Family purpose doctrine

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The family purpose doctrine is "a court-created legal fiction that employs agency principles to impose vicarious liability on a head of the household for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a family member." [1] [2] [3] In a typical case involving the doctrine, the so-called "head of the household" has given their family members permission to drive their car "for their general use, pleasure, and convenience," i.e., a "family purpose." [4] Furthermore, plaintiffs in most American courts that follow the doctrine can prove the car was being used for a family purpose "merely by showing that it was being used by a family member with the defendant's consent." [4] [5] The underlying theory of the doctrine is that "the driver of a family car, in pursuit of recreation or pleasure, is engaged in the owner's business and is viewed as either the agent or servant of the owner." [1] [2] [6] [7] In some instances, the doctrine may apply to more than just traditional cars, such as motorbikes, trucks, and motor boats. [4] Moreover, a plaintiff's family purpose doctrine claim does not necessarily fail if "the defendant has provided a separate vehicle for each licensed driver in the family, so that each family member ordinarily operates his or her own vehicle." [4] [8]

Contents

Overview

In the US, this is primarily a state-level rule with considerable variation in its application. [9] For example, in Arizona, the family purpose doctrine is applied very broadly and holds parents liable even for the negligence of a child driving a motor vehicle in defiance of driving restrictions placed upon him. [10] In Georgia, the 'family purpose' liability extends to third parties allowed by the teenage driver to operate the car. Georgia also extends the rule to adult children in some cases and explicitly extends the rule to family boats. [11]

In Colorado, on the other hand, the same term is used to describe joint and several liability for household bills. [12]

History

Around the 1910s, when automobiles became affordable for most Americans, significant social and economic changes followed. [13] Specifically, courts across the United States faced new legal issues regarding car accidents. [13] In particular, policy issues from the "parade of litigants seeking to recover damages arising in such accidents brought about some modifications of the standard theories of liability in order to dovetail with the exigencies of the automotive revolution." [13] One of the "modifications" included the family purpose doctrine. [13]

Who can sue and who can be sued under the family purpose doctrine

For plaintiffs, states that recognize the family purpose doctrine allow "any person suffering injury or loss as a consequence of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle used by a family member..." to sue "the family member who furnished the vehicle." [4]

Categories of potential family purpose doctrine defendants include "the head of a family, the owner of a vehicle, the member of a family who furnished a vehicle to another member of the family, or the member of a family who controlled other family members' use of a vehicle." [4] In most cases, "liability will be based upon actual ownership of a motor vehicle since, in most cases, it is the owner who makes the vehicle available for use by other members of the family." [4] However, the plaintiff does not necessarily have to prove exclusive ownership. [14] "For example, even though a husband and wife purchase a vehicle using joint funds and register the vehicle in both of their names as co-owners, one spouse may be considered to have "furnished" the vehicle to the other spouse." [4] Furthermore, in the case of someone who transferred title to a car to a different family member, the latter could be held liable under the family purpose doctrine "if the transfer is anything less than a sale for full and fair consideration." [15] Defendants using a vehicle that a corporation has title in (rather than the individual) for a family purpose can additionally be held liable. [16] In such a case, while a defendant, as the car's original owner, could possibly "avoid liability by transferring all incidents of ownership of a vehicle to a family business, the defendant will remain liable under the family purpose doctrine where, at the time of the accident in which the plaintiff is injured, the defendant retains some degree of personal control over the vehicle's use." [16]

In some states, statutory law determines the people for which the family purpose doctrine applies. [4] [17] These states have a similar law to Nevada, which provides that the car owner is liable for negligent driving "by the owner's wife, husband, son, daughter, father, mother, brother, sister, or other immediate member of family if operation is with owner's express or implied permission." [4] [17]

Which courts have power to handle family purpose doctrine cases

When someone sues another person via the family purpose doctrine, the respective state court normally has the power to oversee the case. [4] However, federal district courts may handle family purpose doctrine cases "if the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are satisfied." [4]

State courts that expressly reject the doctrine vs. statutory law

Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah courts have all "expressly rejected" the family purpose doctrine. [1] Regardless, many of these states enacted statutes "which in effect hold the owner responsible for all injuries negligently inflicted while his or her motor vehicle is being used by another with the owner's consent, express or implied, including members of the owner's family." [1]

