Barron v Potter

Last updated

Barron v Potter
Coat of Arms of the United Kingdom (1837-1952).svg
Court High Court, Chancery Division
Decided13 March 1914
Citation(s)[1914] 1 Ch 895
Case opinions
Warrington J
Keywords
Board of directors, deadlock, general meeting

Barron v Potter [1914] 1 Ch 895 is a UK company law case, concerning the balance of power between the board of directors and the general meeting. It stands for the principle that when the board is incapable of taking action, power to conduct the company's affairs will revert to the general meeting.

Contents

Facts

Canon Barron was not on speaking terms with Mr. William James Potter, the other director of the British Seagumite Co Ltd. Their office was 28 Fleet Street. The constitution said that the quorum for a meeting was two (art 26). Mr. Potter was the chairman, with a casting vote. But Canon Barron was refusing to come to meetings. So on 23 February 1914, Mr. Potter came to meet Canon Barron, as he got off the train on a Paddington Station platform, from his country home (Woodham Ferris, Essex). He told Canon Barron they were now holding a board meeting. He proposed appointing more directors. Canon Barron objected. Mr. Potter said he was using his casting vote, and declared the motion effective. The report recorded Mr. Potter's version of the exchange as follows:

Accordingly on February 23 he met the train at Paddington by which he expected Canon Barron to arrive, and seeing him alight from it walked by his side along the platform and said to him, “I want to see you, please.” Canon Barron replied, “I have nothing to say to you.” Mr. Potter then said, “I formally propose that we add the Reverend Charles Herbert, Mr. William George Walter Barnard, and Mr. John Tolehurst Musgrave as additional directors to the board of the British Seagumite Company Limited. Do you agree or object?” Canon Barron replied, “I object and I object to say anything to you at all.” Mr. Potter then said, “In my capacity as chairman I give my casting vote in their favour and declare them duly elected.” He continued to walk with Canon Barron a few steps and then said, “That is all I want to say; thank you. Good day.”

There followed a general meeting at which new directors were again said to be appointed, again with Canon Barron's objection. Canon Barron sought a declaration that the appointment of the directors were ineffective, arguing that the meeting on the train station was no meeting, and that the general meeting's resolution was invalid, since the board was the only organ that could appoint more directors.

Judgment

Warrington J held that in view of the deadlock, the power reverted to the general meeting. In this case, the appointments were valid. There had been no proper board meeting on the train platform, but the shareholder meeting was effective afterwards.

Thomas Warrington, 1st Baron Warrington of Clyffe. LordWarrington.jpg
Thomas Warrington, 1st Baron Warrington of Clyffe.

The question then arises, Was the resolution passed at the general meeting of the company a valid appointment? The argument against the validity of the appointment is that the articles of association of the company gave to the board of directors the power of appointing additional directors, that the company has accordingly surrendered the power, and that the directors alone can exercise it. It is true that the general point was so decided by Eve J in Blair Open Hearth Furnace Co v Reigart , [1] and I am not concerned to say that in ordinary cases where there is a board ready and willing to act it would be competent for the company to override the power conferred on the directors by the articles except by way of special resolution for the purpose of altering the articles. But the case which I have to deal with is a different one. For practical purposes there is no board of directors at all. The only directors are two persons, one of whom refuses to act with the other, and the question is, What is to be done under these circumstances? On this point I think that I can usefully refer to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Isle of Wight Ry Co v Tahourdin , [2] not for the sake of the decision, which depended on the fact that it was a case under the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 , but for the sake of the observations of Cotton and Fry LJJ upon the effect of a deadlock such as arose in the present case. Cotton LJ says:

“Then it is said that there is no power in the meeting of shareholders to elect new directors, for that under the 89th section the power would be in the remaining directors. The remaining directors would no doubt have that power if there was a quorum left. But suppose the meeting were to remove so many directors that a quorum was not left, what then follows? It has been argued that in that case, there being no board which could act, there would be no power of filling up the board so as to enable it to work. In my opinion that is utterly wrong. A power is given by the 89th section to the remaining directors ‘if they think proper so to do’ to elect persons to fill up the vacancies. I do not see how it is possible for a non-existent body to think proper to fill up vacancies. In such a case a general meeting duly summoned for the purpose must have power to elect a new board so as not to let the business of the company be at a deadlock.”

Fry LJ says this:

“Then with regard to the objection that a general meeting cannot elect directors to fill up vacancies, it appears to me that a general meeting would at any rate have that power in the event of all the directors being removed. In my judgment it is quite impossible to read the 89th section as the only section relating to the filling up of vacancies in the office of directors. That applies only where there are remaining directors, and those remaining directors think proper to exercise their power. That does not, in my judgment, deprive the general meeting of the power to elect directors, where there are no directors, or where the directors do not think fit to exercise their powers.”

Those observations express a principle which seems to me to be as applicable to the case of a limited company incorporated under the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908, as to a case falling under the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, and moreover to be a principle founded on plain common sense. If directors having certain powers are unable or unwilling to exercise them—are in fact a non-existent body for the purpose—there must be some power in the company to do itself that which under other circumstances would be otherwise done. The directors in the present case being unwilling to appoint additional directors under the power conferred on them by the articles, in my opinion, the company in general meeting has power to make the appointment. The company has passed a resolution for that purpose, and though a poll has been demanded no date or place has yet been fixed for taking it. The result therefore is that I must grant an injunction on the motion in Canon Barron's action and refuse the motion in Mr. Potter's action.

Another case [1915] 3 KB 593 followed, with Atkin J in the High Court, and Warrington LJ again in the Court of Appeal.

