A Hampden TB.1 of the Leuchars Wing makes a torpedo attack on a German vessel during the Second World War. (A photograph taken by a member of 18 Group on an unrelated operation.)
The Hampden crews made a long and dangerous flight from bases in Scotland (4–5 September) and assembled at Vaenga airfield on the Kola Inlet, 25mi (40km) north of Murmansk. The two squadrons lost nine aircraft shot down or crashed in transit but the remainder joined a detachment of 210 SquadronCatalina flying boats and a section of photographic reconnaissance Spitfires from 1 Photographic Reconnaissance Unit to make up the Search & Strike Force (S&SF).
At 7:30 a.m. on 14 September, 23 Hampdens were scrambled, after Tirpitz was reported absent from its moorings. The Hampdens flew to the maximum distance that Tirpitz could have reached then turned to follow the track back to Altafjord, as far as the Catalina cross over patrols. After an uneventful flight, the Hampdens returned at 3:00 p.m. from what turned out to be a false alarm; Tirpitz having moved to a nearby fjord. The S&SF Hampdens stayed at readiness and the Spitfires watched over Tirpitz until October. Operation Orator had deterred the Germans from risking their capital ships against PQ 18 and after converting the Soviet Air Forces (VVS) to the Hampden and Spitfire aircraft to be left behind, the aircrew and ground personnel returned to Britain.
In October 1941, after Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the USSR, which had begun on 22 June, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made a commitment to send a convoy to the Arctic ports of the USSR every ten days and to deliver 1,200 tanks a month from July 1942 to January 1943, followed by 2,000 tanks and another 3,600 aircraft. The first convoy was due at Murmansk around 12 October and the next convoy was to depart Iceland on 22 October. A motley of British, Allied and neutral shipping loaded with military stores and raw materials for the Soviet war effort would be assembled at Hvalfjörður, Iceland, an anchorage convenient for ships from both sides of the Atlantic.[2]
By late 1941, the convoy system used in the Atlantic had been established on the Arctic run; a convoy commodore ensured that the ships' masters and signals officers attended a briefing to make arrangements for the management of the convoy, which sailed in a formation of long rows of short columns. The commodore was usually a retired naval officer, aboard a ship identified by a white pendant with a blue cross. The commodore was assisted by a Naval signals party of four men, who used lamps, semaphore flags and telescopes to pass signals, coded from books carried in a weighted bag, to be dumped overboard in an emergency. In large convoys, the commodore was assisted by vice- and rear-commodores who directed the speed, course and zig-zagging of the merchant ships in co-operation with the escort commander.[3][lower-alpha 2]
Convoy hiatus
Following Convoy PQ 16 and the disaster to PQ 17 in July 1942, Arctic convoys were suspended for nine weeks and much of the Home Fleet was detached to the Mediterranean. During the lull, Admiral John "Jack" Tovey concluded that the Home Fleet had been of no great protection to convoys once beyond Bear Island, midway between Svalbard and the North Cape of Norway. Tovey planned to oversee the operation from Scapa Flow, where the fleet was linked to the Admiralty by landline and immune to variations in wireless reception. The next convoy was to be accompanied by the longer-range destroyers of the Home Fleet. Along with the close escort force of anti-submarine and anti-aircraft ships, the fleet destroyers could confront a sortie by German ships with the threat of a massed torpedo attack. Instead of meeting homeward-bound QP convoys near Bear Island, QP 14 was to remain in port until PQ 18 was near its destination, despite the longer journey being more demanding of the escort crews, fuel and equipment. The new escort carrierHMSAvenger (Commander A. P. Colthurst) had arrived from the United States and was added to the escort force.[5]
The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters (Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the older Heimish (Hydra from 1942, Dolphin to the British). By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to receive and read LuftwaffeW/T transmissions and give advance warning of Luftwaffe operations. [6][7]
In 1941, naval Headache personnel, with receivers to eavesdrop on Luftwaffe wireless transmissions, were embarked on warships and from May 1942, ships gained RAF Y computor parties, which sailed with cruiser admirals in command of convoy escorts, to interpret Luftwaffe W/T signals intercepted by the Headaches. The Admiralty sent details of Luftwaffe wireless frequencies, call signs and the daily local codes to the computors, which combined with their knowledge of Luftwaffe procedures, could glean fairly accurate details of German reconnaissance sorties. Sometimes computors predicted attacks twenty minutes before they were detected by radar.[6][7]
