In American law, the clear statement rule is a guideline for statutory construction, instructing courts to not interpret a statute in a way that will have particular consequences unless the statute makes unmistakably clear its intent to achieve that result. [1] According to law professor William Popkin, such rules "insist that a particular result can be achieved only if the text…says so in no uncertain terms." [2]
Clear statement rules are commonly applied in areas implicating the structural constitution, such as federalism, sovereign immunity, nondelegation, preemption, or federal spending with strings attached. This is especially true when there is a strong interest against implicit abridgment of traditional understandings.
Congress can abrogate the states' sovereign immunity in some situations. [3] However, it cannot do so implicitly: it must "mak[e] its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." [4] Conversely, just as purported abrogation requires a clear statement, so too a purported waiver by a state requires a clear statement. [4]
The major questions doctrine arises in much the same way as the nondelegation doctrine. The Supreme Court has held in recent years that Congress is expected to be clear when it authorizes agencies to regulate issues of national significance. [5] In a January 2022 decision regarding the authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to require private-sector workers to be vaccinated, the Court reiterated that, “We expect Congress to speak clearly” if Congress wishes to empower executive branch agencies to make decisions “of vast economic and political significance.” [6] [7]
The Court arguably applied a similar approach in the 2006 case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld . [8] [9] According to Professor John Yoo, the Court in that case attempted "to force a clear statement rule upon congressional delegations of authority to the President." [10] Law Professor Michael W. McConnell has written that a clear statement rule should have been used in the case of Bolling v. Sharpe (1954), because "courts should not presume that Congress has delegated the authority to depart from general principles of equal protection of the laws to subordinate agencies without a clear statement to that effect...." [11]
With respect to preemption, Congress may preempt a field of regulation, "occup[ying] a field [and] leaving no room for any claim under state law," [12] but it doesn't have to. When a law is construed to preempt, the result is a broad and indiscriminate extinguishment of substantive and remedial state law, and sensitive to this problem, the Court has occasionally said, in cases like Wyeth v. Levine (2009), that it will find preemption only if Congress has clearly expressed preemptive intent. [13] The Court has indicated that preemption of state laws concerning the political activities of the states and their subdivisions requires a more stringent application of the clear statement rule. [14] In Bond v. United States (2014), the Supreme Court insisted upon a “clear indication” that Congress meant to intrude upon powers normally reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment, and so the Court did not address whether a treaty empowered Congress to do so. [15]
When Congress gives money to states pursuant to the Taxing and Spending Clause, it often attaches conditions. The U.S. Supreme Court has said those conditions must include a clear statement of what the recipient states would be required to do. [16]
In the 1987 case of South Dakota v. Dole , [17] the Court reaffirmed congressional authority to attach conditional strings to receipt of federal funds by state or local governments, but said there can be no surprises; Congress must enable the states "to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation." The clear statement requirement is in addition to the usual rules that the federal spending must be for the general welfare, the conditions that are imposed must be related to the spending in question, and the arrangement must not turn cooperation into coercion.
Another area in which a clear statement rule operates is with regard to legislation potentially addressing the past, instead of being forward-looking as usual. [18] Statutory retroactivity has usually been disfavored and is in many instances forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. [19] Therefore:
Absent a clear statement from Congress that an amendment [to a statute] should apply retroactively, we presume that it applies only prospectively to future conduct, at least to the extent that it affects substantive rights, liabilities, or duties. [20]
As the Supreme Court has explained, [19] "a requirement that Congress first make its intention clear helps ensure that Congress itself has determined that the benefits of retroactivity outweigh the potential for disruption or unfairness." Such rules do, therefore, have some life in the area of substantive rights as well as enforcement of constitutional structure.
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank (2010) the Supreme Court established a presumption against extraterritorial effect and so Congress must clearly express it for U.S. laws to have effect outside U.S. boundaries.
According to Professor Popkin, Chief Justice John Marshall imposed a clear statement rule: "where fundamental values were at stake, statutes would not be interpreted to impair such values, absent a clear statement in the legislation.” [2] Indeed, Marshall wrote in 1805 that "Where fundamental principles are overthrown, when the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects." [21]
Marshall also required a clear statement rule to protect international law and wrote that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” The Charming Betsy Doctrine is from Marshall’s opinion in Murray v. The Charming Betsy (1804), and Marshall applied a similar principle even earlier, in Talbot v. Seeman (1801).
American courts do not apply clear statement rules in all areas, however. In many cases, the court has found "implied" prohibitions and causes of action in statutes, a result that would be precluded (or at least hampered) by clear statement rules. For example, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits gender discrimination by recipients of federal education funding. Does the bare prohibition also provide an implied cause of action to an individual subject to discrimination? Yes, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Cannon v. University of Chicago , 441 U.S. 677 (1979) that it provides an implied cause of action. Does the statutory prohibition on discrimination also imply a prohibition on and cause of action for,retaliation against someone who complains of such discrimination? Yes, the Court so held in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education , 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
Similarly, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) prohibits age discrimination. Does that also imply a prohibition on retaliation against someone who complains of such discrimination? Yes, the Supreme Court held in Gomez-Perez v. Potter , 128 S. Ct. 29 (2008) that a clear statement was unnecessary to prohibit retaliation of that kind.