Elements and standard of proof

In general, to successfully sue someone under the family purpose doctrine, the plaintiff has to prove four things happened: "

  1. the vehicle whose negligent operation resulted in injury to the plaintiff was owned, furnished, or controlled by the defendant;
  2. the vehicle was made available to the defendant's family for general use by family members;
  3. the vehicle was being used by a family member at the time of the plaintiff's injury;
  4. use of the vehicle was with the defendant's permission or acquiescence." [4]

The doctrine requires the plaintiff to prove "both the negligence of the driver of the vehicle and the elements supporting application of the family purpose doctrine." [4] In a situation where a non-family member is the negligent driver of the vehicle "furnished" for a family purpose, the plaintiff has to prove that "a family member had constructive control over the use or operation of the vehicle." [4] The plaintiff may also have to "establish that the defendant is the head of the household." [4] Finally, a car for "business use" rather than a family purpose will not apply to family purpose doctrine claims. [4] [18]

Furnishing a motor vehicle

The following factors are frequently applied to determine the family member who has ownership of a vehicle: (1) the identity of the person who paid for the vehicle, (2) the identity of the person who had the right to control the vehicle's use, (3) the intent of the parties who bought and sold the vehicle, (4) the intent of the family members as to who, between them, is the owner of the vehicle, (5) the identity of the person to whom the seller made delivery of the vehicle, (6) the identity of the person who exercised property rights in the vehicle from the date of its purchase to the date of the accident, and (7) any other evidence that bears on the issue of who is the owner in fact. [4] [19]

When someone "purchases," "owns," "keeps," "maintains," or "provides" a car for their family members to use, a majority of courts view this as "furnishing" that car. [20] However, "a person must intend to provide the vehicle for another, must take steps to do so, and must contribute substantially toward that end without expectation of reimbursement or compensation" to be a "furnisher." [21]

Some family purpose doctrine cases, such as Brown v. Stogsdill, have involved cars with transferred titles as furnished automobiles. [15] The court in Brown v. Stogsdill concluded that "even though the son had title to the automobile, the defendant might be said to have 'furnished' the automobile if the defendant, through a substantial gift or a loan, had made it possible for the son to purchase the vehicle, which he otherwise would not have been able to do." [15]

Permission or acquiescence

Most American courts that accept the family purpose doctrine liberally define what counts as "permission." [4] The plaintiff does not have to prove that the driver causing their injuries "had permission to use the vehicle at the exact time and place of the accident, since it will suffice that the person had ongoing permission to use the vehicle." [4] [22] Conversely, once the household family member who controls the car gives the driver permission to use it for a family purpose, that permission may last even if "the family member was using the vehicle at a time or place contrary to the owner's instructions." [4] [22]

The plaintiff may have to show that the family member who was using the vehicle received express permission to do so if the owner made the vehicle available to family members only with express permission. However, the fact that the owner required family members to have special or express permission to use the vehicle does not, in and of itself, render the family purpose doctrine inapplicable, since the doctrine is generally deemed to apply in such circumstances, as well as where the owner provided a vehicle for family members to use at will. [4] [23] The question of whether implied consent has been given, as required for application of family purpose doctrine, is generally determined by the parents' initial decision to furnish a vehicle that will be used for the pleasure and convenience of family members, as opposed to whether the driver was acting in the course and scope of "family business," as would be the case in a true agency relationship, and thus, whether the vehicle is being operated for the direct benefit of only one family member or whether specific limitations are placed on the driver's use of the vehicle is largely irrelevant. [4] [24]

Defenses

A person who faces a family purpose doctrine lawsuit can protect themselves in court with several different defenses. [4] Generally, "there will be no liability under the family purpose doctrine if:

  1. the defendant did not own, furnish, or control use of the vehicle.
  2. the defendant owned the vehicle for a business or other nonfamily purpose.
  3. the operator of the vehicle was not a member of the defendant's immediate family or household.
  4. the operator of the vehicle used it without the defendant's consent or in a manner entirely different from the manner for which consent was given.
  5. the operator of the vehicle was not negligent or otherwise was not liable to the plaintiff for some reason other than a defense personal to the operator." [4]

