In metaphysics and ontology, Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong advanced nonexistent objects in the 19th and 20th centuries within a "theory of objects". He was interested in intentional states which are directed at nonexistent objects. Starting with the "principle of intentionality", mental phenomena are intentionally directed towards an object. People may imagine, desire or fear something that does not exist. Other philosophers concluded that intentionality is not a real relation and therefore does not require the existence of an object, while Meinong concluded there is an object for every mental state whatsoever—if not an existent then at least a nonexistent one. [1]
The round square copula is a common example of the dual copula strategy used in reference to the "problem of nonexistent objects" as well as their relation to problems in modern philosophy of language. [2]
The issue arose, most notably, between the theories of contemporary philosophers Alexius Meinong (see Meinong's 1904 book Investigations in Theory of Objects and Psychology) [3] and Bertrand Russell (see Russell's 1905 article "On Denoting"). [4] Russell's critique of Meinong's theory of objects, also known as the Russellian view, became the established view on the problem of nonexistent objects. [5]
In late modern philosophy, the concept of the "square circle" (German : viereckiger Kreis) had also been discussed before in Gottlob Frege's The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884). [6]
The strategy employed is the dual copula strategy, [2] also known as the dual predication approach, [7] which is used to make a distinction between relations of properties and individuals. It entails creating a sentence that is not supposed to make sense by forcing the term "is" into ambiguous meaning.
The dual copula strategy was originally brought to prominence in contemporary philosophy by Ernst Mally. [8] [9] Other proponents of this approach include: Héctor-Neri Castañeda, William J. Rapaport, and Edward N. Zalta. [10]
By borrowing Zalta's notational method (Fb stands for b exemplifies the property of being F; bF stands for b encodes the property of being F), and using a revised version of Meinongian object theory which makes use of a dual copula distinction (MOTdc), we can say that the object called "the round square" encodes the property of being round, the property of being square, all properties implied by these, and no others. [2] But it is true that there are also infinitely many properties being exemplified by an object called the round square (and, really, any object)—e.g. the property of not being a computer, and the property of not being a pyramid. Note that this strategy has forced "is" to abandon its predicative use, and now functions abstractly.
When one now analyzes the round square copula using the MOTdc, one will find that it now avoids the three common paradoxes: (1) The violation of the law of noncontradiction, (2) The paradox of claiming the property of existence without actually existing, and (3) producing counterintuitive consequences. Firstly, the MOTdc shows that the round square does not exemplify the property of being round, but the property of being round and square. Thus, there is no subsequent contradiction. Secondly, it avoids the conflict of existence/non-existence by claiming non-physical existence: by the MOTdc, it can only be said that the round square simply does not exemplify the property of occupying a region in space. Finally, the MOTdc avoids counterintuitive consequences (like a 'thing' having the property of nonexistence) by stressing that the round square copula can be said merely to encode the property of being round and square, not actually exemplifying it. Thus, logically, it does not belong to any set or class.
In the end, what the MOTdc really does is create a kind of object: a nonexistent object that is very different from the objects we might normally think of. Occasionally, references to this notion, while obscure, may be called "Meinongian objects."
Making use of the notion of "non-physically existent" objects is controversial in philosophy, and created the buzz for many articles and books on the subject during the first half of the 20th century. There are other strategies for avoiding the problems of Meinong's theories, but they suffer from serious problems as well.
First is the dual property strategy, [2] also known as the nuclear–extranuclear strategy. [2]
Mally introduced the dual property strategy, [11] [12] but did not endorse it. The dual property strategy was eventually adopted by Meinong. [9] Other proponents of this approach include: Terence Parsons and Richard Routley. [10]
According to Meinong, it is possible to distinguish the natural (nuclear) properties of an object, from its external (extranuclear) properties. Parsons identifies four types of extranuclear properties: ontological, modal, intentional, technical—however, philosophers dispute Parson's claims in number and kind. Additionally, Meinong states that nuclear properties are either constitutive or consecutive, meaning properties that are either explicitly contained or implied/included in a description of the object. Essentially the strategy denies the possibility for objects to have only one property, and instead they may have only one nuclear property. Meinong himself, however, found this solution to be inadequate in several ways and its inclusion only served to muddle the definition of an object.
There is also the other worlds strategy. [2] Similar to the ideas explained with possible worlds theory, this strategy employs the view that logical principles and the law of contradiction have limits, but without assuming that everything is true. Enumerated and championed by Graham Priest, who was heavily influenced by Routley, this strategy forms the notion of "noneism". In short, assuming there exist infinite possible and impossible worlds, objects are freed from necessarily existing in all worlds, but instead may exist in impossible worlds (where the law of contradiction does not apply, for example) and not in the actual world. Unfortunately, accepting this strategy entails accepting the host of problems that come with it, such as the ontological status of impossible worlds.
Existence is the state of being real or participating in reality. The terms "being", "reality", and "actuality" are often used as close synonyms. Existence contrasts with nonexistence, nothingness, and nonbeing. A common distinction is between the existence of an entity and its essence, which refers to the entity's nature or essential qualities.
