Background
In 1890, Lau Ow Bew, a Chinese merchant who had resided in San Francisco for seventeen years traveled to China to visit relatives “with the intention of returning as soon as possible to [the United States]” (Lau Ow Bew). Even though Bew possessed proof of his merchant status from the United States, he neglected to obtain proof of his merchant status from the Chinese government before returning. As a result, he was not allowed to reenter the United States, due to a new provision in section 6 of the Chinese Exclusion Act amended in 1884 (Lau Ow Bew). The case was originally heard by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District Court of California which determined that Bew could not be admitted into the country without the certificate of permission from the Chinese government (United States. Congress). Lau Ow Bew filed for a writ of Habeas Corpus and was denied. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the original ruling. The Supreme Court files a writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court heard the case in January, 1892.
Prior Treaties and Acts
The Burlingame and Angell Treaties of 1868 and 1880, respectively, outlined the rights of immigrants and emigrants between China and the United States. The Burlingame Treaty emphasized the “inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance” as well as the “mutual advantage of free migration and emigration of [Chinese and United States] citizens” (United States Department of States, “English and Chinese”). After experiencing an influx of Chinese laborers, the United States proposed the Angell Treaty which recognized the right of the United States to limit the immigration of Chinese laborers in order to protect the United States economy (United States Department of State, “Angell Treaty”). Importantly, the treaty did not limit the movement of merchants and even accorded merchants with “all the rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions which are accorded to citizens and subjects of the most favored nation” (United States Department of State, Angell Treaty).
The Chinese Exclusion Act of May 1882 implemented the limitation permitted by the Angell treaty, by barring Chinese laborers from entering the United States. Amended in 1884, section 6 of the Act requires a certificate of permission from the Chinese government for all Chinese immigrants to enter the United States as “sole permissible evidence” (United States. Congress). The certificate must be written in English, or accompanied by an English translation include basic information about the person attempting to enter the United States (United States. Congress).
Case proceedings
Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court, focusing on whether the court had jurisdiction in the case as well as whether Bew might enter the country without the certificate of permission from China.
The Evarts Act created the Circuit Courts of Appeals to act as an intermediary between the Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court (“Landmark Judicial Legislation). That the Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari granted the court jurisdiction it otherwise would not have had due to the new Act (Lau Ow Bew).
To determine whether Bew might reenter the country lacking the specified paperwork, Fuller examines three issues.
Two precedent cases, both decided before the 1884 amendments to the Chinese Exclusion Act, provide skepticism toward the necessity of the paperwork. Low Yam Chow in the Circuit Court for the District of California in 1882 found that “the certificate mentioned in [section 6] is…not required as a means of restricting [Chinese merchants] coming” as that would violate the freedom of movement outlined in the Burlingame and Angell treaties (Lau Ow Bew). In re Ho King also found that “the certificate…was not the only competent evidence that a Chinese person is not a laborer” (Lau Ow Bew). Considering these findings, Fuller writes that asking a foreign government to certify all of the components stipulated by the amendments is particularly onerous.
Language used within the Act itself relieves Bew of the burden to demonstrate the certificate of permission from the Chinese government. Section 6 states that persons “who shall be about to come to the United States” must obtain the certificate of permission from the Chinese government, or in other words, “those who are about to come into the United States for the first time” (Lau Ow Bew). As Bew had been living in the United States for seventeen years, the language of the Act does not apply to Bew's case. Additionally, Fuller holds that immigrants should not have to fear that travel abroad means the potential loss of house and home (Lau Ow Bew)
Lastly, Lau Ow Bew's status as a merchant affords him “all…rights, privileges and immunities enjoyed in this country by the citizenry of subjects of the ‘most favored nation’” as set forth by the Burlingame and Angell treaties (Lau Ow Bew). Thus the court finds it is unlawful to withhold from Lau Ow Bew his rights to Habeas Corpus.
In the end, the Supreme Court held that “Lau Ow Bew [was]…unlawfully restrained of his liberty.” The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and remands the decision to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California, “with directions to reverse its judgment and discharge the petitioner” (Lau Ow Bew).
Implications
The ruling made in Lau Ow Bew v. United States as well as Fuller's opinion helped to inform legal rulings concerning the newly created Circuit Courts of Appeals under the Evart's Act as well as immigration rulings at the turn of the century.
In the years following Lau Ow Bew, many questions arose concerning the power of the Circuit Courts of Appeals. The American Law Review of 1892 cites the Fuller opinion to define the scope of the Circuit Court of Appeals and when the Supreme Court might hear a case (Murfree, 550, 552, 553). Likewise, the Yale Law Review, also published in 1892, examines Lau Ow Bew as an example of when a writ of certiorari might be used by the Supreme Court to hear a case (Foster, 101–103). Thus, the case proved important for interpreting the power given to the newly created Circuit Courts of Appeal under the Evart's Act.
Turn of the century courts and scholars also used Lau Ow Bew to discuss the rights of immigrants, especially Chinese immigrants, during the age of Chinese exclusion. An article in the American Bar Association Journal published in 1930 uses the case to assert that immigrants may use the power of the courts in their favor when legislation is wielded against them (Kohler, “Disability,” 3). Not only did Lau Ow Bew demonstrate how an immigrant might use the courts in their favor, but it also established ways in which people perceived immigrants. For example, an article in the American Journal of International Law published in 1930 cites the Fuller Opinion to promote the idea that the place a person lives necessarily engenders allegiance from that person (Cutler, 227). In these ways Lau Ow Bew helped inform the perception of immigrants in the United States.
