General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.

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General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued December 13–4, 1937
Reargued October 19–20, 1938
Decided November 21, 1938
Full case nameGeneral Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co.
Citations304 U.S. 175 ( more )
58 S. Ct. 849; 82 L. Ed. 1273; 1938 U.S. LEXIS 1134; 37 U.S.P.Q. 357
Case history
PriorAffirmed, 91 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1937)
SubsequentAffirmed on rehearing, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
Holding
The owner of a patent may lawfully restrict his licensee to manufacture and sale of the patented invention for use in only one or some of several distinct fields in which it is useful, excluding him from the others. Where a licensee, so restricted, makes and sells the patented article for a use outside the scope of his license, he is an infringer, and his vendee, buying with knowledge of the facts, is likewise an infringer. Affirmed.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Charles E. Hughes
Associate Justices
James C. McReynolds  · Louis Brandeis
Pierce Butler  · Harlan F. Stone
Owen Roberts  · Hugo Black
Stanley F. Reed
Case opinions
MajorityButler, joined by Hughes, McReynolds, Sutherland, Stone
DissentBlack
Laws applied
Rev. Stat. § 4886, as amended, 35 U.S.C.   § 31

General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), was a case that the Supreme Court of the United States decided in 1938. The decision upheld so-called field-of-use limitations in patent licenses: it held that the limitations were enforceable in a patent infringement suit in federal court against the licensee and those acting in concert with it—for example, a customer that knowingly buys a patented product from the licensee that is outside the scope of the license. [1]

Supreme Court of the United States Highest court in the United States

The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) is the highest court in the federal judiciary of the United States. Established pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitution in 1789, it has original jurisdiction over a narrow range of cases, including suits between two or more states and those involving ambassadors. It also has ultimate appellate jurisdiction over all federal court and state court cases that involve a point of federal constitutional or statutory law. The Court has the power of judicial review, the ability to invalidate a statute for violating a provision of the Constitution. Executive acts can be struck down by the Court for violating either the Constitution or federal law. However, it may act only within the context of a case in an area of law over which it has jurisdiction. The court may decide cases having political overtones, but it has ruled that it does not have power to decide non-justiciable political questions.

A field-of-use limitation is a provision in a patent license that limits the scope of what the patent owner authorizes a manufacturing licensee to do in relation to the patent, by specifying a defined field of use—that is, a defined field of permissible operation by the licensee. In addition to affirmatively specifying the field of use, the license may negatively specify a field or fields, by specifying fields of use from which the licensee is excluded.

Patent infringement is the commission of a prohibited act with respect to a patented invention without permission from the patent holder. Permission may typically be granted in the form of a license. The definition of patent infringement may vary by jurisdiction, but it typically includes using or selling the patented invention. In many countries, a use is required to be commercial to constitute patent infringement.

Contents

A field-of-use limitation is a provision in a patent license that limits the scope of what the patent owner authorizes a manufacturing licensee (that is, a licensee that manufactures a patented product or performs a patented process) to use the patent to make a specified product or do specified things. The license specifies a defined field of permissible operation or specifies fields from which the licensee is excluded. By way of example, such a license might authorize a licensee to manufacture patented engines only for incorporation into trucks, or to manufacture such engines only for sale to farmers, or only engines rated from 100 to 200 horsepower. More generally, this kind of license permits the licensee to use the patented invention in some, but not all, possible ways in which the invention could be exploited. In an exclusive field-of-use license the licensee is the only person authorized to use the invention in the field of the license. [2]

The General Talking Pictures doctrine does not apply to all cases in which a patent owner imposes a restriction on what may subsequently be done with the patented product. When the patent owner sells a patented product to a customer, for example, the exhaustion doctrine applies instead and the patent no longer operates to limit what the customer does with the product or in what field the customer uses it. [3]

The exhaustion doctrine, also referred to as the first sale doctrine, is a U.S. common law patent doctrine that limits the extent to which patent holders can control an individual article of a patented product after a so-called authorized sale. Under the doctrine, once an authorized sale of a patented article occurs, the patent holder's exclusive rights to control the use and sale of that article are said to be "exhausted," and the purchaser is free to use or resell that article without further restraint from patent law. However, under the repair and reconstruction doctrine, the patent owner retains the right to exclude purchasers of the articles from making the patented invention anew, unless it is specifically authorized by the patentee to do so.

