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In cryptography, blinding is a technique by which an agent can provide a service to (i.e., compute a function for) a client in an encoded form without knowing either the real input or the real output. Blinding techniques also have applications to preventing side-channel attacks on encryption devices.
More precisely, Alice has an input x and Oscar has a function f. Alice would like Oscar to compute y = f(x) for her without revealing either x or y to him. The reason for her wanting this might be that she doesn't know the function f or that she does not have the resources to compute it. Alice "blinds" the message by encoding it into some other input E(x); the encoding E must be a bijection on the input space of f, ideally a random permutation. Oscar gives her f(E(x)), to which she applies a decoding D to obtain D(f(E(x))) = y.
Not all functions allow for blind computation. At other times, blinding must be applied with care. An example of the latter is Rabin–Williams signatures. If blinding is applied to the formatted message but the random value does not honor Jacobi requirements on p and q, then it could lead to private key recovery. A demonstration of the recovery can be seen in CVE - 2015-2141 [1] discovered by Evgeny Sidorov.
A common application of blinding is in blind signatures. In a blind signature protocol, the signer digitally signs a message without being able to learn its content.
The one-time pad (OTP) is an application of blinding to the secure communication problem, by its very nature. Alice would like to send a message to Bob secretly, however all of their communication can be read by Oscar. Therefore, Alice sends the message after blinding it with a secret key or OTP that she shares with Bob. Bob reverses the blinding after receiving the message. In this example, the function f is the identity and E and D are both typically the XOR operation.
Blinding can also be used to prevent certain side-channel attacks on asymmetric encryption schemes. Side-channel attacks allow an adversary to recover information about the input to a cryptographic operation, by measuring something other than the algorithm's result, e.g., power consumption, computation time, or radio-frequency emanations by a device. Typically these attacks depend on the attacker knowing the characteristics of the algorithm, as well as (some) inputs. In this setting, blinding serves to alter the algorithm's input into some unpredictable state. Depending on the characteristics of the blinding function, this can prevent some or all leakage of useful information. Note that security depends also on the resistance of the blinding functions themselves to side-channel attacks.
For example, in RSA blinding involves computing the blinding operation E(x) = (xr)e mod N, where r is a random integer between 1 and N and relatively prime to N (i.e. gcd(r, N) = 1), x is the plaintext, e is the public RSA exponent and N is the RSA modulus. As usual, the decryption function f(z) = zd mod N is applied thus giving f(E(x)) = (xr)ed mod N = xr mod N. Finally it is unblinded using the function D(z) = zr−1 mod N. Multiplying xr mod N by r−1 mod N yields x, as desired. When decrypting in this manner, an adversary who is able to measure time taken by this operation would not be able to make use of this information (by applying timing attacks RSA is known to be vulnerable to) as she does not know the constant r and hence has no knowledge of the real input fed to the RSA primitives.
Diffie–Hellman (DH) key exchange is a mathematical method of securely generating a symmetric cryptographic key over a public channel and was one of the first public-key protocols as conceived by Ralph Merkle and named after Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman. DH is one of the earliest practical examples of public key exchange implemented within the field of cryptography. Published in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman, this is the earliest publicly known work that proposed the idea of a private key and a corresponding public key.
Public-key cryptography, or asymmetric cryptography, is the field of cryptographic systems that use pairs of related keys. Each key pair consists of a public key and a corresponding private key. Key pairs are generated with cryptographic algorithms based on mathematical problems termed one-way functions. Security of public-key cryptography depends on keeping the private key secret; the public key can be openly distributed without compromising security. There are many kinds of public-key cryptosystems, with different security goals, including digital signature, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, public-key key encapsulation, and public-key encryption.
RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adleman) is a public-key cryptosystem, one of the oldest widely used for secure data transmission. The initialism "RSA" comes from the surnames of Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman, who publicly described the algorithm in 1977. An equivalent system was developed secretly in 1973 at Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the British signals intelligence agency, by the English mathematician Clifford Cocks. That system was declassified in 1997.
