Kuhn-Popper debate

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The Kuhn-Popper debate was a philosophical debate about research methodologies and the growth of knowledge that happened over a series of essays during the 1965 International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science at the University of London. The debate had three major areas of contention: the existence of a scientific method, the specific actions and practices of scientists, and the differentiation between scientific knowledge and other forms of knowledge. Initially sparked by a disagreement about the role of the normal scientist, Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper both had equally valid arguments: one prescriptive, and one realistic. Thomas Kuhn proposed a sociological model of normal science and revolutionary science to represent how research progresses under paradigms and paradigm shifts, a model that Karl Popper rejected for its deterministic implications. Popper instead proposed that science should aim to follow the hypothetico-deductive model at all times, contending that 'normality' should never be an accepted standard for scientific research. [1] This counter-proposal sparked the debate.

Contents

Background

The Duck-Rabbit illusion used in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to explain the concept of gestalt psychology in relation to scientists and paradigms. Duck-Rabbit illusion.jpg
The Duck-Rabbit illusion used in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to explain the concept of gestalt psychology in relation to scientists and paradigms.

Thomas Kuhn

Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) was born into a world of technological and scientific advancement. Working as a historian and philosopher of science at MIT, Kuhn published The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962, proposing a theory for classifying generational knowledge under frameworks known as paradigms. [2] Paradigms being, “an accepted model or pattern,” [3] when upturned, “what were ducks in the scientist’s world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards." [4]

Karl Popper

Karl Popper (1902-1994) a physicist and philosopher of science Karl Popper2.jpg
Karl Popper (1902-1994) a physicist and philosopher of science

Karl Popper (1902-1994) was born into a world of dogmatism and ideology amidst totalitarianism and WW2. As a Jew at the University of Vienna, Popper had fled to New Zealand taking up professorship at the University of Canterbury. [5] Here, he had begun to write The Poverty of Historicism (1957) and The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) the day the Nazis stormed Austria. [6] Both works are critical analyses of methodologies within the social sciences. [7] However beyond the social sciences, Popper was also a physicist who lived amidst the second quantum revolution. Such a time proceeded through bold ideas and questions (a time which Kuhn identified as revolutionary science.) [8] [9]

This background inspired Popper to produce methodological ways of knowing based upon critical rationalism, producing the concept of falsifiability. Because of Kuhn and Poppers different contexts, the two proposed starkly different theories on the growth of knowledge. However, it is recognized that the two shared similar fan bases and still agreed on most areas of contention within the sciences. [10]

Debate

Argument

Kuhn and Popper both proposed different models for how scientific research should be (and is) conducted. Kuhn saw science through sociological patterns, progressing through paradigms and paradigm shifts where it was possible for discoveries in a particular field to plateau. [11] However, Popper argued Kuhn's model was far too deterministic, instead proposing the hypothetico-deductive model, claiming that:

Science is not a system [...] which steadily advances towards a state of finality... [Science is] the method of reasoning which men now ordinarily apply to nature'—as consisting of 'anticipations, rash and premature' and as 'prejudices'. [12]

Which is why Popper rejected Kuhn's acceptance of normal science, instead claiming that the regular mode of scientific inquiry should emphasize its degree of falsifiability, and in the process demarcated science from pseudo-science. [13] This is because Kuhn cared about science as a way to solve problems, and Popper cared about science as a way to solve questions with truth as an aim. Popper's model, however, was prescriptive rather than truly reflective of reality, often attacked for being too 'romantic', whereas Kuhn's was popularly accepted to have realistically portrayed scientific progression from a sociological perspective. [14] [13] [15]

In the end, Popper was far more idyllic, urging the scientist to work beyond their paradigm, and hold themselves to a higher standard. In opposition, Kuhn was far more pragmatic. Kuhn developed a new approach to understanding research which agreed with the history of science. Popper's argument holds sway amongst naturalists, claiming that "we become makers of our fate when we have ceased to pose as its prophets" against the deterministic nature of Kuhn's model. In contradistinction, Kuhn's argument holds footing amongst researchers in the humanities. This is because Kuhn created useful models and terminology to better understand history as thought in a time where relativism and revisionism was becoming of increasing value in academic circles. [16] The conflict was about the future of science and what standards scientists should be held to when they conduct research.

