Self-agency

Last updated

Self-agency, also known as the phenomenal will, is the sense that actions are self-generated. Scientist Benjamin Libet was the first to study it, concluding that brain activity predicts the action before one even has conscious awareness of his or her intention to act upon that action (see Neuroscience of free will). Daniel Wegner later defined the three criteria of self-agency: priority, exclusivity, and consistency.

Contents

According to Wegner, priority means that an action must be planned before the action is initiated. The interval between the action and the effect is known as the intentional binding. Another criterion for self-agency is exclusivity, which means the effect is due to the person's action and not because of other potential causes for the effect. The last criterion Wegner suggested was consistency. Consistency means that one's planned action must occur as planned.

Internal motor cues are also an indicator in deciding whether an action occurred through self-agency, and can be measured by the generation of movement. If the predicted sensory state matches the actual sensory state, then self-agency has likely occurred. No models that predict agency have ever been proved.

Self-agency as inference under uncertainty

Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel [1] conducted a seminal work on the perception of external causal events.[ citation needed ] Work on attribution of agency to oneself, however, began with Benjamin Libet's conclusion that brain activity predictive of action precedes conscious awareness of the intention to act, [2] [3] which was later refuted (Neuroscience of free will). [4] Since this demonstration psychologists have been trying to determine the relationship between the sense of agency, also known as the phenomenal will, and actual self-agency.

Daniel Wegner's book The Illusion of Conscious Will (Illusion of control) [5] [lower-alpha 1] posits the phenomenal will as the illusory product of post hoc inference. Sense of agency, on this view, is a product of fallible post hoc inference rather than infallible direct access to one's conscious force of will. The attribution of self-agency is made most strongly when the following three conditions are met: priority, exclusivity, and consistency. Thus, one's action must be the exclusive potential cause of the event (exclusivity), one must have had prior thoughts or plans about the action before it occurred (priority), and the action that occurred must match the action that was planned (consistency). An inference of self-agency is thus made under at least three parameters of uncertainty.

Uncertainty in Wegner’s three conditions: postdictive accounts of agency

Most studies of self-attribution of agency can be categorized as examining one or more of Wegner's three conditions of priority, exclusivity, and consistency. By manipulating these three parameters in systematic ways, researchers have shed light on the role that each plays in self-attributions of agency.

Priority

Wegner suggests that temporal order is critical to attributions of self-agency; the agent must have planned or thought about the event/action before it occurred it in order to feel that he has willed it. This is a natural extension of the commonsense notion that a cause cannot occur after its effect. However, a range of findings have shown that, beyond the basic requirement of cause preceding effect, the specifics of the timing are important. Moreover, judgments of timing (and thus priority) can be influenced by variation of other parameters, chiefly Wegner's consistency condition.

The experience of causing an event alters the subjective experience of their timing. For instance, actions are perceived as temporally shifted towards their effects when they are performed volitionally, but not when involuntarily evoked by transcranial magnetic stimulation. [6] This distortion of the perceived interval between movement and effect is known as intentional binding and is considered an implicit measure of the sense of agency. Moore, Wegner, and Haggard in 2009 show that supraliminal priming affects intentional binding. [7] This effect contains an inferential postdictive component, because the effect shifts the perceived time of action, even when the probability of the effect's occurrence is low. [8]

Gentsch and Schütz-Bosbach in 2011 find top–down modulation of visual event-related potentials by both self agency and priming of self-agency, suggesting that both efferent information and prior thoughts about action consequence inform the sense of agency. [9] Furthermore, Engbert et al. in 2008 showed that intentional binding occurred only when the movement of the response lever was actively generated by the subject; passive movements (initiated by the response lever) did not result in intentional binding. They take these results to suggest that efferent motor commands, rather than just priority and consistency, is key to self-agency attributions. [10]

Intentional binding may not be exclusive to self-agency, however; Strother, House, and Sukhvinder (2010) found intentional binding in a shared action situation where other agents with similar goals and actions were present. [11]

Exclusivity

Wegner's exclusivity condition posits that attribution of self-agency occurs most strongly in the absence of other potential causes. The presence of other potential causes in temporal and spatial proximity to the event will, all else being equal, result in a diminished sense of self-agency.