Article One of the Constitution of the United States establishes the legislative branch of the federal government, the United States Congress. Under Article One, Congress is a bicameral legislature consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Article One grants Congress various enumerated powers and the ability to pass laws "necessary and proper" to carry out those powers. Article One also establishes the procedures for passing a bill and places various limits on the powers of Congress and the states from abusing their powers.
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is a United States antitrust law which prescribes the rule of free competition among those engaged in commerce. It was passed by Congress and is named for Senator John Sherman, its principal author.
In United States labor law, at-will employment is an employer's ability to dismiss an employee for any reason, and without warning, as long as the reason is not illegal. When an employee is acknowledged as being hired "at will", courts deny the employee any claim for loss resulting from the dismissal. The rule is justified by its proponents on the basis that an employee may be similarly entitled to leave their job without reason or warning. The practice is seen as unjust by those who view the employment relationship as characterized by inequality of bargaining power.
The doctrine of nondelegation is the theory that one branch of government must not authorize another entity to exercise the power or function which it is constitutionally authorized to exercise itself. It is explicit or implicit in all written constitutions that impose a strict structural separation of powers. It is usually applied in questions of constitutionally improper delegations of powers of any of the three branches of government to either of the other, to the administrative state, or to private entities. Although it is usually constitutional for executive officials to delegate executive powers to executive branch subordinates, there can also be improper delegations of powers within an executive branch.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that foreign nationals held in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp could petition federal courts for writs of habeas corpus to review the legality of their detention. The Court's 6–3 judgment on June 28, 2004, reversed a D.C. Circuit decision which had held that the judiciary has no jurisdiction to hear any petitions from foreign nationals held in Guantanamo Bay.
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), was a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held, 6–3, that the line-item veto, as granted in the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, violated the Presentment Clause of the United States Constitution because it impermissibly gave the President of the United States the power to unilaterally amend or repeal parts of statutes that had been duly passed by the United States Congress. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the six-justice majority that the line-item veto gave the President power over legislation unintended by the Constitution, and was therefore an overstep in their duties.
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998), is a case in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined the immunity of Internet service providers for wrongs committed by their users under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA). Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA provides that "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider."
Statutory interpretation is the process by which courts interpret and apply legislation. Some amount of interpretation is often necessary when a case involves a statute. Sometimes the words of a statute have a plain and a straightforward meaning. But in many cases, there is some ambiguity in the words of the statute that must be resolved by the judge. To find the meanings of statutes, judges use various tools and methods of statutory interpretation, including traditional canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and purpose. In common law jurisdictions, the judiciary may apply rules of statutory interpretation both to legislation enacted by the legislature and to delegated legislation such as administrative agency regulations.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that military commissions set up by the Bush administration to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva Conventions ratified by the U.S.
A cause of action or right of action, in law, is a set of facts sufficient to justify suing to obtain money or property, or to justify the enforcement of a legal right against another party. The term also refers to the legal theory upon which a plaintiff brings suit. The legal document which carries a claim is often called a 'statement of claim' in English law, or a 'complaint' in U.S. federal practice and in many U.S. states. It can be any communication notifying the party to whom it is addressed of an alleged fault which resulted in damages, often expressed in amount of money the receiving party should pay/reimburse.
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), is a Supreme Court of the United States case holding that a county's policy of requiring employees to schedule time off to avoid accruing time off was not prohibited by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Altria Group v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a state law prohibiting deceptive tobacco advertising was not preempted by a federal law regulating cigarette advertising.
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), is a United States Supreme Court case holding that Federal regulatory approval of a medication does not shield the manufacturer from liability under state law.
In the law of the United States, federal preemption is the invalidation of a U.S. state law that conflicts with federal law.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), is a case applying the law of conflict preemption. The United States Supreme Court held that a Pennsylvania state system of alien registration was superseded by a federal system because it was an "obstacle to the accomplishment" of its goals.
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association, 505 U.S. 88 (1992), is a United States labor law case of the United States Supreme Court. The Court determined that federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations preempted various Illinois provisions for licensing workers who handled hazardous waste materials.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States establishes that the Constitution, federal laws made pursuant to it, and treaties made under its authority, constitute the "supreme Law of the Land", and thus take priority over any conflicting state laws. It provides that state courts are bound by, and state constitutions subordinate to, the supreme law. However, federal statutes and treaties must be within the parameters of the Constitution; that is, they must be pursuant to the federal government's enumerated powers, and not violate other constitutional limits on federal power, such as the Bill of Rights—of particular interest is the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that the federal government has only those powers that are delegated to it by the Constitution.
POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102 (2014), was a United States Supreme Court case that held that a statutory private right of action under the Lanham Act is not precluded by regulatory provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) was a U.S. Supreme Court case. It concerned a provision in the Missouri state constitution that required state judges to retire at the age of 70, and the court was asked to consider whether it conflicted with the 1967 federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The provision was upheld, with the case being one of several Supreme Court decisions supporting the principle that "ambiguous language will not be interpreted to intrude on areas of traditional state authority or important state governmental functions".
The major questions doctrine is a principle of statutory interpretation applied in United States administrative law cases which states that courts will presume that Congress does not delegate to executive agencies issues of major political or economic significance.