Liberal institutionalism

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Liberal institutionalism (or institutional liberalism or neoliberalism) is a theory of international relations that holds that international cooperation between states is feasible and sustainable, and that such cooperation can reduce conflict and competition. Neoliberalism is a revised version of liberalism. Alongside neorealism, liberal institutionalism is one of the two most influential contemporary approaches to international relations. [1]

Contents

In contrast to neorealist scholarship (which is skeptical of prospects for sustainable cooperation), liberal institutionalism argues that cooperation is feasible and sustainable. Liberal institutionalists highlight the role of international institutions and regimes in facilitating cooperation between states. [2] Robert Keohane's 1984 book After Hegemony used insights from the new institutional economics to argue that the international system could remain stable in the absence of a hegemon, thus rebutting hegemonic stability theory. [3]

Keohane showed that international cooperation could be sustained through repeated interactions, transparency, and monitoring. [4] [5] According to Keohane and other liberal institutionalists, institutions facilitate cooperation by:

Terminology

Some call the school of thought rational functionalism instead of liberal institutionalism. Liberal institutionalism is also close to—but not synonymous with—regime theory and neoliberalism. [11] [12] Robert Keohane, a political scientist largely responsible for the development of liberal institutionalism, considers his ideas part of institutionalism or rational institutionalism, even though those schools disagree with him on certain points. [13] Keohane dislikes using the adjectives "liberal" or "neoliberal" to describe his work because he also draws from realism, a school of thought that is often contrasted with liberalism. [14] [15] Other major influences are the hegemonic stability theory of Stephen Krasner and the work of Charles P. Kindleberger, among others.

Liberal institutionalism differs from other common international relations theories like realism in the fact that it does not ignore internal politics. Furthermore, institutional liberalism follows the idea that democracy and capitalism create systems which not only maintain peace but also create beneficial economic opportunities for those involved. Liberal institutionalists believe that democracies naturally lead to peace because the many govern and not the few, and therefore those who decide to go to war will be the many that serve. This is in stark contrast to monarchies and dictatorships that are more warlike due to the fact that the few that do not serve will go to war. Beyond that liberal institutionalists defend capitalism on an international scale because they believe that if two nations are friendly, democratic, and capitalist the two nations will inevitably negotiate mutually beneficial trade deals.

Role of institutions

According to liberal institutionalists, institutions facilitate cooperation by:

Critics of liberal institutionalism argue that institutions do not overcome power politics; rather, institutions reflect power politics. [16] [17] Realist Joseph Grieco argues that liberal institutionalist analyses omit that states pursue relative gains (rather than absolute gains), and that institutionalist analyses that focus on the issue of "cheating" ignore that the relative gains problem is key to why realists believe international cooperation fails. [17] Critics also argue that it is unclear whether institutions have an independent effect on cooperation or whether they reflect that the members are already willing to cooperate and comply. [18] Other critics argue that liberal institutionalist underestimate the enforcement powers of institutions: institutions are often designed to be weak to attract more members, [19] and they tend to be particularly weak on issues related to security rather than economy. [20]

Using logics from historical institutionalism, John Ikenberry argues that institutions may be highly durable because

Contentions

Keohane and Nye

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, in response to neorealism, develop an opposing theory they dub "Complex interdependence." Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye explain, "... complex interdependence sometimes comes closer to reality than does realism." [22] In explaining this, Keohane and Nye cover the three assumptions in realist thought: First, states are coherent units and are the dominant actors in international relations; second, force is a usable and effective instrument of policy; and finally, the assumption that there is a hierarchy in international politics. [23]

The heart of Keohane and Nye's argument is that in international politics there are, in fact, multiple channels that connect societies exceeding the conventional Westphalian system of states. This manifests itself in many forms ranging from informal governmental ties to multinational corporations and organizations. Here they define their terminology; interstate relations are those channels assumed by realists; transgovernmental relations occur when one relaxes the realist assumption that states act coherently as units; transnational applies when one removes the assumption that states are the only units. It is through these channels that political exchange occurs, not through the limited interstate channel as championed by realists.

Secondly, Keohane and Nye argue that there is not, in fact, a hierarchy among issues, meaning that not only is the martial arm of foreign policy not the supreme tool by which to carry out a state's agenda, but that there is a multitude of different agendas that come to the forefront. The line between domestic and foreign policy becomes blurred in this case, as realistically there is no clear agenda in interstate relations.

Finally, the use of military force is not exercised when complex interdependence prevails. The idea is developed that between countries in which a complex interdependence exists, the role of the military in resolving disputes is negated. However, Keohane and Nye go on to state that the role of the military is in fact important in that "alliance's political and military relations with a rival bloc."