Dijksterhuis and colleagues in 2008 found that nonconscious priming with first-person singular pronouns increased feelings of self-agency, while nonconscious priming with other potential causes (computer, God) decreased feelings of self-agency. [12] Hindriks et al. in 2011 have proposed a computational Bayesian inference model of self-attribution of agency that deals mainly with the exclusivity dimension. [13] [lower-alpha 2]

Consistency

Wegner argues that the event must match the planned action; attribution will be low if the outcome does not match the perceived cause. Wegner and Wheatley in 1999 demonstrated that priming participants with thoughts relevant to a movement just before it was made by another person caused participants to feel they had caused the action themselves. [14] Ebert and Wegner in 2010 also showed that manipulating consistency enhanced both judgments of self-authorship and temporal binding between cause and effect. [15] [lower-alpha 3]

Other studies have shown that consistency between prior thought and subsequent action can produce a sense of vicarious agency for another person's actions, [16] increase self-agency attributions for one's own actions, [17] and even produce changes in self-attribution when the prior thought is unconscious [18] or the result of nonconscious priming. [19]

Internal motor cues: predictive accounts of agency

Wegner's account is a leading example of a postdictive or inferential account of the attribution of self-agency. On this type of view, the feeling of self-agency emerges entirely from post hoc inference and does not track or emerge from anything directly related to the actual causation of the action.

Computational models of motor control, by contrast, hypothesize that the sense of agency for a given action arises most directly from internal motor representations associated with generating the movement. An internal forward model based on efference copy, for example, can predict the sensory consequences of a motor command and compare them with the actual sensory state after that action has been initiated. [20] [21] [22] If the actual sensory state matches the predicted one, self-agency is (likely to be) inferred. Indeed, the intentional binding effect may depend on the motor efference command; Engbert, Wohlschläger and Haggard in 2008 provide data suggesting that compression of estimated intervals between action and effect occurs only for volitional actions initiated by the self and not for passive actions or for actions performed by others. [10] These authors maintain an efferent motor command is necessary for a sense of agency. [10] Indeed, omitting the effect of an action does eliminate intentional binding, so long as the probability of an effect given an action is sufficiently high. [8]

Attempts to synthesize predictive and postdictive accounts of agency

Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen in 2008 review findings on comparator models and argue that they cannot account for either a feeling of agency or a judgment of agency. Their multifactorial model separates feeling from judgment and discusses the conceptual level of processing that is added to the latter. Their discussion concerns explicit judgments of agency, however, which may differ from results obtained using implicit measures. [23] [lower-alpha 4]

Moore, Lagnado, Deal and Haggard in 2009 investigated whether statistical contingency alone could explain both predictive and inferential postdictive intentional binding effects. Both predictive and postdictive shifts in the time of action perception depended on strong contingency between the action and effect, suggesting that the experience of agency involves causal learning based on statistical contingency. [24]

Although predictive and postdictive accounts of agency are often cast as competitors, they may in fact be reconcilable when attributions of self-agency are viewed within the framework of cognition under uncertainty. In particular, a comparator model based on efference copy can be seen as a more sophisticated way of characterizing Wegner's consistency parameter and the computations that are likely to be a part of it. Basing outcome predictions on motor commands, rather than just higher-level representations of the goal state that an action is intended to bring about, is likely to provide finer-grained predictions with which to compare outcomes, thereby reducing uncertainty in agency attributions. This higher predictive resolution, in turn, could be useful in making exclusivity judgments (Wegner's second condition): even if a particular goal state is brought about, if the way it is brought about does not closely match the motoric prediction, the attribution of agency may be reduced or blocked entirely. Similarly, given evidence that whether or not an action is volitional affects intentional binding, motoric representations and predictions seem also to affect Wegner's priority parameter. [6] As such, predictive and postdictive accounts may simply differ in emphasis and in the level at which they describe the phenomenon, rather than being fundamentally incompatible.