In addition, a key exception to the doctrine is that "title to the vehicle or an insurance policy covering the vehicle, may not be a sufficient basis for invoking the family purpose doctrine where the reality is that the defendant is merely the nominal owner, or owner-of-convenience, and the actual owner and user of the vehicle is some other family member." [4] [16] [25] The defendants in both Calhoun v. Eaves and Dupree v. Batts escaped liability by proving that "although they were the nominal owners, the vehicles were in fact owned and operated solely by an emancipated or adult child living away from home." [4]

Damages available to successful plaintiffs

With respect to recovery, a plaintiff who successfully sues a defendant under the family purpose doctrine "is entitled to recover compensatory damages." [4] Furthermore, punitive damages are never awarded for these types of suits. [4]

Related Research Articles

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In law and insurance, a proximate cause is an event sufficiently related to an injury that the courts deem the event to be the cause of that injury. There are two types of causation in the law: cause-in-fact, and proximate cause. Cause-in-fact is determined by the "but for" test: But for the action, the result would not have happened. The action is a necessary condition, but may not be a sufficient condition, for the resulting injury. A few circumstances exist where the but-for test is ineffective. Since but-for causation is very easy to show, a second test is used to determine if an action is close enough to a harm in a "chain of events" to be legally valid. This test is called proximate cause. Proximate cause is a key principle of insurance and is concerned with how the loss or damage actually occurred. There are several competing theories of proximate cause. For an act to be deemed to cause a harm, both tests must be met; proximate cause is a legal limitation on cause-in-fact.

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A tort is a civil wrong that causes a claimant to suffer loss or harm, resulting in legal liability for the person who commits the tortious act. Tort law can be contrasted with criminal law, which deals with criminal wrongs that are punishable by the state. While criminal law aims to punish individuals who commit crimes, tort law aims to compensate individuals who suffer harm as a result of the actions of others. Some wrongful acts, such as assault and battery, can result in both a civil lawsuit and a criminal prosecution in countries where the civil and criminal legal systems are separate. Tort law may also be contrasted with contract law, which provides civil remedies after breach of a duty that arises from a contract. Obligations in both tort and criminal law are more fundamental and are imposed regardless of whether the parties have a contract.

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Trespass is an area of tort law broadly divided into three groups: trespass to the person, trespass to chattels, and trespass to land.

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In law, liable means "responsible or answerable in law; legally obligated". Legal liability concerns both civil law and criminal law and can arise from various areas of law, such as contracts, torts, taxes, or fines given by government agencies. The claimant is the one who seeks to establish, or prove, liability.

Vicarious liability is a form of a strict, secondary liability that arises under the common law doctrine of agency, respondeat superior, the responsibility of the superior for the acts of their subordinate or, in a broader sense, the responsibility of any third party that had the "right, ability or duty to control" the activities of a violator. It can be distinguished from contributory liability, another form of secondary liability, which is rooted in the tort theory of enterprise liability because, unlike contributory infringement, knowledge is not an element of vicarious liability. The law has developed the view that some relationships by their nature require the person who engages others to accept responsibility for the wrongdoing of those others. The most important such relationship for practical purposes is that of employer and employee.

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An intentional tort is a category of torts that describes a civil wrong resulting from an intentional act on the part of the tortfeasor. The term negligence, on the other hand, pertains to a tort that simply results from the failure of the tortfeasor to take sufficient care in fulfilling a duty owed, while strict liability torts refers to situations where a party is liable for injuries no matter what precautions were taken.

Tortious interference, also known as intentional interference with contractual relations, in the common law of torts, occurs when one person intentionally damages someone else's contractual or business relationships with a third party, causing economic harm. As an example, someone could use blackmail to induce a contractor into breaking a contract; they could threaten a supplier to prevent them from supplying goods or services to another party; or they could obstruct someone's ability to honor a contract with a client by deliberately refusing to deliver necessary goods.

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The following outline is provided as an overview of and introduction to tort law in common law jurisdictions:

<i>Devlin v. Smith</i>

Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882) was a seminal case decided by the New York Court of Appeals in the area of product liability law.

