South Korea and weapons of mass destruction

Last updated

South Korea has the raw materials and equipment to produce a nuclear weapon. However, it has not opted to make one. [1] South Korea has continued on a stated policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons since 2004 and has adopted a policy to maintain a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. By contrast, North Korea has and is developing additional nuclear weapons.

Contents

In August 2004, South Korea revealed the extent of its highly secretive and sensitive nuclear research programs to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including some experiments which were conducted without the obligatory reporting to the IAEA called for by South Korea's safeguards agreement. [2] The IAEA Secretariat reported the failure to report to IAEA Board of Governors. [3] However, the IAEA Board of Governors decided to not make a formal finding of noncompliance. [4]

Early nuclear ambitions

When the United States notified the South Korean administration of its plan to withdraw USFK in July 1970, South Korea first considered the possibility of an independent nuclear program. Under the direction of South Korea's Weapons Exploitation Committee, the country attempted to obtain plutonium reprocessing facilities following the pullout of the 26,000 American soldiers of the 7th Infantry Division in 1971. [5] After South Vietnam had fallen in April 1975, then South Korean president Park Chung Hee first mentioned its nuclear weapons aspiration during the press conference on 12 June 1975. [6] However, under pressure from the United States, France eventually decided not to deliver a reprocessing facility to South Korea in 1975. [5] South Korea's nuclear weapons research program effectively ended on April 23, 1975, with its ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. [5]

Post-NPT programs

Previously unreported experiments

In 1982, scientists at the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute performed an experiment in which they extracted several milligrams of plutonium. Although plutonium has uses other than the manufacture of weapons, the United States later insisted that South Korea not attempt to reprocess plutonium in any way. In exchange, the US agreed to transfer reactor technology and give financial assistance to South Korea's nuclear energy program. It was revealed in 2004 that some South Korean scientists continued some studies; for example, in 1983 and 1984 Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute was conducting chemical experiments related to the handling of spent fuel that crossed the reprocessing boundary. [7]

Later, in an experiment at the same facility in 2000, scientists enriched 200 milligrams of uranium to near-weapons grade (up to 77 percent) using laser enrichment. [7] [8] The South Korean government claimed that this research was conducted without its knowledge. [9] While uranium enriched to 77 percent is usually not considered weapons-grade, it could theoretically be used to construct a nuclear weapon. [10] [11] Highly enriched uranium with a purity of 20% or more is usable in a weapon, but this route is less desirable as far more material is required to obtain critical mass. [12]

These events went unreported to the IAEA until late 2004. [7]

IAEA response

Following Seoul's disclosure of the above incidents, the IAEA launched a full investigation into South Korea's nuclear activities. In a report issued on November 11, 2004, the IAEA described the South Korean government's failure to report its nuclear activities a matter of "serious concern", but accepted that these experiments never produced more than very small amounts of weaponizeable fissile material. The Board of Governors decided to not make a formal finding of noncompliance, and the matter was not referred to the Security Council. [4]

Pierre Goldschmidt, former head of the department of safeguards at the IAEA, has called on the Board of Governors to adopt generic resolutions which would apply to all states in such circumstances and has argued "political considerations played a dominant role in the board's decision" to not make a formal finding of non-compliance. [13]

American nuclear weapons in South Korea

Deployment of US atomic weapons in Korea in 1958

The US first deployed nuclear weapons to South Korea in 1958, [14] and numbers peaked in the late 1960s at close to 950, including a mix of tactical and strategic weapons. [15] [16]

Following its accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, the government of North Korea had cited the presence of US tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea as a reason to avoid completing a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. [17] In 1991, President George H W Bush announced the withdrawal of all naval and land-based tactical nuclear weapons deployed abroad, including approximately 100 such weapons based in South Korea. [18] In January 1992, the governments of North and South Korea signed a Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and in January 1992, the North concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. [17] Implementation meetings for the Joint Declaration took place in 1992 and 1993, but no agreement could be found, so consequently the declaration never entered into force. [19] [20]

