External links
- Equal Access to Justice Act, as codified.
- http://www.schnaufer.com/eaja.htm Collecting EAJA cases by topic.
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In the United States of America, the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) authorizes the payment of attorney's fees to a prevailing party in an action against the United States absent a showing by the government that its position in the underlying litigation "was substantially justified". The Act is codified in scattered sections of the United States Code:
Each is subject to multiple conditions. Section 2412(d)(1) for court fees requires:
An applicant for attorney's fees under the EAJA must file an application within thirty days of the final judgment in the civil action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Scarborough, 541 U.S. 401 (2004). However, an EAJA application may be filed until thirty days after a judgment becomes “final and not appealable”. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(B) and (d)(2)(G). In some instances when an agency of the United States is a party in this case, a notice of appeal may be filed within 60 days of entry of the judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993). See Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991), where the Supreme Court ruled that the filing period starts to accrue only after the time to appeal has expired for all parties. [1]
A party must meet the threshold requirement of having a net worth not in excess of $7,000,000 for any owner of an unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government, or organization. Or, $2,000,000 at the time the action was filed for an individual. 28 U. S. C. §2412(d)(2)(B)).
The court must determine whether “the position of the United States was substantially justified or . . . special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The government has the burden of proving its action is substantially justified or that circumstances make an award of attorney's fees unjust. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004) citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 567 (1988); id., at 575 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F. 3d 503, 506 (CA5 2003); Lauer v. Barnhart, 321 F. 3d 762, 764 (CA8 2003); Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 314 F. 3d 1362, 1365 (CA Fed. 2003). See also H. R. Rep. No. 96-1005, at 10 ("[T]he strong deterrents to contesting Government action that currently exis[t] require that the burden of proof rest with the Government.").
In Pierce, the Supreme Court held that the position of the United States is substantially justified if it is “justified in substance or in the main--that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). The Pierce Court provided further guidance on this standard, noting, ". . . [A] position can be substantially justified even though it is not correct, and we believe that it can be substantially (i.e., for the most part) justified if a reasonable person could think it correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact." Id. at 566 n.2.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has described the substantial justification standard as requiring that the government show that its position was grounded in "'(1) a reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable basis in law for the theory propounded; and (3) a reasonable connection between the facts alleged and the legal theory advanced.'" United States v. Hallmark Constr. Co., 200 F.3d 1076, 1080 (7th Cir. 2000) quoting Phil Smidt & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 810 F.2d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1987) quoting Donovan v. DialAmerica Mkting, Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1389 (3d Cir. 1985). Furthermore, some courts have held the “court only needs to find one reason for finding the ALJ was not substantially justified in order to allow EAJA fees . . .” Mallette v. Sullivan, 1990 WL 19894, *3-*5 (N.D. Il. 1990).
Congress's inclusion in the EAJA of the substantial justification standard manifests its intent not to permit a prevailing party to automatically recover fees. SeeFederal Election Comm'n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1986). As the Cummings court observed, these two standards of review “are used at different stages and involve different tests.” Cummings v. Sullivan, 950 F.2d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 1991). A court at the EAJA stage must take a fresh look at the case from an EAJA perspective, and reach a judgment independent from the ultimate merits decision. Rose, 806 F.2d at 1087–90. Thus, the government's position may be substantially justified even if its decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
In Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the government's position is substantially justified if it is “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person,” that is, “if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact.” Id. at 565-66 & n.2. The Pierce Court rejected the position that substantial justification requires more than mere reasonableness. Id. 487 U.S. at 567–68. See alsoBrouwers v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1987) (“the substantial justification standard is a lesser standard than the substantial evidence standard used to review administrative determinations”) (citations omitted).
“Substantially justified” does not mean “justified to a high degree,” but rather has been said to be satisfied if there is a “genuine dispute,” or if reasonable people could differ as to the appropriateness of the contested action. Stein v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565). Thus, a loss on the merits does not equate with a lack of substantial justification. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 569 (“[O]bviously, the fact that one other court agreed or disagreed with the Government does not establish whether its position was substantially justified. Conceivably, the Government could take a position that is not substantially justified, yet win; even more likely, it could take a position that is substantially justified, yet lose.”); United States v. Hallmark Construction Co., 200 F.3d 1076, 1080 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, a court's statement in its merits decision that a government agency did not have a “rational ground” for denying benefits does not imply a lack of substantial justification for the agency's position. Kolman v. Shalala, 39 F.3d 173, 177 (7th Cir. 1994). As the Seventh Circuit explained in Kolman, its statement that the agency did not have a rational ground for its decision was a reference to the test for invalidating agency action; at the EAJA stage, the test is “whether the agency had a rational ground for thinking it had a rational ground for its action.” Kolman, 39 F.3d at 177.
