Irregular warfare

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Irregular warfare (IW) is defined in United States joint doctrine as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations." [1] In practice, control of institutions and infrastructure is also important. Concepts associated with irregular warfare are older than the term itself. [2]

Contents

Irregular warfare favors indirect warfare and asymmetric warfare approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode the adversary's power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of a state and its strategic partners. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]

The term "irregular warfare" was settled upon in distinction from "traditional warfare" and "unconventional warfare", and to differentiate it as such; it is unrelated to the distinction between "regular" and "irregular forces". [8]

In an entry to the electronic open access Handbook of Military Sciences [9] the Dutch military scholar Martijn Kitzen explores Operations in Irregular Warfare and the underlying body of knowledge which characterizes these conflicts as violent struggles involving non-state actors and states that seek to establish power, control, and legitimacy over relevant populations. [10] In the chapter, Kitzen provides an overview of much of the academic literature that covers this field. [11]

Terminology

Early usage

One of the earliest known uses of the term irregular warfare is in the 1986 English edition of "Modern Irregular Warfare in Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon" by former Nazi officer Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte. The original 1972 German edition of the book is titled "Der Moderne Kleinkrieg als Wehrpolitisches und Militarisches Phänomen". The German word "Kleinkrieg" is literally translated as "Small War." [12] The word "Irregular," used in the title of the English translation of the book, seems to be a reference to non "regular armed forces" as per the Third Geneva Convention.

Another early use of the term is in a 1996 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) document by Jeffrey B. White. [13] Major military doctrine developments related to IW were done between 2004 and 2007 [14] as a result of the September 11 attacks on the United States. [15] [16] A key proponent of IW within US Department of Defense (DoD) is Michael G. Vickers, a former paramilitary officer in the CIA. [17] The CIA's Special Activities Center (SAC) is the premiere American paramilitary clandestine unit for creating and for combating irregular warfare units. [18] [19] [20] For example, SAC paramilitary officers created and led successful irregular units from the Hmong tribe during the war in Laos in the 1960s, [21] from the Northern Alliance against the Taliban during the war in Afghanistan in 2001, [22] and from the Kurdish Peshmerga against Ansar al-Islam and the forces of Saddam Hussein during the war in Iraq in 2003. [23] [24] [25]

Other definitions

Examples

Nearly all modern wars include at least some element of irregular warfare. Since the time of Napoleon, approximately 80% of conflict has been irregular in nature. However, the following conflicts may be considered to have exemplified by irregular warfare: [2] [13]

Activities

Activities and types of conflict included in IW are:

According to the DoD, there are five core activities of IW:

Modeling and simulation

As a result of DoD Directive 3000.07, [5] United States armed forces are studying[ when? ] irregular warfare concepts using modeling and simulation. [30] [31] [32]

Wargames and exercises

There have been several military wargames and military exercises associated with IW, including:

See also

Individuals:

Notes

  1. ↑ According to the definition of "regular forces," which came much after the American Revolutionary War (ARW), the American forces did not meet the following criteria at all times during the ARW:
    • having a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance
    • carrying arms openly
    • conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war

    Notwithstanding, in terms of modern international humanitarian law which was also developed much later than the ARW, the American forces formed part of the armed forces of a party to an armed conflict but not belonging to that party's regular forces (since the United States of America did not exist and hence could not have had regular forces; the American forces were an insurgency at least until 1776) and operating in or outside of their own territory even if the territory is under occupation. American forces did become regular forces but cannot be considered regular forces during the entire period of the ARW. For example, the American flag got established (1777) 2 years after the ARW started (1775). Also, there were great disparities between the American and British forces. It was not until France started to assist American forces (1778) that the disparity started to be narrowed. Conflict during the disparity surely counts as Asymmetric warfare. Also, the Boston Tea Party (1773) can be viewed as guerrilla tactics. At the very least, a good portion of the ARW should be counted as IW, although the entire ARW being counted as IW is controversial. However, since more than 1/2 of the ARW was fought as ARW then it is thought that it is safe to classify it as IW even though that the American forces acted in all respects as regular forces towards the end of the conflict.