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ See also
    • Wegner, Daniel M (2003). "The mind's best trick: how we experience conscious will". Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Elsevier BV. 7 (2): 65–69. doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00002-0. ISSN   1364-6613. PMID   12584024. S2CID   3143541.
    • Wegner, Daniel M. (2004). "Précis of The illusion of conscious will". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Cambridge University Press (CUP). 27 (5): 649–659. doi:10.1017/s0140525x04000159. ISSN   0140-525X. PMID   15895616. S2CID   29672900.
  2. ↑ For another Bayesian approach to agency and control, see Huys QJ, Dayan P (2009). "A Bayesian formulation of behavioral control". Cognition. Elsevier BV. 113 (3): 314–328. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.01.008. ISSN   0010-0277. PMID   19285311. S2CID   10147779.
  3. ↑ See also Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras 2002 and Moore, Wegner & Haggard 2009.
  4. ↑ e.g., Engbert, Wohlschläger & Haggard 2008

Related Research Articles

Postdiction involves explanation after the fact. In skepticism, it is considered an effect of hindsight bias that explains claimed predictions of significant events such as plane crashes and natural disasters. In religious contexts, theologians frequently refer to postdiction using the Latin term vaticinium ex eventu. Through this term, skeptics postulate that many biblical prophecies appearing to have come true may have been written after the events supposedly predicted, or that the text or interpretation may have been modified after the event to fit the facts as they occurred.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">PLATO (computational chemistry)</span>

PLATO is a suite of programs for electronic structure calculations. It receives its name from the choice of basis set used to expand the electronic wavefunctions.

Experimental philosophy is an emerging field of philosophical inquiry that makes use of empirical data—often gathered through surveys which probe the intuitions of ordinary people—in order to inform research on philosophical questions. This use of empirical data is widely seen as opposed to a philosophical methodology that relies mainly on a priori justification, sometimes called "armchair" philosophy, by experimental philosophers. Experimental philosophy initially began by focusing on philosophical questions related to intentional action, the putative conflict between free will and determinism, and causal vs. descriptive theories of linguistic reference. However, experimental philosophy has continued to expand to new areas of research.

Thought insertion is defined by the ICD-10 as the delusion that one's thoughts are not one's own, but rather belong to someone else and have been inserted into one's mind. The person experiencing the thought insertion delusion will not necessarily know where the thought is coming from, but makes a distinction between their own thoughts and those inserted into their minds. However, patients do not experience all thoughts as inserted; only certain ones, normally following a similar content or pattern. A person with this delusional belief is convinced of the veracity of their beliefs and is unwilling to accept such diagnosis.

Repetition priming refers to improvements in a behavioural response when stimuli are repeatedly presented. The improvements can be measured in terms of accuracy or reaction time and can occur when the repeated stimuli are either identical or similar to previous stimuli. These improvements have been shown to be cumulative, so as the number of repetitions increases the responses get continually faster up to a maximum of around seven repetitions. These improvements are also found when the repeated items are changed slightly in terms of orientation, size and position. The size of the effect is also modulated by the length of time the item is presented for and the length time between the first and subsequent presentations of the repeated items.

Implicit cognition refers to cognitive processes that occur outside conscious awareness or conscious control. This includes domains such as learning, perception, or memory which may influence a person's behavior without their conscious awareness of those influences.

In psychology, a fluency heuristic is a mental heuristic in which, if one object is processed more fluently, faster, or more smoothly than another, the mind infers that this object has the higher value with respect to the question being considered. In other words, the more skillfully or elegantly an idea is communicated, the more likely it is to be considered seriously, whether or not it is logical.

The concept of motor cognition grasps the notion that cognition is embodied in action, and that the motor system participates in what is usually considered as mental processing, including those involved in social interaction. The fundamental unit of the motor cognition paradigm is action, defined as the movements produced to satisfy an intention towards a specific motor goal, or in reaction to a meaningful event in the physical and social environments. Motor cognition takes into account the preparation and production of actions, as well as the processes involved in recognizing, predicting, mimicking, and understanding the behavior of other people. This paradigm has received a great deal of attention and empirical support in recent years from a variety of research domains including embodied cognition, developmental psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and social psychology.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Marc Jeannerod</span>

Marc Jeannerod was a neurologist, a neurophysiologist and an internationally recognized expert in cognitive neuroscience and experimental psychology. His research focuses on the cognitive and neurophysiological mechanisms underpinning motor control, motor cognition, the sense of agency, and more recently language and social cognition. Jeannerod's work bridges with elegance and rigor various levels of analysis, ranging from neuroscience to philosophy of mind, with clear implications for the understanding of a number of psychiatric and neurological disorders, especially schizophrenia.