In 2013, South Korean Prime Minister Chung Hong-won rejected calls to again station American tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. [21]

In 2017, during a period of unusually high tension with North Korea, South Korean defence minister Song Young-moo suggested it was worth reviewing the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula. [22]

Yoon Suk-yeol, the incumbent President of South Korea, stated in 2021 that he would ask that the United States redeploy tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. [23]

Public opinion

In the late 1990s, a notable minority of South Koreans supported the country's effort to reprocess materials, although only a small number called for the government to obtain nuclear weapons. [24]

With the escalation of the 2017 North Korea crisis, amid worries that the United States might hesitate to defend South Korea from a North Korean attack for fear of inviting a missile attack against the United States, public opinion turned strongly in favour of a South Korean nuclear arsenal, with polls showing that 60% of South Koreans supported building nuclear weapons. [25]

In a 2023 poll, over 76% of South Koreans support the indigenous development of nuclear weapons. [26] [27] [28]

Nuclear-capable state

Although currently, South Korea is under the US nuclear umbrella of protection, it could very well break away and try to develop its own nuclear weapons if necessary. Like Japan, South Korea has the raw materials, technology, and resources to create nuclear weapons. Previous incidents show the Republic of Korea (ROK) to be able to possess nuclear weapons in anywhere from one to three years if necessary. The ROK has been shown before to create enriched uranium up to 77%, which, although not particularly powerful, shows that South Korea has the potential to make nuclear weapons with more highly enriched uranium. South Korea does not have any ICBMs but possesses a wide range of SRBM and MRBMs through the Hyunmoo series of ballistic/cruise missiles currently fielded by the ROK Army. The Hyunmoo series of ballistic missiles works similarly to the American Tomahawk Missile, which can be armed with the W80 and W84 nuclear warheads. Theoretically, if needed, the 500 kg conventional warhead could be replaced by a small nuclear warhead. The Hyunmoo missiles can already cover the entire range of North Korea and would drastically change the North's disposition if the South had nuclear-armed MRBMs. Even though the ROK could procure nuclear weapons, currently, like Japan, it sees no reason to do so with the protection of the American nuclear arsenal. However, if a conflict erupts with the North, South Korea could quickly evolve into a nuclear-armed state and pose even with the North with the support of the US. [29] According to Suh Kune-yull, a professor of nuclear engineering at Seoul National University, “If we decide to stand on our own feet and put our resources together, we can build nuclear weapons in six months”. [30]

South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol stated in January 2023 that if the security situation regarding the threat from North Korean nuclear weapons deteriorates further, South Korea would consider building their own nuclear weapons to deter the North or request that the United States deploy nuclear weapons in South Korea. In 1991 the United States removed all of its nuclear weapons from South Korea. The statements from the South Korean president came during a policy briefing by his foreign and defense ministries; the comments are the first time South Korea has officially acknowledged they would consider developing its own nuclear arsenal in response to North Korean nuclear weapons. In 2022 South Korea announced it had developed submarine-launched ballistic missiles; South Korea is the only nation with SLBMs that does not possess nuclear weapons. [31] [32] [33]

In February 2023, Leader of the People Power Party Chung Jin Suk said that South Korea might need nuclear weapons. [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [28]

In March 2023, Mayor of Seoul Oh Se-hoon called for South Korea to have nuclear weapons. [39] [40]

