Evidential burden

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Evidential burden or "production burden" [1] is the obligation to produce evidence to properly raise an issue at trial. Failure to satisfy the evidential burden means that an issue cannot be raised at a court of law.

Contents

Definition

Evidential burden has been described as the obligation "to show, if called upon to do so, that there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue, due regard being had to the standard of proof demanded of the party under such obligation". [2]

Lord Bingham said that evidential burden is not a burden of proof, but rather a burden of raising an issue as to the matter in question fit for consideration by the tribunal of fact. In the criminal law context, if an issue is properly raised, it is for the prosecutor to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that that issue does not avail the defendant. [3] " In the United States, however, both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion are referred to as "burdens of proof." [4]

An evidential burden compels a party to produce evidence in support of an issue it seeks to raise, failing which the party shall not be permitted to raise it at all. This burden can rest on either party, although it usually relates to matters of defence raised by the accused. Some defences impose an evidential burden on the defendant. If the evidential burden is met, the prosecution then bears the burden of proof (which is not called an evidential burden). For example, if a person charged with murder pleads self-defence, the defendant must satisfy the evidential burden that there is some evidence suggesting self-defence. The burden of proof then falls on the prosecution to produce evidence to support their position. In such a case, a legal burden will always rest on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in self-defence. A legal burden is determined by substantive law, rests upon one party and never shifts. [5]

The satisfaction of the evidential burden has sometimes been described as "shifting the burden of proof", a label which has been criticized because the burden placed on a defendant is not the legal burden of proof resting on the prosecution. [6]

To satisfy the burden, there must be evidence which both supported the issue and which is sufficiently substantial to raise a reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt. [7] Whether the burden is satisfied is a matter for the judge.

Case example

In R v Acott , [8] the defendant was charged with murdering his mother. He claimed his mother was injured in a fall, but the medical evidence demonstrated that the deceased died because of a sustained attack and was indicative of a possible loss of self-control from the defendant. The trial judge did not leave the issue of provocation to the jury, and the defendant was eventually convicted. The defendant's appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed and he appealed to the House of Lords, the issue being:

In a prosecution for murder, before the judge is obliged to leave the issue of provocation to the jury, must there be some evidence, either direct or inferential, as to what was either done or said to provoke the alleged loss of self-control?

The House of Lords held that in the absence of any evidence, emerging from whatever source, which suggested the reasonable possibility that the defendant might have lost his self-control due to provoking conduct, the question of provocation did not arise and should not be put to the jury. On the facts, there was no evidence of the nature of the provocation and the jury could not, therefore, determine the relevant conditions necessary for provocation. The appeal was therefore dismissed. [9]

Rationale

The reason for imposing an evidential burden is to ensure the prosecution does not have to disprove all imaginable defences, only those properly supported by sufficient evidence. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said in Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland : [10]

As human behaviour may manifest itself in infinite varieties of circumstances it is perilous to generalize, but it is not every facile mouthing of some easy phrase of excuse that can amount to an explanation. It is for a judge to decide whether there is evidence fit to be left to the jury which could be the basis of some suggested verdict...

Human rights law

In 2002, the imposition of evidential burden on defendants in England and Wales was challenged as contrary to Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to a fair trial. The House of Lords held that a mere evidential burden was not contrary to the ECHR. [11]

See also

Related Research Articles

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The M'Naghten rule is any variant of the 1840s jury instruction in a criminal case when there is a defence of insanity:

that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and ... that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.

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<i>Woolmington v DPP</i> House of Lords law case

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Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, [1961] 3 All ER 523, [1961] UKHL 3 is a House of Lords decision relating to non-insane automatism. The court decided that medical evidence is needed to prove that the defendant was not aware of what they were doing, and if this is available, the burden of proof lies with the prosecution to prove that intention was present.

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DPP v Camplin (1978) was an English criminal law appeal to the House of Lords in 1978. Its unanimous judgment helped to define the main limits of defence of provocation chiefly until Parliament replaced the defence with one of "loss of control" in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Its ratio decidendi continues to have precedent value as the new "loss of control" defence is a renaming to avoid creep of the term into scenarios for which it was never intended, above all a blurring with diminished responsibility.

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Watkins v Home Office and others[2006] UKHL 17, was a United Kingdom legal case heard by the House of Lords where the Home Office made an appeal as to whether the tort of misfeasance in public office was actionable in the absence of proof of pecuniary losses or injury of a mental or physical nature. The appeal was upheld, ruling that the tort of misfeasance in public office is never actionable without proof of material damage as defined by Lord Bingham of Cornhill.

References

  1. Barron's Law Dictionary, p. 56 (2nd ed. 1984).
  2. Tapper, Collin (2010). Cross & Tapper on Evidence (11 ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 132. ISBN   978-0-19-929200-4.
  3. Sheldrake v DPP [2004] UKHL 43 , [2005] 1 AC 264, [2005] 1 All ER 237, [2004] 3 WLR 976(14 October 2004), House of Lords
  4. Barron's Law Dictionary, pp. 55-56 (2nd ed. 1984).
  5. Herring, J. (2004). Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.  58–64. ISBN   0-19-876578-9.
  6. Jackson, Michael (2003). Criminal Law in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. pp. 41–42. ISBN   962-209-558-5.
  7. "Bribery, Corruption and Organised Crime". Hong Kong Lawyer. May 2010. Archived from the original on 11 July 2011. Retrieved 6 September 2010.
  8. R v. Acott [1997] UKHL 5 , [1997] 1 WLR 306, [1997] Crim LR 514, 161 JP 368, [1997] 1 All ER 706, [1997] 2 Cr App Rep 94(20 February 1997), House of Lords
  9. "Web JCLI Index".
  10. Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland [1961] UKHL 3 , [1963] AC 386, [1961] 3 All ER 523(3 October 1961), House of Lords
  11. R v. Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex Parte Kebeline and Others [1999] UKHL 43 , [2000] Crim LR 486, [2000] 1 Cr App Rep 275, [1999] 3 WLR 972, [2000] 2 AC 326, [1999] 4 All ER 801(28 October 1999), House of Lords