The rival German Beobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst, Observation Service) of the KriegsmarineMarinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to help Kriegsmarine ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941, B-Dienst read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones.[8]B-Dienst had broken Naval Cypher No 3 in February 1942 and by March was reading up to 80 per cent of the traffic, which continued until 15 December 1943. By coincidence, the British lost access to the Shark cypher and had no information to send in Cypher No 3 which might compromise Ultra.[9] In early September, Finnish Radio Intelligence deciphered a Soviet Air Force transmission which divulged the convoy itinerary and forwarded it to the Germans.[10]
Five Sea Hurricanes in the hangar of HMSArgus (1942–1944)
As Arctic convoys passed by the North Cape of Norway into the Barents Sea, they were easily within range of German aircraft, U-boats and ships based in Norway and Finland. The ships were still vulnerable while unloading at Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Polyarny and Hawker Hurricane fighters delivered by the first Arctic convoy, were intended for air defence against the Luftwaffe. In Operation Dervish (21–31 August 1941), six elderly freighters sailed from Iceland for Archangelsk carrying wood, rubber, tin and fifteen crated Hawker Hurricane fighters. In Operation Strength, the aircraft carrier HMSArgus carried 24 Hurricanes concurrent with the convoy, escorted by three cruisers with the RAF ground party. When Argus was in range of Vayenga, the Hurricanes were flown off and all reached their destination.[11]
No. 151 Wing RAF (Wing Commander Neville Ramsbottom-Isherwood) flew in the defence of Murmansk for five weeks and claimed 16 victories, four probables and seven aircraft damaged. The winter snows began on 22 September and the conversion of Soviet Air Force (VVS, Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily) pilots and ground crews to the Hurricane Mk IID began in mid-October and in late November the RAF party returned to Britain, less various signals staff.[12] The Allied Operation Gauntlet (25 August – 3 September 1941), Fritham (30 April 1942 – 2 July 1943) had taken place in the Svalbard Archipelago on the main island of Spitsbergen, midway between northern Norway the North Pole, to eliminate German weather stations and to stop its coal exports to Norway.[13] In Operation Gearbox II (2–21 September 1942) two cruisers and a destroyer took 200 long tons (203t) of supplies and equipment to Spitsbergen.[14] On 3 September, Force P, the oilers RFABlue Ranger, RFAOligarch and four destroyer escorts sailed for Van Mijenfjorden (Lowe Sound) in Spitsbergen and from 9 to 13 September refuelled destroyers detached from PQ 18.[15]
Authority in the Kriegsmarine was derived from the Seekriegsleitung (Supreme Naval Command) in Berlin and Arctic operations were commanded by Admiral Boehm, the Admiral Commanding Norway, from the Marinegruppenkommando Nord (Naval Group North) HQ in Kiel. Three flag officers were detached to Oslo in command of minesweeping, coast defence, patrols and minelaying off the west, north and polar coasts. The large surface ships and U-boats were under the command of the Flag Officer Northern Waters at Narvik, who did not answer to Boehm but had authority over the Flag Officer Battlegroup, who commanded the ships when at sea. The Flag Officer Northern Waters also had tactical control of aircraft from Luftflotte 5 (GeneraloberstHans-Jürgen Stumpff) when they operated in support of the Kriegsmarine. The Norwegian-based aircraft had tactical headquarters at Kirkenes, Trondheim and Bardufoss. The Luftwaffe HQs were separate from the Kriegsmarine commanders except at Kirkenes, with the Flag Officer Polar Coast.[16]
On 24 June, a British minesweeper based at Kola was sunk by Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers and on 16 August, Admiral Scheer conducted Operation Wunderland (Unternehmen Wunderland), a sortie against Russian ships thought to be sailing along the route north of Siberia.[17][18]Admiral Scheer sailed north of Novaya Zemlya and then to the east and sank a Soviet icebreaker; by 30 August Admiral Scheer was back in Narvik. B-Dienst signals interception and documents recovered from the crashed Hampden UB-C, revealed the crossover and escort changeover points of convoys PQ 18 and QP 14 and other details including Operation Orator.[17][18] U-boats, destroyers and the minelayer Ulm sailed on Operation Zar (Unternehmen Zar) to sow mines at the entrance of the White Sea and off Novaya Zemlya.[19] On 25 August, Ultra revealed the itinerary of Ulm and three of the destroyers with USSTuscaloosa south of Bear Island, were sent to intercept the ship; Ulm was sunk that night and sixty survivors were taken prisoner. The Germans had to press Admiral Hipper into service as a minelayer.[20]Tirpitz, the cruiser Lützow and three destroyers had been in dock for repairs since Unternehmen Rosselsprung against Convoy PQ 17 (2–5 July) and were not available. Twelve U-boats formed a patrol group in the Norwegian Sea against PQ 18 and the Kriegsmarine planned Unternehmen Doppelschlag (Operation Double Hit) in which the cruisers Admiral Scheer, Admiral Hipper and Köln with four destroyer escorts, would sail against the convoy.[21]