Delivery systems

South Korea missile development originates in 1970 with creation of Defense Ministry's research arm the Agency of Defense Development with development starting in 1971 under orders of then president Park Chung Hee. In 19708090 was allowed to service Hawk and Nike Hercules surface-to-air missiles under agreement with maintenance facility under the supervision of the U.S. which was set up in the country with South Korean engineers receiving training from the Raytheon and U.S. military involving improvement of the missiles. South Korea in 1975 purchased mixer for missiles solid fuel propellant from Lockheed along with some equipment imported later on in 1978 with first successful ballistic missile test of first South Korean short range ballistic missile NHK-1(also known as White/Polar Bear) conducted the same year on September 26 demonstrating 160 km range with maximum range of 180 to 200 km. NHK-1 was by South Korea touted as completely indigenous development though in fact some of the technology was supplied and obtained from the United States. Seoul agreed to not extended range of the missile beyond 180 km under South Korea Ballistic Missile Range Guidelines with the U.S. with development of its successor NHK-2 that was tested in October 1982 with development being halted in 1984 until resumption couple years later with completion in 1987 when it entered service, its guidance system was supplied by United Kingdom. In 1995 South Korea requested permission to have 300 km range missiles from the US in line with MTCR with request in 1999 for expansion to 500 km. [41] Development of 300 km range Hyunmoo-2 started in mid to late 1990s with first test in April 1999 with entering service in 2008 as Hyunmoo-2A after restrictions were lifted from previous agreement to limitation comparable to MTCR, [42] Hyunmoo-2B entered service in 2009 with range under MTCR-like restriction and range restriction under South Korea Ballistic Missile Range Guidelines renegotiated in 2012 with the US from 300 km to 800 km with reduced payload from 997 kg to 500 kg. [43] Cap on missile warhead weight was lifted in 2017. [44] On May 21, 2021, the decades-old South Korea Ballistic Missile Range Guidelines was scrapped, allowing South Korea to develop and possess any type of missile, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and advanced submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). [45] [46]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</span> International treaty to prevent spread of nuclear weapons

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Between 1965 and 1968, the treaty was negotiated by the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, a United Nations-sponsored organization based in Geneva, Switzerland.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear proliferation</span> Spread of nuclear weapons

Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, fissionable material, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information to nations not recognized as "Nuclear Weapon States" by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. Proliferation has been opposed by many nations with and without nuclear weapons, as governments fear that more countries with nuclear weapons will increase the possibility of nuclear warfare, de-stabilize international or regional relations, or infringe upon the national sovereignty of nation states.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">North Korea and weapons of mass destruction</span>

North Korea has a military nuclear weapons program and, as of early 2020, is estimated to have an arsenal of approximately 30 to 40 nuclear weapons and sufficient production of fissile material for six to seven nuclear weapons per year. North Korea has also stockpiled a significant quantity of chemical and biological weapons. In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Since 2006, the country has conducted six nuclear tests at increasing levels of expertise, prompting the imposition of sanctions.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nyongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center</span> North Korean nuclear site

The Nyongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center (녕변원자력연구소) is North Korea's major nuclear facility, operating its first nuclear reactors. It is located in Nyongbyon County in North Pyongan Province, about 100 km north of Pyongyang. The center produced the fissile material for North Korea's six nuclear weapon tests from 2006 to 2017, and since 2009 is developing indigenous light water reactor nuclear power station technology.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">China and weapons of mass destruction</span>

The People's Republic of China has developed and possesses weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons. The first of China's nuclear weapons tests took place in 1964, and its first hydrogen bomb test occurred in 1967 at Lop Nur. Tests continued until 1996, when the country signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), but did not ratify it. China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984 and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997.

Iran has several research sites, two uranium mines, a research reactor, and uranium processing facilities that include three known uranium enrichment plants.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction</span>

Taiwan pursued a number of weapons of mass destruction programs from 1949 to the late 1980s. The final secret nuclear weapons program was shut down in the late 1980s under US pressure after completing all stages of weapons development besides final assembly and testing; they lacked an effective delivery mechanism and would have needed to further miniaturize any weapon before it could be effectively used in combat. Currently, there is no evidence of Taiwan possessing any chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. However, nuclear weapons from the United States were deployed to Taiwan during a period of heightened regional tensions with China beginning with the First Taiwan Strait Crisis and ending in the 1970s.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction</span>

