Director of Public Prosecutions v Pat Hegarty

Last updated

Director of Public Prosecutions v Pat Hegarty is an Irish Supreme Court case in which the court confirmed that officers/key employees of undertakings involved in anti-competitive practices in Ireland may be prosecuted and convicted for their involvement, regardless of whether the undertaking itself has been prosecuted. [1] [2]

Contents

Director of Public Prosecutions v Pat Hegarty
Coat of arms of Ireland.svg
Coat of arms of Ireland
Court Supreme Court of Ireland
Full case nameDirector of Public Prosecutions v Pat Hegarty
Citation(s)DPP v Pat Hegarty [2011] IESC 32
Court membership
Judge(s) sittingMurray C.J., O'Donnell J., McKechnie J
Keywords
Criminal Law; Anticompetitive Practice

Background

The accused (Pat Hegarty) in this case was the manager of an oil company (Fate Park Ltd). Hegarty was charged with two charges under section 3(4)(a) of the Competition (Amendment) Act 1996 (the "1996 Act"). Section 3(4)(a) of the 1996 Act provided that:

"Where an offence under section 2 of this Act has been committed by an undertaking and the doing of the acts that constituted the offence has been authorised, or consented to, by a person, being a director, manager, or other similar officer of the undertaking, or a person who purports to act in any such capacity, that person as well as the undertaking shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished as if he or she were guilty of the first-mentioned offence." [3]

Hegarty's legal counsel sought to have the charges rejected as invalid on the basis that in order for Hegarty to be found guilty, Fate Park Ltd must first have committed the crime of price fixing under section 2 Competition Act 1991. The Director of Public Prosecutions (the "DPP") accepted "the contingency as an ingredient of the offence", but argued that Fate Park Ltd's having engaged in price fixing could be shown without the need for a formal conviction. [1] In the Circuit Court, Judge Groarke rejected the DPP's argument. However, the judge agreed to raise two questions with the Supreme Court:

"Where an individual is prosecuted pursuant to s. 3(4)(a) of the Competition Act 1996:

(a) whether an adjudication as to whether the relevant undertaking has committed an offence can be undertaken when no prosecution has been initiated against the undertaking, and

(b) whether it is necessary that the undertaking be convicted of the offence before the individual can be convicted. [1] [4] "

Holding of the Supreme Court

McKechnie J delivered the only written judgment for the Supreme Court (with which the other judges agreed).

The Supreme Court noted that pursuant to section 3(4)(a) 1996 Act, "where an offence under s. 2 of this Act has been committed by an undertaking…” [1] [3] and the acts that constituted the offence in question were "authorised, or consented to, by a person, being a director, manager, or other similar officer of the undertaking, or a person who purports to act in any such capacity", [1] [3] that person will be guilty of an offence and prosecuted as if he / she was guilty of the section 2 1996 Act offence. [4] The court went on to note that as section 3(4)(a) 1996 Act created a criminal offence, it had to be "strictly construed". [1] The court noted, however that "[t]hat provision ... must be viewed and its true meaning ascertained by reference to its immediate context, properly derived from the scheme of the Act, or more accurately from that part of the Act which criminalised behaviour previously not so declared." [1] Examining the wording of the 1996 Act, therefore, the court concluded that the undertaking referred to in section 3(4)(a) 1996 Act must have committed a section 2 offence, but that such undertaking did not have to have been convicted of such an offence in order for an individual referred to in section 3(4)(a) 1996 Act to be found guilty of the offence. As the court noted: “[t]here is no reference to a conviction and in my view there is no interpretative basis for importing into the provision such a condition”. [1] It was, therefore, an essential ingredient of the offence relating to the individual that the undertaking itself must have been found to have committed the offence, but this could be established on the facts by the jury during the trial for the prosecution of the individual. McKechnie J. noted that the employer undertaking itself would, if subsequently tried, be entitled to all appropriate rights and safeguards and could challenge any evidence, including that relied upon to support any finding in the earlier proceedings. [5]

In consequence, the court answered the questions posed in the case stated as follows: (a) yes; (b) no.