The Luftwaffe used the lull after PQ 17 to assemble a force of 35 Junkers Ju 88 A-4 dive-bombers of Kampfgeschwader 30 (KG 30) and 42 torpedo-bombers of Kampfgeschwader 26 (KG 26) (I/KG 26 with 28 Heinkel He 111 H-6s and III/KG 26 with 14 Ju 88 A-4s) to join the reconnaissance aircraft of Luftflotte 5.[22][23] After analysing the results of anti-shipping operations against PQ 17, in which the crews of Luftflotte 5 made exaggerated claims of ships sunk, including a cruiser, the anti-shipping units devised the Goldene Zange (Golden Comb). Ju 88 bombers were to divert the defenders with medium and dive bombing attacks as the torpedo-bombers approached out of the twilight. The torpedo bombers were to fly towards the convoy in line abreast, at wave-top height to evade radar, as the convoy was silhouetted against the lighter sky, then drop their torpedoes in a salvo.[24] When B-Dienst discovered that an aircraft carrier would accompany the next convoy, ReichsmarschallHermann Göring gave orders that it must be sunk first; Luftwaffe aircrew were told that the destruction of the convoy was the best way to help the German army at Stalingrad and in southern Russia.[25]
On 13 August, Hopps, RAF and RAAF ground staff and a medical unit sailed for Russia on the cruiser Tuscaloosa, along with three destroyers (two US and one British).[30][lower-alpha 4] Hopps was to establish an HQ at Polyarny on the Kola Inlet, 37mi (60km) north-north-east of Murmansk.[31] The three PRU Spitfires for the Search & Strike Force departed from Sumburgh, Shetland on 1 September on a journey of more than 1,210mi (1,950km) over the North Sea, occupied Norway, Sweden (in breach of Swedish neutrality) the Gulf of Bothnia and Finland (at the time an Axis power) to Afrikanda in north Russia and arrived safely after a 4+1⁄2-hour flight.[1] The 210 Squadron Catalinas had to remain on operations until the last minute and their equipment and ground crews also had to travel by air but the distance was easily within Catalina range.[17]
On 2 September 1942, as PQ 18 departed from Loch Ewe, the 32 Hampdens of the Search & Strike Force flew from their base at RAF Leuchars to Sumburgh. The safe range for a Hampden not carrying a torpedo or overload tanks was thought to be a maximum of 1,040nmi (1,200mi; 1,930km). There was no time to fit long-range fuel tanks and each Hampden was to carry a member of the ground staff, the rest travelling to Murmansk on Tuscaloosa, with the Mk XII torpedoes, munitions and other stores. If the Hampdens flew at 125kn (144mph; 232km/h) and did not need rich mixture for manoeuvring, the range to dry tanks might be stretched to 1,360nmi (1,570mi; 2,520km), when the safe route from Sumburgh to Vayenga was 1,314nmi (1,512mi; 2,434km).[32] On 3 September an attempt to send the squadrons to Russia despite an unfavourable weather report, in fear of even worse weather to come, was refused by McLaughlin and Lindeman and the squadrons waited for better weather.[33]
Late on 4 September, the Hampdens of the Leuchars Wing took off for Russia. Their route would keep the Hampdens a minimum of 60nmi (69mi; 110km) from German-occupied territory but was clearly too risky. A flight along the Norwegian coast would cover 1,200nmi (1,400mi; 2,200km), parts easily in range of the Luftwaffe. A direct route over the mountains of Norway would be only 1,100nmi (1,300mi; 2,000km) long but the fuel consumed in climbing high enough would leave little left to overcome head winds, engine trouble, navigation errors or a landing delay.[32] The Hampden crews were to follow a route similar to that of the Spitfires, flying north to Burrafirth in Shetland and the fly on a course to reach Norway at 66°N, cross the mountains in the dark, overfly northern Sweden and Finland, before landing at the Soviet air base at Afrikanda, at the southern end of Murmansk Oblast. The flight to Afrikanda was expected to take five to eight hours, depending on the weather and German opposition. After refuelling, the Hampden crews were to fly the remaining 120mi (190km) to Vayenga, following the Kandalaksha–Murmansk railway northwards.[34]
Part of the wrecked tail section of Hampden AE436 ("PL-J"), 144 Squadron RAF. In the background is a scale model of the same aircraft; AE436, crashed in Sweden on 4 September 1942, en route to Russia.