The sense of agency (SA), or sense of control, is the subjective awareness of initiating, executing, and controlling one's own volitional actions in the world. It is the pre-reflective awareness or implicit sense that it is I who is executing bodily movement(s) or thinking thoughts. In non-pathological experience, the SA is tightly integrated with one's "sense of ownership" (SO), which is the pre-reflective awareness or implicit sense that one is the owner of an action, movement or thought. If someone else were to move your arm you would certainly have sensed that it were your arm that moved and thus a sense of ownership (SO) for that movement. However, you would not have felt that you were the author of the movement; you would not have a sense of agency (SA).

Implicit attitudes are evaluations that occur without conscious awareness towards an attitude object or the self. These evaluations are generally either favorable or unfavorable and come about from various influences in the individual experience. The commonly used definition of implicit attitude within cognitive and social psychology comes from Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji's template for definitions of terms related to implicit cognition: "Implicit attitudes are introspectively unidentified traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects". These thoughts, feelings or actions have an influence on behavior that the individual may not be aware of.

Priming is the idea that exposure to one stimulus may influence a response to a subsequent stimulus, without conscious guidance or intention. The priming effect refers to the positive or negative effect of a rapidly presented stimulus on the processing of a second stimulus that appears shortly after. Generally speaking, the generation of priming effect depends on the existence of some positive or negative relationship between priming and target stimuli. For example, the word nurse might be recognized more quickly following the word doctor than following the word bread. Priming can be perceptual, associative, repetitive, positive, negative, affective, semantic, or conceptual. Priming effects involve word recognition, semantic processing, attention, unconscious processing, and many other issues, and are related to differences in various writing systems. Research, however, has yet to firmly establish the duration of priming effects, yet their onset can be almost instantaneous.

In psychology, implicit memory is one of the two main types of long-term human memory. It is acquired and used unconsciously, and can affect thoughts and behaviours. One of its most common forms is procedural memory, which allows people to perform certain tasks without conscious awareness of these previous experiences; for example, remembering how to tie one's shoes or ride a bicycle without consciously thinking about those activities.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Introspection illusion</span> Cognitive bias of people thinking they understand their own mental states but others are inaccurate

The introspection illusion is a cognitive bias in which people wrongly think they have direct insight into the origins of their mental states, while treating others' introspections as unreliable. The illusion has been examined in psychological experiments, and suggested as a basis for biases in how people compare themselves to others. These experiments have been interpreted as suggesting that, rather than offering direct access to the processes underlying mental states, introspection is a process of construction and inference, much as people indirectly infer others' mental states from their behaviour.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Neuroscience of free will</span> Neurophilosophical study of topics related to free will

Neuroscience of free will, a part of neurophilosophy, is the study of topics related to free will using neuroscience and the analysis of how findings from such studies may impact the free will debate.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Embodied cognition</span> Interdisciplinary theory

Embodied cognition is the concept suggesting that many features of cognition are shaped by the state and capacities of the organism. The cognitive features include a wide spectrum of cognitive functions, such as perception biases, memory recall, comprehension and high-level mental constructs and performance on various cognitive tasks. The bodily aspects involve the motor system, the perceptual system, the bodily interactions with the environment (situatedness), and the assumptions about the world built the functional structure of organism's brain and body.

Subliminal stimuli are any sensory stimuli below an individual's threshold for conscious perception, in contrast to supraliminal stimuli. A 2012 review of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies showed that subliminal stimuli activate specific regions of the brain despite participants' unawareness. Visual stimuli may be quickly flashed before an individual can process them, or flashed and then masked to interrupt processing. Audio stimuli may be played below audible volumes or masked by other stimuli.