Factual background

AT&T owned patents on vacuum tubes (which the majority opinion termed “amplifiers”) and licensed the patents to Transformer Company to manufacture tubes for use in the field of home radios, or small, so-called noncommercial amplifiers. AT&T licensed other companies (its subsidiaries) in the field of so-called commercial use, or large amplifiers for use in theaters. The vacuum tubes used in the different fields were indistinguishable. Transformer Company sold its products to General Talking Pictures (GTP), which knew of the field-of-use limitation but (like Transformer Company) ignored it. AT&T sued GTP and Transformer Company.

AT&T American multinational conglomerate holding company

AT&T Inc. is an American multinational conglomerate holding company headquartered at Whitacre Tower in Downtown Dallas, Texas. It is the world's largest telecommunications company, the largest provider of mobile telephone services, and the largest provider of fixed telephone services in the United States through AT&T Communications. Since June 14, 2018, it is also the parent company of mass media conglomerate WarnerMedia, making it the world's largest media and entertainment company in terms of revenue. As of 2018, AT&T is ranked #9 on the Fortune 500 rankings of the largest United States corporations by total revenue.

Vacuum tube Device that controls electric current between electrodes in an evacuated container

In electronics, a vacuum tube, an electron tube, or valve or, colloquially, a tube, is a device that controls electric current flow in a high vacuum between electrodes to which an electric potential difference has been applied.

Amplifier electronic device that can increase the power of a signal

An amplifier, electronic amplifier or (informally) amp is an electronic device that can increase the power of a signal. It is a two-port electronic circuit that uses electric power from a power supply to increase the amplitude of a signal applied to its input terminals, producing a proportionally greater amplitude signal at its output. The amount of amplification provided by an amplifier is measured by its gain: the ratio of output voltage, current, or power to input. An amplifier is a circuit that has a power gain greater than one.

Supreme Court decision

Majority opinion

The majority upheld the arrangement as a well-known, legitimate expedient: “Patent owners may grant licenses extending to all uses or limited to use in a defined field.” The Transformer Company was only a nonexclusive licensee in a limited field, as it and General Talking Pictures knew. The Transformer Company had no rights outside its licensed field, and thus “could not convey to petitioner [General Talking Pictures] what both knew it was not authorized to sell.” The majority paid no attention to whether the so-called amplifiers were actually interchangeable shelf-item components of amplifying systems, a point that Justice Black emphasized in his dissent. [4]

Dissenting opinion

Justice Black dissented. As he perceived it, and considered of great importance, the tubes that all licensees made were fungible, interchangeable articles of commerce, which the Transformer Company was authorized to manufacture. Once they left the manufacturing licensee's hands, who sold them to General Talking Pictures, they passed outside the patent monopoly:

Hugo Black U.S. Supreme Court justice

Hugo Lafayette Black was an American politician and jurist who served in the United States Senate from 1927 to 1937, and as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1937 to 1971. A member of the Democratic Party and a devoted New Dealer, Black endorsed Franklin D. Roosevelt in both the 1932 and 1936 presidential elections. Having gained a reputation in the Senate as a reformer, Black was nominated to the Supreme Court by President Roosevelt and confirmed by the Senate by a vote of 63 to 16. He was the first of nine Roosevelt nominees to the Court, and he outlasted all except for William O. Douglas.

