A structured settlement is a negotiated financial or insurance arrangement through which a claimant agrees to resolve a personal injury tort claim by receiving part or all of a settlement in the form of periodic payments on an agreed schedule, rather than as a lump sum. As part of the negotiations, a structured settlement may be offered by the defendant or requested by the plaintiff. Ultimately both parties must agree on the terms of settlement. A settlement may allow the parties to a lawsuit to reduce legal and other costs by avoiding trial. Structured settlements are most widely used in the United States, but are also utilized in Canada, England and Australia.
The Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act is a United States federal law, first passed in 1957 and since renewed several times, which governs liability-related issues for all non-military nuclear facilities constructed in the United States before 2026. The main purpose of the Act is to partially compensate the nuclear industry against liability claims arising from nuclear incidents while still ensuring compensation coverage for the general public. The Act establishes a no fault insurance-type system in which the first approximately $15 billion is industry-funded as described in the Act. Any claims above the $12.6 billion would be covered by a Congressional mandate to retroactively increase nuclear utility liability or would be covered by the federal government. At the time of the Act's passing, it was considered necessary as an incentive for the private production of nuclear power — this was because electric utilities viewed the available liability coverage as inadequate.
The Japanese-American Claims Act is a law passed by the United States Congress and signed by President Harry S. Truman on July 2, 1948. The law authorized the settlement of property loss claims by people of Japanese descent who were removed from the Pacific Coast area during World War II. According to a Senate report on the Act, there were concerns about whether the United States government had the right to evacuate and place all people of Japanese ancestry in internment camps. As result of being placed in the Japanese internment camps there was great loss of property, belongings, business, "and the principles of justice and responsible government require that there should be compensation for such losses. "Congress over time appropriated $38 million to settle 23,000 claims for damages totaling $131 million. The final claim was adjudicated in 1955."
The Court of Claims was a federal court that heard claims against the United States government. It was established in 1855, renamed in 1948 to the United States Court of Claims, and abolished in 1982. Then, its jurisdiction was assumed by the newly created United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and United States Claims Court, which was later renamed the Court of Federal Claims.
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), combined three pending federal cases for a hearing in certiorari in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the United States is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to members of the armed forces sustained while on active duty and not on furlough and resulting from the negligence of others in the armed forces. The opinion is an extension of the English common-law concept of sovereign immunity.
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States (FCSC) is a quasi-judicial, independent agency within the U.S. Department of Justice which adjudicates claims of U.S. nationals against foreign governments, either under specific jurisdiction conferred by Congress or pursuant to international claims settlement agreements. Funds for payment of the commission's awards are derived from congressional appropriations, international claims settlements, or liquidation of foreign assets in the United States by the Departments of Justice and the U.S. treasury.
Central Railroad & Banking Co. of Ga. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885), was an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Middle district of Alabama in favor of the appellees, Pettus & Dawson and Watts & Sons, adjudging them entitled to the sum of, 161.21, and interest thereon at eight percent per annum from March 7, 1881, with lien, to secure its payment, upon the roadbed, depots, side tracks, turnouts, trestles, and bridges owned and used by the appellants, corporations of the State of Georgia, in operating the railroad formerly belonging to the Montgomery and West Point Railroad Company, an Alabama corporation, and which extends from Montgomery to West Point with a branch from Opelika to Columbus. This property was directed to be exposed to sale unless within a given time the said amount was paid. This suit is the outgrowth of certain litigation in the courts of Alabama relating to the before-mentioned and other railroad property in which the appellants are interested.
Harvey v. United States, 113 U.S. 243 (1885), was a case for labor and materials furnished by the claimants in constructing coffer dams in Davenport, Iowa and in performing the work necessarily connected therewith and preliminary to the mason work for the piers and abutments referred to in the contract. That court proceeded on the view that the claimants had no right to rely on the testimony of experts introduced by them as to the value of the work, but should have kept and produced accounts of its cost and expense, but it gave to the claimants the benefit of the testimony of experts introduced by the United States as to such value in awarding the above amount. Held that the claimants could not be deprived of reasonable compensation for their work because they did not produce evidence of the character referred to, when it did not appear that such evidence existed, if the evidence they produced was the best evidence accessible to them and it enabled the court to arrive at a proper conclusion.
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co. v. United States, 113 U.S. 261 (1885), regarded a suit brought by the United States against a railroad company, Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway, to recover monies paid for delivery of United States mail in Tennessee from March 31 to June 8, 1861.
United States v. Jordan, 113 U.S. 418 (1885), was a Supreme Court of the United States case regarding an Act of Congress that involved tax refunds. Specifically, it provided for the refunding to the persons therein named of the amount of taxes assessed upon and collected from them contrary to the provisions of the regulations therein mentioned. In other words, pay to each of such persons the sum set opposite his name, each of them is entitled to be paid the whole of that sum, and no discretion is vested in the Secretary of the Treasury or in any court to determine whether the sum specified was or was not the amount of a tax assessed contrary to the provisions of such regulations.
Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885), was a case involving several judgments of the United States Court of Claims in four cases against the United States for the payment of United States bonds known as "five-twenty bonds."
Peugh v. Davis, 113 U.S. 542 (1885), was a suit in equity for redeeming unoccupied and unenclosed city lots from a mortgage, continued from a case brought to the high court during the October 1877 term, the question then was whether certain instruments of writing, made by Peugh to Davis constituted an absolute conveyance of lots in the District of Columbia or were in the nature of a mortgage security for loan of money. The court was of opinion that, on all the facts of the case, the latter was the true construction of the transaction between the parties. Respondent defended against complainant's claim to redeem by setting up that the alleged mortgage was an absolute conveyance. This being decided adversely, held that, in accounting as mortgagee in constructive possession, he was not liable for a temporary speculative rise in the value of the tract, which subsequently declined—both during the time of such possession.
Brown v. United States, 113 U.S. 568 (1885), was an appeal from the Court of Claims regarding one James Brown, the intestate of the appellant, who was a boatswain in the United States Navy. The petition in this case was filed against the United States by the administratrix of his estate in the Court of Claims to recover a balance of pay which she alleged was due to Brown at his death.
Pearce v. Ham, 113 U.S. 585 (1885), was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois regarding a bill filed by Charles I. Ham, the appellee, against Isaac N. Pearce and Andrew J. Kuykendall, the appellants. Originally, one Joseph K. Frick contracted with the County Court of Johnson County in the State of Illinois, where he agreed to build, according to certain plans and specifications, a courthouse for said county at Vienna, the county seat, furnishing the material and completing it by the first Monday of September 1870, in consideration whereof the county court agreed to pay him $38,357 in the bonds of Johnson county, bearing ten percent interest, and due in six years. Frick never did any work on the building, and, owing to some misunderstanding with the county court, abandoned the contract and told Kuykendall that he might go on and build the courthouse if he chose to do so. On September 9, 1869, Kuykendall, as the agent and attorney in fact of Frick, assigned the contract of the latter to Ham and Pearce, Ham being the appellee, and Pearce one of the appellants, who had formed a partnership for the purpose of building the courthouse under said contract.
Flagg v. Walker, 113 U.S. 659 (1885), regards a case where the deeds for several parcels of land were transferred from Flagg, who was in financial difficulty, to Walker in return for paying off Flagg's debts and profits from the sale against a mortgage for other property owned by Flagg.
Looney v. District of Columbia, 113 U.S. 258 (1885), was a U.S. Supreme Court case testing whether a government contractor could sue for outstanding payment when those debts had already been sold off to other parties. The court ruled a street contractor could not both sell the debts at a discount as a security and also sue District of Columbia for the difference in what they were owed.
The Cherokee Commission, was a three-person bi-partisan body created by President Benjamin Harrison to operate under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, as empowered by Section 14 of the Indian Appropriations Act of March 2, 1889. Section 15 of the same Act empowered the President to open land for settlement. The Commission's purpose was to legally acquire land occupied by the Cherokee Nation and other tribes in the Oklahoma Territory for non-indigenous homestead acreage.
The Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA) is an administrative tribunal within the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), located in Washington, D.C. Established by Executive Order on July 28, 1933, it determines whether U.S. military veterans are entitled to claimed veterans' benefits and services. The Board's mission is to conduct hearings and decide appeals properly before the Board in a timely manner. The Board's jurisdiction extends to all questions in matters involving a decision by the Secretary under a law that affects a provision of benefits by the Secretary to Veterans, their dependents, or their Survivors. Final decision on such appeals are made by the Board based on the entire record in the proceedings and upon consideration of all evidence and applicable provisions of law and regulation. The Board's review is de novo.
The No Budget, No Pay Act of 2013 is a law passed during the 113th United States Congress. The Act temporarily suspended the US debt ceiling from February 4 to May 18, 2013. It also placed temporary restrictions on Congressional salaries.
CN v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2022] EWCA Civ 86 was an appeal against the refusal of permission to apply for judicial review to challenge the infected blood support scheme administered by the NHS Business Services Authority (NHSBSA) for non-inclusion of those infected with chronic Hepatitis B virus. The appeal was based on the grounds that the exclusion of HBV sufferers from the England Infected Blood Support Scheme (EIBSS) was unreasonable and discriminatory, contrary to article 14 when read in conjunction with article 8 and article 1 protocol 1 (A1P1) of the ECHR. The appellant also claimed that there was different treatment and that the failure to include HBV sufferers was unreasonable, and that the original application for review should not have been deemed out of time.
