Sully v. Drennan, 113 U.S. 287 (1885), was an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Iowa in the United States remanding to the state court a case which had been removed from the state into the circuit court.
The United States circuit courts were the original intermediate level courts of the United States federal court system. They were established by the Judiciary Act of 1789. They had trial court jurisdiction over civil suits of diversity jurisdiction and major federal crimes. They also had appellate jurisdiction over the United States district courts. The Judiciary Act of 1891 transferred their appellate jurisdiction to the newly created United States circuit courts of appeals, which are now known as the United States courts of appeals. On January 1, 1912, the effective date of the Judicial Code of 1911, the circuit courts were abolished, with their remaining trial court jurisdiction transferred to the U.S. district courts.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa has jurisdiction over forty-seven of Iowa's ninety-nine counties. It is subject to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The suit was brought originally in the district court of the state by James N. Drennan and others, taxpayers of Prairie Township, in the County of Mahaska.[1]
Prairie Township is a township in Mahaska County, Iowa, USA.
Mahaska County is a county located in the U.S. state of Iowa. As of the 2010 census, the population was 22,335. The county seat is Oskaloosa.
Allegations
The allegations of the bill for this case were that on May 11, 1880, the voters of said township voted a tax of three percent upon the taxable property of said township to aid in constructing a railroad by a company whose name was afterwards lawfully changed to that of the Chicago, Burlington and Pacific Railroad Company. That by the order and notice submitting the question to vote, it was provided that one-half of the tax should be collected the first year and one-half the second year; the said road to be fully completed and running to a depot within the Sharon, Iowa, in said township, before the tax is due and collectible by the said railroad company, and if not built within two years from the day of the election, said tax never to be collectible. That the railroad was not completed to a depot in Sharon within two years from the date of the vote. That it was not completed from Sharon to any other town.
That Morgan, president of the railroad company and another director, pending the consideration of the matter by the voters, made false and fraudulent representations to them that the company had arrangements with the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, and the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad Company, by which either of these companies would build and equip the road to the Town of Sharon as soon as the tax was voted. That the railroad company, by its officers and agents, are demanding of the trustees of the township that they certify to the County Treasurer of Mahaska County that the conditions required by said vote have been complied with, and are threatening, by suits against them and otherwise, to compel them to make such certificate, and petitioners fear that said trustees will yield and make the certificate unless restrained by the act of the court.
The Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad was a railroad that operated in the Midwestern United States. Commonly referred to as the Burlington Route, the Burlington or as the Q, it operated extensive trackage in the states of Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and also in New Mexico and Texas through subsidiaries Colorado and Southern Railway, Fort Worth and Denver Railway, and Burlington-Rock Island Railroad. Its primary connections included Chicago, Minneapolis-St. Paul, St. Louis, Kansas City and Denver. Because of this extensive trackage in the midwest and mountain states, the railroad used the advertising slogans "Everywhere West", "Way of the Zephyrs", and "The Way West".
Trustee is a legal term which, in its broadest sense, is a synonym for anyone in a position of trust and so can refer to any person who holds property, authority, or a position of trust or responsibility to transfer the title of ownership to the person named as the new owner, in a trust instrument, called a beneficiary. A trustee can also refer to a person who is allowed to do certain tasks but not able to gain income, although that is untrue. Although in the strictest sense of the term a trustee is the holder of property on behalf of a beneficiary, the more expansive sense encompasses persons who serve, for example, on the board of trustees of an institution that operates for a charity, for the benefit of the general public, or a person in the local government.
They averred that one Alfred Sully claims some interest in the tax, and ask that he be made a party to the suit so that he may be estopped by the judgment. They said the tax is illegal and void for many reasons, and prayed for an injunction against the trustees from certifying to the county treasurer that the conditions of the vote have been complied with, and the county treasurer, John H. Warren, and his successor in office, and the Chicago, Burlington and Pacific Railroad Company, and Alfred Sully, from in any manner attempting to collect said tax or from endeavoring to procure said certificate from the trustees of Prairie Township.
Estoppel is a judicial device in common law legal systems whereby a court may prevent, or "estop" a person from making assertions or from going back on his or her word; the person being sanctioned is "estopped". Estoppel may prevent someone from bringing a particular claim. Legal doctrines of estoppel are based in both common law and equity.
An injunction is a legal and equitable remedy in the form of a special court order that compels a party to do or refrain from specific acts. "When a court employs the extraordinary remedy of injunction, it directs the conduct of a party, and does so with the backing of its full coercive powers." A party that fails to comply with an injunction faces criminal or civil penalties, including possible monetary sanctions and even imprisonment. They can also be charged with contempt of court. Counterinjunctions are injunctions that stop or reverse the enforcement of another injunction.