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Asymmetric warfare</span> A war between belligerents whose relative military power differs significantly

Asymmetric warfare is a type of war between belligerents whose relative military power, strategy, or tactics differ significantly. This type of warfare often, but not necessarily, involves insurgents or resistance movement militias who may have the status of unlawful combatants against a standing army.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Low-intensity conflict</span> Military conflict below the intensity of conventional war

A low-intensity conflict (LIC) is a military conflict, usually localised, between two or more state or non-state groups which is below the intensity of conventional war. It involves the state's use of military forces applied selectively and with restraint to enforce compliance with its policies or objectives.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Unconventional warfare</span> Opposite of conventional warfare

Unconventional warfare (UW) is broadly defined as "military and quasi-military operations other than conventional warfare" and may use covert forces, subversion, or guerrilla warfare. This is typically done to avoid escalation into conventional warfare as well as international conventions.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Insurgency</span> Revolt or uprising by irregular forces, especially one that is prolonged

An insurgency is a violent, armed rebellion by small, lightly armed bands who practice guerrilla warfare from primarily rural base areas against a larger authority. The key descriptive feature of insurgency is its asymmetric nature: small irregular forces face a large, well-equipped, regular military force state adversary. Due to this asymmetry, insurgents avoid large-scale direct battles, opting instead to blend in with the civilian population where they gradually expand territorial control and military forces. Insurgency frequently hinges on control of and collaboration with local populations.

Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) is conflict characterized by a blurring of the distinction between war and politics, and of the distinction between combatants and civilians.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Irregular military</span> Any non-standard military organization

Irregular military is any non-standard military component that is distinct from a country's national armed forces. Being defined by exclusion, there is significant variance in what comes under the term. It can refer to the type of military organization, or to the type of tactics used. An irregular military organization is one which is not part of the regular army organization. Without standard military unit organization, various more general names are often used; such organizations may be called a troop, group, unit, column, band, or force. Irregulars are soldiers or warriors that are members of these organizations, or are members of special military units that employ irregular military tactics. This also applies to irregular infantry and irregular cavalry units.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Counterinsurgency</span> Military operation aimed at defeating insurgent forces

Counterinsurgency is "the totality of actions aimed at defeating irregular forces". The Oxford English Dictionary defines counterinsurgency as any "military or political action taken against the activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries" and can be considered war by a state against a non-state adversary. Insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns have been waged since ancient history. However, modern thinking on counterinsurgency was developed during decolonization. Within the military sciences, counterinsurgency is one of the main operational approaches of irregular warfare.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Directorate of Operations (CIA)</span> US clandestine intelligence organization

The Directorate of Operations (DO), less formally called the Clandestine Service, is a component of the US Central Intelligence Agency. It was known as the Directorate of Plans from 1951 to 1973; as the Directorate of Operations from 1973 to 2005; and as the National Clandestine Service (NCS) from 2005 to 2015.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Partisan Ranger Act</span> 1862 act by the Confederate Congress

The Partisan Ranger Act was passed on April 21, 1862 by the Confederate Congress. It was intended as a stimulus for recruitment of irregulars for service into the Confederate Army during the American Civil War. The Confederate leadership, like the Union leadership, later opposed the use of unconventional warfare out of fear the lack of discipline among rival guerrilla groups could spiral out of control. On February 17, 1864, the law was repealed after pressure from General Robert E. Lee and other Confederate regulars.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Foreign internal defense</span> Approach to combating actual or threatened insurgency

Foreign internal defense (FID) is a term used by the military in several countries, including the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, to describe an integrated, or multi-country approach to combating actual or threatened insurgency in a foreign state. This foreign state is known as the Host Nation (HN) under the US doctrine. The term counter-insurgency is commonly used for FID.

National governments deal in both intelligence and military special operations functions that either should be completely secret, or simply cannot be linked to the sponsor. It is a continuing and unsolved question for governments whether clandestine intelligence collection and covert action should be under the same agency. The arguments for doing so include having centralized functions for monitoring covert action and clandestine HUMINT and making sure they do not conflict, as well as avoiding duplication in common services such as cover identity support, counterespionage, and secret communications. The arguments against doing so suggest that the management of the two activities takes a quite different mindset and skills, in part because clandestine collection almost always is on a slower timeline than covert action.

