Coffin v. United States

Last updated
Coffin v. United States
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued December 6  December 7, 1894
Decided March 4, 1895
Full case nameCoffin, et al. v. United States
Citations156 U.S. 432 ( more )
15 S. Ct. 394; 39 L. Ed. 481
Holding
It is the duty of the judge, in all jurisdictions, when requested, and in some when not requested, to explain the presumption of innocence to the jury in his charge. The usual formula in which this doctrine is expressed is that every man is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Melville Fuller
Associate Justices
Stephen J. Field  · John M. Harlan
Horace Gray  · David J. Brewer
Henry B. Brown  · George Shiras Jr.
Howell E. Jackson  · Edward D. White
Case opinion
MajorityWhite, joined by unanimous

Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895), was an appellate case before the United States Supreme Court in 1895 which established the presumption of innocence of persons accused of crimes.

Contents

F. A. Coffin and Percival B. Coffin, plaintiffs in error, and A. S. Reed had been charged with aiding and abetting the former president of the Indianapolis National Bank, Theodore P. Haughey, in misdemeanor bank fraud between January 1, 1891, and July 26, 1893.

It is a complex case with a 50-count indictment. But the most interesting aspect is commentary by the Court regarding presumption of innocence:

The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law ... Concluding, then, that the presumption of innocence is evidence in favor of the accused, introduced by the law in his behalf, let us consider what is 'reasonable doubt.' It is, of necessity, the condition of mind produced by the proof resulting from the evidence in the cause. It is the result of the proof, not the proof itself, whereas the presumption of innocence is one of the instruments of proof, going to bring about the proof from which reasonable doubt arises; thus one is a cause, the other an effect. To say that the one is the equivalent of the other is therefore to say that legal evidence can be excluded from the jury, and that such exclusion may be cured by instructing them correctly in regard to the method by which they are required to reach their conclusion upon the proof actually before them; in other words, that the exclusion of an important element of proof can be justified by correctly instructing as to the proof admitted. The evolution of the principle of the presumption of innocence, and its resultant, the doctrine of reasonable doubt, make more apparent the correctness of these views, and indicate the necessity of enforcing the one in order that the other may continue to exist.

In the decision, the Court then goes on to detail the complete legal history of presumed innocence.

See also

Further reading

Related Research Articles

Criminal procedure is the adjudication process of the criminal law. While criminal procedure differs dramatically by jurisdiction, the process generally begins with a formal criminal charge with the person on trial either being free on bail or incarcerated, and results in the conviction or acquittal of the defendant. Criminal procedure can be either in form of inquisitorial or adversarial criminal procedure.

Burden of proof is a legal duty that encompasses two connected but separate ideas that apply for establishing the truth of facts in a trial before tribunals in the United States: the "burden of production" and the "burden of persuasion." In a legal dispute, one party is initially presumed to be correct, while the other side bears the burden of producing evidence persuasive enough to establish the truth of facts needed to satisfy all the required legal elements of legal dispute. There are varying types of burden of persuasion commonly referred to as standards of proof, and depending on the type of case, the standard of proof will be higher or lower. Burdens of persuasion and production may be of different standards for each party, in different phases of litigation. The burden of production is a minimal burden to produce at least enough evidence for the trier of fact to consider a disputed claim. After litigants have met the burden of production, they have the burden of persuasion: that enough evidence has been presented to persuade the trier of fact that their side is correct. There are different standards of persuasiveness ranging from a preponderance of the evidence, where there is just enough evidence to tip the balance, to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as in United States criminal courts.

The presumption of innocence is a legal principle that every person accused of any crime is considered innocent until proven guilty. Under the presumption of innocence, the legal burden of proof is thus on the prosecution, which must present compelling evidence to the trier of fact. If the prosecution does not prove the charges true, then the person is acquitted of the charges. The prosecution must in most cases prove that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If reasonable doubt remains, the accused must be acquitted. The opposite system is a presumption of guilt.

In the law of evidence, a presumption of a particular fact can be made without the aid of proof in some situations. The invocation of a presumption shifts the burden of proof from one party to the opposing party in a court trial.

Beyond a reasonable doubt is a legal standard of proof required to validate a criminal conviction in most adversarial legal systems. It is a higher standard of proof than the balance of probabilities and is usually therefore reserved for criminal matters where what is at stake is considered more serious and therefore deserving of a higher threshold.