Following the Supreme Court decision, the case returned the Circuit Court. Here, Mr Hegarty was convicted by a unanimous jury verdict. He was fined €30,000 and handed a (suspended) two-year sentence. [6]

DPP v Hegarty formulated the definition of “director, manager or other similar officer”, with strict employment of the terms “director, manager or other similar officer” with little guidance offered on the definition of “manager or other similar officer”.

Director of Public Prosecutions v Pat Hegarty

Related Research Articles

In jurisprudence, double jeopardy is a procedural defence that prevents an accused person from being tried again on the same charges following an acquittal or conviction and in rare cases prosecutorial and/or judge misconduct in the same jurisdiction. Double jeopardy is a common concept in criminal law. In civil law, a similar concept is that of res judicata. Variation in common law countries is the peremptory plea, which may take the specific forms of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict. These doctrines appear to have originated in ancient Roman law, in the broader principle non bis in idem.

The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is the office or official charged with the prosecution of criminal offences in several criminal jurisdictions around the world. The title is used mainly in jurisdictions that are or have been members of the Commonwealth of Nations.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Prosecutor</span> Legal profession

A prosecutor is a legal representative of the prosecution in states with either the common law adversarial system or the civil law inquisitorial system. The prosecution is the legal party responsible for presenting the case in a criminal trial against the defendant, an individual accused of breaking the law. Typically, the prosecutor represents the state or the government in the case brought against the accused person.

Assault occasioning grievous bodily harm is a term used in English criminal law to describe the severest forms of battery. It refers to two offences that are created by sections 18 and 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The distinction between these two sections is the requirement of specific intent for section 18; the offence under section 18 is variously referred to as "wounding with intent" or "causing grievous bodily harm with intent", whereas the offence under section 20 is variously referred to as "unlawful wounding", "malicious wounding" or "inflicting grievous bodily harm".

Capital murder was a statutory offence of aggravated murder in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland, which was later adopted as a legal provision to define certain forms of aggravated murder in the United States. In some parts of the US, this term still defines the category of murder for which the perpetrator is eligible for the death penalty. Some jurisdictions that provide for death as a possible punishment for murder, such as California, do not have a specific statute creating or defining a crime known as capital murder; instead, death is one of the possible sentences for certain kinds of murder. In these cases, "capital murder" is not a phrase used in the legal system but may still be used by others such as the media.

Assault occasioning actual bodily harm is a statutory offence of aggravated assault in England and Wales, Northern Ireland, the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Hong Kong and the Solomon Islands. It has been abolished in the Republic of Ireland and in South Australia, but replaced with a similar offence.

In criminal law, a conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime at some time in the future. Criminal law in some countries or for some conspiracies may require that at least one overt act be undertaken in furtherance of that agreement, to constitute an offense. There is no limit to the number participating in the conspiracy and, in most countries, the plan itself is the crime, so there is no requirement that any steps have been taken to put the plan into effect. For the purposes of concurrence, the actus reus is a continuing one and parties may join the plot later and incur joint liability and conspiracy can be charged where the co-conspirators have been acquitted or cannot be traced. Finally, repentance by one or more parties does not affect liability but may reduce their sentence.

Common assault is an offence in English law. It is committed by a person who causes another person to apprehend the immediate use of unlawful violence by the defendant. In England and Wales, the penalty and mode of trial for this offence is provided by section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

Murder is an offence under the common law of England and Wales. It is considered the most serious form of homicide, in which one person kills another with the intention to cause either death or serious injury unlawfully. The element of intentionality was originally termed malice aforethought, although it required neither malice nor premeditation. Baker, chapter 14 states that many killings done with a high degree of subjective recklessness were treated as murder from the 12th century right through until the 1974 decision in DPP v Hyam.