The notice, which in the Iowa practice stands for the original writ, was returnable to the May term, 1883, and service acknowledged by the trustees and treasurer on 20th day of March, and on the railroad company, March 29. The day required for the appearance and pleading of the defendants was May 11.
In common law, a writ is a formal written order issued by a body with administrative or judicial jurisdiction; in modern usage, this body is generally a court. Warrants, prerogative writs, and subpoenas are common types of writ, but many forms exist and have existed.
A defendant is a person accused of committing a crime in criminal prosecution or a person against whom some type of civil relief is being sought in a civil case.
Injunction
A temporary injunction was granted September 13, 1883. It seems that on 15th day of May, the case was, by order of the judge of the district court, who had been of counsel in it, transferred to the circuit court of the same county, the judge of which granted the injunction. At the October term of this Court, all the parties, including Sully, who had not been served with notice, appeared. A demurrer was interposed by Sully, and overruled. Many motions were made and decided about the pleadings, and the railroad company, Sully, and Warren filed a joint answer denying the right to the relief prayed. The pleadings were finally made up at this term.
A demurrer is a pleading in a lawsuit that objects to or challenges a pleading filed by an opposing party. The word demur means "to object"; a demurrer is the document that makes the objection. Lawyers informally define a demurrer as a defendant saying "So what?" to the pleading.
In law as practiced in countries that follow the English models, a pleading is a formal written statement of a party's claims or defenses to another party's claims in a civil action. The parties' pleadings in a case define the issues to be adjudicated in the action.
At the next term of that court, in May, the application of Sully to remove the case into the United States court was made on the ground that he was a citizen of the State of New York, and all the other parties were citizens of Iowa. He claimed to have an assignment from the railroad company of the right to the taxes. The state court refused to make the order, and Sully took a transcript of the record and filed it in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Iowa. When the attention of that court was called to the matter, the case was remanded to the state court, and from that order this appeal is taken.
Opinion of the Court
Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the Court. He recited the facts as above stated and continued:
We think the order remanding the case was well made.
1. Mr. Sully is the only defendant who is not a citizen of Iowa. The other defendants, against whom relief is sought, are the railroad company, the trustees of Prairie Township, and the treasurer of the county. All of these are proper parties, and are necessary parties against whom positive and affirmative relief is sought.
Without deciding whether the railroad company could assign the right to sue for and enforce these taxes to Mr. Sully, it is sufficient to say that the assignment did not carry that right to him discharged of the equities between the company and the taxpayers, as if they had been negotiable bonds. To any suit, therefore, to invalidate this tax the company was a necessary party. It is especially so in equity, where the matter set up to defeat the tax, as in this case, was the failure of the company to comply with the conditions of the vote, and its false and fraudulent representations by which the vote was secured. In such a suit, the company has a right to defend against these allegations, and the plaintiffs have a right that the company shall be bound by the judgment in the case. The interest of Sully and the company in this controversy are the same, and are both opposed to the interests of plaintiffs. This railroad company is organized under the laws of Iowa, and is a citizen of that state as well as plaintiffs.
2. The township trustees are also citizens of Iowa. These are not nominal parties, and their interest is not identical with that of plaintiffs. What may be their personal wishes is not known, nor is it material. They are sued in regard to their official position to restrain them in the threatened exercise of their official authority, to the prejudice of plaintiffs. The exercise of this power lies at the root of plaintiffs' case, and of defendants' rights. The statute of Iowa which authorizes this vote by a township declares that the money collected under it shall be paid out by the county treasurer
at any time after the trustees of the township, or a majority of them, shall have certified to the county treasurer that the conditions required of the railroad and set forth in the notice for the special election at which the tax was voted, have been complied with.
Until this is done, no right to the money accrues to the railroad company, or anyone else. The act here required of the trustees is not a mere ministerial one. It requires them to ascertain and decide what was required of the company by the notice, with the meaning of its terms, and, when they have construed these, to ascertain as a matter of fact whether they have been complied with.
So important is this action to Sully and to the railroad company that the bill alleges they are seeking to drive them to make the certificate by threats of expensive litigation, and it is said in the brief that Sully has resorted already to a writ of mandamus. Are these trustees nominal parties? Are they, in their official action, on the same side of this controversy with plaintiffs? If they were, there would be no necessity to sue out an injunction to prevent them from issuing this certificate. If there is any nominal party, or any party unnecessary to the relief sought by plaintiffs, it is Sully, for if plaintiffs can procure a decree enjoining the trustees from making that certificate, their relief is sufficient, if not complete. So of the treasurer, Warren, who, so far from siding with plaintiffs in the suit, has joined Sully and the railroad company in a demurrer to the bill, and in his answer denies the merits.