Two Hampdens crashed in northern Sweden, near Arjeplog; both crashes were thought to have been caused by atmospheric icing. Four RAAF, three RCAF and one RAFVR crew were killed and buried at Kviberg Cemetery, Gothenburg.[27] There were no survivors from Hampden P5304 ("UB-H") of 455 Squadron, piloted by Sgt Edward Smart, when it crashed on 4/5 September by lake Arvestuottar, after passing over the larger lake Arvesjaure (sv) to the north-west.[lower-alpha 5] Hampden AE436 ("PL-J", 144 Squadron) piloted by Pilot Officer (P/O) David Evans, crashed in the Sarek National Park on Tsatsa, a massif located between the valleys of Njåtjosvagge (sv) and Tjuoltavagge (sv), about 15nmi (17mi; 28km) north of the intended route. Evans and his supernumerary, Corporal Bernard Sowerby, survived the crash and made a three-day trek to the nearest village. Under international law, combatant aircraft entering a neutral country during wartime have normally been subject to impounding and their crews to internment and these laws were being enforced. To avoid internment, Evans and Sowerby told the Swedish authorities that they had crashed in Norway and walked across the border; they were repatriated to Britain on 21 September.[36][37][lower-alpha 6]
Four Hampdens were either shot down or forced to land in German-held territory. AT109 ("UB-C") of 455 Squadron, piloted by Sqn Ldr James Catanach, landed on a beach in northern Norway after being damaged by flak from a German submarine chaser and the crew were taken prisoner. Hampden AT138 "PL-C" of 144 Squadron, was attacked over Finland by a fighter of Jagdgeschwader 5 (JG 5); three crew and one passenger were killed. Sergeant J.C.R. (John) Bray (RAAF), the pilot, bailed out and became a prisoner of war. AT138 crashed near Alakurtti.[39][36][lower-alpha 7]P1344 "PL-K", piloted by P/O E.H.E.Perry, suffered from icing and was forced to take an alternate, lower altitude route. The Hampden flew over the Luftwaffe base at Petsamo, where P1344 was damaged by FlaK; it was then attacked by two Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters of JG 5. During a crash-landing in an Axis-held part of the Kola Peninsula, three crewmembers were killed and Perry was seriously injured; he and his passenger were taken prisoner.[40][39][36][41]P1273 "PL-Q", piloted by Sgt H. L. (Hank) Bertrand, was attacked by fighters from JG 5 near Petsamo; the crew and passenger bailed out and were captured.[36][lower-alpha 8] Plans for PQ18 and QP14 were recovered by the Germans from "UB-C" and with a decoded signal from the Soviet 95th Naval Flight Regiment, provided the Germans with the itinerary for both convoys.[34][43]
Poor visibility in the Afrikanda area made landings difficult and two Hampden pilots, Sqn Ldr Dennis Foster (144 Sqn) and Sqn Ldr Jack Davenport (455 Sqn), landed on a mud airstrip at Monchegorsk, about 30mi (48km) to the north. Davenport did so after his Hampden was intercepted by VVS fighter pilots, who directed him to land.[44][45] Two Hampdens ran out of fuel over Russia and were damaged in forced landings at or near Afrikanda. One pilot made a wheels-up landing in soft ground at Khibiniy, several miles north of Afrikanda and the other Hampden was written off after hitting tree stumps. A further Hampden was lost on the Afrikanda–Murmansk leg. AE356, piloted by Sgt Walter Hood (144 Sqn), was caught up in a German air raid over the Kola Inlet and was attacked in error by VVS fighter pilots. Forced to ditch in a lake, the crew were strafed in the water and the ventral gunner, Sgt Walter Tabor (RCAF) died, either from bullet wounds or drowning when the aircraft sank. The survivors got ashore and received small-arms fire from Soviet troops until they were recognised as Allies (from their shouts of "Angliski"); 23 Hampdens arrived at Soviet airfields intact or with only minor damage.[17][29]
Photograph of a Heinkel 111 just after a torpedo drop
The German surface force at Narvik had been alerted when PQ 18 was first sighted and on 10 September sailed north to Altafjord past the British submarines HMSTribune and HMSTigris.[17]Tigris made an abortive torpedo attack on Admiral Scheer and erroneously reported it as Tirpitz.[46] Soon after midnight on 10/11 September, the Admiralty supplied Enigma messages to the British escort commander that Admiral Hipper was due at Altafjord at 3:00 a.m. and in the afternoon reported that Tirpitz was still at Narvik. On 13 September, Enigma showed that the ships at Altafjord had come to one hours' notice at 4:50 p.m. which was relayed to the convoy escort commander at 11:25 p.m. Enigma showed that Tirpitz was still in Narvik on 14 September and on 16 September, a Swedish source, A2, reported that only Admiral Hipper, Admiral Scheer and Koln would operate against PQ 18. Doppeslschlag had already been called off on 13 September; Hitler, reluctant to risk the loss of any of his capital ships on an offensive operation, had refused to authorise a sortie.[47]
Scheer and its escorts remained far to the north of PQ 18 as the convoy rounded the North Cape. Operation EV, the escort operation for the forty Allied freighters in the convoy comprised an exceptionally large number of navy ships, including Avenger, the first escort carrier to accompany an Arctic convoy. Detailed information on German intentions was provided by Allied code breakers, through Ultra signals decrypts and eavesdropping on Luftwaffe wireless communications. From 12 to 21 September, PQ 18 was attacked by bombers, torpedo-bombers, U-boats and mines, which sank thirteen ships at a cost of forty-four aircraft and four U-boats. The escort ships and the aircraft of Avenger were able to use signals intelligence from the Admiralty to provide early warning of some air attacks and to attempt evasive routeing of the convoy around concentrations of U-boats. The convoy handed over its distant escorts and Avenger to the homeward bound Convoy QP 14 near Archangelsk on 16 September and continued with the close escort and local escorts, riding out a storm in the northern Dvina estuary and the last attacks by the Luftwaffe, before reaching Archangelsk on 21 September.[48]
