Allen v. United States (1896)

Last updated

Allen v. United States
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Submitted October 23, 1896
Decided December 7, 1896
Full case nameAllen v. United States
Citations164 U.S. 492 ( more )
17 S. Ct. 154; 41 L. Ed. 528
Case history
PriorError to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas
Holding
There is no error in a jury instruction encouraging dissenting jurors to reconsider
Court membership
Chief Justice
Melville Fuller
Associate Justices
Stephen J. Field  · John M. Harlan
Horace Gray  · David J. Brewer
Henry B. Brown  · George Shiras Jr.
Edward D. White  · Rufus W. Peckham
Case opinion
MajorityBrown, joined by unanimous

Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), was a United States Supreme Court case that, amongst other things, approved the use of a jury instruction intended to prevent a hung jury by encouraging jurors in the minority to reconsider. The Court affirmed Alexander Allen's murder conviction, having vacated his two prior convictions for the same crime. [1]

Contents

Such an instruction became known as an Allen charge and is given when, after deliberation, a jury reports that it is deadlocked and unable to decide on a verdict. Because it is used to dislodge jurors from entrenched positions, the Allen charge is sometimes referred to as the "dynamite charge" or the "hammer charge."

Allen is based upon the Supreme Court's supervisory power over the federal courts. Thus, it is not binding on state courts. Approximately half of US states prohibit Allen charges on state law grounds. [2]

Background

Allen's three trials had been presided over by Judge Isaac C. Parker of the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas.

Opinion

The relevant portion of Allen held:

The seventeenth and eighteenth assignments were taken to instructions given to the jury after the main charge was delivered, and when the jury had returned to the court, apparently for further instructions. These instructions were quite lengthy, and were, in substance, that in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected; that, although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question submitted with candor, and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments; that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority were for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority. These instructions were taken literally from a charge in a criminal case which was approved of by the supreme court of Massachusetts and by the supreme court of Connecticut. While, undoubtedly, the verdict of the jury should represent the opinion of each individual juror, it by no means follows that opinions may not be changed by conference in the jury room. The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves. It certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with deference to the arguments, and with a distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury taking a different view of the case from what he does himself. It cannot be that each juror should go to the jury room with a blind determination that the verdict shall represent his opinion of the case at that moment, or that he should close his ears to the arguments of men who are equally honest and intelligent as himself. There was no error in these instructions. [3]

Text of Allen charge

Text of the Allen charge as approved for use in the United States district courts of the Fifth Circuit:

Members of the Jury:

I'm going to ask that you continue your deliberations in an effort to reach agreement upon a verdict and dispose of this case; and I have a few additional comments I would like for you to consider as you do so.

This is an important case. The trial has been expensive in time, effort, money and emotional strain to both the defense and the prosecution. If you should fail to agree upon a verdict, the case will be left open and may have to be tried again. Obviously, another trial would only serve to increase the cost to both sides, and there is no reason to believe that the case can be tried again by either side any better or more exhaustively than it has been tried before you.

Any future jury must be selected in the same manner and from the same source as you were chosen, and there is no reason to believe that the case could ever be submitted to twelve men and women more conscientious, more impartial, or more competent to decide it, or that more or clearer evidence could be produced.

If a substantial majority of your number are in favor of a conviction, those of you who disagree should reconsider whether your doubt is a reasonable one since it appears to make no effective impression upon the minds of the others. On the other hand, if a majority or even a lesser number of you are in favor of an acquittal, the rest of you should ask yourselves again, and most thoughtfully, whether you should accept the weight and sufficiency of evidence which fails to convince your fellow jurors beyond a reasonable doubt.

Remember at all times that no juror is expected to give up an honest belief he or she may have as to the weight or effect of the evidence; but, after full deliberation and consideration of the evidence in the case, it is your duty to agree upon a verdict if you can do so.

You must also remember that if the evidence in the case fails to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt the Defendant should have your unanimous verdict of Not Guilty.

You may be as leisurely in your deliberations as the occasion may require and should take all the time which you may feel is necessary.