The first half of the topic of agency deals with the behavioral sense, or outward expressive evidence thereof. In behavioral psychology, agents are goal-directed entities that are able to monitor their environment to select and perform efficient means-ends actions that are available in a given situation to achieve an intended goal. Behavioral agency, therefore, implies the ability to perceive and to change the environment of the agent. Crucially, it also entails intentionality to represent the goal-state in the future, equifinal variability to be able to achieve the intended goal-state with different actions in different contexts, and rationality of actions in relation to their goal to produce the most efficient action available. Cognitive scientists and Behavioral psychologists have thoroughly investigated agency attribution in humans and non-human animals, since social cognitive mechanisms such as communication, social learning, imitation, or theory of mind presuppose the ability to identify agents and differentiate them from inanimate, non-agentive objects. This ability has also been assumed to have a major effect on inferential and predictive processes of the observers of agents, because agentive entities are expected to perform autonomous behavior based on their current and previous knowledge and intentions. On the other hand, inanimate objects are supposed to react to external physical forces.

Social cognitive neuroscience is the scientific study of the biological processes underpinning social cognition. Specifically, it uses the tools of neuroscience to study "the mental mechanisms that create, frame, regulate, and respond to our experience of the social world". Social cognitive neuroscience uses the epistemological foundations of cognitive neuroscience, and is closely related to social neuroscience. Social cognitive neuroscience employs human neuroimaging, typically using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Human brain stimulation techniques such as transcranial magnetic stimulation and transcranial direct-current stimulation are also used. In nonhuman animals, direct electrophysiological recordings and electrical stimulation of single cells and neuronal populations are utilized for investigating lower-level social cognitive processes.

Epistemic innocence is a psychological phenomenon that applies to epistemically costly and epistemically beneficial cognition. It determines the relationship between a cognition's psychological and epistemic benefits.