The patent statute which permits a patentee to “make, use and vend” confers no power to fix and restrict the uses to which a merchantable commodity can be put after it has been bought in the open market from one who was granted authority to manufacture and sell it. Neither the right to make, nor the right to use, nor the right to sell a chattel, includes the right …to control the use of the same chattel by another who has purchased it. A license to sell a widely used merchantable chattel must be as to prospective purchasers…a transfer of the patentee's entire right to sell; it cannot — as to noncontracting parties — restrict the use of ordinary articles of purchase bought in the open market.

Impact

The General Talking Pictures doctrine remains valid law, subject to possible antitrust exceptions (see below). The exhaustion doctrine does not operate to free from the patent monopoly product sales that a limited licensee makes to one who seeks to use the sold product outside the licensed field — at least when the buyer has notice of the limitation. Nonetheless, tension exists between the two doctrines — particularly when the field-of-use license is not as explicit as it might be. Then, as illustrated by the recent Supreme Court decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., [5] “default” rules take over. The default rules, which apply when a court interprets a license or other contract as ambiguous or not complete, are that the exhaustion doctrine governs over the General Talking Pictures doctrine in ambiguous cases. A use restriction in a license must be explicit to bind a seller, if it is to do so at all. Furthermore, the default rule for licenses to manufacture a patented product is that the license is unlimited, i.e., it covers all possible fields. Thus, a manufacturing license is unlimited unless its language explicitly provides otherwise. Because the contractual documents in the Quanta case were insufficiently explicit, or so the Supreme Court seemed to believe, the Court applied the exhaustion doctrine rather than the General Talking Pictures doctrine. Therefore, purchasers of the patented product were free to use them without restrictions that the patentee sought to have imposed on them.

Antitrust exception

In some circumstances, field-of-use arrangements (particularly those of patent pools) may violate the antitrust laws. A set of field-of-use licenses may be used to allocate markets among competing manufacturers of a product with attendant price manipulation.

Thus, in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States , [6] the courts condemned a cartel among bottle manufacturers that operated by parceling out different markets to different members of the cartel. The members were given limited licenses in the respective markets allocated to them. This was held to violate the antitrust laws.

In Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States , [7] the defendant Ethyl had established an elaborate licensing program under its several patents on a fuel additive tetra-ethyl lead, a motor fuel containing tetra-ethyl lead, and a method of operating an automobile engine with fuel containing tetra-ethyl lead. Ethyl sold the fuel additive, and licensed purchasers to use it to practice the other patents. The licensing program fixed prices for the motor fuel and strictly limited the types of customer to which given licensees could sell the motor fuel. Ethyl emphasized to the Supreme Court the fact that while it sold the fuel subject to a post-sale restraint it licensed the other patents, which covered the manufacture of the fuel (by adding tetra-ethyl lead to ordinary gasoline) and the use of the fuel in automobile engines. Ethyl argued that the licensed patents and the manufacturing brought the case within the shelter of the General Talking Pictures doctrine. The Supreme Court refused to make any distinctions among the different patents and struck the whole program down for improperly “regimenting” the industry in violation of the antitrust laws.

Related Research Articles

In United States patent law, patent misuse is a patent holder's use of a patent to restrain trade beyond enforcing the exclusive rights that a lawfully obtained patent provides. If a court finds that a patent holder committed patent misuse, the court may rule that the patent holder has lost the right to enforce the patent. Patent misuse that restrains economic competition substantially can also violate United States antitrust law.

<i>Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.</i>

Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, is a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in which the court appeared to overrule or drastically limit many years of U.S. Supreme Court precedent affirming the patent exhaustion doctrine, for example in Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell.

Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court reaffirmed the validity of the patent exhaustion doctrine, and in doing so made uncertain the continuing precedential value of a line of decisions in the Federal Circuit that had sought to limit Supreme Court exhaustion doctrine decisions to their facts and to require a so-called "rule of reason" analysis of all post-sale restrictions other than tie-ins and price fixes. In the course of restating the patent exhaustion doctrine, the Court held that the exhaustion doctrine is triggered by, among other things, an authorized sale of a component when the only reasonable and intended use of the component is to practice the patent and the component substantially embodies the patented invention by embodying its essential features. The Court also overturned, in passing, the part of decision below that held that the exhaustion doctrine was limited to product claims and did not apply to method claims.