I will ask now that you retire once again and continue your deliberations with these additional comments in mind to be applied, of course, in conjunction with all of the other instructions I have previously given to you. [4]

In state courts

Allen charges have been rejected, in whole or in part, by at least twenty-three states. Twenty-two states have rejected the charge by judicial decision:

See also

Notes

  1. Allen v. United States, 150 U.S. 551 (1893); Allen v. United States, 157 U.S. 675 (1895).
  2. See, e.g., Early v. Packer , 537 U.S. 3 (2002) (noting California's rejection of Allen).
  3. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896) (citations omitted).
  4. 5th Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, 1.45.
  5. Fields v. State, 487P.2d831 (Alaska1971).
  6. State v. Thomas, 342P.2d197 (Ariz.1959).
  7. People v. Gainer,566P.2d997(Cal.1977).
  8. Taylor v. People, 490P.2d292 (Colo.1971).
  9. State v. Fajardo, 699P.2d20 (Haw.1985).
  10. State v. Brown,487P.2d946(Idaho1971).
  11. Kentucky has eliminated the Allen charge through its rules of criminal procedure. Ky. R. Crim. P. 9.57. SeeIseral v. Commonwealth, 2003 WL 22227193 (Ky. 2003); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 943 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. 1997).
  12. State v. Nicholson, 315So. 2d639 (La.1975).
  13. State v. White, 285A.2d832 (Me.1972).
  14. People v. Sullivan, 220N.W.2d441 (Mich.1974).
  15. State v. Martin,211N.W.2d765(Minn.1973).
  16. State v. Randall,353P.2d1054(Mont.1960).
  17. State v. Garza, 176 N.W.2d 664 (Neb. 1970); Potard v. State, 299 N.W. 362 (Neb. 1941).
  18. Azbill v. State, 495P.2d1064 (Nev.1972).
  19. State v. Blake, 305A.2d300 (N.H.1973).
  20. State v. Minns, 454P.2d355 (N.M.1969).
  21. State v. Champagne, 198N.W.2d218 (N.D.1972).
  22. State v. Howard,537N.E.2d188(Ohio1989).
  23. State v. Marsh, 490P.2d491 (Or.1971).
  24. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 275A.2d299 (Pa.1971).
  25. State v. Patriarca, 308A.2d300 (R.I.1973).
  26. Kersey v. State, 525S.W.2d139 (Tenn.1975).
  27. Kelley v. State, 187N.W.2d810 (Wis.1971).
  28. Elmer v. State,463P.2d14(Wyo.1969).

    Further reading

    Related Research Articles

    Jury instructions, also known as charges or directions, are a set of legal guidelines given by a judge to a jury in a court of law. They are an important procedural step in a trial by jury, and as such are a cornerstone of criminal process in many common law countries.

    Jury nullification, also known in the United Kingdom as jury equity or a perverse verdict, is when the jury in a criminal trial gives a verdict of not guilty even though they think a defendant has broken the law. The jury's reasons may include the belief that the law itself is unjust, that the prosecutor has misapplied the law in the defendant's case, that the punishment for breaking the law is too harsh, or general frustrations with the criminal justice system. Some juries have also refused to convict due to their own prejudices in favor of the defendant. Such verdicts are possible because a jury has an absolute right to return any verdict it chooses.

    In common law, a petit jury hears the evidence in a trial as presented by both the plaintiff (petitioner) and the defendant (respondent). After hearing the evidence and often jury instructions from the judge, the group retires for deliberation, to consider a verdict. The majority required for a verdict varies. In some cases it must be unanimous, while in other jurisdictions it may be a majority or supermajority. A jury that is unable to come to a verdict is referred to as a hung jury. The size of the jury varies; in criminal cases involving serious felonies there are usually 12 jurors, although Scotland uses 15. A number of countries that are not in the English common law tradition have quasi-juries on which lay judges or jurors and professional judges deliberate together regarding criminal cases. However, the common law trial jury is the most common type of jury system.

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">Acquittal</span> The legal result of a verdict of not guilty

    In common law jurisdictions, an acquittal means that the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charge presented. It certifies that the accused is free from the charge of an offense, as far as criminal law is concerned. The finality of an acquittal is dependent on the jurisdiction. In some countries, such as the United States, an acquittal prohibits the retrial of the accused for the same offense, even if new evidence surfaces that further implicates the accused. The effect of an acquittal on criminal proceedings is the same whether it results from a jury verdict or results from the operation of some other rule that discharges the accused. In other countries, like Australia and the UK, the prosecuting authority may appeal an acquittal similar to how a defendant may appeal a conviction — but usually only if new and compelling evidence comes to light or the accused has interfered with or intimidated a juror or witness.

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">Verdict</span> Formal finding of fact made by a jury on matters submitted to it by the judge

    In law, a verdict is the formal finding of fact made by a jury on matters or questions submitted to the jury by a judge. In a bench trial, the judge's decision near the end of the trial is simply referred to as a finding. In England and Wales, a coroner's findings used to be called verdicts but are, since 2009, called conclusions.

