Vertical restraints

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Vertical restraints are competition restrictions in agreements between firms or individuals at different levels of the production and distribution process. Vertical restraints are to be distinguished from so-called "horizontal restraints", which are found in agreements between horizontal competitors. Vertical restraints can take numerous forms, ranging from a requirement that dealers accept returns of a manufacturer's product, to resale price maintenance agreements setting the minimum or maximum price that dealers can charge for the manufacturer's product.

Resale price maintenance (RPM) (US) or retail price maintenance (UK) is the practice whereby a manufacturer and its distributors agree that the distributors will sell the manufacturer's product at certain prices, at or above a price floor or at or below a price ceiling. If a reseller refuses to maintain prices, either openly or covertly, the manufacturer may stop doing business with it.

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So-called "intrabrand restraints" such as resale price maintenance govern products made by a particular manufacturer, while "interbrand restraints" regulate a dealer's or manufacturer's relationship with its trading partner's rivals (e.g., "English clauses"). Quintessential examples of interbrand restraints include tying contracts, whereby a purchaser agrees to purchase a second product as a condition of obtaining a so-called "tying" product, and exclusive dealing agreements, whereby a dealer agrees not to purchase products from suppliers that are rivals of the manufacturer.

Tying is the practice of selling one product or service as a mandatory addition to the purchase of a different product or service. In legal terms, a tying sale makes the sale of one good to the de facto customer conditional on the purchase of a second distinctive good. Tying is often illegal when the products are not naturally related. It is related to but distinct from freebie marketing, a common method of giving away one item to ensure a continual flow of sales of another related item.

In competition law, exclusive dealing refers to an arrangement whereby a retailer or wholesaler is ‘tied’ to purchase from a supplier on the understanding that no other distributor will be appointed or receive supplies in a given area. When the sales outlets are owned by the supplier, exclusive dealing is because of vertical integration, where the outlets are independent exclusive dealing is illegal due to the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, however, if it is registered and approved it is allowed.

United States antitrust law

Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act governs all the vertical restraints involving interstate commerce in the United States. Section 3 of the Clayton Act governs interbrand restraints involving the sale of "goods". Finally, Section 2 of the Sherman Act governs restraints entered by monopolists. For several decades, courts were quite hostile to many vertical restraints, declaring them unlawful per se or nearly so. [1] More recently, courts have reversed course and held that most such restraints should be analyzed under the rule of reason. [2]

English clause

An "English clause" is a contractual provision requiring a buyer to report any better offer to his supplier and allowing him to accept such offer only when the supplier does not match it. An "English clause" is a vertical restraint under competition law, and can be expected to have the same effect as a single branding obligation, especially when the buyer has to reveal who makes the better offer. [3]

Competition law is a law that promotes or seeks to maintain market competition by regulating anti-competitive conduct by companies. Competition law is implemented through public and private enforcement. Competition law is known as "antitrust law" in the United States for historical reasons, and as "anti-monopoly law" in China and Russia. In previous years it has been known as trade practices law in the United Kingdom and Australia. In the European Union, it is referred to as both antitrust and competition law.

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Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 US antitrust Congress Act of 1890

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United States Antitrust law is a collection of federal and state government laws that regulates the conduct and organization of business corporations, generally to promote fair competition for the benefit of consumers. The main statutes are the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914 and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. These Acts, first, restrict the formation of cartels and prohibit other collusive practices regarded as being in restraint of trade. Second, they restrict the mergers and acquisitions of organizations that could substantially lessen competition. Third, they prohibit the creation of a monopoly and the abuse of monopoly power.

Price fixing agreement over prices between participants on the same side in a market

Price fixing is an agreement between participants on the same side in a market to buy or sell a product, service, or commodity only at a fixed price, or maintain the market conditions such that the price is maintained at a given level by controlling supply and demand.

The list price, also known as the manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP), or the recommended retail price (RRP), or the suggested retail price (SRP), of a product is the price at which the manufacturer recommends that the retailer sell the product. The intention was to help to standardize prices among locations. While some stores always sell at, or below, the suggested retail price, others do so only when items are on sale or closeout/clearance.

The rule of reason is a legal doctrine used to interpret the Sherman Antitrust Act, one of the cornerstones of United States antitrust law. While some actions like price-fixing are considered illegal per se, other actions, such as possession of a monopoly, must be analyzed under the rule of reason and are only considered illegal when their effect is to unreasonablyrestrain trade. William Howard Taft, then Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, first developed the doctrine in a ruling on Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, which was affirmed in 1899 by the Supreme Court. The doctrine also played a major role in the 1911 Supreme Court case Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States.

Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), is a US antitrust case in which the United States Supreme Court overruled Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.Dr Miles had ruled that vertical price restraints were illegal per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Leegin established that the legality of such restraints are to be judged based on the rule of reason.