References

  1. ↑ Heider F, Simmel M (1944). "An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior". The American Journal of Psychology. University of Illinois Press. 57 (2): 243–259. doi:10.2307/1416950. ISSN   0002-9556. JSTOR   1416950.
  2. ↑ Libet B, Gleason CA, Wright EW, Pearl DK (1983). "Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential)". Neurophysiology of Consciousness. Contemporary Neuroscientists. Boston, MA: Birkhäuser Boston. pp. 249–268. doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-0355-1_15. ISBN   978-1-4612-6722-5.
  3. ↑ Libet B (1985). "Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Cambridge University Press. 8 (4): 529–539. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00044903. ISSN   0140-525X. S2CID   6965339.
  4. ↑ Gholipour, Bahar (10 September 2019). "A Famous Argument Against Free Will has been Debunked". The Atlantic.
  5. ↑ Wegner D, Gilbert D (2002). The Illusion of Conscious Will. MIT Press. ISBN   978-0-262-53492-5.
  6. 1 2 Haggard P, Clark S, Kalogeras J (18 March 2002). "Voluntary action and conscious awareness". Nature Neuroscience. Springer Science and Business Media LLC. 5 (4): 382–385. doi:10.1038/nn827. ISSN   1097-6256. PMID   11896397. S2CID   7457462.
  7. ↑ Moore JW, Wegner DM, Haggard P (2009). "Modulating the sense of agency with external cues" (PDF). Consciousness and Cognition. Elsevier BV. 18 (4): 1056–1064. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.05.004. ISSN   1053-8100. PMID   19515577. S2CID   1592888.
  8. 1 2 Moore J, Haggard P (2008). "Awareness of action: Inference and prediction" (PDF). Consciousness and Cognition. Elsevier BV. 17 (1): 136–144. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2006.12.004. ISSN   1053-8100. PMID   17306565. S2CID   9518129.
  9. ↑ Gentsch A, Schütz-Bosbach S (1 December 2011). "I Did It: Unconscious Expectation of Sensory Consequences Modulates the Experience of Self-agency and Its Functional Signature". Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. MIT Press - Journals. 23 (12): 3817–3828. doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00012. ISSN   0898-929X. PMID   21452945. S2CID   1234691.
  10. 1 2 3 Engbert K, Wohlschläger A, Haggard P (2008). "Who is causing what? The sense of agency is relational and efferent-triggered". Cognition. Elsevier BV. 107 (2): 693–704. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.07.021. ISSN   0010-0277. PMID   17825813. S2CID   3017349.
  11. ↑ Strother L, House KA, Obhi SS (2010). "Subjective agency and awareness of shared actions". Consciousness and Cognition. Elsevier BV. 19 (1): 12–20. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.12.007. ISSN   1053-8100. PMID   20122852. S2CID   39648799.
  12. ↑ Dijksterhuis A, Preston J, Wegner DM, Aarts H (2008). "Effects of subliminal priming of self and God on self-attribution of authorship for events". Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. Elsevier BV. 44 (1): 2–9. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2007.01.003. ISSN   0022-1031. S2CID   1988608.
  13. ↑ Hindriks K, Wiggers P, Jonker C, Haselager W (2011). "Towards a Computational Model of the Self-attribution of Agency". Lecture Notes in Computer Science. International Conference on Industrial, Engineering and Other Applications of Applied Intelligent Systems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 6703. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. pp. 295–305. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-21822-4_30. hdl: 2066/56002 . ISBN   978-3-642-21821-7. ISSN   0302-9743.
  14. ↑ Wegner DM, Wheatley T (1999). "Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will". American Psychologist. American Psychological Association. 54 (7): 480–492. doi:10.1037/0003-066x.54.7.480. ISSN   1935-990X. PMID   10424155.
  15. ↑ Ebert JP, Wegner DM (2010). "Time warp: Authorship shapes the perceived timing of actions and events". Consciousness and Cognition. Elsevier BV. 19 (1): 481–489. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.10.002. ISSN   1053-8100. PMC   2836403 . PMID   19896868.
  16. ↑ Wegner DM, Sparrow B, Winerman L (2004). "Vicarious Agency: Experiencing Control Over the Movements of Others". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. American Psychological Association (APA). 86 (6): 838–848. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.6.838. ISSN   1939-1315. PMID   15149258.
  17. ↑ Pronin E, Wegner DM, McCarthy K, Rodriguez S (2006). "Everyday magical powers: The role of apparent mental causation in the overestimation of personal influence". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. American Psychological Association (APA). 91 (2): 218–231. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.91.2.218. ISSN   1939-1315. PMID   16881760.
  18. ↑ Aarts H, Custers R, Wegner DM (2005). "On the inference of personal authorship: Enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information". Consciousness and Cognition. Elsevier BV. 14 (3): 439–458. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.11.001. ISSN   1053-8100. PMID   16091264. S2CID   13991023.
  19. ↑ Aarts H, Custers R, Marien H (2009). "Priming and authorship ascription: When nonconscious goals turn into conscious experiences of self-agency". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. American Psychological Association (APA). 96 (5): 967–979. doi:10.1037/a0015000. ISSN   1939-1315. PMID   19379030.
  20. ↑ Blakemore S, Wolpert D, Frith C (2000). "Why canʼt you tickle yourself?". NeuroReport. Ovid Technologies (Wolters Kluwer Health). 11 (11): R11–R16. doi:10.1097/00001756-200008030-00002. ISSN   0959-4965. PMID   10943682.
  21. ↑ Blakemore S, Wolpert DM, Frith CD (2002). "Abnormalities in the awareness of action". Trends in Cognitive Sciences (opinion article). Elsevier BV. 6 (6): 237–242. doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)01907-1. ISSN   1364-6613. PMID   12039604. S2CID   8995474.
  22. ↑ Haggard P (2005). "Conscious intention and motor cognition". Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Elsevier BV. 9 (6): 290–295. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.04.012. ISSN   1364-6613. PMID   15925808. S2CID   7933426.
  23. ↑ Synofzik, Matthis; Vosgerau, Gottfried; Newen, Albert (2008). "Beyond the comparator model: A multifactorial two-step account of agency". Consciousness and Cognition. Elsevier BV. 17 (1): 219–239. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.03.010. ISSN   1053-8100. PMID   17482480. S2CID   7058609.
  24. ↑ Moore JW, Lagnado D, Deal DC, Haggard P (2009). "Feelings of control: Contingency determines experience of action" (PDF). Cognition. Elsevier BV. 110 (2): 279–283. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.11.006. ISSN   0010-0277. PMID   19110240. S2CID   2600326.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.