In United States military doctrine, unconventional warfare is one of the core activities of irregular warfare. Unconventional warfare is essentially support provided by the military to a foreign insurgency or resistance. The legal definition of UW is:

Unconventional Warfare consists of activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary or guerrilla force in a denied area.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">War in Vietnam (1959–1963)</span> Phase of the war between North and South Vietnam

The 1959 to 1963 phase of the Vietnam War started after the North Vietnamese had made a firm decision to commit to a military intervention in the guerrilla war in the South Vietnam, a buildup phase began, between the 1959 North Vietnamese decision and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, which led to a major US escalation of its involvement. Vietnamese communists saw this as a second phase of their revolution, the US now substituting for the French.

Hybrid warfare is a theory of military strategy, first proposed by Frank Hoffman, which employs political warfare and blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and cyberwarfare with other influencing methods, such as fake news, diplomacy, lawfare and foreign electoral intervention. By combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts, the aggressor intends to avoid attribution or retribution. The concept of hybrid warfare has been criticized by a number of academics and practitioners due to its alleged vagueness, its disputed constitutive elements, and its alleged historical distortions.

Joint unconventional warfare is the inter-agency, or international implementation of an unconventional warfare strategy, comprising elements of asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, urban warfare and various forms of psychological operations deployed by non-traditional means.

Informatized warfare of China is the implementation of information warfare (IW) within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and other organizations affiliated or controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Laid out in the Chinese Defence White Paper of 2008, informatized warfare includes the utilization of information-based weapons and forces, including battlefield management systems, precision-strike capabilities, and technology-assisted command and control (C4ISR). However, some media and analyst report also uses the term to describe the political and espionage effort from the Chinese state.

The Fourth Department (4PLA) of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Joint Staff Department (JSD) is also known as the Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Department. It is charged with the Chinese People's Liberation Army's offensive electronic warfare (EW) and information warfare (IW) missions, to include offensive cyber operations.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United States Special Operations Command</span> Unified combatant command of the United States Armed Forces responsible for special operations

The United States Special Operations Command is the unified combatant command charged with overseeing the various special operations component commands of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force of the United States Armed Forces. The command is part of the Department of Defense and is the only unified combatant command created by an Act of Congress. USSOCOM is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Michael Patrick Mulroy</span> Senior National Security Official

Michael Patrick Mulroy is the former United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for the Middle East, serving under Secretary James N. Mattis and Secretary Mark T. Esper. He was responsible for representing the United States Department of Defense (DoD) for defense policy and for Middle East policy in the interagency. He is also a retired CIA Paramilitary Operations Officer and a United States Marine.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Security force assistance</span> Military term for adviser assistance to foreign forces

Security Force Assistance (SFA) a term originating in the United States Armed Forces for military adviser assistance with "training, equipping and advising allied or 'partner' militaries to enable them to defend themselves without 100,000 Americans on the ground to do it for them." SFA is used when improving the security of the host country aligns with the national interests of the donor country. It may be used alongside or instead of larger commitments of the donor country's military personnel and matériel. This means SFA can provide an alternative to large-scale operations if a war becomes controversial or politically difficult.