Outcome

Inquiry was central to the Kuhn-Popper debate, and while the two men were both philosophers of science, one was a historian and the other a scientist. Their backgrounds greatly influenced their perspectives. The debate never reached a true consensus; however, it represents two popular perspectives on how to treat the growth of knowledge, promoting:

Popper's argument is largely seen as the aim of research institutions and researchers, while Kuhn created a picture of what science is right now. [18]

Philosophical influences

Karl Popper's initial perspectives paid tribute to Bertrand Russel and Tarski. [19] However Popper soon diverted from these early influences, rejecting specific linguistic analyses as a means to derive deeper meanings from, favouring less-specific cases instead (finding social systems to be too complex a system to deconstruct from deductive inference.) Often Popper looked for how language was broadly used, and from there, deconstructed anti-rationalist tendencies such as historicism, and Marxism using falsifiability. [19] This approach largely removed him from the dominant Neo-Kantian tradition. [20]

Poppers philosophical doctrine is that of critical rationalism. It is dependent upon a theory for attaining knowledge with rejected causation as a viable path to knowledge due its inability to explain future events. This is inspired by Hume's problem of induction, where Hume says:

"...the supposition, that the future resembles the past, is not founded on arguments of any kind,’ but is deriv’d entirely from habit." [21]

In The Logic of Scientific Discovery Popper refuted Hume's final sentiment that nothing can be known due to the illusory nature of the world, and instead proposed a deductive model of science. [22] This model is rationalist, but critical insofar as it actively rejects inductivism.

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Falsifiability</span> Property of a statement that can be logically contradicted

Falsifiability is a deductive standard of evaluation of scientific theories and hypotheses, introduced by the philosopher of science Karl Popper in his book The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934). A theory or hypothesis is falsifiable if it can be logically contradicted by an empirical test.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Karl Popper</span> Austrian-British philosopher of science (1902–1994)

Sir Karl Raimund Popper was an Austrian-British philosopher, academic and social commentator. One of the 20th century's most influential philosophers of science, Popper is known for his rejection of the classical inductivist views on the scientific method in favour of empirical falsification. According to Popper, a theory in the empirical sciences can never be proven, but it can be falsified, meaning that it can be scrutinised with decisive experiments. Popper was opposed to the classical justificationist account of knowledge, which he replaced with critical rationalism, namely "the first non-justificational philosophy of criticism in the history of philosophy".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Logical positivism</span> Movement in Western philosophy

Logical positivism, later called logical empiricism, and both of which together are also known as neopositivism, is a movement whose central thesis is the verification principle. This theory of knowledge asserted that only statements verifiable through direct observation or logical proof are meaningful in terms of conveying truth value, information or factual content. Starting in the late 1920s, groups of philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians formed the Berlin Circle and the Vienna Circle, which, in these two cities, would propound the ideas of logical positivism.

A paradigm shift is a fundamental change in the basic concepts and experimental practices of a scientific discipline. It is a concept in the philosophy of science that was introduced and brought into the common lexicon by the American physicist and philosopher Thomas Kuhn. Even though Kuhn restricted the use of the term to the natural sciences, the concept of a paradigm shift has also been used in numerous non-scientific contexts to describe a profound change in a fundamental model or perception of events.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Philosophy of science</span> Study of foundations, methods, and implications of science

Philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of science. The central questions of this study concern what qualifies as science, the reliability of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose of science. This discipline overlaps with metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology, for example, when it explores the relationship between science and truth. Philosophy of science focuses on metaphysical, epistemic and semantic aspects of science. Ethical issues such as bioethics and scientific misconduct are often considered ethics or science studies rather than the philosophy of science.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Problem of induction</span> Question of whether inductive reasoning leads to definitive knowledge

First formulated by David Hume, the problem of induction questions our reasons for believing that the future will resemble the past, or more broadly it questions predictions about unobserved things based on previous observations. This inference from the observed to the unobserved is known as "inductive inferences", and Hume, while acknowledging that everyone does and must make such inferences, argued that there is no non-circular way to justify them, thereby undermining one of the Enlightenment pillars of rationality.

Scientific evidence is evidence that serves to either support or counter a scientific theory or hypothesis, although scientists also use evidence in other ways, such as when applying theories to practical problems. Such evidence is expected to be empirical evidence and interpretable in accordance with the scientific method. Standards for scientific evidence vary according to the field of inquiry, but the strength of scientific evidence is generally based on the results of statistical analysis and the strength of scientific controls.

<i>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</i> 1962 book by Thomas S. Kuhn

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is a book about the history of science by philosopher Thomas S. Kuhn. Its publication was a landmark event in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science. Kuhn challenged the then prevailing view of progress in science in which scientific progress was viewed as "development-by-accumulation" of accepted facts and theories. Kuhn argued for an episodic model in which periods of conceptual continuity where there is cumulative progress, which Kuhn referred to as periods of "normal science", were interrupted by periods of revolutionary science. The discovery of "anomalies" during revolutions in science leads to new paradigms. New paradigms then ask new questions of old data, move beyond the mere "puzzle-solving" of the previous paradigm, change the rules of the game and the "map" directing new research.