Lebow

Richard Ned Lebow states that the failure of neorealism lies in its "institutionalist" ontology, whereas the neorealist thinker Kenneth Waltz states, "the creators [of the system] become the creatures of the market that their activity gave rise to." This critical failure, according to Lebow, is due to the realists' inability "to escape from the predicament of anarchy." Or rather, the assumption that states do not adapt and will respond similarly to similar constraints and opportunities. [24]

Mearsheimer

Norman Angell, a classical London School of Economics liberal, had held: "We cannot ensure the stability of the present system by the political or military preponderance of our nation or alliance by imposing its will on a rival." [25]

Keohane and Lisa L. Martin expound upon these ideas in the mid 1990s as a response to John J. Mearsheimer's "The False Promise of International Institutions," where Mearsheimer purports that, "institutions cannot get states to stop behaving as short-term power maximizers." [26] In fact Mearsheimer's article is a direct response to the liberal-institutionalist movement created in response to neo-realism. The central point in Keohane and Martin's idea is that neo-realism insists that, "institutions have only marginal effects ... [which] leaves [neo-realism] without a plausible account of the investments that states have made in such international institutions as the EU, NATO, GATT, and regional trading organizations." [27] This idea is in keeping with the notion of complex interdependence. Moreover, Keohane and Martin argue that the fact that international institutions are created in response to state interests, that the real empirical question is "knowing how to distinguish the effects of underlying conditions from those of the institutions themselves." [26] The debate between the institutionalists and Mearsheimer is about whether institutions have an independent effect on state behavior, or whether they reflect great power interests that said powers employ to advance their respective interests. [28]

Mearsheimer is concerned with 'inner-directed' institutions, which he states, "seek to cause peace by influencing the behavior of the member states." In doing so he dismisses Keohane and Martin's NATO argument in favor of the example of the European Community and the International Energy Agency. According to Mearsheimer, NATO is an alliance that is interested in "an outside state, or coalition of states, which the alliance aims to deter, coerce, or defeat in war." Mearsheimer reasons that since NATO is an alliance it has special concerns. He concedes this point to Keohane and Martin. [29] However, Mearsheimer reasons, "to the extent that alliances cause peace, they do so by deterrence, which is straightforward realist behavior." [30] In essence, Mearsheimer believes that Keohane and Martin "are shifting the terms of the debate, and making realist claims under the guise of institutionalism. [30]

Mearsheimer criticizes Martin's argument that the European Community (EC) enhances the prospects of cooperation, particularly in the case of Great Britain's sanctioning of Argentina during the Falklands War, where it was able to secure the cooperation of other European states by linking the issues at hand to the EC. Mearsheimer purports that the United States was not a member of the EC and yet the US and Britain managed to cooperate on sanctions, creating an ad hoc alliance which effected change. "... Issue linkage was a commonplace practice in world politics well before institutions came on the scene; moreover, Britain and other European states could have used other diplomatic tactics to solve the problem. After all, Britain and America managed to cooperate on sanctions even though the United States was not a member of the EC." [31]

See also

Related Research Articles

Neorealism or structural realism is a theory of international relations that emphasizes the role of power politics in international relations, sees competition and conflict as enduring features and sees limited potential for cooperation. The anarchic state of the international system means that states cannot be certain of other states' intentions and their security, thus prompting them to engage in power politics.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">International relations</span> Study of relationships between two or more states

International relations (IR) are the interactions among sovereign states. The scientific study of those interactions is also referred to as international studies, international politics, or international affairs. In a broader sense, the study of IR, in addition to multilateral relations, concerns all activities among states—such as war, diplomacy, trade, and foreign policy—as well as relations with and among other international actors, such as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), international legal bodies, and multinational corporations (MNCs). There are several schools of thought within IR, of which the most prominent are realism, liberalism, and constructivism.

International relations theory is the study of international relations (IR) from a theoretical perspective. It seeks to explain behaviors and outcomes in international politics. The four most prominent schools of thought are realism, liberalism, constructivism, and rational choice. Whereas realism and liberalism make broad and specific predictions about international relations, constructivism and rational choice are methodological approaches that focus on certain types of social explanation for phenomena.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Military alliance</span> Alliance between different states with the purpose to cooperate militarily

A military alliance is a formal agreement between nations that specifies mutual obligations regarding national security. In the event a nation is attacked, members of the alliance are often obligated to come to their defense regardless if attacked directly. Military alliances can be classified into defense pacts, non-aggression pacts, and ententes. Alliances may be covert or public.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">John Mearsheimer</span> American political scientist (born 1947)

John Joseph Mearsheimer is an American political scientist and international relations scholar who belongs to the realist school of thought. He is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago. He has been described as the most influential realist of his generation.

