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William Rufus Day was an American diplomat and jurist who served as an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1903 to 1922. Prior to his service on the Supreme Court, Day served as United States Secretary of State during the administration of President William McKinley. He also served as a United States Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the United States Circuit Courts for the Sixth Circuit.
Symbolic speech is a legal term in United States law used to describe actions that purposefully and discernibly convey a particular message or statement to those viewing it. Symbolic speech is recognized as being protected under the First Amendment as a form of speech, but this is not expressly written as such in the document. One possible explanation as to why the Framers did not address this issue in the Bill of Rights is because the primary forms for both political debate and protest in their time were verbal expression and published word, and they may have been unaware of the possibility of future people using non-verbal expression. Symbolic speech is distinguished from pure speech, which is the communication of ideas through spoken or written words or through conduct limited in form to that necessary to convey the idea.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court ruling that a criminal prohibition against burning a draft card did not violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. Though the court recognized that O'Brien's conduct was expressive as a protest against the Vietnam War, it considered the law justified by a significant government interest unrelated to the suppression of speech and was tailored towards that end.
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine is a doctrine of civil procedure enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in two cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine holds that lower United States federal courts—i.e., federal courts other than the Supreme Court—should not sit in direct review of state court decisions unless Congress has specifically authorized such relief. In short, federal courts below the Supreme Court must not become a court of appeals for state court decisions. The state court appellant has to find a state court remedy, or obtain relief from the U.S. Supreme Court.
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court enunciated a rule of civil procedure that would eventually become known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (also named for the later case of District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462. The doctrine holds that lower United States federal courts may not sit in direct review of state court decisions.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court in which the Court enunciated a rule of civil procedure known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The doctrine holds that lower United States federal courts may not sit in direct review of state court decisions.
The California Alien Land Law of 1913 prohibited "aliens ineligible for citizenship" from owning agricultural land or possessing long-term leases over it, but permitted leases lasting up to three years. It affected the Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and Korean immigrant farmers in California. Implicitly, the law was primarily directed at the Japanese. It passed 35–2 in the State Senate and 72–3 in the State Assembly and was co-written by attorney Francis J. Heney and California state attorney general Ulysses S. Webb at the behest of Governor Hiram Johnson. Japan's Consul General Kametaro Iijima and lawyer Juichi Soyeda lobbied against the law. In a letter to the United States Secretary of State, the Japanese government via the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs called the law "essentially unfair and inconsistent... with the sentiments of amity and good neighborhood which have presided over the relations between the two countries," and noted that Japan felt it was "in disregard of the spirit of the existing treaty between Japan and the United States." The law was meant to discourage immigration from Asia, and to create an inhospitable climate for immigrants already living in California.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), is a First Amendment case decided in the Supreme Court of the United States. Three defendants were convicted in two separate cases of violating a Virginia statute against cross burning. In this case, the Court struck down that statute to the extent that it considered cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate. Such a provision, the Court argued, blurs the distinction between proscribable "threats of intimidation" and the Ku Klux Klan's protected "messages of shared ideology." However, cross-burning can be a criminal offense if the intent to intimidate is proven. It was argued by former Solicitor General of Virginia, William Hurd.
Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the government had failed to show a compelling interest in prosecuting religious adherents for drinking a sacramental tea containing a Schedule I controlled substance. After the federal government seized its sacramental tea, the União do Vegetal (UDV), the New Mexican branch of a Brazilian church that imbibes ayahuasca in its services, sued, claiming the seizure was illegal, and sought to ensure future importation of the tea for religious use. The church won a preliminary injunction from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, which was affirmed on appeal.
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the First Amendment and the ability of the government to outlaw certain forms of expressive conduct. It ruled that the state has the constitutional authority to ban public nudity, even as part of expressive conduct such as dancing, because it furthers a substantial government interest in protecting the morality and order of society. This case is perhaps best summarized by a sentence in Justice Souter's concurring opinion, which is often paraphrased as "Nudity itself is not inherently expressive conduct."
The Fifth Amendment (Amendment V) to the United States Constitution addresses criminal procedure and other aspects of the Constitution. It was ratified, along with nine other articles, in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights. The Fifth Amendment applies to every level of the government, including the federal, state, and local levels, in regard to a US citizen or resident of the US. The Supreme Court furthered the protections of this amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Erie v. Pap's A. M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000), was a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States regarding nude dancing as free speech. The court held that an ordinance banning public nudity did not violate the operator of a totally nude entertainment establishment's constitutional right to free speech.
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), was a test case brought by Japanese-American fishermen before the United States Supreme Court to challenge California state legislation aimed at preventing them from returning to fishing occupations they worked in before their mass removal and internment during World War II. The issue at hand was a restrictive law in California requiring American citizenship to get a fishing license. A 1945 amendment to the state code barred "aliens ineligible to citizenship" from obtaining fishing licenses. The Court held that this was an unreasonable restriction and was discriminatory to residents of Japanese ancestry.
Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that prescriptions of narcotics for maintenance treatment was not within the discretion of physicians and thus not privileged under the Harrison Narcotics Act.
Alien land laws were a series of legislative attempts to discourage Asian and other "non-desirable" immigrants from settling permanently in U.S. states and territories by limiting their ability to own land and property. Because the Naturalization Act of 1870 had extended citizenship rights only to African Americans but not other ethnic groups, these laws relied on coded language excluding "aliens ineligible for citizenship" to prohibit primarily Chinese and Japanese immigrants from becoming landowners without explicitly naming any racial group. Various alien land laws existed in over a dozen states before they were ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1952. Like other discriminatory measures aimed at preventing minorities from establishing homes and businesses in certain areas, such as redlining and restrictive covenants, many alien land laws remained technically in effect, forgotten or ignored, for many years after enforcement of the laws fell out of practice.
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), was a United States Supreme Court case.
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923), decided by U.S. Supreme Court on November 12, 1923, was a case challenging Washington Alien Land Law that is preventing aliens purchasing, using, or leasing the land. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the decision of state that Due Process and Equal Protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment and the treaty between the United States and Japan are not conflicted.
References
- ↑ "Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923)". Justia Law. Retrieved 2022-09-16.