Pakistan is one of nine states that possess nuclear weapons. Pakistan began developing nuclear weapons in January 1972 under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who delegated the program to the Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Munir Ahmad Khan with a commitment to having the device ready by the end of 1976. Since PAEC, which consisted of over twenty laboratories and projects under reactor physicist Munir Ahmad Khan, was falling behind schedule and having considerable difficulty producing fissile material, Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgist working on centrifuge enrichment for Urenco, joined the program at the behest of the Bhutto administration by the end of 1974. Producing fissile material was pivotal to the Kahuta Project's success and thus to Pakistan obtaining the capability to detonate a nuclear weapon by the end of 1984.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Iran and weapons of mass destruction</span>

Iran is not known to currently possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and has signed treaties repudiating the possession of WMDs including the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran has first-hand knowledge of WMD effects—over 100,000 Iranian troops and civilians were victims of chemical weapons during the 1980s Iran–Iraq War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hyunmoo</span> South Korean missile series

Hyunmoo is a series of strategic missiles developed by South Korea.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hyunmoo-3</span> South Korean cruise missile

The Hyunmoo-3 is a cruise missile fielded by the South Korean military designed by Agency for Defense Development (ADD). The name Hyunmoo comes from a mythical beast described as the "Guardian of the Northern Sky", perhaps hinting North Korea.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Timeline of the North Korean nuclear program</span> Chronology of the North Korean nuclear program

This chronology of the North Korean nuclear program has its roots in the 1950s and begins in earnest in 1989 with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the main economic ally of North Korea. The chronology mainly addresses the conflict between the United States and North Korea, while including the influences of the other members of the six-party talks: China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Romania and weapons of mass destruction</span> Usage of weapons of mass destruction in the history of Romania

Romania started pursuing nuclear technology, according to some scholars, as early as 1967. In the 1980s, during the long rule of Nicolae Ceaușescu, Romania had a secret program intended to develop nuclear weapons, violating its word on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1970. The program ended after the Romanian Revolution of 1989. Romania is considered free of weapons of mass destruction, using nuclear power only for civilian purposes.

President Adly Mansour announced on 7 November 2013 that Egypt was restarting its nuclear power program in El Dabaa; a deal was reached with the residents in which it was agreed that a residential area will also be built. The Egyptian minister of electricity, Ahmed Emam, has called the project "necessary" because of a small amount of renewable energy sources and not enough fuel.

This timeline of nuclear weapons development is a chronological catalog of the evolution of nuclear weapons rooting from the development of the science surrounding nuclear fission and nuclear fusion. In addition to the scientific advancements, this timeline also includes several political events relating to the development of nuclear weapons. The availability of intelligence on recent advancements in nuclear weapons of several major countries is limited because of the classification of technical knowledge of nuclear weapons development.

Nuclear latency or a nuclear threshold state is the condition of a country possessing the technology to quickly build nuclear weapons, without having actually yet done so. Because such latent capability is not prescribed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, this is sometimes called the "Japan Option", as Japan is considered a "paranuclear" state, being a clear case of a country with complete technical prowess to develop a nuclear weapon quickly, or as it is sometimes called "being one screwdriver's turn" from the bomb, as Japan is considered to have the materials, expertise and technical capacity to make a nuclear bomb at will. However, nuclear latency does not presume any particular intentions on the part of a state recognized as being nuclear-latent.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929</span> United Nations Security Council resolution

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, adopted on 9 June 2010, after recalling resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1887 (2009) concerning the topics of Iran and non-proliferation, the Council noted that Iran had failed to comply with previous Security Council resolutions concerning its nuclear program and imposed further sanctions on the country.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">South Korea Ballistic Missile Range Guidelines</span> 1979 U.S.–South Korea agreement

In 1979, South Korea agreed to ballistic missile guidelines, limiting the country's ballistic missile development and possession to 180 km in range.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Saudi Arabia and weapons of mass destruction</span>

Saudi Arabia has not officially maintained and possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In 1972 Saudi Arabia signed and approved the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of biological (bacteriological) and toxin weapons. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has made steps towards a nuclear program and according to some observations, they can be used to develop nuclear weapons. According to some reports, Riyadh has an alleged deal with Pakistan regarding nuclear weapons projects.