The applicant for EAJA fees has the burden of proving that the fees requested are reasonable. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (although Hensley dealt with attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the standards which it sets out are applicable generally to attorney's fee cases); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 691-92 (1983).
Attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or other special factors justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The movant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate for the kind and quality of legal services rendered. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892 n. 11 (1984). Applicants for EAJA who claim and provide proof of inflation may be awarded attorney fees at an hourly fee in excess of $125.00 for work beginning after 1996 due to inflation. Failure to adjust the statutory cap for inflation might be considered an abuse of discretion. Sierra Club v. Sec'y of the Army, 820 F.2d 513, 521 (1st Cir. 1987); Trichilo v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 823 F.2d 702, 704-07 (2d Cir. 1987); Allen v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1987); Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 863 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1988); and U.S. v. A Leasehold Interest in Property, 789 F.Supp. 1385, 1394 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
Some costs may be compensated by the EAJA, including federal court filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(a)(1) and (a)(2), and (d)(2)(A).
In Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010) the Supreme Court unanimously held that an EAJA award is payable to the litigant, not his or her attorney, and is subject to offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt that the litigant owes to the United States.
The Open Book on Equal Access to Justice Act (H.R. 2919; 113th Congress) was introduced into the United States House of Representatives on August 1, 2013. [2] The bill would amend the Equal Access to Justice Act by requiring the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) to prepare a report each year on the amount of fees and other expenses awarded by federal courts to nonfederal entities when they prevail in a case against the United States. [2] [3]
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Attorney–client privilege or lawyer–client privilege is the common law doctrine of legal professional privilege in the United States. Attorney–client privilege is "[a] client's right to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications between the client and the attorney."
A declaratory judgment, also called a declaration, is the legal determination of a court that resolves legal uncertainty for the litigants. It is a form of legally binding preventive by which a party involved in an actual or possible legal matter can ask a court to conclusively rule on and affirm the rights, duties, or obligations of one or more parties in a civil dispute. The declaratory judgment is generally considered a statutory remedy and not an equitable remedy in the United States, and is thus not subject to equitable requirements, though there are analogies that can be found in the remedies granted by courts of equity. A declaratory judgment does not by itself order any action by a party, or imply damages or an injunction, although it may be accompanied by one or more other remedies.
United States federal administrative law encompasses statutes, regulations, rules, common law rulings, and directives issued by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Executive Office of the President, that together define the extent of powers and responsibilities held by administrative agencies of the United States government. The executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the U.S. federal government cannot always directly perform their constitutional responsibilities. Specialized powers are therefore delegated to an agency, board, or commission. These administrative governmental bodies oversee and monitor activities in complex areas, such as commercial aviation, medical device manufacturing, and securities markets.
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The American rule is the default legal rule in the United States controlling assessment of attorneys' fees arising out of litigation. It provides that each party is responsible for paying its own attorney's fees, unless specific authority granted by statute or contract allows the assessment of those fees against the other party.
Attorney's fee is a chiefly United States term for compensation for legal services performed by an attorney for a client, in or out of court.
An interlocutory appeal, in the law of civil procedure in the United States, occurs when a ruling by a trial court is appealed while other aspects of the case are still proceeding. Interlocutory appeals are allowed only under specific circumstances, which are laid down by the federal and the separate state courts.
José Alberto Cabranes is an American lawyer who serves as a senior United States circuit judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and a former presiding judge of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ("FISCR"). Formerly a practicing lawyer, government official, and law teacher, he was the first Puerto Rican appointed to a federal judgeship in the continental United States (1979).
The Laffey Matrix is a fee schedule used by many United States courts for determining the reasonable hourly rates in the District of Columbia for attorneys' fee awards under federal fee-shifting statutes.
