Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is a Latin [2] maxim [3] meaning "false in one thing, false in everything". [4] At common law, it is the legal principle that a witness who falsely testifies about one matter is not credible to testify about any matter. [5] While many common law jurisdictions reject categorical application of the rule, the doctrine survives in some American courts. [6]
The origins of the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus in the common law have been traced as far back as the Stuart Treason Trials in the late seventeenth century. [7] However, the widespread acceptance of the principle in seventeenth century English courts suggests that the doctrine has much earlier roots. [8] In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the principle functioned as a mandatory presumption that a witness was unreliable if they previously lied while offering testimony. [9] By the early nineteenth century, English courts began instructing juries that they may presume a witness who testified falsely was unreliable, but such a presumption was not mandatory. [10] In 1809, Lord Ellenborough rejected a categorical application of the rule, stating that "though a person may be proved on his own shewing, or by other evidence, to have foresworn himself as to a particular fact; it does not follow that he can never afterwards feel the obligation of an oath." [11] Although some American courts disfavor the mandatory application of the doctrine, others continue to uphold a mandatory presumption of unreliability for witnesses that have previously testified falsely. [12]
Today, many jurisdictions have abandoned the principle as a formal rule of evidence and instead apply the rule as a "permissible inference that the jury may or may not draw." [13] However, some courts continue to apply the doctrine to discredit witnesses that have previously offered false testimony. [14] In 2013, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that in immigration cases, a court may "use an adverse credibility finding on one claim to support an adverse finding on another claim." [15] Likewise, at the O.J. Simpson murder trial, Judge Lance Ito applied the doctrine to instruct the jury that "[a] witness who is willfully false in one material part of his or her testimony is to be distrusted in others." [16]
Many legal scholars have criticized the continued use of the doctrine of falsus in uno to discredit a witness' entire testimony. [17] For example, Judge Richard Posner once remarked that falsus in uno was a "discredited doctrine" based on "primitive psychology". This assertion was not made in relation to fraudulent documentation or a "material" inconsistency; rather, it was based on what the court characterizes as "innocent mistakes, trivial inconsistencies, and harmless exaggerations" by the applicant during his testimony before an immigration judge. Indeed, later in the Kadia opinion, the court concedes that inconsistencies of less than material importance can[NOT] be relevant to the assessment of veracity. Specifically, the court stated that "the mistakes that witnesses make in all innocence must be distinguished from slips that, whether or not they go to the core of the witness's testimony, show that the witness is a liar." [18] Judge Posner argued that because witnesses "are prone to fudge, to fumble, to misspeak, to misstate, to exaggerate", few trials would reach a judgment if "any such pratfall warranted disbelieving a witness's entire testimony." [19] Additionally, evidence scholar John Henry Wigmore was an outspoken critic of the doctrine. [20] In his Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, he wrote: [21]
It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself worthless, first, in point of validity, because in one form it merely contains in loose fashion a kernel of truth which no one needs to be told, and in the others it is absolutely false as a maxim of life; and secondly, in point of utility, because it merely tells the jury what they may do in any event, not what they must do or must not do, and therefore it is a superfluous form of words. It is also in practice pernicious, first, because there is frequently a misunderstanding of its proper force, and secondly, because it has become in the hands of many counsel a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points wholly unimportant in themselves.
An expert witness, particularly in common law countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States, is a person whose opinion by virtue of education, training, certification, skills or experience, is accepted by the judge as an expert. The judge may consider the witness's specialized opinion about evidence or about facts before the court within the expert's area of expertise, to be referred to as an "expert opinion". Expert witnesses may also deliver "expert evidence" within the area of their expertise. Their testimony may be rebutted by testimony from other experts or by other evidence or facts.
Attorney–client privilege or lawyer–client privilege is the common law doctrine of legal professional privilege in the United States. Attorney–client privilege is "[a] client's right to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications between the client and the attorney."
In United States federal law, the Daubert standard is a rule of evidence regarding the admissibility of expert witness testimony. A party may raise a Daubert motion, a special motion in limine raised before or during trial, to exclude the presentation of unqualified evidence to the jury. The Daubert trilogy are the three United States Supreme Court cases that articulated the Daubert standard:
Forum non conveniens (FNC) is a mostly common law legal doctrine through which a court acknowledges that another forum or court where the case might have been brought is a more appropriate venue for a legal case, and transfers the case to such a forum. A change of venue might be ordered, for example, to transfer a case to a jurisdiction within which an accident or incident underlying the litigation occurred and where all the witnesses reside.
