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Abbate v. United States | |
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Argued October 22, 1958 Decided March 30, 1959 | |
Full case name | Abbate v. United States |
Citations | 359 U.S. 187 ( more ) 79 S. Ct. 666; 3 L. Ed. 2d 729; 1959 U.S. LEXIS 1264 |
Case history | |
Prior | 247 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1957); cert. granted, 355 U.S. 902(1957). |
Holding | |
The double jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit the prosecution of a conspiracy in federal court under federal law when that same conspiracy has already resulted in a conviction in state court under state law. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Brennan, joined by Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, Whittaker, Stewart |
Concurrence | Brennan |
Dissent | Black, joined by Warren, Douglas |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. V |
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Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), is a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. The decision held that the double jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit the prosecution of a conspiracy in federal court under federal law when that same conspiracy has already resulted in a conviction in state court under state law. [1]
Abbate was part of a conspiracy to blow up multiple facilities owned by the Southern Bell Telephone Company. He was convicted in Illinois under a state law making it a crime to conspire to destroy the property of another and sentenced to three months of imprisonment. Thereafter, Abbate was indicted in federal district court for a violation of federal law stemming from the same conspiracy.
The question presented in this case had already been decided by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lanza . Abbate asked that the Court overrule its prior decision, which the Court declined to do. The Court reasoned that overruling Lanza would result in serious and undesirable consequences. Particularly, the state conviction here resulted in only three months' imprisonment, while the federal conviction made up to five years of imprisonment available. The Court deemed this potential disparity to be problematic. The only way to ensure that federal law enforcement interests would be vindicated under such a regime would be to displace state power to prosecute actions that also constitute federal crimes, which would be a massive shift in the balance of criminal power as between the states and the federal government.
Justice Brennan wrote separately to address an additional argument that the government had presented but that was unnecessary to the resolution of the case. The government contended that the Double Jeopardy Clause should not be construed to bar separate prosecutions for the same acts when those prosecutions are based on different evidence and vindicate different interests. Brennan rejected this argument, noting that it could lead to harassment of defendants by empowering the government to prosecute the same people over and over again using different statutes that protect different interests.
The dissenters argued for reversal, relying on two arguments. First, they observed that most civilized countries recognized that a conviction elsewhere barred a conviction in their own jurisdiction. Second, they argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to represent a national policy against allowing the federal government to prosecute someone who had already been prosecuted in another court for an offense stemming from his actions.
This case was decided the same day as Bartkus v. Illinois , a case with similar facts except the order of the convictions was reversed: the state conviction followed the federal conviction. The Supreme Court likewise did not find a double jeopardy violation.
This case is also a rare example of the majority opinion's author writing a separate opinion concurring in his own majority opinion.
Double jeopardy is a procedural defence that prevents an accused person from being tried again on the same charges following a valid acquittal or conviction.
In common law jurisdictions, an acquittal certifies that the accused is free from the charge of an offense, as far as the criminal law is concerned. The finality of an acquittal is dependent on the jurisdiction. In some countries, such as the United States, an acquittal operates to bar the retrial of the accused for the same offense, even if new evidence surfaces that further implicates the accused. The effect of an acquittal on criminal proceedings is the same whether it results from a jury verdict or results from the operation of some other rule that discharges the accused. In other countries, the prosecuting authority may appeal an acquittal similar to how a defendant may appeal a conviction.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held 6-3 that, while the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the states, the exclusionary rule was not a necessary ingredient of the Fourth Amendment's right against warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court held that as a matter of judicial implication the exclusionary rule was enforceable in federal courts but not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The Wolf Court decided not to incorporate the exclusionary rule as part of the Fourth Amendment in large part because the states which had rejected the Weeks Doctrine had not left the right to privacy without other means of protection. However, because most of the states' rules proved to be ineffective in deterrence, the Court overruled Wolf in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). This landmark case made the exclusionary rule enforceable against the states through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the same extent that it applied against the federal government.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), was a United States Supreme Court case concerning the incorporation of the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy.
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), is a Supreme Court of the United States decision concerning double jeopardy. Benton ruled that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the states. In doing so, Benton expressly overruled Palko v. Connecticut.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution addresses criminal procedure and other aspects of the Constitution. It was ratified in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights. The Fifth Amendment applies to every level of the government, including the federal, state, and local levels, as well as any corporation, private enterprise, group, or individual, or any foreign government in regard to a US citizen or resident of the US. The Supreme Court furthered the protections of this amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that, because of the doctrine of "dual sovereignty", the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution does not prohibit one state from prosecuting and punishing somebody for an act of which they had already been convicted of and sentenced for in another state.
United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that “a[n]…offense and a conspiracy to commit that offense are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.” The Supreme Court rejected the Tenth Circuit's reversal of Felix's conviction, finding that the Court of Appeals read the holding in Grady v. Corbin (1990) too broadly.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..." The four essential protections included are prohibitions against, for the same offense:
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that "when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." The Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a state from relitigating a question already decided in favor of a defendant at a previous trial. Here, the guarantee against double jeopardy enforceable through the Fifth Amendment provided that where the defendant was acquitted of robbing one victim, the government could not prosecute the criminal defendant in a second trial for a different victim in the same robbery.
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), was a United States Supreme Court decision holding that: "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted."
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants from successive prosecutions by states and municipalities for offenses based on the same criminal conduct.
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), is a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. The decision held that coordination of federal officials with state officials did not implicate the double jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It also held that a defendant may be acquitted of a federal crime and convicted of a state crime, even if those crimes share the same evidence, without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court case which held that both the United States and a Native American (Indian) tribe could prosecute an Indian for the same acts that constituted crimes in both jurisdictions. The Court held that the United States and the tribe were separate sovereigns; therefore, separate tribal and federal prosecutions did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The United States Constitution contains several provisions regarding the law of criminal procedure.
The Taney Court heard thirty criminal law cases, approximately one per year. Notable cases include Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), United States v. Rogers (1846), Ableman v. Booth (1858), Ex parte Vallandigham (1861), and United States v. Jackalow (1862).
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the federal prosecution of a Native American (Indian) who has already been prosecuted by the tribe.
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court concerning double jeopardy. The case overruled Grady v. Corbin (1990) and revived the traditional Blockburger standard. The case held that subsequent convictions for offenses that contained the same elements were violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), is a United States Supreme Court decision that clarified both the scope of the protection against double jeopardy provided by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the limits of an appellate court's discretion to fashion a remedy under section 2106 of Title 28 to the United States Code. It established the constitutional rule that where an appellate court reverses a criminal conviction on the ground that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Double Jeopardy Clause shields the defendant from a second prosecution for the same offense. Notwithstanding the power that appellate courts have under section 2106 to "remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances," a court that reverses a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence may not allow the lower court a choice on remand between acquitting the defendant and ordering a new trial. The "only 'just' remedy" in this situation, the Court held, is to order an acquittal.
Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646, 587 U.S. ___ (2019), was a United States Supreme Court case about the separate sovereignty exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which allows both federal and state prosecution of the same crime as the governments are "separate sovereigns". Terance Martez Gamble was prosecuted under both state and then federal laws for possessing a gun while being a felon. His argument that doing so was double jeopardy was found unpersuasive due to the exception. In June 2019, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision 7–2, with the majority opinion stating that there was not sufficient cause for overturning the dual sovereignty doctrine.