Air operations from Russia
The Catalinas of 210 Squadron were to provide a close escort for PQ 18 at the beginning and end of its journey. The aircraft based at Shetland and Iceland carried depth charges instead of overload tanks and on 23 September, an aircraft from Shetland sank U-253, 115nmi (132mi; 213km) off Cape Langanaes, Iceland. The Catalina detachment based in Russia carried overload tanks instead of depth charges and could only menace the U-boats and report their positions to Allied naval ships. The main task of the Catalinas was to maintain ten crossover patrols, AA to KK, 100nmi (120mi; 190km) from the Norwegian coast, from west of Narvik to east of the North Cape. It would be impossible for a sortie by the German ships in north Norway to pass through without being detected by Air to Surface Vessel (ASV) radar. As PQ 18 sailed around Norway, the patrol areas moved north-eastwards; AA to CC were flown by the Catalinas from Shetland, as were DD to EE but the aircraft flew on to Russia. EE was the furthest from both bases and five aircraft were necessary to keep continuously one aircraft in the patrol area; areas FF to KK were flown by the detachment in Russia. The flights from Shetland could take 16 hours before the first landfall and low stratus cloud often prevented celestial navigation, the crew having to rely on dead reckoning instead.[49]
The Catalinas detached to Russia, were based at Lake Lakhta near Archangelsk on the White Sea; using Grasnaya on the Kola Inlet as an advanced base. The communications between them were impossible; Hopps used Grasnaya instead, which was 400nmi (460mi; 740km) nearer to the patrol areas and equally closer to occupied Norway. Lake Lakhta became a rest area and the base for close escort of PQ 18, once it was on the final leg of the journey. The Catalinas bound for Russia left Shetland in sequence, completed the circuits of their patrol area and proceeded to Russia. From above, the Arctic tundra looked uninviting but having landed, the crews found the Soviet Naval Aviation (Morskaya Aviatsiya) base at Lake Lakhta an idyllic setting, lying amidst woods and cliffs. Russian ground crews were found to be very efficient, impressing the British with their ability to improvise. The damaged Hampden from Khibiniy was put back into service and a Catalina damaged by a Luftwaffe aircraft was hauled ashore within eight minutes of landing and swiftly repaired; once begun, work went on until aircraft were serviceable. The flight from Lake Lakhta to Grasnaya took about five hours and once over PQ 18, the Catalina would circle it, keeping a careful watch on aircraft nearby in case of mistaken identity. [50]
By 5 September, the serviceable Hampdens were at Vayenga, further back from the front line than Polyarny. The airfield was bombed several times by the Luftwaffe and a Spitfire to be written off on 9 September but there were no casualties.[51] An Area Combined HQ was set up at Polyarny, where a Senior British Naval Officer, Rear-Admiral Douglas Fisher was already installed.[52] The PR Spitfires at Vayenga had their RAF roundels painted out and replaced by red stars: oblique F24 cameras were used on twelve sorties to Narvik and Altafjord, flying through foul weather to keep watch over the German ships.[1] To replace the written off Spitfire, 1 PRU despatched another Spitfire, which arrived from Britain on 16 September, along with a de Havilland Mosquito PR Mk I (W4061).[51]
On the night of 13/14 September, communications between PQ 18 and Lake Lakhta failed, a Catalina at Grasnaya was unable to take off until dawn and the PR sortie found Altafjord covered by cloud. If the Catalina sent a sighting report, it would come too late for the Hampdens to attack and as a precaution, Hopps ordered the 23 operational Hampdens up 5:00 a.m. on 14 September, for a reconnaissance in force.[53] Each aircraft carried an 18 inch Mark XII torpedo and the force flew to the maximum distance that Tirpitz could have reached then turned to follow the track back to Altafjord, as far as the Catalina patrol zone. After a flight of 7+1⁄2 hours, the Hampdens returned at 3:00 p.m., later to discover that Tirpitz had merely moved to a nearby fiord.[54] The other German ships were photographed at Altafiord by the PR Spitfires on 14, 15 and 16 September.[47]
By late September, the S&SF was experiencing increased attention from the Luftwaffe. The Hampdens remained dispersed around Vayenga airfield, receiving some damage during air raids.[55] One of the PR pilots, F/O Gavin Walker, was killed on a sortie to Altafiord, when Spitfire BP889 was shot down near Lakselv, Norway between 11:30 a.m. and midday on 27 September. Luftwaffe records attributed the loss to Gefreiter Kurt Dobner a fighter pilot of 11./JG5 based at Banak airfield in a Focke-Wulf Fw 190.[56] Some sources suggest that Walker was hit by ground fire near Alta airfield, on the outward leg to the fiord.[1][57] Vayenga airfield was bombed the same day by two Ju 88s in a low-level raid. The pilot of a VVS Yak fighter, who had dived on the Ju 88s from approximately 9,000ft (2,700m), was forced to bail out when the tail of his aircraft was shot off by Soviet anti-aircraft fire. The Yak crashed through the roof of a three-storey barracks assigned to S&SF commissioned officers and the building caught fire; the S&SF suffered no casualties and its members helped to put out the fire.[58]
