Frege's propositional calculus

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In mathematical logic, Frege's propositional calculus was the first axiomatization of propositional calculus. It was invented by Gottlob Frege, who also invented predicate calculus, in 1879 as part of his second-order predicate calculus (although Charles Peirce was the first to use the term "second-order" and developed his own version of the predicate calculus independently of Frege).

Contents

It makes use of just two logical operators: implication and negation, and it is constituted by six axioms and one inference rule: modus ponens.

AxiomsInference Rule
THEN-1
A → (B → A)
THEN-2
(A → (B → C)) → ((A → B) → (A → C))
THEN-3
(A → (B → C)) → (B → (A → C))
FRG-1
(A → B) → (¬B → ¬A)
FRG-2
¬¬A → A
FRG-3
A → ¬¬A
MP
P, P→Q ⊢ Q

Frege's propositional calculus is equivalent to any other classical propositional calculus, such as the "standard PC" with 11 axioms. Frege's PC and standard PC share two common axioms: THEN-1 and THEN-2. Notice that axioms THEN-1 through THEN-3 only make use of (and define) the implication operator, whereas axioms FRG-1 through FRG-3 define the negation operator.

The following theorems will aim to find the remaining nine axioms of standard PC within the "theorem-space" of Frege's PC, showing that the theory of standard PC is contained within the theory of Frege's PC.

(A theory, also called here, for figurative purposes, a "theorem-space", is a set of theorems that are a subset of a universal set of well-formed formulas. The theorems are linked to each other in a directed manner by inference rules, forming a sort of dendritic network. At the roots of the theorem-space are found the axioms, which "generate" the theorem-space much like a generating set generates a group.)

Rules

Rule (THEN-1)  A ⊢ B→A

#wffreason
1.Apremise
2.A→(B→A)THEN-1
3.B→AMP 1,2.

Rule (THEN-2)   A→(B→C) ⊢ (A→B)→(A→C)

#wffreason
1.A→(B→C)premise
2.(A → (B → C)) → ((A → B) → (A → C))THEN-2
3.(A→B)→(A→C)MP 1,2.

Rule (THEN-3)  A→(B→C) ⊢ B→(A→C)

#wffreason
1.A→(B→C)premise
2.(A → (B → C)) → (B → (A → C))THEN-3
3.B→(A→C)MP 1,2.

Rule (FRG-1)  A→B ⊢ ¬B→¬A

#wffreason
1.(A→B)→(¬B→¬A)FRG-1
2.A→Bpremise
3.¬B→¬AMP 2,1.

Rule (TH1)   A→B, B→C ⊢ A→C

#wffreason
1.B→Cpremise
2.(B→C)→(A→(B→C))THEN-1
3.A→(B→C)MP 1,2
4.(A→(B→C))→((A→B)→(A→C))THEN-2
5.(A→B)→(A→C)MP 3,4
6.A→Bpremise
7.A→CMP 6,5.

Theorems

Theorem (TH1)  (A→B)→((B→C)→(A→C))

#wffreason
1.(B→C)→(A→(B→C))THEN-1
2.(A→(B→C))→((A→B)→(A→C))THEN-2
3.(B→C)→((A→B)→(A→C))TH1* 1,2
4.((B→C)→((A→B)→(A→C)))→((A→B)→((B→C)→(A→C)))THEN-3
5.(A→B)→((B→C)→(A→C))MP 3,4.

Theorem (TH2)  A→(¬A→¬B)

#wffreason
1.A→(B→A)THEN-1
2.(B→A)→(¬A→¬B)FRG-1
3.A→(¬A→¬B)TH1* 1,2.

Theorem (TH3)  ¬A→(A→¬B)

#wffreason
1.A→(¬A→¬B)TH 2
2.(A→(¬A→¬B))→(¬A→(A→¬B))THEN-3
3.¬A→(A→¬B)MP 1,2.

Theorem (TH4)  ¬(A→¬B)→A

#wffreason
1.¬A→(A→¬B)TH3
2.(¬A→(A→¬B))→(¬(A→¬B)→¬¬A)FRG-1
3.¬(A→¬B)→¬¬AMP 1,2
4.¬¬A→AFRG-2
5.¬(A→¬B)→ATH1* 3,4.

Theorem (TH5)  (A→¬B)→(B→¬A)

#wffreason
1.(A→¬B)→(¬¬B→¬A)FRG-1
2.((A→¬B)→(¬¬B→¬A))→(¬¬B→((A→¬B)→¬A))THEN-3
3.¬¬B→((A→¬B)→¬A)MP 1,2
4.B→¬¬BFRG-3, with A := B
5.B→((A→¬B)→¬A)TH1* 4,3
6.(B→((A→¬B)→¬A))→((A→¬B)→(B→¬A))THEN-3
7.(A→¬B)→(B→¬A)MP 5,6.

Theorem (TH6)  ¬(A→¬B)→B

#wffreason
1.¬(B→¬A)→BTH4, with A := B, B := A
2.(B→¬A)→(A→¬B)TH5, with A := B, B := A
3.((B→¬A)→(A→¬B))→(¬(A→¬B)→¬(B→¬A))FRG-1
4.¬(A→¬B)→¬(B→¬A)MP 2,3
5.¬(A→¬B)→BTH1* 4,1.