Economic interdependence is the mutual dependence of the participants in an economic system who trade in order to obtain the products they cannot produce efficiently for themselves. Such trading relationships require that the behavior of a participant affects its trading partners and it would be costly to rupture their relationship. The subject was addressed by A. A. Cournot who wrote: "...but in reality the economic system is a whole in which all of the parts are connected and react on one another. An increase in the income of the producers of commodity A will affect the demands for commodities B, C, etc. and the incomes of their producers, and by its reaction will affect the demand for commodity A." Economic Interdependence is evidently a consequence of the division of labour.

Regime theory is a theory within international relations derived from the liberal tradition that argues that international institutions or regimes affect the behavior of states or other international actors. It assumes that cooperation is possible in the anarchic system of states, as regimes are, by definition, instances of international cooperation.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Robert Keohane</span> American academic

Robert Owen Keohane is an American academic working within the fields of international relations and international political economy. Following the publication of his influential book After Hegemony (1984), he has become widely associated with the theory of neoliberal institutionalism in international relations, as well as transnational relations and world politics in international relations in the 1970s.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Realism (international relations)</span> Belief that world politics is always and necessarily a field of conflict among actors pursuing power

Realism, a dominant school of thought in international relations theory, is a theoretical framework that views world politics as an enduring competition among self-interested states vying for power and positioning within an anarchic global system devoid of a centralized authority. It centers on states as rational primary actors navigating a system shaped by power politics, national interest, and a pursuit of security and self-preservation.

Polarity in international relations is any of the various ways in which power is distributed within the international system. It describes the nature of the international system at any given period of time. One generally distinguishes three types of systems: unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity for three or more centers of power. The type of system is completely dependent on the distribution of power and influence of states in a region or globally.

Historical institutionalism (HI) is a new institutionalist social science approach that emphasizes how timing, sequences and path dependence affect institutions, and shape social, political, economic behavior and change. Unlike functionalist theories and some rational choice approaches, historical institutionalism tends to emphasize that many outcomes are possible, small events and flukes can have large consequences, actions are hard to reverse once they take place, and that outcomes may be inefficient. A critical juncture may set in motion events that are hard to reverse, because of issues related to path dependency. Historical institutionalists tend to focus on history to understand why specific events happen.

In international relations (IR), constructivism is a social theory that asserts that significant aspects of international relations are shaped by ideational factors. The most important ideational factors are those that are collectively held; these collectively held beliefs construct the interests and identities of actors.

Robert Gilpin was an American political scientist. He was Professor of Politics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University where he held the Eisenhower professorship.

In international relations theory, the concept of anarchy is the idea that the world lacks any supreme authority or sovereignty. In an anarchic state, there is no hierarchically superior, coercive power that can resolve disputes, enforce law, or order the system of international politics. In international relations, anarchy is widely accepted as the starting point for international relations theory.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Complex interdependence</span>

Complex interdependence in international relations and international political economy is a concept put forth by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the 1970s to describe the emerging nature of the global political economy. The concept entails that relations between states are becoming increasingly deep and complex. These increasingly complex webs of economic interdependence undermine state power and elevate the influence of transnational non-state actors. These complex relationships can be explored through both the liberal and realism lenses and can later explain the debate of power from complex interdependence.

<i>After Hegemony</i> 1984 English-language book by Robert Keohane

After Hegemony is a book by Robert Keohane first published in 1984. It is a leading text in the liberal institutionalist international relations scholarship. The book challenges neorealist claims that meaningful international cooperation is not possible, as well as hegemonic stability theory claims that international cooperation is only possible under hegemony. The book applies insights from new institutional economics to international relations. The book shows how realist assumptions about actors and the international system can logically lead to the conclusion that meaningful cooperation is possible.

International economic structures range from complete autarky to complete market openness. This structure has undergone numerous changes since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The state-power theory as put into perspective by Stephen Krasner (1976), explains that the structure of international trade is determined by the interests and power of states acting to maximize their aggregate national income, social stability, political power and economic growth. Such state interests can be achieved under free trade.

In international relations, international order refers to patterned or structured relationships between actors on the international level.

Lisa Martin is an American political scientist. She is a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. She studies political institutions in international relations, including economic sanctions and cooperation between states. Martin was the first female editor of International Organization, where she also currently serves as a senior advisor to the journal's editorial board. In 2021, she was elected as president of the American Political Science Association for 2022-2023.

Rational choice is a prominent framework in international relations scholarship. Rational choice is not a substantive theory of international politics, but rather a methodological approach that focuses on certain types of social explanation for phenomena. In that sense, it is similar to constructivism, and differs from liberalism and realism, which are substantive theories of world politics. Rationalist analyses have been used to substantiate realist theories, as well as liberal theories of international relations.

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