Aftermath
Analysis
Operation Orator was called a success by J. H. W. Lawson in his history of 455 Squadron (1951) and in 1975, Peter Smith wrote that intelligence from B-Dienst and documents recovered from the Hampden crash about Operation Orator may have deterred a surface attack on PQ 18 by Scheer and its escorts.[59][60][17] In the 2005 edition of Arctic Airmen... Ernest Schofield and Roy Nesbit wrote that "it is reasonable to assume that the aircraft based in north Russia had worried the German commander".[61][lower-alpha 9] Chris Mann in a 2012 study of British wartime strategy towards Norway, called it an expensive victory and in 2017, Jan Forsgren in a book on RAF attacks on Tirpitz called the operation a success, because no Axis surface vessels approached PQ 18.[62][51] PQ 18 was also judged a success by the Allies, having revived the Arctic convoy route to the USSR and because Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer, Admiral Hipper and Köln had been deterred by Operation Orator from attacking the convoy.[62]
In 2011, Michael Walling called the loss of nine Hampdens on the transit flight, the equivalent of the loss anticipated on an attack against a big warship, a disaster.[63] The surviving Hampdens were to be flown back to Scotland but the crews had doubts about the prevailing west–east headwinds, which could push the aircraft beyond their maximum range.[64] Wing Commander Grant Lindeman, the CO of 455 Squadron, called the flight "suicidal".[51] On 1 October, Soviet authorities made a formal request for the Hampdens.[51] The RAF agreed to donate the Hampdens and PR Spitfires to the VVS; S&SF personnel were to return to Britain by sea after helping to convert the Soviet air- and ground-crews to both types.[65][66][51] RAAF and RAF personnel returned to Britain on 28 October in HMSArgonaut.[64] All but one of the Catalinas was flown back to Britain, once QP 14 had passed through the danger zone.[67]
Aircraft losses
Handley-Page Hampden TB1 (4–5 September 1942)
144 Squadron RAF (squadron code prefix "PL")
AE310 squadron code unknown, pilot unknown: fuel shortage over Afrikanda led to a forced landing, the crew was unhurt but the aircraft was damaged.[36][68] (AE310 or P5323 was repaired and returned to service.)[36]
AE436 "PL-J", Pilot Officer (P/O) D. I. Evans: icing affected the Hampden, an engine overheated and it crashed on the Tsatsa massif near Kvikkjokk in Sweden, 15mi (24km) north of track. Evans and his supernumerary survived and walked for three days to Kvikkvok 20mi (32km) away.[69] At risk of internment for violating Swedish neutrality, they claimed to have crashed in Norway and were later repatriated to the UK.[41][36]
AE356 "PL-?", Sergeant Walter Hood: shot down accidentally by fighters of the VVS into a lake near Murmansk, ventral gunner died of wounds and/or drowning.[70]
AT138 "PL-C", Sergeant John Bray: attacked by a fighter belonging to Jagdgeschwader 5 (JG 5) over Finland; three crew and one passenger were killed; Bray bailed out and became a prisoner of war. AT138 crashed near Alakurtti.[39][36]
P1273 "PL-Q", Sergeant Harry Bertrand: attacked by fighters from JG 5 over Finland; the crew and their passenger bailed out and became Prisoners of war. PL-Q crashed in a swamp near Petsamo (later known as Pechenga).[36]
P1344 "PL-K", P/O E. H. E. Perry: damaged by flak, as it passed directly over Petsamo airfield and subsequently attacked by two Messerschmitt Bf 109s of JG 5. During a crash-landing in an Axis-held part of the Kola Peninsula, three crewmembers were killed and Perry was seriously injured. He and his passenger were taken prisoner.[36][40]
P5304 "UB-H", Sergeant E. J. "Sandy" Smart: shot down over Sweden near Arvestuottar lake, north of Arjeplog, by a German fighter from Bodø; no survivors.[71]
P5323 "UB-L", P/O Rupert "Jeep" Patrick: ran out of fuel, made a wheels-up landing in an area of cut-down silver birch at Kandalaksha, Russia without casualties; the aircraft was damaged.[72][73] (Either P5323 or AE310 was repaired and returned to service.)[36]
Supermarine Spitfire PR Mk IV(D) (9–27 September 1942)
1 PRU RAF (squadron code prefix "LY")
Build number and squadron code unknown, damaged on the ground during a German air raid at Vayenga (9 September 1942) and written off.[51]
BP889, squadron code unknown, Flying Officer (F/O) Gavin Walker: shot down on a sortie to Altafiord and crashed on the shores of Lakselv, Norway, late on the morning of 27 September, killing Walker. Some sources suggest that BP889 was hit by ground fire near Alta airfield on the outward leg.[57]Luftwaffe records suggest that Walker was shot down by Gefreiter Kurt Dobner (11./JG5, Banak airfield), flying a Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighter.[56]
Notes
↑ The cruiser USSTuscaloosa carried most of the RAAF–RAF ground staff and a medical unit to Russia.[1]
↑ By the end of 1941, 187 Matilda II and 249 Valentine tanks had been delivered, comprising 25 per cent of the medium-heavy tanks in the Red Army and 30–40 per cent of the medium-heavy tanks defending Moscow. In December 1941, 16 per cent of the fighters defending Moscow were Hawker Hurricanes and Curtiss Tomahawks from Britain and by 1 January 1942, 96 Hurricane fighters were flying in the Soviet Air Forces (Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily, VVS). The British supplied radar apparatus, machine tools, Asdic and bulk commodities.[4]