Harassment, alarm or distress is an element of a statutory offence in England and Wales, arising from an expression used in sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, which created the offence. The Act was amended in 1994.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Criminal Law Act 1967</span> United Kingdom legislation

The Criminal Law Act 1967 is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom that made some major changes to English criminal law, as part of wider liberal reforms by the Labour government elected in 1966. Most of it is still in force.

A private prosecution is a criminal proceeding initiated by an individual private citizen or private organisation instead of by a public prosecutor who represents the state. Private prosecutions are allowed in many jurisdictions under common law, but have become less frequent in modern times as most prosecutions are now handled by professional public prosecutors instead of private individuals who retain barristers.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Military courts of the United Kingdom</span>

The military courts of the United Kingdom are governed by the Armed Forces Act 2006. The system set up under the Act applies to all three armed services: the Royal Navy (RN), the British Army, and the Royal Air Force (RAF), and replaces the three parallel systems that were previously in existence.

Rape is a statutory offence in England and Wales. The offence is created by section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003:

(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—

(2) Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.
(3) Sections 75 and 76 apply to an offence under this section.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.

Criminal procedure in South Africa refers to the adjudication process of that country's criminal law. It forms part of procedural or adjectival law, and describes the means by which its substantive counterpart, South African criminal law, is applied. It has its basis mainly in English law.

The New South Wales Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) is an independent prosecuting service and government agency within the portfolio of the Attorney General of New South Wales. Of all prosecuting services in Australia, the ODPP has the largest caseload, staff, and budget.

The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions is the principal public agency for conducting criminal prosecutions in the Republic of Ireland. It is led by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP).

<i>Blood v DPP</i> Irish Supreme Court case

In Blood v DPP [2005] IESC 8, the Irish Supreme Court confirmed that a right to an expeditious trial is implied in the right to a fair trial under Irish law. The decision of McGuinness J further suggested that "blameworthy prosecution delay was insufficient without some evidence of prejudice to the accused, whether in the form of a real risk of an unfair trial or stress and anxiety arising from the delay". The applicant in the case was successful in their appeal.

<i>Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform v Bailey</i> Irish Supreme Court case

Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform v Bailey[2012] IESC 16, was an Irish Supreme Court case in which the Court held they did not have the jurisdiction to order the surrender of a non-Irish citizen for the commission of a crime committed in Ireland. Ian Bailey was accused of murdering a French citizen in Ireland. The French judicial authorities requested the extradition of Bailey from Ireland to France so to question him about the crime. However, the issue in this case was that Bailey is not a French citizen, rather his nationality is British. This case dealt with an unprecedented question of law as usually the person requested by the issuing state is a national of that state. The significance of this case was that the Supreme Court dealt with a situation where Bailey was a British national yet the French authorities requested for his extradition. Nevertheless, the Court decided that Bailey could not be surrendered because the French had not actually charged him with a crime.

Kerida Naidoo is an Irish lawyer who has been a judge of the High Court since February 2022. He was formerly a barrister.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Director of Public Prosecutions v Pat Hegarty [2011] IESC 32
  2. ↑ "Home Heating Oil Cartel: Irish Supreme Court Rules on Prosecution of Officers". William Fry. 2012.
  3. 1 2 3 Competition (Amendment) Act 1996
  4. 1 2 Boyle, David P. (2013). "ILT Digest of Legislation and Superior Court Decisions". Irish Law Times. 31: 201–204 – via Westlaw.ie.
  5. ↑ Cormac Little and Sarah Lynam, ‘Home Heating Oil Cartel: Irish Supreme Court Rules On Prosecution of Officers’ (William Fry, 7 March 2012) https://www.williamfry.com/newsandinsights/news-article/2012/03/07/home_heating_oil_cartel_irish_supreme_court_rules_on_prosecution_of_officers_ accessed 3 December 2019
  6. ↑ Wade, Gordon (2015). "The Irish Competition Authority: Looking Back at Some Landmark Cases as a New Era for Irish Competition Law Dawns–Part 1". Commercial Law Practitioner. 22 (6): 153–160 – via Westlaw.ie.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.