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States involving the pleading standard for retaliatory prosecution claims against government officials. After a successful lobbying attempt by the CEO of a manufacturing company against competing devices that the US Postal Service supported, the CEO found himself the target of an investigation by US postal inspectors and a criminal prosecution that was dismissed for lack of evidence. The CEO then filed suit against the inspectors and other government officials for seeking to prosecute him in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights to criticize postal policy. The Court ruled 5-2 that to prove that the prosecution was caused by a retaliatory motive, the plaintiff bringing such a claim must allege and prove that the criminal charges were brought without probable cause.
Dennis Jacobs is a senior United States circuit judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
David Brookman "Brooks" Smith is a senior judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. He was previously Chief Judge of both the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and is the only judge in the history of the Third Circuit to have served as both a chief district judge and chief of the Court of Appeals.
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 is a law of the United States codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). It is often referred to as "Section 1988." It allows a Federal court to award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party in certain civil rights cases. The Act was designed to create an enforcement mechanism for the nation's civil rights laws without creating an enforcement bureaucracy, because the prospect of being awarded attorneys' fees is thought to incentivize attorneys to bring civil rights cases on behalf of plaintiffs.
Commissioner v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005), together with Commissioner v. Banaitis, was a case decided before the Supreme Court of the United States, dealing with the issue of whether the portion of a money judgment or settlement paid to a taxpayer's attorney under a contingent-fee agreement is income to the taxpayer for federal income tax purposes. The Supreme Court held when a taxpayer's recovery constitutes income, the taxpayer's income includes the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a contingent fee. Employment cases are an exception to this Supreme Court ruling because of the Civil Rights Tax Relief in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. The Civil Rights Tax Relief amended Internal Revenue Code § 62(a) to permit taxpayers to subtract attorney's fees from gross income in arriving at adjusted gross income.
Pro se legal representation comes from Latin pro se, meaning "for oneself" or "on behalf of themselves" which, in modern law, means to argue on one's own behalf in a legal proceeding, as a defendant or plaintiff in civil cases, or a defendant in criminal cases, rather than have representation from counsel or an attorney.
Disparate treatment is one kind of unlawful discrimination in US labor law. In the United States, it means unequal behavior toward someone because of a protected characteristic under Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act. This contrasts with disparate impact, where an employer applies a neutral rule that treats everyone equally in form, but has a disadvantageous effect on some people of a protected characteristic compared to others.
Eunique v. Powell, 281 F.3d 940, challenging passport denial for child support arrearage under 42 U.S.C. § 652(k) and enacted as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act in 1996, is the second cornerstone of the Court's thinking on passport denial/revocation under this law.
Several statutes, mostly codified in Title 18 of the United States Code, provide for federal prosecution of public corruption in the United States. Federal prosecutions of public corruption under the Hobbs Act, the mail and wire fraud statutes, including the honest services fraud provision, the Travel Act, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) began in the 1970s. "Although none of these statutes was enacted in order to prosecute official corruption, each has been interpreted to provide a means to do so." The federal official bribery and gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 15 U.S.C. § 78dd, and the federal program bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 666 directly address public corruption.
Peter v. NantKwest Inc., 589 U.S. ___ (2019), was a United States Supreme Court case from the October 2019 term.
Marcus Gray et al. v. Katy Perry et al. was a copyright infringement lawsuit against Katheryn Elizabeth Hudson, Jordan Houston, Lukasz Gottwald, Karl Martin Sandberg, Henry Russell Walter ("Cirkut"), Capitol Records and others, in which the plaintiffs Marcus Gray ("Flame"), Emanuel Lambert and Chike Ojukwu alleged that Perry's song "Dark Horse" infringed their exclusive rights in their song "Joyful Noise" pursuant to 17 U.S.C § 106. The focus of the similarity was a short descending pattern known in music as an "ostinato". In both songs, a short ostinato is used repeatedly to form part of the beat of each song and both ostinatos share similar descending shapes. Gray et al. claimed that the instrumental beat of the ostinato in "Joyful Noise" was protectable original expression and that Perry et al. had access to and copied the ostinato when composing "Dark Horse." On March 16, 2020, Judge Christina A. Snyder ultimately found that Gray et al. had failed to satisfy the extrinsic test for substantial similarity, overturning a previous jury verdict which had sided with the plaintiffs. Snyder's ruling was affirmed on appeal.