The case of Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562, is cited in opposition to this view of the case. But in that case, negotiable bonds had been issued and were in the hands of Kernochan as a bona fide holder. The case between him and the township of Harter was a very different one from the present case. In that case, the whole right was vested in Kernochan, and the whole matter in controversy could be determined between him and the township. In the suit as brought in the state court in that case, the officers who were served with the writ made default, and a notice by publication against the unknown owner of the bonds being unanswered, a default was taken against them, and a decree made enjoining all proceedings to collect the bonds. Under a statutory provision, Kernochan came in due time and, alleging himself to be a holder of the bonds, the default as to the unknown owner was set aside and he was permitted to answer. As to the other defendants, they were now out of the case, and Kernochan being a citizen of another state, removed the case into the circuit court of the United States.
The difference between the two cases was obvious.
The judgment of the circuit court, remanding the case, was affirmed.
A lawsuit is a proceeding by a party or parties against another in the civil court of law. The archaic term "suit in law" is found in only a small number of laws still in effect today. The term "lawsuit" is used in reference to a civil action brought in a court of law in which a plaintiff, a party who claims to have incurred loss as a result of a defendant's actions, demands a legal or equitable remedy. The defendant is required to respond to the plaintiff's complaint. If the plaintiff is successful, judgment is in the plaintiff's favor, and a variety of court orders may be issued to enforce a right, award damages, or impose a temporary or permanent injunction to prevent an act or compel an act. A declaratory judgment may be issued to prevent future legal disputes.
Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, 547 U.S. 9 (2006), was a lengthy and high-profile U.S. legal case interpreting and applying the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO): a law originally drafted to combat the mafia and organized crime, the Hobbs Act: an anti-extortion law prohibiting interference with commerce by violence or threat of violence, and the Travel Act: a law prohibiting interstate travel in support of racketeering.
In the United States, removal jurisdiction sometimes exists for the defendant to move a civil action filed in a state court to the United States district court in the district in which the state court is located. A federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441et seq., governs removal.
Ligue contre le racisme et l'antisémitisme et Union des étudiants juifs de France c. Yahoo! Inc. et Société Yahoo! France is a French court case decided by the Tribunal de grande instance of Paris in 2000. The case concerned the sale of memorabilia from the Nazi period by Internet auction and the application of national laws to the Internet. Some observers have claimed that the judgement creates a universal competence for French courts to decide Internet cases.
Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Speck, 113 U.S. 84 (1885), was an appeals case from the circuit court for the Northern district of Illinois a case that had been removed from that court. The appeal was on the grounds that while a party who has a case for removal is not put to his election to exercise or abandon the right to remove at the moment of entering his appearance, he is not permitted unreasonably to delay this election during all the period incident to the preparation of the case, until both parties find themselves in condition to go to trial at law.
Findlay v. McAllister, 113 U.S. 104 (1885), was a suit brought against Thomas McAllister and 14 other defendants, to recover damages as follows:
Central Railroad & Banking Co. of Ga. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885), was an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Middle district of Alabama in favor of the appellees, Pettus & Dawson and Watts & Sons, adjudging them entitled to the sum of, 161.21, and interest thereon at eight percent per annum from March 7, 1881, with lien, to secure its payment, upon the roadbed, depots, side tracks, turnouts, trestles, and bridges owned and used by the appellants, corporations of the State of Georgia, in operating the railroad formerly belonging to the Montgomery and West Point Railroad Company, an Alabama corporation, and which extends from Montgomery to West Point with a branch from Opelika to Columbus. This property was directed to be exposed to sale unless within a given time the said amount was paid. This suit is the outgrowth of certain litigation in the courts of Alabama relating to the before-mentioned and other railroad property in which the appellants are interested.
Ackley School District v. Hall, 113 U.S. 135 (1885), was a suit to recover principal and interest claimed to be due the defendant on negotiable bonds issued by the plaintiff.
Citizens' Sav. & Trust Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 205 U.S. 46 (1907), was a suit brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, the Belleville & Southern Illinois Railroad Company, the St. Louis, Alton, & Terre Haute Railroad Company, all Illinois corporations, and the United States Trust Company, a New York corporation. The lastnamed corporation was never served with process and did not appear in the suit. The case presents a question as to the jurisdiction of the court below.
Anderson County Commissioners v. Beal, 113 U.S. 227 (1885), was a United States Supreme Court case.
Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. v. Crane, 113 U.S. 424 (1885), was a suit brought by a taxpayer and resident in the Town of Polk City, Iowa, on behalf of himself and all other resident voters, taxpayers and property holders, commenced suit in a state court of Iowa against two companies, praying for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the reconstruction and operation of the old line after the Chicago and North Western Railway, an Illinois corporation. changed the line and made it avoid the city, constructing a branch to the latter. C&NW Railway was leased the line by the D&M Railroad Company, an Iowa Corporation, who had received from a township in Iowa, in consideration of its agreement to construct and maintain a railroad to a city in the township, the proceeds of a special tax and a conveyance of a large amount of swamp lands. It constructed the railroad and operating it for a time before leasing it to C&N Railway.
