Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Railway Co.

Last updated
Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Railway Co.
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued January 18,21, 1907
Decided March 4, 1907
Full case nameCatherine Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Railway Co.
Citations205 U.S. 1 ( more )
27 S. Ct. 407; 51 L. Ed. 681; 1907 U.S. LEXIS 1447
Court membership
Chief Justice
Melville Fuller
Associate Justices
John M. Harlan  · David J. Brewer
Edward D. White  · Rufus W. Peckham
Joseph McKenna  · Oliver W. Holmes Jr.
William R. Day  · William H. Moody

Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Railway Co., 205 U.S. 1 (1907), was a cause of action for the death of the plaintiff's intestate, Adam M. Schlemmer, while trying to couple a shovel car to a caboose. [1]

Contents

Background

Facts

The decedent was killed while following orders to couple railway cars that did not have a coupling device required by the Safety Appliance Act (Act). Plaintiff filed an action against defendant railroad company for the wrongful death of her intestate under the Safety Appliance Act.

The shovel car was part of a train on its way through Pennsylvania from a point in New York, and was not equipped with an automatic coupler in accordance with Federal law. Instead it had an iron drawbar fastened underneath the car by a pin and projecting about a foot beyond the car. The drawbar weighed about 80 pounds and its free and played up and down. On this end was an eye, and the coupling had to be done by lifting the free end possibly a foot, so that it should enter a slot in an automatic coupler on the caboose and allow a pin to drop through the eye. Due to the absence of buffers on the shovel car and to its being so high that it would pass over those on the caboose, the car and caboose would crush anyone between them if they came together and the coupling failed to be made. Schlemmer was ordered to make the coupling as the train was slowly approaching the caboose. To do so he had to get between the cars, and in endeavoring to obey the order and to guide the drawbar he rose a little too high, and, as he failed to hit the slot, the top of his head was crushed.

The plaintiff, in her declaration, alleged that the defendant was transporting the shovel car from state to state, and that the coupler was not such as was required by existing laws.

Procedural history

The trial judge decided that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence but left uncertain what the negligence was. The Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's grant of a nonsuit. (207 Pa. St. 198)

Opinion of the court

The court reversed the grant of nonsuit, holding that the decedent had not assumed the risk. The court held, as preliminary matters that the railway car was in the course of interstate transportation, and it was a car within the contemplation of § 2 of the Act. Thus, under § 8 of the act, the decedent could not be deemed to have assumed the risk of the injury or death. The court noted that to the extent the state court alternatively indicated that, even if assumption of risk did not apply, the decedent was guilty of contributory negligence, such statement ran afoul of the Act because the state court was merely substituting contributory negligence for assumption of risk.

See also

Related Research Articles

Negligence is a failure to exercise appropriate and/or ethical ruled care expected to be exercised amongst specified circumstances. The area of tort law known as negligence involves harm caused by failing to act as a form of carelessness possibly with extenuating circumstances. The core concept of negligence is that people should exercise reasonable care in their actions, by taking account of the potential harm that they might foreseeably cause to other people or property.

Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine in the Anglo-American common law and Roman-Dutch law that says in a tort or civil lawsuit a court can infer negligence from the very nature of an accident or injury in the absence of direct evidence on how any defendant behaved. Although modern formulations differ by jurisdiction, Anglo-American common law originally stated that the accident must satisfy the necessary elements of negligence: duty, breach of duty, causation, and injury. In res ipsa loquitur, the elements of duty of care, breach, and causation are inferred from an injury that does not ordinarily occur without negligence.

An affirmative defense to a civil lawsuit or criminal charge is a fact or set of facts other than those alleged by the plaintiff or prosecutor which, if proven by the defendant, defeats or mitigates the legal consequences of the defendant's otherwise unlawful conduct. In civil lawsuits, affirmative defenses include the statute of limitations, the statute of frauds, waiver, and other affirmative defenses such as, in the United States, those listed in Rule 8 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In criminal prosecutions, examples of affirmative defenses are self defense, insanity, entrapment and the statute of limitations.

Railroad Safety Appliance Act

The Safety Appliance Act is a United States federal law that made air brakes and automatic couplers mandatory on all trains in the United States. It was enacted on March 2, 1893, and took effect in 1900, after a seven-year grace period. The act is credited with a sharp drop in accidents on American railroads in the early 20th century.