References

  1. ↑ "Nuclear Capabilities And Potential Around The World". NPR website. 13 April 2010. Retrieved 11 October 2012.
  2. ↑ "Nonproliferation, By the Numbers Archived 2009-08-14 at the Wayback Machine ". Sokolski, Henry. Journal of International Security Affairs. Spring 2007 - Number 12.
  3. ↑ IAEA GOV/2004/84: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea Archived November 22, 2008, at the Wayback Machine
  4. 1 2 "IAEA Board Concludes Consideration of Safeguards in South Korea". 26 November 2004.
  5. 1 2 3 Pike, John. "South Korea Special Weapons".
  6. ↑ Washington Post. 12 June 1975.{{cite news}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  7. 1 2 3 Kang, Jungmin; Hayes, Peter; Bin, Li; Suzuki, Tatsujiro; Tanter, Richard. "South Korea's Nuclear Surprise [ permanent dead link ]". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. January 1, 2005.
  8. ↑ "Washington Post: Breaking News, World, US, DC News & Analysis".
  9. ↑ "South Korea experimented with highly enriched uranium / Incident could complicate arms talks with North". 3 September 2004.
  10. ↑ Council on Foreign Relations: Iran's Nuclear Program Archived 2010-06-07 at the Wayback Machine
    Weapons-grade uranium—also known as highly-enriched uranium, or HEU—is around 90 percent (technically, HEU is any concentration over 20 percent, but weapons-grade levels are described as being in excess of 90 percent).
  11. ↑ Federation of American Scientists: Uranium Production Archived 2016-07-12 at the Wayback Machine
    A state selecting uranium for its weapons must obtain a supply of uranium ore and construct an enrichment plant because the U-235 content in natural uranium is over two orders of magnitude lower than that found in weapons grade uranium (>90 percent U-235 U).
  12. ↑ HEU as weapons material – a technical background Archived March 27, 2009, at the Wayback Machine
  13. ↑ Exposing Nuclear Non-Compliance. Pierre Goldschmidt. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 51, no. 1, February–March 2009, pp. 143–164
  14. ↑ Mark Selden, Alvin Y. So (2004). War and state terrorism: the United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the long twentieth century. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 77–80. ISBN   978-0-7425-2391-3.
  15. ↑ Hans M. Kristensen (September 28, 2005). "A history of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea". Federation of American Scientists . Retrieved 2017-09-24.
  16. ↑ Mizokami, Kyle (September 10, 2017). "The History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea". Archived from the original on September 15, 2017. Retrieved September 24, 2017.
  17. 1 2 "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy". The Arms Control Association.
  18. ↑ Hans M. Kristensen (September 28, 2005). "The Withdrawal of U.S. Nuclear Weapons From South Korea". Federation of American Scientists . Retrieved 2017-09-24.
  19. ↑ Kim, B-K (2002). Step-By-Step Nuclear Confidence Building on the Korean Peninsula : Where Do We Start? (PDF) (Report). Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute. Retrieved 21 April 2018.
  20. ↑ Carlin, Robert (13 July 2016). "North Korea Said It's Willing to Talk Denuclearization (But No One Noticed)". The Diplomat. Retrieved 21 April 2018. That the 1992 N-S joint declaration didn't work is beside the point; in fact, it never even got through the stage of setting up implementation arrangements, the fault of both sides.
  21. ↑ Pike, John. "S.Korean PM Against Redeploying US Tactical Nuclear Weapons".