↑ The Swedish aviation historian Bengt Hermansson cited an official report stating that the aircraft clock of P5304 had stopped at 1:04 a.m. (time zone not known); the Hampden had hit the ground at a steep angle and exploded, creating a large crater. The report and wreckage indicated engine failure, probably due to carburettor icing. If ice had accumulated on the control surfaces, the failure of one engine may have led to the Hampden entering a sudden, stall dive. Swedish witnesses claimed that a Luftwaffe fighter had pursued P5304 over the Norwegian border and may have shot it down. Harald Jörgensen, a Swedish Home Guard officer stationed in Arjeplog, wrote later that the flight of Allied aircraft across the area, en route from Britain to Murmansk was well-known and that these flights passed near a Luftwaffe base at Bodø in Norway. Juho Grufvisare, a Sami reindeer herder, told Jörgensen that a twin-engined aircraft had been shot down in early September 1942 near Arvedstuottar, after crossing the Swedish border near Strimasund. Grufvisare claimed to have seen the shooting down from the Karats area, had been so frightened that he abandoned his herd, returned to his home in Jokkmokk and reported the incident to police.[35]
↑ The wreckage of the Hampden and the remains of those killed in the crash were found 5,000ft (1,500m) up Tsatsa in 1976.[38]
↑ Sergeant Henry Lewis (Hank) Bertrand 10772247 was a Canadian serving in the RAF.[42]
↑ The authors also wrote that the operations at Spitsbergen had an indirect influence on the success of PQ 18, because Fritham and Gearbox made it safe for tankers to anchor and refuel destroyer escorts from the convoy, free from interference by German ground forces.[61]
↑ Catanach was shot by the Germans for his part in the Great Escape.[43]
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PQ 17 was the code name for an Allied Arctic convoy during the Second World War. On 27 June 1942, the ships sailed from Hvalfjörður, Iceland, for the port of Arkhangelsk in the Soviet Union. The convoy was located by German forces on 1 July, after which it was shadowed continuously and attacked. The First Sea Lord Admiral Dudley Pound, acting on information that German surface units, including the German battleship Tirpitz, were moving to intercept, ordered the covering force built around the Allied battleships HMS Duke of York and the USS Washington away from the convoy and told the convoy to scatter. Because of vacillation by Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the Tirpitz raid never materialised. The convoy was the first large joint Anglo-American naval operation under British command; in Churchill's view this encouraged a more careful approach to fleet movements.
The Arctic convoys of World War II were oceangoing convoys which sailed from the United Kingdom, Iceland, and North America to northern ports in the Soviet Union – primarily Arkhangelsk (Archangel) and Murmansk in Russia. There were 78 convoys between August 1941 and May 1945, sailing via several seas of the Atlantic and Arctic oceans, with periods with no sailings during several months in 1942, and in the summers of 1943 and 1944.
Operation Zitronella, also known as Unternehmen Sizilien, was an eight-hour German raid on Spitzbergen, in the Svalbard Archipelago, on 8 September 1943. The battleships Tirpitz and Scharnhorst, plus nine destroyers, sailed to the archipelago, bombarded Allied-occupied settlements in Isfjorden and covered a landing party. Six Norwegians were killed and 31 were taken prisoner; sixteen Germans were wounded, one dying of his wounds.
Operation Sportpalast, also known as Operation Nordmeer, was a German naval raid between 6 and 13 March 1942 against two of the Allied Arctic convoys of World War II as they passed through the Norwegian Sea. It was conducted by the battleship Tirpitz, three destroyers and eight submarines. The German ships were unable to locate either of the convoys but sank a merchant vessel that was sailing independently. The Allies attempted to intercept the German force, also without success.
Operation Tungsten was a Second World War Royal Navy air raid that targeted the German battleship Tirpitz. The operation sought to damage or destroy Tirpitz at her base in Kaafjord in the far north of Norway before she could become fully operational again following a period of repairs.
Convoy PQ 16 was an Arctic convoy of British, United States and Allied ships from Iceland to Murmansk and Archangelsk in the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The convoy was the largest yet and was provided with a considerable number of escorts and submarines. QP 12, a return convoy, sailed on the same day
Convoy PQ 18 was an Arctic convoy of forty Allied freighters from Scotland and Iceland to Arkhangelsk in the Soviet Union in the war against Nazi Germany. The convoy departed Loch Ewe, Scotland on 2 September 1942, rendezvoused with more ships and escorts at Iceland and arrived at Arkhangelsk on 21 September. An exceptionally large number of escorts was provided by the Royal Navy in Operation EV, including the first escort carrier to accompany an Arctic convoy. Detailed information on German intentions was provided by the code breakers at Bletchley Park and elsewhere, through Ultra signals decrypts and eavesdropping on Luftwaffe wireless communications.