The following outline is provided as an overview of and topical guide to the scientific method:

The hypothetico-deductive model or method is a proposed description of the scientific method. According to it, scientific inquiry proceeds by formulating a hypothesis in a form that can be falsifiable, using a test on observable data where the outcome is not yet known. A test outcome that could have and does run contrary to predictions of the hypothesis is taken as a falsification of the hypothesis. A test outcome that could have, but does not run contrary to the hypothesis corroborates the theory. It is then proposed to compare the explanatory value of competing hypotheses by testing how stringently they are corroborated by their predictions.

Scientific consensus is the generally held judgment, position, and opinion of the majority or the supermajority of scientists in a particular field of study at any particular time.

The historiography of science or the historiography of the history of science is the study of the history and methodology of the sub-discipline of history, known as the history of science, including its disciplinary aspects and practices and the study of its own historical development.

In philosophy of science and epistemology, the demarcation problem is the question of how to distinguish between science and non-science. It also examines the boundaries between science, pseudoscience and other products of human activity, like art and literature and beliefs. The debate continues after more than two millennia of dialogue among philosophers of science and scientists in various fields. The debate has consequences for what can be termed "scientific" in topics such as education and public policy.

Commensurability is a concept in the philosophy of science whereby scientific theories are said to be "commensurable" if scientists can discuss the theories using a shared nomenclature that allows direct comparison of them to determine which one is more valid or useful. On the other hand, theories are incommensurable if they are embedded in starkly contrasting conceptual frameworks whose languages do not overlap sufficiently to permit scientists to directly compare the theories or to cite empirical evidence favoring one theory over the other. Discussed by Ludwik Fleck in the 1930s, and popularized by Thomas Kuhn in the 1960s, the problem of incommensurability results in scientists talking past each other, as it were, while comparison of theories is muddled by confusions about terms, contexts and consequences.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Postpositivism</span> Metatheoretical stance on scientific inquiry

Postpositivism or postempiricism is a metatheoretical stance that critiques and amends positivism and has impacted theories and practices across philosophy, social sciences, and various models of scientific inquiry. While positivists emphasize independence between the researcher and the researched person, postpositivists argue that theories, hypotheses, background knowledge and values of the researcher can influence what is observed. Postpositivists pursue objectivity by recognizing the possible effects of biases. While positivists emphasize quantitative methods, postpositivists consider both quantitative and qualitative methods to be valid approaches.

Verificationism, also known as the verification principle or the verifiability criterion of meaning, is the philosophical doctrine which asserts that a statement is meaningful only if it is either empirically verifiable or a truth of logic.

Models of scientific inquiry have two functions: first, to provide a descriptive account of how scientific inquiry is carried out in practice, and second, to provide an explanatory account of why scientific inquiry succeeds as well as it appears to do in arriving at genuine knowledge. The philosopher Wesley C. Salmon described scientific inquiry:

The search for scientific knowledge ends far back into antiquity. At some point in the past, at least by the time of Aristotle, philosophers recognized that a fundamental distinction should be drawn between two kinds of scientific knowledge—roughly, knowledge that and knowledge why. It is one thing to know that each planet periodically reverses the direction of its motion with respect to the background of fixed stars; it is quite a different matter to know why. Knowledge of the former type is descriptive; knowledge of the latter type is explanatory. It is explanatory knowledge that provides scientific understanding of the world.

Inductivism is the traditional and still commonplace philosophy of scientific method to develop scientific theories. Inductivism aims to neutrally observe a domain, infer laws from examined cases—hence, inductive reasoning—and thus objectively discover the sole naturally true theory of the observed.

A research program is a professional network of scientists conducting basic research. The term was used by philosopher of science Imre Lakatos to blend and revise the normative model of science offered by Karl Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery and the descriptive model of science offered by Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Lakatos found falsificationism impractical and often not practiced, and found normal science—where a paradigm of science, mimicking an exemplar, extinguishes differing perspectives—more monopolistic than actual.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Thomas Kuhn</span> American philosopher of science (1922–1996)

Thomas Samuel Kuhn was an American historian and philosopher of science whose 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was influential in both academic and popular circles, introducing the term paradigm shift, which has since become an English-language idiom.