    A hung jury, also called a deadlocked jury, is a judicial jury that cannot agree upon a verdict after extended deliberation and is unable to reach the required unanimity or supermajority. A hung jury may result in the case being tried again.

    Beyond (a) reasonable doubt is a legal standard of proof required to validate a criminal conviction in most adversarial legal systems. It is a higher standard of proof than the standard of balance of probabilities commonly used in civil cases because the stakes are much higher in a criminal case: a person found guilty can be deprived of liberty or, in extreme cases, life, as well as suffering the collateral consequences and social stigma attached to a conviction. The prosecution is tasked with providing evidence that establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to get a conviction; albeit prosecution may fail to complete such task, the trier-of-fact's acceptance that guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt will in theory lead to conviction of the defendant. A failure for the trier-of-fact to accept that the standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been met thus entitles the accused to an acquittal. This standard of proof is widely accepted in many criminal justice systems, and its origin can be traced to Blackstone's ratio, "It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer."

    Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court reversed the conviction of John L. Cheek, a tax protester, for willful failure to file tax returns and tax evasion. The Court held that an actual good-faith belief that one is not violating the tax law, based on a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the tax law, negates willfulness, even if that belief is irrational or unreasonable. The Court also ruled that an actual belief that the tax law is invalid or unconstitutional is not a good faith belief based on a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the tax law, and is not a defense.

    Actual innocence is a special standard of review in legal cases to prove that a charged defendant did not commit the crimes that they were accused of, which is often applied by appellate courts to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

    Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that state juries may convict a defendant by a less-than-unanimous verdict in a felony criminal case. The four-justice plurality opinion of the court, written by Justice White, affirmed the judgment of the Oregon Court of Appeals and held that there was no constitutional right to a unanimous verdict. Although federal law requires federal juries to reach criminal verdicts unanimously, the Court held Oregon's practice did not violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and so allowed it to continue. In Johnson v. Louisiana, a case decided on the same day, the Court held that Louisiana's similar practice of allowing criminal convictions by a jury vote of 9–3 did not violate due process or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.

    <i>R v Wallace</i> English criminal case

    R v Wallace (1931) 23 Cr App R 32 is a leading English criminal case, the first time a conviction for murder was overturned on the ground that the verdict "cannot be supported, having regard to the evidence", as provided for by Section 4(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907. The headnote states: "The Court will quash a conviction founded on mere suspicion".

    United States criminal procedure derives from several sources of law: the baseline protections of the United States Constitution; federal and state statutes; federal and state rules of criminal procedure ; and state and federal case law. Criminal procedures are distinct from civil procedures in the US.

    In the United States, jury nullification occurs when a jury in a criminal case reaches a verdict contrary to the weight of evidence, sometimes because of a disagreement with the relevant law. It has its origins in colonial America under British law. The American jury draws its power of nullification from its right to render a general verdict in criminal trials, the inability of criminal courts to direct a verdict no matter how strong the evidence, the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, which prohibits the appeal of an acquittal, and the fact that jurors cannot be punished for the verdict they return.

    A juror's oath is used to swear in jurors at the beginning of jury selection or trial.

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">United States constitutional criminal procedure</span> United States constitutional criminal procedure

    The United States Constitution contains several provisions regarding the law of criminal procedure.

    Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court on two issues of constitutional criminal procedure. Glasser was the first Supreme Court decision to hold that the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment required the reversal of a criminal defendant's conviction if his lawyer's representation of him was limited by a conflict of interest.

    Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U.S. 599 (2012), was a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that clarified the limits of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial of counts that a jury had previously unanimously voted to acquit on, when a mistrial is declared after the jury deadlocked on a lesser included offense.

    Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), is a United States Supreme Court decision that clarified both the scope of the protection against double jeopardy provided by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the limits of an appellate court's discretion to fashion a remedy under section 2106 of Title 28 to the United States Code. It established the constitutional rule that where an appellate court reverses a criminal conviction on the ground that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Double Jeopardy Clause shields the defendant from a second prosecution for the same offense. Notwithstanding the power that appellate courts have under section 2106 to "remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances," a court that reverses a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence may not allow the lower court a choice on remand between acquitting the defendant and ordering a new trial. The "only 'just' remedy" in this situation, the Court held, is to order an acquittal.


    Johnson v. Louisiana,
    406 U. S. 356 (1972), was a court case in the U.S. Supreme Court involving the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Louisiana law that allowed less-than unanimous jury verdicts to convict persons charged with a felony, does not violate the Due Process clause. This case was argued on a similar basis as Apodaca v. Oregon.

    United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1003, was a United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit case affirming a district court's refusal to permit defense counsel to argue for jury nullification.