See also

Notes

  1. 108 LT 665
  2. 25 Ch D 320

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Board of directors</span> Type of governing body for an organisation

A board of directors is an executive committee that jointly supervises the activities of an organization, which can be either a for-profit or a nonprofit organization such as a business, nonprofit organization, or a government agency.

<i>Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd</i> UK landmark company law case

Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd[1896] UKHL 1, [1897] AC 22 is a landmark UK company law case. The effect of the House of Lords' unanimous ruling was to uphold firmly the doctrine of corporate personality, as set out in the Companies Act 1862, so that creditors of an insolvent company could not sue the company's shareholders for payment of outstanding debts.

Re D’Jan of London Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 561 is a leading English company law case, concerning a director's duty of care and skill, whose main precedent is now codified under s 174 of the Companies Act 2006. The case was decided under the older Companies Act 1985.

<i>Hutton v West Cork Rly Co</i> West Cork Railway

Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 Ch D 654 is a UK company law case, which concerns the limits of a director's discretion to spend company funds for the benefit of non-shareholders. It was decided in relation to employees in the context of a company's insolvency proceedings.

O'Neill v Phillips[1999] UKHL 24 is a UK company law case on an action for unfair prejudice under s.459 Companies Act 1985. It is the only case thus far in the House of Lords on the provision and it deals with the concept of members of a business having their "legitimate expectations" disappointed.

<i>Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd</i>

Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 is a United Kingdom company law case on the rights of minority shareholders. The case was decided in the House of Lords.

<i>Bushell v Faith</i>

Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 is a UK company law case, concerning the possibility of weighting votes, and the relationship to section 184 of Companies Act 1948 which mandates that directors may be removed from a board by ordinary resolution.

<i>Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw</i>

Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw [1940] AC 701 is an important English contract law and company law case. In the field of contracts it is well known for MacKinnon LJ's decision in the Court of Appeal, where he put forth the "officious bystander" formulation for determining what terms should be implied into agreements by the courts. In the field of company law, it is known primarily to stand for the principle that damages may be sought for breach of contract by a director even though a contract may de facto constrain the exercise of powers to sack people found in the company's constitution.

<i>Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd</i>

Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd[2009] UKPC 10 is a judicial decision of the Privy Council in relation to contract law, company law and constitutional law. It concerns the correct method for interpretation and implication of terms into a company's articles of association.

<i>Pender v Lushington</i> Law case

Pender v Lushington (1877) 6 Ch D 70 is a leading case in UK company law, which confirms that a company member's right to vote may not be interfered with, because it is a right of property. Furthermore, any interference leads to a personal right of a member to sue in his own name to enforce his right. As Lord Jessel MR put it, a member:

has a right to say, "Whether I vote in the majority or minority, you shall record my vote, as that is a right of property belonging to my interest in this company, and if you refuse to record my vote I will institute legal proceedings against you to compel you."

<i>Guinness plc v Saunders</i>

Guinness plc v Saunders [1989] UKHL 2 is a UK company law case, regarding the power of the company to pay directors. It required that whatever rules exist for payment in the company's articles, they must be strictly observed.

<i>Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v Maxwell (No 2)</i>

Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v Maxwell [1993] BCLC 814 is a UK company law case concerning a director's duty to act for proper purposes of the company. This case is an example of what would now be Companies Act 2006, section 171.

<i>Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame</i>

Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 is a UK company law case, which concerns the enforceability of provisions in a company's constitution.

<i>Isle of Wight Rly Co v Tahourdin</i>

Isle of Wight Railway Company v Tahourdin (1884) LR 25 Ch D 320 is a UK company law case on removing directors under the old Companies Clauses Act 1845. In the modern Companies Act 2006, section 168 allows shareholders to remove of directors by a majority vote on reasonable notice, regardless of what the company constitution says. Before 1945, removal of directors depended on the constitution, however this case contains some useful guidance on how to properly construe the provisions of a constitution.

<i>Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co v Hampson</i>

Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co, Blackpool v Hampson (1883) 23 Ch D 1 is a UK company law case, concerning the interpretation of a company's articles of association. On the specific facts it has been superseded by the Companies Act 2006 section 168, which allows a director to be removed through an ordinary majority resolution of the general meeting.

<i>Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corp</i>

Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corp [1986] Ch 246 is a UK company law case, concerning the enforceability of obligations against a company. The case was one of the last significant cases on ultra vires under English company law before the provisions abrogating that doctrine in the Companies Act 1985 became effective.

<i>Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co</i>

Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co [1925] Ch 407 is a UK company law case concerning directors' duties, and in particular the duty of care. It is no longer good law, as it stipulated that a "subjective" standard of competence applied. Now under Companies Act 2006 section 174, and given the development of the common law in Re D'Jan of London Ltd, directors owe an objective standard of care based on what should reasonably be expected from someone in their position.

<i>Re Yenidje Tobacco Co Ltd</i>

Re Yenidje Tobacco Co Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 426 is a UK company law and UK insolvency law case concerning just and equitable winding up.

<i>Oldham v Kyrris</i>

Oldham v Kyrris[2003] EWCA Civ 1506 is a UK insolvency law case concerning the administration procedure when a company is unable to repay its debts.

National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously ruled that the President of the United States cannot use his authority under the Recess Appointment Clause of the United States Constitution to appoint public officials unless the United States Senate is in recess and not able to transact Senate business. The Court held that the clause allows the president to make appointments during both intra-session and inter-session recesses but only if the recess is of sufficient length, and if the Senate is actually unavailable for deliberation, thereby limiting future recess appointments. The Court also ruled that any office vacancy can be filled during the recess, regardless of when it arose. The case arose out of President Barack Obama's appointments of Sharon Block, Richard Griffin, and Terence Flynn to the National Labor Relations Board and Richard Cordray as the director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.

References