United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court explaining the exhaustion doctrine and applying it to find an antitrust violation because Univis's ownership of patents did not exclude its restrictive practices from the antitrust laws. The Univis case stands for the proposition that when an article sold by a patent holder or one whom it has authorized to sell it embodies the essential features of a patented invention, the effect of the sale is to terminate any right of the patent holder under patent law to control the purchaser's further disposition or use of the article itself and of articles into which it is incorporated as a component or precursor.

United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that a patentee who has granted a single license to a competitor to manufacture the patented product may lawfully fix the price at which the licensee may sell the product.

A post-sale restraint, also termed a post-sale restriction, as those terms are used in United States patent law and antitrust law, is a limitation that operates after a sale of goods to a purchaser has occurred and purports to restrain, restrict, or limit the scope of the buyer's freedom to utilize, resell, or otherwise dispose of or take action regarding the sold goods. Such restraints have also been termed "equitable servitudes on chattels".

Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court first elaborated on the exhaustion doctrine. According to that doctrine, a so-called authorized sale of a patented product liberates the product from the patent monopoly. The product becomes the complete property of the purchaser and "passes without the monopoly." The property owner is then free to use or dispose of it as it may choose, free of any control by the patentee. Adams is a widely cited, leading case. A substantially identical doctrine applies in copyright law and is known as the "first sale doctrine".

Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), is United States Supreme Court decision that is notable as an early example of the patent misuse doctrine. It held that, because a patent grant is limited to the invention described in the claims of the patent, the patent law does not empower the patent owner, by notices attached to the patented article, to extend the scope of the patent monopoly by restricting the use of the patented article to materials necessary for their operation but forming no part of the patented invention, or to place downstream restrictions on the articles making them subject to conditions as to use. The decision overruled The Button-Fastener Case, and Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., which had held such restrictive notices effective and enforceable.

Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court that limited the doctrine of the Court's 1938 decision in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co. Beginning with the 1926 decision in United States v. General Electric Co., the Supreme Court made a sharp distinction between (i) post-sale restraints that a patentee imposed on purchasers of a patented product and (ii) restrictions (limitations) that a patentee imposed on a licensee to manufacture a patented product: the former being illegal and unenforceable under the exhaustion doctrine while the latter were generally permissible under a lenient "rule of reason." Thus, under the General Talking Pictures doctrine, a patent holder may permissibly license others to manufacture and then sell patented products in only a specified field (market), such as only a particular type of product made under the patent or only a particular category of customer for the patented product. The Ethyl decision held, however, that a patent licensing and distribution program based on both the sale of a patented product and licenses to manufacture a related product was subject to ordinary testing under the antitrust laws, and accordingly was illegal when its effect was to "regiment" an entire industry.

<i>Princo Corp. v. ITC</i>

Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318 was a 2010 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, that sought to narrow the defense of patent misuse to claims for patent infringement. Princo held that a party asserting the defense of patent misuse, absent a case of so-called per se misuse, must prove both "leveraging" of the patent being enforced against it and a substantial anticompetitive effect outside the legitimate scope of that patent right. In so ruling, the court emphasized that the misuse alleged must involve the patent in suit, not another patent.

Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 581 U.S. ___ (2017), is a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on the exhaustion doctrine in patent law in which the Court held that after the sale of a patented item, the patent holder cannot sue for patent infringement relating to further use of that item, even when in violation of a contract with a customer or imported from outside the United States. The case concerned a patent infringement lawsuit brought by Lexmark against Impression Products, Inc., which bought used ink cartridges, refilled them, replaced a microchip on the cartridge to circumvent a digital rights management scheme, and then resold them. Lexmark argued that as they own several patents related to the ink cartridges, Impression Products was violating their patent rights. The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing a 2016 decision of the Federal Circuit, held that the exhaustion doctrine prevented Lexmark's patent infringement lawsuit, although Lexmark could enforce restrictions on use or resale of its contracts with direct purchasers under regular contract law. Besides printer and ink manufacturers, the decision of the case could affect the markets of high tech consumer goods and prescription drugs.