Under a Unilateral Policy a manufacturer, without any agreement with the reseller, announces a minimum resale price and refuses to make further sales to any reseller that sells below the announced price. Unilateral policy is a form of resale price maintenance that enables a manufacturer to influence the price at which its distributors and dealers resell its products without a formal contract regarding the resale price. The policy was first identified in United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).

Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), is a 1941 decision of the United States Supreme Court sustaining an order of the Federal Trade Commission against a boycott agreement among manufacturers of "high-fashion" dresses. The purpose of the boycott was to suppress "style piracy". The FTC found the Fashion Guild in violation of § 5 of the FTC Act, because the challenged conduct was a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.

Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which reaffirmed the law that fixing a maximum price was illegal per se. This rule was reversed in 1997 by State Oil Co. v. Khan, which held that maximum price-setting was not inherently anti-competitive and not always a violation of antitrust law, and should therefore be evaluated for legality under the rule of reason rather than a per se rule.

Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982), was a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court involving the preemption of state law by the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court held, in a 9-0 decision, that the Sherman Act did not invalidate a California law prohibiting the importing of spirits not authorized by the brand owner.

<i>United States v. Apple Inc.</i>

United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, was a US antitrust case in which the Court held that Apple Inc. conspired to raise the price of e-books in violation of the Sherman Act.

U.S. v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), is a US antitrust case in which the United States Supreme Court noted that a company has the power to decide with whom to do business. Per the Colgate Doctrine, a company may unilaterally terminate business with any other company without triggering a violation of the antitrust laws.

FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953), was a 1953 decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that, where exclusive output contracts used by one company "and the three other major companies have foreclosed to competitors 75 percent of all available outlets for this business throughout the United States" the practice is "a device which has sewed up a market so tightly for the benefit of a few [that it] falls within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, and is therefore an 'unfair method of competition' " under § 5 of the FTC Act. In so ruling, the Court extended the analysis under § 3 of the Clayton Act of requirements contracts that it made in the Standard Stations case to output contracts brought under the Sherman or FTC Acts.

United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), was a 1960 decision of the United States Supreme Court limiting the so-called Colgate doctrine, which substantially insulates unilateral refusals to deal with price-cutters from the antitrust laws. The Parke, Davis & Co. case held that, when a company goes beyond "the limited dispensation" of Colgate by taking affirmative steps to induce adherence to its suggested prices, it puts together a combination among competitors to fix prices in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. In addition, the Court held that when a company abandons an illegal practice because it knows the US Government is investigating it and contemplating suit, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to hold the case that follows moot and dismiss it without granting relief sought against the illegal practice.

United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), is a 1940 United States Supreme Court decision widely cited for the proposition that price-fixing is illegal per se. The Socony case was, at least until recently, the most widely cited case on price fixing.

United States v. United States Gypsum Co. was a patent–antitrust case in which the United States Supreme Court decided, first, in 1948, that a patent licensing program that fixed prices of many licensees and regimented an entire industry violated the antitrust laws, and then, decided in 1950, after a remand, that appropriate relief in such cases did not extend so far as to permit licensees enjoying a compulsory, reasonable–royalty license to challenge the validity of the licensed patents. The Court also ruled, in obiter dicta, that the United States had standing to challenge the validity of patents when a patentee relied on the patents to justify its fixing prices. It held in this case, however, that the defendants violated the antitrust laws irrespective of whether the patents were valid, which made the validity issue irrelevant.

A hub-and-spoke conspiracy is a legal construct or doctrine of United States antitrust and criminal law. In such a conspiracy, several parties ("spokes") enter into an unlawful agreement with a leading party ("hub"). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained the concept in these terms:

In a "hub-and-spoke conspiracy," a central mastermind, or "hub," controls numerous "spokes," or secondary co-conspirators. These co-conspirators participate in independent transactions with the individual or group of individuals at the "hub" that collectively further a single, illegal enterprise.

United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942), is a United States Supreme Court decision that limited the scope of the 1926 Supreme Court decision in the General Electric case that had exempted patent licensing agreements from antitrust law's prohibition of price fixing. The Court did so by applying the doctrine of the Court's recent Interstate Circuit hub-and-spoke conspiracy decision.

Bulk-sale restrictions—also known as bulk-sale restraints, finished-form limitations, and dosage-form limitations—are, as the term is used in United States antitrust case law, clauses in patent licenses that provide that the licensee shall make and sell the licensed product only in "finished pharmaceutical form" or "dosage form", not in bulk. Bulk form is the form in which drug chemicals are manufactured by chemical or other processes. These clauses are found primarily in pharmaceutical product licenses and are used to keep active drug ingredients out of the hands of generic manufacturers and price-cutters.

References

  1. ↑ e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co. , 390 U.S. 145 (1969) (declaring maximum resale price maintenance unlawful per se).
  2. ↑ Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS , 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007); Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1978)
  3. ↑ European Commission (May 2010), Guidelines on vertical restraints



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