Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.

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Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued December 17, 1940
Decided January 13, 1941
Full case nameSibbach v. Wilson & Company, Incorporated
Citations312 U.S. 1 ( more )
61 S. Ct. 422; 85 L. Ed. 479; 1941 U.S. LEXIS 1032
Case history
Prior108 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1939); cert. granted, 309 U.S. 650(1940).
Holding
In a diversity jurisdiction case, important and substantial procedures are considered "Procedural" not "Substantive" and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Charles E. Hughes
Associate Justices
James C. McReynolds  · Harlan F. Stone
Owen Roberts  · Hugo Black
Stanley F. Reed  · Felix Frankfurter
William O. Douglas  · Frank Murphy
Case opinions
MajorityRoberts, joined by Hughes, McReynolds, Stone, Reed
DissentFrankfurter, joined by Black, Douglas, Murphy

Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that under American law important and substantial procedures are not substantive, rather they are still considered procedural, and federal law applies.

This was a post- Erie decision, and thus the decision whether to apply the law of the state of jurisdiction or uniform federal rules depended on whether the rule in question was procedural or substantive in nature.

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