Assumption of risk is a defense, specifically an affirmative defense, in the law of torts, which bars or reduces a plaintiff's right to recovery against a negligent tortfeasor if the defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly assumed the risks at issue inherent to the dangerous activity in which the plaintiff was participating at the time of his or her injury.

In some common law jurisdictions, contributory negligence is a defense to a tort claim based on negligence. If it is available, the defense completely bars plaintiffs from any recovery if they contribute to their own injury through their own negligence.

Volenti non fit iniuria is a common law doctrine which states that if someone willingly places themselves in a position where harm might result, knowing that some degree of harm might result, they are not able to bring a claim against the other party in tort or delict. Volenti applies only to the risk which a reasonable person would consider them as having assumed by their actions; thus a boxer consents to being hit, and to the injuries that might be expected from being hit, but does not consent to his opponent striking him with an iron bar, or punching him outside the usual terms of boxing. Volenti is also known as a "voluntary assumption of risk".

<i>Li v. Yellow Cab Co.</i>

Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975), commonly referred to simply as Li, is a California Supreme Court case that judicially embraced comparative negligence in California tort law and rejected strict contributory negligence.

In English tort law, there can be no liability in negligence unless the claimant establishes both that they were owed a duty of care by the defendant, and that there has been a breach of that duty. The defendant is in breach of duty towards the claimant if their conduct fell short of the standard expected under the circumstances.

In the English law of negligence, the acts of the claimant may give the defendant a defence to liability, whether in whole or part, if those acts unreasonably add to the loss.

<i>Martin v. Herzog</i>

Martin v. Herzog, Ct. of App. of N.Y., 228 N Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920), was a New York Court of Appeals case.

Tinsley v. Treat, 205 U.S. 20 (1907), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that found while an indictment in a removal proceeding constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause, it is not conclusive, so evidence put forth by a defendant showing that no offense triable in the district to which removal is sought had been committed is admissible, and its exclusion is not mere error, but the denial of a right secured under the Federal Constitution.

<i>Nettleship v Weston</i>

Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691 is an English Court of Appeal judgment dealing with the breach of duty in negligence claims. In this case the court had considered the question of the standard of care that should be applied to a learner driver, and whether it should be the same as is expected of an experienced driver.

Buffalo, Rochester and Pittsburgh Railway

The Buffalo, Rochester, and Pittsburgh Railway was one of the more than ten thousand railroad companies founded in North America. It lasted much longer than most, serving communities from the shore of Lake Ontario to the center of western Pennsylvania.

Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1 (1904), was a case before the United States Supreme Court. It interpreted the words "any car" in the Railroad Safety Appliance Act, prohibiting common carriers moving interstate commerce from using any car that was not equipped with automatic couplers. In doing so, it overturned the Eighth Circuit in Johnson v. Southern P. Co., 117 F. 462

<i>Hall v Hebert</i> Canadian tort law case on contributory negligence

Hall v Hebert is a leading tort law case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on the defences of contributory negligence and ex turpi causa non oritur actio.

Schlemmer may refer to:

The civil liability of a recreational diver may include a duty of care to another diver during a dive. Breach of this duty that is a proximate cause of injury or loss to the other diver may lead to civil litigation for damages in compensation for the injury or loss suffered.

<i>Venning v Chin</i> Australian court case

Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299 is a Supreme Court of South Australia full court judgment, by which it was decided that in trespass cases, the onus lies on the defendant to disprove fault. However, for injuries caused in highway accidents, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove fault on the part of the defendant.

<i>Chapman v Hearse</i>

Chapman v Hearse is a significant case in common law related to duty of care, reasonable foreseeability and novus actus interveniens within the tort of negligence. The case concerned three parties; Chapman who drove negligently, Dr Cherry who assisted him on the side of the road, and Hearse who, in driving negligently, killed Dr Cherry while he was assisting Chapman. In the Supreme Court of South Australia, Hearse was found liable for damages to Dr Cherry's estate under the Wrongs Act 1936. Hearse sought to reclaim damages from Chapman due to his alleged contributory negligence; Chapman was found liable to one quarter of the damages. Chapman appealed the case to the High Court of Australia on August 8, 1961 but it was dismissed as the results of his negligence were deemed reasonably foreseeable. A duty of care was established between Chapman and the deceased and his claim of novus actus interveniens was rejected. Dr Cherry was considered a ‘rescuer’ and his respective rights remained.

References

  1. Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Railway Co., 205 U.S. 1 (1907).