References

  1. ↑ Popper, Karl (1970). Lakatos, Irme (ed.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (4th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 51–58. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139171434.007. ISBN   978-0-521-09623-2.
  2. ↑ Bird, Alexander (Spring 2022). Zalta, Edward N (ed.). Thomas Kuhn . Retrieved 2022-12-30.{{cite encyclopedia}}: |website= ignored (help)CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  3. ↑ Kuhn, Thomas S. (2012). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Ian Hacking (4th ed.). The University of Chicago Press. p. 23. ISBN   978-0-226-45812-0.
  4. ↑ Kuhn, Thomas S. (2012). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Ian Hacking (4th ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. pp. 111–112. ISBN   978-0-226-45811-3. OCLC   756577696.
  5. ↑ Stachel, Peter (2022-12-30). Flotzinger, Rudolf; Boisits, Barbara (eds.). "Popper, Karl Raimund". Oesterreichisches Musiklexikon online. doi:10.1553/0x0001dde4 . Retrieved 2022-12-30.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  6. ↑ "Beware of Rule by Dreamers". Haaretz. 1 August 2003. Retrieved 2022-12-30.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  7. ↑ Thornton, Stephan (2022-12-30). Edward N., Zalta; Nodelman, Uri (eds.). Karl Popper . Retrieved 2022-12-30.{{cite encyclopedia}}: |website= ignored (help)CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  8. ↑ Kuhn, Thomas S. (2012). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Ian Hacking (4th ed.). The University of Chicago Press. p. 16. ISBN   978-0-226-45812-0.
  9. ↑ Kuhn, Thomas S. (2012). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Ian Hacking (4th ed.). The University of Chicago Press. p. 89. ISBN   978-0-226-45812-0.
  10. ↑ Kuhn, Thomas S. (1970). "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?". In Lakatos, Irme; Musgrave, Alan (eds.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press. pp. 1–24. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139171434.003. ISBN   978-0-521-09623-2.
  11. ↑ O'Connor, Cailin (2001-02-26). "Social Epistemology". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2022-12-25.
  12. ↑ Popper, Karl (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2 ed.). Martino Publishing. p. 278. ISBN   978-1-61427-743-9.
  13. 1 2 Chike, Anetoh (2021-07-12). "Karl Popper's Critique of Thomas Kuhn's Concept of Normal Science". African Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Research . 4: 105–115. doi: 10.52589/AJSSHR-NROPSRCB . S2CID   237765742 – via ResearchGate.
  14. ↑ Grant, Don C. (2005). "Psychoanalysis, science and the seductive theory of Karl Popper". The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry . 39 (6): 446–452. doi:10.1080/j.1440-1614.2005.01602.x. ISSN   0004-8674. PMID   15943645. S2CID   208624045.
  15. ↑ Horgan, John (30 December 2022). "The Paradox of Karl Popper". Scientific American . Retrieved 30 December 2022.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  16. ↑ Karl, Popper (1966). "The Spell of Plato". The Open Society and its Enemies. Vol. 1–2 (5 ed.). p. 13.
  17. ↑ Cooksey, Ray; McDonald, Gael (2019-06-27). "Why Should I Think About Guiding Assumptions?". Surviving and Thriving in Postgraduate Research (2nd ed.). Singapore. pp. 347–304. doi:10.1007/978-981-13-7747-1. ISBN   978-981-13-7746-4. S2CID   58239658 . Retrieved 2023-01-11.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  18. ↑ Roch, Stefen (2018). "Educating Skeptical but Passionate Citizens: The Open Society Ideal as a University Mission.". In Ignatieff, Micheal; Roch, Stefen (eds.). Rethinking Open Society . Central European University Press. pp. 47–62. ISBN   9789633862704. JSTOR   10.7829/j.ctv4cbhr8.7 . Retrieved 2023-03-23.
  19. 1 2 Hattiangadi, J. N. (1985). "The Realism of Popper and Russel". Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 15 (4): 7–8. doi:10.1177/004839318501500405. S2CID   143861006.
  20. ↑ Popper, K (1953). "Language and the body-mind problem: A restatement of interactionism". PhilPapers . Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Philosophy. 7: 101–107.
  21. ↑ Hume, David (189). "Of the Passions". In Selby-Bigge, L.A (ed.). A Treatise of Human Nature. Vol. 3. London, Edinburgh and New York: Clarendon Press (published 1739). p. 134. Retrieved 14 February 2023– via Liberty Fund Network.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  22. ↑ Popper, Karl (1934). "2". The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Martino Publishing (published 2014). p. 312. ISBN   978-1-61427-743-9.
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