References

  1. ↑ Pelleriti, John A.; Maloney, Michael; Cox, David C.; Sullivan, Heather J.; Piskura, J. Eric; Hawkins, Montigo J. (2019). "The Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine" (PDF). Joint Force Quarterly. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 February 2022.
  2. 1 2 Gates, John M. "The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare". College of Wooster . Archived from the original on 2009-06-23. Retrieved 2010-02-20.
  3. ↑ "Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)", Version 1.0, United States Department of Defense, 27 February 2009
  4. ↑ "US Irregular Warfare (IW) Analysis Workshop", Military Operations Research Society (MORS), 11 September 2007 Archived 2008-09-03 at the Wayback Machine
  5. 1 2 "Irregular Warfare (IW)", DoD Directive 3000.07, United States Department of Defense, 1 December 2008
  6. ↑ "Quadrennial Roles & Missions (QRM) Review Report", United States Department of Defense, January 2009
  7. ↑ "Irregular Warfare", Doctrine Document 2-3, United States Air Force, 1 August 2007
  8. ↑ Larson, Eric V.; Eaton, Derek; Nichiporuk, Brian; Szayna, Thomas S. (2008). "Defining Irregular Warfare". Assessing Irregular Warfare. RAND Corporation. pp. 7–18. ISBN   9780833043221. JSTOR   10.7249/mg668a.10.
  9. ↑ Sookermany A. (ed) (2020) Handbook of Military Sciences. Springer, Cham doi : 10.1007/978-3-030-02866-4
  10. ↑ Kitzen M. (2020) Operations in Irregular Warfare. In: Sookermany A. (eds) Handbook of Military Sciences. p. 1-21. Springer, Cham doi : 10.1007/978-3-030-02866-4_81-1
  11. ↑ Kitzen, Martijn (2012). "Western Military Culture and Counterinsurgency: An Ambiguous Reality". Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies. 40. doi: 10.5787/40-1-982 – via ResearchGate.
  12. ↑ Moses, A. Dirk (2007). German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN   978-0-511-51190-5. OCLC   191719860.
  13. 1 2 White, Jeffrey B. (14 April 2007). "Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare". CIA . Archived from the original on 13 June 2007.
  14. ↑ "The National Military Strategy of the United States of America" (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute . 2004. Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 June 2007.
  15. ↑ Miller, Frank A. (15 March 2006). "Irregular Warfare – Perhaps Not So "Irregular" (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute . Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 June 2007.
  16. ↑ "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (PDF). GlobalSecurity.org . United States National Security Council. September 2002. Archived from the original (PDF) on 24 December 2003.
  17. ↑ Grant, Greg (7 April 2009). "The Man Behind Irregular Warfare Push: Mike Vickers". DoDBuzz. Archived from the original on 11 April 2009.
  18. ↑ Southworth, Samuel A.; Tanner, Stephen (2002). U.S. Special Forces : A Guide to America's Special Operations Units : The World's Most Elite Fighting Force (1st ed.). Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press. ISBN   978-0-306-81165-4. OCLC   49594086.
  19. ↑ "Waller, Douglas, "The CIA Secret Army", Time Inc., 3 February 2003". time.com. Archived from the original on February 1, 2003.
  20. ↑ Stone, Kathryn & Williams, Anthony R., All Necessary Means: Employing CIA operatives in a Warfighting Role Alongside Special Operations Forces, United States Army War College (USAWC), 7 April 2003
  21. ↑ Shooting at the Moon: The Story of America's Clandestine War in Laos, Steerforth Press, ISBN   978-1-883642-36-5, 1996
  22. ↑ Woodward, Bob, Bush at War, Simon and Schuster, ISBN   0-7432-0473-5, 19 November 2002
  23. ↑ Tucker, Mike & Faddis, Charles, Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War inside Iraq, The Lyons Press, ISBN   978-1-59921-366-8, 2008
  24. ↑ Woodward, Bob, Plan of Attack, Simon and Schuster, ISBN   978-0-7432-5547-9, 2004
  25. ↑ Covert Action: Title 10, Title 50, and the Chain of Commanaad
  26. ↑ "Irregular Warfare Special Study," United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, 4 August 2006
  27. ↑ "Quadrennial Defense Review Report", United States Department of Defense, 6 February 2006
  28. ↑ "Benest, David, "British Leaders and Irregular Warfare," 29 August 2007" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 February 2012. Retrieved 28 August 2009.
  29. ↑ Marston, Daniel (2002). The American Revolution 1774-1783. Osprey Publishing. ISBN   978-1-84176-343-9.[ permanent dead link ]
  30. ↑ "U. S. Army Enhancement of Irregular Warfare Modeling & Simulation", United States Army Modeling and Simulation Office, 24 February 2009 Archived 2016-12-22 at the Wayback Machine
  31. ↑ "MORS Workshop Irregular Warfare (IW) II Analysis Workshop", Military Operations Research Society, 3–6 February 2009
  32. ↑ Cragg, Lt. Jennifer, "Behavior Studies May Improve Irregular Warfare Techniques", American Forces Press Service, 20 April 2009
  33. ↑ "Av免费在线观看,国产免费A∨在线播放,国产高清AV免费观看,AV免费在线观看". Archived from the original on 2022-07-02. Retrieved 2009-04-29.
  34. ↑ "Home". unifiedquest.army.mil. Archived from the original on 2011-07-22. Retrieved 2009-04-29.
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