  22. ↑ Fifield, Anna. "South Korea's defense minister suggests bringing back tactical U.S. nuclear weapons". Washington Post. Retrieved 5 September 2017.
  23. ↑ "Yoon says he will request redeployment of U.S. tactical nukes in case of emergency". Yonhap News Agency . 22 September 2021. Retrieved 24 September 2021.
  24. ↑ Mack, Andrew (1 July 1997). "Potential, not proliferation: Northeast Asia has several nuclear-capable countries, but only China has built weapons". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists . Archived from the original on 10 January 2016. Retrieved 18 May 2015.
  25. ↑ "North Korea Rouses Neighbors to Reconsider Nuclear Weapons". The New York Times . 28 October 2017. Retrieved 30 October 2017.
  26. ↑ "Over 76% of South Koreans support development of nuclear weapons". koreatimes. 2023-01-30. Retrieved 2023-07-10.
  27. ↑ "South Korea: Why support for nukes is on the rise – DW – 02/17/2023". dw.com. Retrieved 2023-04-06.
  28. 1 2 McCurry, Justin (2023-02-20). "North Korea launches more missiles as Kim sister warns Pacific could become 'firing range'". The Guardian. ISSN   0261-3077 . Retrieved 2023-04-06.
  29. ↑ "Why South Korea Won't Develop Nuclear Weapons". Korean Economic Institute. 13 May 2013. Retrieved May 13, 2013.
  30. ↑ "If North Korea is preparing for nuclear war, all of Asia needs nuclear weapons, says Henry Kissinger". Newsweek.com. 29 October 2017. Retrieved November 3, 2017.
  31. ↑ Sang-Hun, C. (12 January 2023), "In a First, South Korea Declares Nuclear Weapons a Policy Option", The New York Times , retrieved 17 January 2023
  32. ↑ Cohen, M. (21 September 2021), "South Korea's new SLBMs are a signal to North Korea and the US", The National Security College, Australian National University, retrieved 17 January 2023
  33. ↑ Sang-Hun, C. (13 January 2023), "In a first, South Korea declares nuclear weapons a policy option", The Japan Times, retrieved 17 January 2023
  34. ↑ "South Korea's ruling party leader hints at need for nuclear weapons". Financial Times. 2023-02-20. Retrieved 2023-04-06.
  35. ↑ 김, 나영 (2023-02-20). "Ruling party leader says calls for own nuclear armament boosted by N.K. provocations". Yonhap News Agency . Retrieved 2023-04-06.
  36. ↑ "PPP Interim Chair Calls for Nuclear Armament to be Considered after N. Korea's Provocations". world.kbs.co.kr. Retrieved 2023-04-06.
  37. ↑ "North Korea Launches More Missiles, Calls Pacific 'Our Firing Range'". VOA. Retrieved 2023-04-06.
  38. ↑ Jeongmin (2023-02-20). "ROK must consider nukes, lawmakers say after North Korea's latest missile launch | NK News". NK News . Retrieved 2023-04-06.
  39. ↑ National, The (2023-03-13). "South Korea needs nuclear weapons, says influential Seoul mayor". The National. Retrieved 2023-04-06.
  40. ↑ Shin, Hyonhee (2023-03-13). "Exclusive: Seoul mayor calls for South Korean nuclear weapons to counter threat from North". Reuters. Retrieved 2023-04-06.
  41. ↑ Mistry, Dinshaw (2005-01-31). Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control. ISBN   9780295985077.
  42. ↑ "Hyunmoo-2A".
  43. ↑ "Hyunmoo-2B".
  44. ↑ "Trump agrees 'in principle' to scrap South Korean warhead weight limit: White House". Reuters . Archived from the original on 2018-10-11.
  45. ↑ "(News Focus) Lifting of U.S. Missile restrictions signifies Seoul's missile sovereignty, Washington's China strategy: Experts". 22 May 2021.
  46. ↑ Jeong, Andrew (11 June 2021). "South Korea Can Now Build Missiles Able to Reach Beijing, with U.S. Blessing". The Wall Street Journal .

Further reading

This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.