The Mercoid casesMercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944), and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944)—are 1944 patent tie-in misuse and antitrust decisions of the United States Supreme Court. These companion cases are said to have reached the "high-water mark of the patent misuse doctrine." The Court substantially limited the contributory infringement doctrine by holding unlawful tie-ins of "non-staple" unpatented articles that were specially adapted only for use in practicing a patent, and the Court observed: "The result of this decision, together with those which have preceded it, is to limit substantially the doctrine of contributory infringement. What residuum may be left we need not stop to consider." The Court also suggested that an attempt to extend the reach of a patent beyond its claims could or would violate the antitrust laws: "The legality of any attempt to bring unpatented goods within the protection of the patent is measured by the antitrust laws, not by the patent law."

<i>National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co.</i>

National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255, is one of the earliest or the earliest federal court decision to hold that it is patent misuse for a patentee to require licensees not to use a competitive technology. Such provisions are known as "tie-outs."

United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952), is a 1952 Supreme Court decision in which the Court held that a claim of conspiracy to fix uniform minimum prices and to eliminate competition throughout substantially all of the wrinkle finish industry of the United States by means of patent license agreements was, if proved, a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. That one of the defendants, a patent-holding company, abstained from manufacturing activities, did not ship goods in commerce, and engaged solely in patent licensing did not insulate its activity from § 1. Making these license contracts for the purpose of regulating distribution and fixing prices of commodities in interstate commerce is subject to the Sherman Act, even though the isolated act of contracting for the licenses occurs within a single state. Patents give no protection from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act when the patent licensing agreements are used to restrain interstate commerce and fix prices of goods shipped in commerce.

United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court limiting the doctrine of the 1926 General Electric decision, excusing price fixing in patent license agreements. The Line Material Court held that cross-licenses between two manufacturer competitors, providing for fixing the prices of the licensed products and providing that one of the manufacturers would license other manufacturers under the patents of each manufacturer, subject to similar price fixing, violated Sherman Act § 1. The Court further held that the licensees who, with knowledge of such arrangements, entered into the price-fixing licenses thereby became party to a hub-and-spoke conspiracy in violation of Sherman Act § 1.

Bulk-sale restrictions—also known as bulk-sale restraints, finished-form limitations, and dosage-form limitations—are, as the term is used in United States antitrust case law, clauses in patent licenses that provide that the licensee shall make and sell the licensed product only in "finished pharmaceutical form" or "dosage form", not in bulk. Bulk form is the form in which drug chemicals are manufactured by chemical or other processes. These clauses are found primarily in pharmaceutical product licenses and are used to keep active drug ingredients out of the hands of generic manufacturers and price-cutters.

Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788 (1869), is an early decision of the United States Supreme Court recognizing the right of a patent owner to license another person to practice the invention only in a limited field, and holding that such a licensee committed patent infringement when it made and sold products of the invention outside that field.

References

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  1. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), affirmed on rehearing, 305 U.S. 124 (1938). PD-icon.svg This article incorporates public domain material from this U.S government document.
  2. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine In Perspective, 66 NYU Ann. Surv. Am. L. 487, 496 (2011).
  3. Hovenkamp.
  4. It was also unmentioned that in Adams v. Burke the patentee Adams assigned the rights to manufacture, sell, and use the patented products in Boston and a ten-mile radius around it to Lockhart & Seelye, who manufactured them and sold them to Burke, who took them more than ten miles from Boston and used them in his business. See Adams v. Burks, 1 Fed. Cas. 100 (Case No. 50) (C.C.D. Mass. 1871). When Adams sued Burke for patent infringement the Supreme Court held that Burke was not liable because of the exhaustion doctrine. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873).
  5. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. , 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
  6. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States , 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
  7. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States , 309 U.S. 436 (1940).