at the judge's discretion, whereas a sentence of life imprisonment is mandatory on conviction for murder. Manslaughter may be either voluntary or involuntary, depending on whether the accused has the required mens rea for murder.
Manslaughter is a common law legal term for homicide considered by law as less culpable than murder. The distinction between murder and manslaughter is sometimes said to have first been made by the ancient Athenian lawmaker Draco in the 7th century BC.
Drury v. Her Majesty's Advocate is a Scottish criminal case heard before a full bench of the High Court of Justiciary sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeal. Stuart Drury had been convicted of killing his former partner with a hammer on concluding that she had begun a new relationship with another man. The original trial judge directed the jury that a finding of culpable homicide could only be made where the accused had not intended to kill and had not displayed enough wicked recklessness to convict of murder, and that a defence of provocation was only possible if the violence was proportionate to the provocation itself.
In Canada, culpable homicide is a category of offences defined in the Criminal Code, a statute passed by the Parliament of Canada that applies uniformly across the country. Murder is the most serious category of culpable homicide, the others being manslaughter and infanticide.
In India according to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, murder is defined as follows:
Murder.--Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or- 167 2ndly.-If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused. or- 3rdly.-If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or- 4thly.-If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
South African criminal law is the body of national law relating to crime in South Africa. In the definition of Van der Walt et al., a crime is "conduct which common or statute law prohibits and expressly or impliedly subjects to punishment remissible by the state alone and which the offender cannot avoid by his own act once he has been convicted." Crime involves the infliction of harm against society. The function or object of criminal law is to provide a social mechanism with which to coerce members of society to abstain from conduct that is harmful to the interests of society.
In S v Russell, an important case in South African criminal law, heard on July 12, 1967, the accused had been warned of the danger of operating a crane under a live electric wire, but had failed to pass on the warning to his co-employees. This omission, constituting negligence, led to the death of one of them. He was convicted of culpable homicide.
R v Patel is an important case in South African criminal law, heard on May 8, 1959. The appellant's attorneys were Levy, Rogaly & Cohen, Pretoria, and S. and v A Rosendorff, Bloemfontein. The Appellate Division ruled that "a person has the same right to use force in the defence of another from a threatened danger, as he would have to defend himself, if he were the person threatened."
In S v Jackson, an important case in South African criminal law, the Appellate Division held that a person is justified in killing in self-defence not only when he fears that his life is in danger but also when he fears grievous bodily harm. PE Linde appeared for the appellant and BG van der Walt, SC, Attorney-General OFS, for the State. The case was heard on March 8, 1963. The appellant's attorney was DA Carroll, Johannesburg.
Rex v Zikalala is an important case in South African criminal law, heard on February 27, 1953. Zikalala, the appellant, had been charged and convicted of the culpable homicide in causing the death of one Alpheus Tsele. On appeal to the Appellate Division, he successfully argued self-defence.
In S v Naidoo 2003 (1) SACR 347 (SCA); [2002] 4 All SA 710 (SCA), an important case in South African criminal procedure, the appellant had been convicted, along with two other accused, on 13 counts of culpable homicide arising out of an incident where a teargas canister was thrown into a rival nightclub. In the ensuing chaos and stampede 13 of the patrons of the nightclub died.
In S v Whitehead, an important case in South African criminal procedure, the appellants were convicted of public violence and culpable homicide and, in the case of the seventh appellant, of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm.
References
- S v Mampa 1985 (4) SA 633 (C)