<i>Cahoon v. Cummings</i>

Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535, was a case decided by the Indiana Supreme Court that adopted the loss of a chance doctrine for tort liability.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Eggshell skull</span> Legal principle

The eggshell rule is a well-established legal doctrine in common law, used in some tort law systems, with a similar doctrine applicable to criminal law. The rule states that, in a tort case, the unexpected frailty of the injured person is not a valid defense to the seriousness of any injury caused to them.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 Van Arsdale, Barbara J.; Braswell, Keith A.; Blum, George; Bourdeau, John; Coltoff, Paul M.; Gebauer, John A.; Gordon, Noah J.; Babb Morris, Mary; Oakes, Karl; Surette, Eric (February 2023). "§ 632. "Family-purpose" doctrine as affecting owner's liability for negligent operation of vehicle, generally". American Jurisprudence, Second Edition. 8 (Am. Jur. 2d).
  2. 1 2 Gummo v. Ward, 57 F. Supp. 3d 871 (M.D. Tenn. 2014).
  3. ↑ Jackson v. Carland, 192 N.C. App. 432, 665 S.E.2d 553 (2008).
  4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Lockhart, J.D., James (February 2023) [1986]. "Cause of Action Under Family Purpose Doctrine for Negligence in Use of Motor Vehicle by Family Member". Causes of Action First Series. 9 (645) – via Westlaw.
  5. ↑ Clayton v. Long, 147 Ga. App. 645, 249 S.E.2d 622 (1978).
  6. ↑ Nelson v. Johnson, 1999 N.D. 171, 599 N.W.2d 246 (N.D. 1999).
  7. ↑ Evans v. Stewart, 370 S.C. 522, 636 S.E.2d 632 (Ct. App. 2006).
  8. ↑ Lucht v. Youngblood, 266 S.C. 127, 221 S.E.2d 854 (1976).
  9. ↑ "Liability of owner under family purpose doctrine for injuries by automobile while being used by member of his family" . American Law Reports. 132 (981). 1941.
  10. ↑ Young v. Beck, Case No. 1 CA-CV 09-0188
  11. ↑ Stuart v. Stephens, 225 Ga. 185, 166 S.E. 2d 890 (1969)
  12. ↑ "Douglas A. Turner, P.C. » Estate Planning & Colorado Probate » The Family Purpose Doctrine". www.douglasturner.com. Archived from the original on 2007-12-10.
  13. 1 2 3 4 Barber, R.E. (1966). "Comment note.-Modern status of family purpose doctrine with respect to motor vehicles". American Law Reports. 8 (A.L.R.3d 1191) – via Westlaw.
  14. ↑ Mortensen v. Knight, 81 Ariz 325, 305 P.2d 463 (1956); Buice v. White, 172 Ga. App. 634, 324 S.E.2d 203 (1984); Marcus v. Everett, 195 Neb. 518, 239 N.W.2d 487 (1976); Sheppard v. Weekly, 72 Or. App. 86, 695 P.2d 53 (1985).
  15. 1 2 3 Brown v. Stogsdill, 140 Ariz. 485, 682 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. App. 1984).
  16. 1 2 3 Calhoun v. Eaves, 114 Ga. App. 756, 152 S.E.2d 805 (1966).
  17. 1 2 Nevada Revised Statutes § 41.440.
  18. ↑ Finnocchio v. Lunsford, 129 Ga. App. 694, 201 SE2d 1 (1973).
  19. ↑ Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1979); Coffman v. McFadden, 68 Wash.2d 954, 416 P.2d 99 (1966).
  20. ↑ McBroom v. Wolsleger, 180 Neb. 622, 144 N.W.2d 199 (1966).
  21. ↑ Buice v. White, 172 Ga. App. 634, 324 S.E.2d 203 (1984).
  22. 1 2 Heenan v. Perkins, 278 Or. 583, 564 P.2d 1354 (1977).
  23. ↑ Lauritsen v. Lammers, 161 N.W.2d 804 (N.D. 1968).
  24. ↑ Young v. Beck, 224 Ariz. 408, 231 P.3d 940 (Ct. App. Div. 1 2010).
  25. ↑ Dupree v. Batts, 276 N.C. 68, 170 S.E.2d 918 (1969).
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