No. 455 Squadron was a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) torpedo bomber squadron during World War II and became famous as part of the "ANZAC Strike Wing" that was formed from Australian and New Zealand squadrons. Raised in early 1941, mainly from Australian personnel, the squadron served over Europe during the war, operating from various bases in the United Kingdom; it also briefly sent a detachment to the Soviet Union in 1942. Operating Handley Page Hampdens and Bristol Beaufighters, the squadron mainly undertook anti-shipping and anti-submarine operations during the war. It was disbanded in May 1945 following the cessation of hostilities against Germany.
No 151 Wing Royal Air Force was a British unit which operated with the Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula in the northern USSR during the first months of Operation Barbarossa, in the Second World War. Operation Benedict, the 1941 expedition to Murmansk, provided air defence for Allied ships as they were discharging at ports within range of Luftwaffe units in Norway and Finland.
Operation Haudegen was the name of a German operation during the Second World War to establish meteorological stations on the Svalbard archipelago in Norway. In September 1944, the submarine U-307 and the supply ship Carl J. Busch transported the men of Unternehmen Haudegen to the island. The station was active from 9 September 1944. On May 8, 1945, the staff received a message from their commanders in Tromsø that Germany had surrendered and the war was over. After that, radio contact was lost. The soldiers were capable of asking for support only in August 1945 and on 6 September, were picked up by a Norwegian seal hunting vessel and surrendered to its captain. The group of men were the last German troops to surrender after the Second World War.
Operation Fritham was an Allied military operation during the Second World War to secure the coal mines on Spitsbergen, the main island of the Svalbard Archipelago, 650 mi (1,050 km) from the North Pole and about the same distance from Norway. The operation was intended to deny the islands to Nazi Germany.
Operation FB took place as part of the Arctic Convoys of the Second World War. The operation consisted of independent sailings by unescorted merchant ships between Iceland and Murmansk. In late 1942, the Allies had taken the offensive against Germany but the dispatch of supplies to the USSR by convoy via the Arctic route was suspended, due to the demands of the Mediterranean campaign. Convoy PQ 19 was cancelled because the Home Fleet diverted ships to the Mediterranean for Operation Torch which would have had to be postponed for three weeks had ships been provided for PQ 19.
Convoy PQ 14 was an Arctic convoy sent from Britain by the Western Allies to aid the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Convoys from Britain had been despatched since August 1941 and advantage had been taken of the perpetual darkness of the Arctic winter. German operations against the convoys had been muted due to the need to support Operation Barbarossa, confidence in imminent victory and the small size of the convoys. In late 1941 and early 1942 the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine had reinforced Norway with aircraft and ships.
Convoy PQ 8 was an Arctic convoy of the Western Allies to aid the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The convoy left Iceland on 8 January 1942. On 12 January the convoy had to turn south to avoid ice; the weather was calm, visibility was exceptional, with a short period of twilight around noon. and arrived in Murmansk nine days later.
Operation Doppelschlag was a German plan for a sortie in 1942 during the Second World War into the Arctic Ocean by the Kriegsmarine. The operation followed Operation Rösselsprung, against Convoy PQ 17 in July 1942 to attack convoy PQ 18 the next Arctic convoy of the Western Allies.
Tirpitz was the second of two Bismarck-class battleships built for Nazi Germany's Kriegsmarine (navy) prior to and during the Second World War. Named after Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the architect of the Kaiserliche Marine, the ship was laid down at the Kriegsmarinewerft in Wilhelmshaven in November 1936 and her hull was launched two and a half years later. Work was completed in February 1941, when she was commissioned into the German fleet. Like her sister ship, Bismarck, Tirpitz was armed with a main battery of eight 38-centimetre (15 in) guns in four twin turrets. After a series of wartime modifications she was 2000 tonnes heavier than Bismarck, making her the heaviest battleship ever built by a European navy.
Operation Mascot was an unsuccessful British carrier air raid conducted against the German battleship Tirpitz at her anchorage in Kaafjord, Norway, on 17 July 1944. The attack was one of a series of strikes against the battleship launched from aircraft carriers between April and August 1944, and was initiated after Allied intelligence determined that the damage inflicted during the Operation Tungsten raid on 3 April had been repaired.
Convoy QP 14 was an Arctic convoy of the QP series which ran during the Second World War. The convoy was a return journey of Allied ships from the port of Archangelsk in the Soviet Union to Loch Ewe in the west of Scotland. The British planned to send Convoy PQ 18 from Iceland to Murmansk and when the convoys crossed transfer much of the escort force from the outbound convoy to Convoy QP 14 and escort back it through the most dangerous waters off Norway.
Operation Gearbox was a joint Norwegian and British operation to occupy the Arctic island of Spitsbergen during the Second World War. It superseded Operation Fritham, an expedition in May, to secure the coal mines on Spitsbergen, the main island of the Svalbard Archipelago which had failed when attacked by four German Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor reconnaissance bombers. The Norwegian force, with 116 long tons (118 t) of supplies, arrived by British cruiser on 2 July.
Operation Gearbox II was a Norwegian and British operation during the Second World War on the Arctic island of Spitsbergen in the Svalbard Archipelago. Operation Fritham, the first attempt to establish a base had been defeated when the two ships carrying the force were sunk by Luftwaffe bombers on 14 May.
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