The Chinese Exclusion Act was a United States federal law signed by President Chester A. Arthur on May 6, 1882, prohibiting all immigration of Chinese laborers for 10 years. The law excluded merchants, teachers, students, travelers, and diplomats. Building on the earlier Page Act of 1875, which banned Chinese women from migrating to the United States, the Chinese Exclusion Act was the only law ever implemented to prevent all members of a specific ethnic or national group from immigrating to the United States.
The Burlingame Treaty, also known as the Burlingame–Seward Treaty of 1868, was a landmark treaty between the United States and Qing China, amending the Treaty of Tientsin, to establish formal friendly relations between the two nations, with the United States granting China the status of most favored nation with regards to trade. It was signed in the capital of the United States, Washington, D.C. in 1868 and ratified in Peking in 1869. The most significant result of the treaty was that it effectively lifted any former restrictions in regards to emigration to the United States from China; with large-scale immigration to the United States beginning in earnest by Chinese immigrants.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court which held that "a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China", automatically became a U.S. citizen at birth. This decision established an important precedent in its interpretation of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
The Geary Act was a United States law that extended the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 by adding onerous new requirements. It was written by California Representative Thomas J. Geary and was passed by Congress on May 5, 1892.
The Judiciary Act of 1891, also known as the Evarts Act after its primary sponsor, Senator William M. Evarts, created the United States courts of appeals and reassigned the jurisdiction of most routine appeals from the district and circuit courts to these appellate courts. Therefore, it is also called the Circuit Courts of Appeals Act.
The Scott Act was a United States law that prohibited U.S. resident Chinese laborers from returning to the United States. Its main author was William Lawrence Scott of Pennsylvania, and it was signed into law by US President Grover Cleveland on October 1, 1888. It was introduced to expand upon the Chinese Exclusion Act passed in 1882 and left an estimated 20,000-30,000 Chinese outside the United States at the time of its passage stranded, with no option to return to their US residence.
A certificate of division was a source of appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court of the United States from 1802 to 1911. Created by the Judiciary Act of 1802, the certification procedure was available only where the circuit court sat with a full panel of two: both the resident district judge and the circuit-riding Supreme Court justice. As Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, he did not have "the privilege of dividing the court when alone."
United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Supreme Court conceded its right to judicial review over immigration matters. The case held that "a citizen of Chinese parentage seeking admission to the United States" could be excluded by the administrative immigration authorities, even when being denied a hearing before a judicial body on the question whether they were indeed a citizen. The Court determined that refusing entry at a port does not deny due process and held that findings by immigration officials are conclusive and not subject to judicial review unless there is evidence of bias or negligence. This case marked a shift in the court in respect to habeas corpus petitions and altered the judicial landscape for citizens applying for admission into the United States as well as for those facing deportation.
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), popularly known as the Japanese Immigrant Case, is a Supreme Court of the United States case about the federal government's power to exclude and deport certain classes of alien immigrants under the Immigration Act of 1891. The Supreme Court held that the courts may not interfere with a pending deportation unless the administrative hearing was unfair. However, deportation procedures are subject to constitutional scrutiny, under the Due Process Clause.
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), better known as the Chinese Exclusion Case, was a case decided by the US Supreme Court on May 13, 1889, that challenged the Scott Act of 1888, an addendum to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
The Angell Treaty of 1880, formally known as the Treaty Regulating Immigration from China, was a modification of the 1868 Burlingame Treaty between the United States and China, passed in Beijing, China, on November 17, 1880.
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876), was a US Supreme Court case that ruled that the powers to set rules surrounding immigration and to manage foreign relations rest with the US federal government, rather than that of the states. The case has been cited in other Supreme Court cases related to government authority on matters relating to immigration policy and immigration enforcement, most recently in Arizona v. United States (2012).
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), decided by the United States Supreme Court on May 15, 1893, was a case challenging provisions in Section 6 of the Geary Act of 1892 that extended and amended the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. The provisions in question required Chinese in the United States to obtain certificates of residency, and allowed for the arrest and deportation of Chinese who had failed to obtain these certificates, even if they had not violated any other laws. The case involved writs of habeas corpus from Fong Yue Ting and two other Chinese citizens residing in New York City who were arrested and detained for not having certificates. The Supreme Court decision was in favor of the United States government, upholding the Geary Act and denying the writs of habeas corpus.
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court found that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution forbid the imprisonment at hard labor without a jury trial for noncitizens convicted of illegal entry to or presence in the United States.
The Immigration Act of 1891, also known as the 1891 Immigration Act, was a modification of the Immigration Act of 1882, focusing on immigration rules and enforcement mechanisms for foreigners arriving from countries other than China. It was the second major federal legislation related to the mechanisms and authority of immigration enforcement, the first being the Immigration Act of 1882. The law was passed on March 3, 1891, at the end of the term of the 51st United States Congress, and signed into law by then United States President Benjamin Harrison.
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), was a United States Supreme Court case challenging the constitutionality of some provisions of the Immigration Act of 1891. The case was decided against the litigant and in favor of the government, upholding the law. The case is one of two major cases that involved challenges to the Immigration Act of 1891 by Japanese immigrants, the other case being Yamataya v. Fisher.
