Shaun Nichols

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Shaun Nichols
ShaunNichols.png
BornFebruary 7, 1964
Wolf Point, Montana
NationalityAmerican
Education Stanford University, Rutgers University
Era Contemporary philosophy
Region Western philosophy
School Experimental philosophy
Institutions Cornell University
Influences
Website sites.google.com/view/shaunbnichols/home

Shaun Nichols (born 7 February 1964) is an American professor of philosophy at Cornell University specializing in the philosophy of cognitive sciences, moral psychology and philosophy of mind. [1]

Contents

Education and career

Nichols received his PhD in philosophy from Rutgers in 1992 under the supervision of Stephen Stich [2] and his BA in philosophy from Stanford. He is a leading contributor to experimental philosophy and was awarded the Stanton Prize by the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in 2005. [3]

He taught at the College of Charleston, University of Arizona and, since 2019, Cornell University.

Philosophical work

His early work was concerned primarily with questions in the theory of mind and the nature of imagination.

Nichols's current research projects are in experimental philosophy, moral psychology, bayesian cognitive science, cultural evolution, free will, and the self. [2]

Experimental philosophy

In his work within experimental philosophy, Nichols has addressed questions about cross-cultural differences in semantic intuitions, [4] free will, [5] [6] intentional action, [7] [8] [9] the nature of moral judgment, [10] [11] [12] and a number of other key philosophical concepts.

Bibliography

Authored

Edited

See also

Related Research Articles

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References

  1. "Shaun Nichols | Sage School of Philosophy Cornell Arts & Sciences".
  2. 1 2 Academic Profile at the University of Arizona Archived 2009-02-26 at the Wayback Machine
  3. Stanton Prize Archived 2016-03-03 at the Wayback Machine
  4. Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., and Stich, S. 2004. Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style. Cognition, 92, B1-B12.
  5. Nichols, S. 2006. Folk Intuitions about Free Will. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6.
  6. Roskies, A. 2006. Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 419-107.
  7. Nichols, S. and Ulatowski, J. forthcoming. Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited. Mind & Language.
  8. Sosa, E. 2006. Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition. Philosophical Studies, 132, 99-107.
  9. Nadelhoffer, T. & Nahmias, E. 2007. The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Explorations, 10, 123-149.
  10. Nichols, S. 2002. Norms with Feeling: Towards a Psychological Account of Moral Judgment, Cognition, 84, 221-236.
  11. Nichols, S. 2004. Sentimental Rules. Oxford University Press.
  12. Andreou, C. 2006. Morality and Psychology. Philosophy Compass, 2, 46-55.