<i>Woolmington v DPP</i>

Woolmington v DPP[1935] UKHL 1 is a landmark House of Lords case, where the presumption of innocence was re-consolidated.

<i>R v Lifchus</i>

R v Lifchus, [1997] 3 SCR 320 is a leading Supreme Court of Canada decision on the legal basis of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for criminal law. Cory J outlined several core principles of the reasonable doubt standard and provided a list of points that must be explained to a jury when they are to consider the standard.

Actual innocence is a special standard of review in legal cases to prove that a charged defendant did not commit the crimes that he or she is accused of, which is often applied by appellate courts to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The actual innocence standard may be invoked at any time and not only in criminal proceedings but also in immigration and other civil proceedings.

A reverse onus clause is a provision within a statute that shifts the burden of proof onto the individual specified to disprove an element of the information. Typically, this particular provision concerns a shift in burden onto a defendant in either a criminal offence or tort claim. For example, the automotive legislation in many countries provides that any driver who hits a pedestrian has the burden of establishing that they were not negligent.

Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court involving the right of a criminal defendant to present evidence that a third party instead committed the crime. The Court vacated the rape and murder conviction in South Carolina of a man who had been denied the opportunity to present evidence of a third party's guilt, because the trial court believed the prosecutor's forensic evidence was too strong for the defendant's evidence to raise an inference of innocence. The Court ruled unanimously that this exclusion violated the right of a defendant to have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, because the strength of a prosecutor's case had no logical relationship to whether a defendant's evidence was too weak to be admissible.

Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), is a United States Supreme Court case interpreting the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, to set forth three distinct crimes, each with distinct elements. The Court drew this conclusion from the structure of the statute, under which two subsections provided for additional punishment if the defendant inflicts more serious harm. The Court also distinguished Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), because that case allowed for sentencing enhancement based on a prior conviction.

Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), was a legal case heard by the Supreme Court of the United States that stated that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause did not prevent the burdening a defendant with proving the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance as defined by New York law.

<i>R v W (D)</i>

R v W (D), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742 is a leading decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on assessing guilt based on the credibility of witnesses in a criminal trial. More specifically, W.D. examines sexual assault cases and burdens of proof in evidence law.

The burden of proof is the obligation on a party in a dispute to provide sufficient warrant for their position.

Following the common law system introduced into Hong Kong when it became a Crown colony, Hong Kong's criminal procedural law and the underlying principles are very similar to the one in the UK. Like other common law jurisdictions, Hong Kong follows the principle of presumption of innocence. This principle penetrates the whole system of Hong Kong's criminal procedure and criminal law. Viscount Sankey once described this principle as a 'golden thread'. Therefore, knowing this principle is vital for understanding the criminal procedures practised in Hong Kong.

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), is a Supreme Court case involving Harry Lee Williams' conviction of assault on his former landlord in Harris County, Texas. While awaiting trial Williams was unable to post bail. He was tried in his prison uniform, and later was found guilty. He sought a writ of habeas corpus saying being tried in a prison uniform violated his Constitutional rights in accordance with the 14th Amendment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the accused does not have to stand trial in identifiable prison clothes and Williams’ right to due process was violated. The Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the conviction, on June 21, 1976.

United States constitutional criminal procedure United States constitutional criminal procedure

The United States Constitution contains several provisions regarding the law of criminal procedure.

In New Zealand, the presumption of supply is a rebuttable presumption in criminal law which is governed by the New Zealand Misuse of Drugs Act 1975. It provides an assumption in drug-possession cases that if a person is found with more than a specified amount of a controlled drug, they are in possession of it for the purpose of supply or sale. This shifts the burden of proof from the Crown to the person found with the drug, who must prove that they possessed it for personal use and not for supply. Note that once the burden of proof has shifted, the burden is one on the balance of probabilities. This presumption exists to make prosecution for supplying drugs easier.

<i>R v Wanhalla</i>

R v Wanhalla was a case in the Court of Appeal of New Zealand concerning how a judge should direct a jury in a criminal case as to interpretation of the standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt. Australian jurist Brian Martin has described the judgments in the "decision as particularly helpful. They contain reviews of research, practices in other jurisdictions and primary issues in the debate."

A presumption of guilt is any presumption within the criminal justice system that a person is guilty of a crime, for example a presumption that a suspect is guilty unless or until proven to be innocent.