A digital signature is a mathematical scheme for verifying the authenticity of digital messages or documents. A valid digital signature on a message gives a recipient confidence that the message came from a sender known to the recipient.
Malleability is a property of some cryptographic algorithms. An encryption algorithm is "malleable" if it is possible to transform a ciphertext into another ciphertext which decrypts to a related plaintext. That is, given an encryption of a plaintext , it is possible to generate another ciphertext which decrypts to , for a known function , without necessarily knowing or learning .
In theoretical computer science and cryptography, a trapdoor function is a function that is easy to compute in one direction, yet difficult to compute in the opposite direction without special information, called the "trapdoor". Trapdoor functions are a special case of one-way functions and are widely used in public-key cryptography.
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In computer science, a one-way function is a function that is easy to compute on every input, but hard to invert given the image of a random input. Here, "easy" and "hard" are to be understood in the sense of computational complexity theory, specifically the theory of polynomial time problems. Not being one-to-one is not considered sufficient for a function to be called one-way.
In cryptography a blind signature, as introduced by David Chaum, is a form of digital signature in which the content of a message is disguised (blinded) before it is signed. The resulting blind signature can be publicly verified against the original, unblinded message in the manner of a regular digital signature. Blind signatures are typically employed in privacy-related protocols where the signer and message author are different parties. Examples include cryptographic election systems and digital cash schemes.
In cryptography, the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) offers a variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) which uses elliptic-curve cryptography.
The Rabin cryptosystem is a family of public-key encryption schemes based on a trapdoor function whose security, like that of RSA, is related to the difficulty of integer factorization.
The ElGamal signature scheme is a digital signature scheme which is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms. It was described by Taher Elgamal in 1985.
The Goldwasser–Micali (GM) cryptosystem is an asymmetric key encryption algorithm developed by Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali in 1982. GM has the distinction of being the first probabilistic public-key encryption scheme which is provably secure under standard cryptographic assumptions. However, it is not an efficient cryptosystem, as ciphertexts may be several hundred times larger than the initial plaintext. To prove the security properties of the cryptosystem, Goldwasser and Micali proposed the widely used definition of semantic security.
In cryptography, the Rabin signature algorithm is a method of digital signature originally proposed by Michael O. Rabin in 1978.
In cryptography, a key encapsulation mechanism, or KEM, is a public-key cryptosystem that allows a sender to generate a short secret key and transmit it to a receiver securely, in spite of eavesdropping and intercepting adversaries. Modern standards for public-key encryption of arbitrary messages are usually based on KEMs.
In cryptography, PKCS #1 is the first of a family of standards called Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS), published by RSA Laboratories. It provides the basic definitions of and recommendations for implementing the RSA algorithm for public-key cryptography. It defines the mathematical properties of public and private keys, primitive operations for encryption and signatures, secure cryptographic schemes, and related ASN.1 syntax representations.
Cryptography, or cryptology, is the practice and study of techniques for secure communication in the presence of adversarial behavior. More generally, cryptography is about constructing and analyzing protocols that prevent third parties or the public from reading private messages. Modern cryptography exists at the intersection of the disciplines of mathematics, computer science, information security, electrical engineering, digital signal processing, physics, and others. Core concepts related to information security are also central to cryptography. Practical applications of cryptography include electronic commerce, chip-based payment cards, digital currencies, computer passwords, and military communications.
In cryptography, subliminal channels are covert channels that can be used to communicate secretly in normal looking communication over an insecure channel. Subliminal channels in digital signature crypto systems were found in 1984 by Gustavus Simmons.
The Schmidt-Samoa cryptosystem is an asymmetric cryptographic technique, whose security, like Rabin depends on the difficulty of integer factorization. Unlike Rabin this algorithm does not produce an ambiguity in the decryption at a cost of encryption speed.
Coppersmith's attack describes a class of cryptographic attacks on the public-key cryptosystem RSA based on the Coppersmith method. Particular applications of the Coppersmith method for attacking RSA include cases when the public exponent e is small or when partial knowledge of a prime factor of the secret key is available.