First adopted in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence codify the evidence law that applies in United States federal courts. In addition, many states in the United States have either adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, with or without local variations, or have revised their own evidence rules or codes to at least partially follow the federal rules.
The law of evidence, also known as the rules of evidence, encompasses the rules and legal principles that govern the proof of facts in a legal proceeding. These rules determine what evidence must or must not be considered by the trier of fact in reaching its decision. The trier of fact is a judge in bench trials, or the jury in any cases involving a jury. The law of evidence is also concerned with the quantum (amount), quality, and type of proof needed to prevail in litigation. The rules vary depending upon whether the venue is a criminal court, civil court, or family court, and they vary by jurisdiction.
Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, was a 2003 legal case decided in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The appellant was Ronald A. Williams, an African American prisoner; the suit was brought against James Price, the prison superintendent of State Correctional Institution – Pittsburgh, and D. Michael Fisher, the then-Attorney General of Pennsylvania.
Dennis Jacobs is a senior United States circuit judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000), was a United States Supreme Court case involving Webster Hubbell, who had been indicted on various tax-related charges, and mail and wire fraud charges, based on documents that the government had subpoenaed from him. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The Supreme Court has, since 1976, applied the so-called "act-of-production doctrine". Under this doctrine, a person can invoke his Fifth Amendment rights against the production of documents only where the very act of producing the documents is incriminating in itself.
The Virginia Journal of International Law is a law journal that was established in 1960 at the University of Virginia School of Law. As of 2023, it is the world's 14th most influential international law journal. Pieces published in the Journal have been cited by the Supreme Court of the United States, multiple U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the International Court of Justice.
Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006), was a United States Supreme Court case concerning the level of proof required to establish the affirmative defense of duress in a federal criminal case.
Adverse inference is a legal inference, adverse to the concerned party, drawn from silence or absence of requested evidence. It is part of evidence codes based on common law in various countries.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution creates several constitutional rights, limiting governmental powers focusing on criminal procedures. It was ratified, along with nine other articles, in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights.
Disparate treatment is one kind of unlawful discrimination in US labor law. In the United States, it means unequal behavior toward someone because of a protected characteristic under Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act. This contrasts with disparate impact, where an employer applies a neutral rule that treats everyone equally in form, but has a disadvantageous effect on some people of a protected characteristic compared to others.
This collection of lists of law topics collects the names of topics related to law. Everything related to law, even quite remotely, should be included on the alphabetical list, and on the appropriate topic lists. All links on topical lists should also appear in the main alphabetical listing. The process of creating lists is ongoing – these lists are neither complete nor up-to-date – if you see an article that should be listed but is not, please update the lists accordingly. You may also want to include Wikiproject Law talk page banners on the relevant pages.
Prosecutorial vindictiveness occurs where a prosecutor retaliates against a defendant for exercising a constitutional or statutory right by increasing the number or severity of the charges against him. The United States Supreme Court has held prosecutorial vindictiveness to constitute a violation of a defendant's right to due process.
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002), was a Supreme Court of the United States case that upheld a death sentence despite the defendant's argument that he should not be sentenced to death because he was suffering from drug-induced psychosis when he committed the crimes. Cone also argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to present sufficient mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of his trial and that his attorney inappropriately waived his final argument during the sentencing phase. In an 8–1 opinion written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the United States Supreme Court denied Cone's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that the actions taken by Cone's attorney during the sentencing phase were "tactical decisions" and that the state courts that denied Cone's appeals did not unreasonably apply clearly established law. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that Cone was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to "subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing."
A presumption of guilt is any presumption within the criminal justice system that a person is guilty of a crime, for example a presumption that a suspect is guilty unless or until proven to be innocent. Such a presumption may legitimately arise from a rule of law or a procedural rule of the court or other adjudicating body which determines how the facts in the case are to be proved, and may be either rebuttable or irrebuttable. An irrebuttable presumption of fact may not be challenged by the defense, and the presumed fact is taken as having been proved. A rebuttable presumption shifts the burden of proof onto the defense, who must collect and present evidence to prove the suspect's innocence, in order to obtain acquittal.
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the knowing use of false testimony by a prosecutor in a criminal case violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, even if the testimony affects only the credibility of the witness and does not directly relate to the innocence or guilt of the defendant.