Franz Clemens Honoratus Hermann Josef Brentano was a German philosopher and psychologist. His 1874 Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, considered his magnum opus, is credited with having reintroduced the medieval scholastic concept of intentionality into contemporary philosophy.
Intentionality is the power of minds to be about something: to represent or to stand for things, properties and states of affairs. Intentionality is primarily ascribed to mental states, like perceptions, beliefs or desires, which is why it has been regarded as the characteristic mark of the mental by many philosophers. A central issue for theories of intentionality has been the problem of intentional inexistence: to determine the ontological status of the entities which are the objects of intentional states.
In metaphysics and the philosophy of language, an empty name is a proper name that has no referent.
Alexius Meinong Ritter von Handschuchsheim was an Austrian philosopher, a realist known for his unique ontology. He also made contributions to philosophy of mind and theory of value.
In logic and philosophy, a property is a characteristic of an object; a red object is said to have the property of redness. The property may be considered a form of object in its own right, able to possess other properties. A property, however, differs from individual objects in that it may be instantiated, and often in more than one object. It differs from the logical/mathematical concept of class by not having any concept of extensionality, and from the philosophical concept of class in that a property is considered to be distinct from the objects which possess it. Understanding how different individual entities can in some sense have some of the same properties is the basis of the problem of universals.
In metaphysics, the distinction between abstract and concrete refers to a divide between two types of entities. Many philosophers hold that this difference has fundamental metaphysical significance. Examples of concrete objects include plants, human beings and planets while things like numbers, sets and propositions are abstract objects. There is no general consensus as to what the characteristic marks of concreteness and abstractness are. Popular suggestions include defining the distinction in terms of the difference between (1) existence inside or outside space-time, (2) having causes and effects or not, (3) having contingent or necessary existence, (4) being particular or universal and (5) belonging to either the physical or the mental realm or to neither. Despite this diversity of views, there is broad agreement concerning most objects as to whether they are abstract or concrete. So under most interpretations, all these views would agree that, for example, plants are concrete objects while numbers are abstract objects.
The Graz School, also Meinong's School, of experimental psychology and object theory was headed by Alexius Meinong, who was professor and Chair of Philosophy at the University of Graz where he founded the Graz Psychological Institute in 1894. The Graz School's phenomenological psychology and philosophical semantics achieved important advances in philosophy and psychological science.
In analytic philosophy, actualism is the view that everything there is is actual. Another phrasing of the thesis is that the domain of unrestricted quantification ranges over all and only actual existents.
Philosophical realism – usually not treated as a position of its own but as a stance towards other subject matters – is the view that a certain kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder. This includes a number of positions within epistemology and metaphysics which express that a given thing instead exists independently of knowledge, thought, or understanding. This can apply to items such as the physical world, the past and future, other minds, and the self, though may also apply less directly to things such as universals, mathematical truths, moral truths, and thought itself. However, realism may also include various positions which instead reject metaphysical treatments of reality entirely.
A free logic is a logic with fewer existential presuppositions than classical logic. Free logics may allow for terms that do not denote any object. Free logics may also allow models that have an empty domain. A free logic with the latter property is an inclusive logic.
Ernst Mally was an Austrian analytic philosopher, initially affiliated with Alexius Meinong's Graz School of object theory. Mally was one of the founders of deontic logic and is mainly known for his contributions in that field of research. In metaphysics, he is known for introducing a distinction between two kinds of predication, better known as the dual predication approach.
Edward Nouri Zalta is an American philosopher who is a senior research scholar at the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford University. He received his BA from Rice University in 1975 and his PhD from the University of Massachusetts Amherst in 1981, both in philosophy. Zalta has taught courses at Stanford University, Rice University, the University of Salzburg, and the University of Auckland. Zalta is also the Principal Editor of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Terence Dwight Parsons (1939–2022) was an American philosopher, specializing in philosophy of language and metaphysics. He was emeritus professor of philosophy at UCLA.
Noneism, also known as modal Meinongianism, is a theory in logic and metaphysics. It holds that some things do not exist. It was first coined by Richard Routley in 1980 and appropriated again in 2005 by Graham Priest.
Héctor-Neri Castañeda was a Guatemalan-American philosopher and founder of the journal Noûs.
William Joseph Rapaport is a North American philosopher who is an Associate Professor Emeritus of the University at Buffalo.
Meinong's jungle is the name given by Richard Routley (1980) to the repository of non-existent objects in the ontology of Alexius Meinong.
Abstract object theory (AOT) is a branch of metaphysics regarding abstract objects. Originally devised by metaphysician Edward Zalta in 1981, the theory was an expansion of mathematical Platonism.
Meinongian argument is a type of ontological argument or an "a priori argument" that seeks to prove the existence of God. This is through an assertion that there is "a distinction between different categories of existence." The premise of the ontological argument is based on Alexius Meinong's works. Some scholars also associate it with St. Anselm's ontological argument.