Chase v. Curtis, 113 U.S. 452 (1885), was a suit brought under the provisions of §12 of the Act of the Legislature of New York of February 17, 1848, as amended June 7, 1875, where trustees of corporations formed for manufacturing, mining, mechanical, or chemical purposes are made liable for debts of the company on failure to file the reports of capital and of debts required by that section, is penal in its character, and must be construed with strictness as against those sought to be subjected to its liabilities. Suit was brought to recover from the trustees of such a corporation the amount of a judgment against the corporation, the judgment roll is not competent evidence to establish a debt due from the corporation to the plaintiff.
A claim in tort against a corporation formed under that act, as amended, is not a debt of the company for which the trustees may become liable jointly and severally under the provisions of the Act. In a proceeding to enforce a liability created by a state statute, the courts of the United States give to a judgment of a state court the same effect, either as evidence or as cause of action, which is given to it in like proceedings in the courts of the state whose laws are invoked in the enforcement.
The complaint in this action, after alleging that the plaintiff in error was a citizen of Pennsylvania, and the defendants citizens of New York, proceeded as follows:
"Wherefore the plaintiffs demand judgment against the above-named defendants in the sum of $40,828.97, with interest on $40,500.00 from the 30th day of July, 1874, and on $328.97 from the 3d day of October, 1874, besides the costs and disbursements of this action."
To this complaint the defendants severally demurred on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained and judgment rendered in favor of the defendants dismissing the complaint, to reverse which this writ of error is prosecuted.
The statute on which the action is founded is as follows:
"SECTION 1. The twelfth section of the 'Act to authorize the formation of corporations for manufacturing, mining, mechanical, or chemical purposes,' passed February 17, 1848, as said section was amended by chapter 657 of the Laws of 1871, is hereby further amended, so that section 12 shall read as follows:"
"§ 12. Every such company shall, within twenty days from the first day of January, if a year from the time of the filing of the certificate of incorporation shall then have expired, and if so long a time shall not have expired, then within twenty days from the first day of January in each year after the expiration of a year from the time of filing such certificate, make a report, which shall be published in some newspaper published in the town, city, or village, or, if there be no newspaper published in said town, city, or village, then in some newspaper published nearest the place where the business of the company is carried on, which shall state the amount of capital, and of the proportion actually paid in, and the amount of its existing debts, which report shall be signed by the president and a majority of the trustees, and shall be verified by the oath of the president or secretary of said company, and filed in the office of the clerk of the county where the business of the company shall be carried on, and if any of said companies shall fail so to do, all the trustees of the company shall be jointly and severally liable for all the debts of the company then existing, and for all that shall be contracted before such report shall be made. But whenever under this section a judgment shall be recovered against a trustee severally, all the trustees of the company shall contribute a ratable share of the amount paid by such trustee on such judgment, and such trustee shall have a right of action against his co-trustees, jointly or severally, to recover from them their proportion of the amount so paid on such judgment, provided that nothing in this act contained shall affect any action now pending.
It is finally insisted that a judgment against the corporation, although founded upon a tort, becomes ipso facto a debt by contract, being a contract of record or a specialty in the nature of a contract. But we have already seen that the settled course of decision in the New York Court of Appeals rejects the judgment against the corporation as either evidence or ground of liability against the trustees, and founds the latter upon the obligation of the corporation on which the judgment itself rests. And it was decided by this Court in the case of Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285, that a liability for a tort, created by statute, although reduced to judgment by a recovery for the damages suffered, did not thereby become a debt by contract in the sense of the Constitution of the United States forbidding state legislation impairing its obligation, for the reason that the term 'contract' is used in the Constitution in its ordinary sense as signifying the agreement of two or more minds, for considerations proceeding from one to the other, to do or not to do certain acts. Mutual assent to its terms is of its very essence."
The same definition applies in the present instance, and excludes the liability of the defendants, as trustees of the corporation, for its torts, although reduced to judgment.
The court found no error in the judgment of the circuit court, and it was accordingly affirmed.
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American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court, in an 8–0 decision, held that corporations cannot be sued for greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) under federal common law, primarily because the Clean Air Act (CAA) delegates the management of carbon dioxide and other GHG emissions to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Brought to court in July 2004 in the Southern District of New York, this was the first global warming case based on a public nuisance claim.
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California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court involving the right to make petitions to the government. The right to petition is enshrined in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as: "Congress shall make no law...abridging...the right of the people...to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." This case involved an accusation that one group of companies was using state and federal regulatory actions to eliminate competitors. The Supreme Court ruled that the right to petition is integral to the legal system but using lawful means to achieve unlawful restraint of trade is not protected.
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