Theorem (TH7)  A→A

#wffreason
1.A→¬¬AFRG-3
2.¬¬A→AFRG-2
3.A→ATH1* 1,2.

Theorem (TH8)  A→((A→B)→B)

#wffreason
1.(A→B)→(A→B)TH7, with A := A→B
2.((A→B)→(A→B))→(A→((A→B)→B))THEN-3
3.A→((A→B)→B)MP 1,2.

Theorem (TH9)  B→((A→B)→B)

#wffreason
1.B→((A→B)→B)THEN-1, with A := B, B := A→B.

Theorem (TH10)  A→(B→¬(A→¬B))

#wffreason
1.(A→¬B)→(A→¬B)TH7
2.((A→¬B)→(A→¬B))→(A→((A→¬B)→¬B)THEN-3
3.A→((A→¬B)→¬B)MP 1,2
4.((A→¬B)→¬B)→(B→¬(A→¬B))TH5
5.A→(B→¬(A→¬B))TH1* 3,4.

Note: ¬(A→¬B)→A (TH4), ¬(A→¬B)→B (TH6), and A→(B→¬(A→¬B)) (TH10), so ¬(A→¬B) behaves just like A∧B (compare with axioms AND-1, AND-2, and AND-3).

Theorem (TH11)  (A→B)→((A→¬B)→¬A)

#wffreason
1.A→(B→¬(A→¬B))TH10
2.(A→(B→¬(A→¬B)))→((A→B)→(A→¬(A→¬B)))THEN-2
3.(A→B)→(A→¬(A→¬B))MP 1,2
4.(A→¬(A→¬B))→((A→¬B)→¬A)TH5
5.(A→B)→((A→¬B)→¬A)TH1* 3,4.

TH11 is axiom NOT-1 of standard PC, called "reductio ad absurdum".

Theorem (TH12)  ((A→B)→C)→(A→(B→C))

#wffreason
1.B→(A→B)THEN-1
2.(B→(A→B))→(((A→B)→C)→(B→C))TH1
3.((A→B)→C)→(B→C)MP 1,2
4.(B→C)→(A→(B→C))THEN-1
5.((A→B)→C)→(A→(B→C))TH1* 3,4.

Theorem (TH13)  (B→(B→C))→(B→C)

#wffreason
1.(B→(B→C)) → ((B→B)→(B→C))THEN-2
2.(B→B)→ ( (B→(B→C)) → (B→C))THEN-3* 1
3.B→BTH7
4.(B→(B→C)) → (B→C)MP 3,2.

Rule (TH14)   A→(B→P), P→Q ⊢ A→(B→Q)

#wffreason
1.P→Qpremise
2.(P→Q)→(B→(P→Q))THEN-1
3.B→(P→Q)MP 1,2
4.(B→(P→Q))→((B→P)→(B→Q))THEN-2
5.(B→P)→(B→Q)MP 3,4
6.((B→P)→(B→Q))→ (A→((B→P)→(B→Q)))THEN-1
7.A→((B→P)→(B→Q))MP 5,6
8.(A→(B→P))→(A→(B→Q))THEN-2* 7
9.A→(B→P)premise
10.A→(B→Q)MP 9,8.

Theorem (TH15)  ((A→B)→(A→C))→(A→(B→C))

#wffreason
1.((A→B)→(A→C))→(((A→B)→A)→((A→B)→C))THEN-2
2.((A→B)→C)→(A→(B→C))TH12
3.((A→B)→(A→C))→(((A→B)→A)→(A→(B→C)))TH14* 1,2
4.((A→B)→A)→ ( ((A→B) →(A→C))→(A→(B→C)))THEN-3* 3
5.A→((A→B)→A)THEN-1
6.A→ ( ((A→B) →(A→C))→(A→(B→C)) )TH1* 5,4
7.((A→B)→(A→C))→(A→(A→(B→C)))THEN-3* 6
8.(A→(A→(B→C)))→(A→(B→C))TH13
9.((A→B)→(A→C))→(A→(B→C))TH1* 7,8.

Theorem TH15 is the converse of axiom THEN-2.

Theorem (TH16)  (¬A→¬B)→(B→A)

#wffreason
1.(¬A→¬B)→(¬¬B→¬¬A)FRG-1
2.¬¬B→((¬A→¬B)→¬¬A)THEN-3* 1
3.B→¬¬BFRG-3
4.B→((¬A→¬B)→¬¬A)TH1* 3,2
5.(¬A→¬B)→(B→¬¬A)THEN-3* 4
6.¬¬A→AFRG-2
7.(¬¬A→A)→(B→(¬¬A→A))THEN-1
8.B→(¬¬A→A)MP 6,7
9.(B→(¬¬A→A))→((B→¬¬A)→(B→A))THEN-2
10.(B→¬¬A)→(B→A)MP 8,9
11.(¬A→¬B)→(B→A)TH1* 5,10.

Theorem (TH17)  (¬A→B)→(¬B→A)

#wffreason
1.(¬A→¬¬B)→(¬B→A)TH16, with B := ¬B
2.B→¬¬BFRG-3
3.(B→¬¬B)→(¬A→(B→¬¬B))THEN-1
4.¬A→(B→¬¬B)MP 2,3
5.(¬A→(B→¬¬B))→((¬A→B)→(¬A→¬¬B))THEN-2
6.(¬A→B)→(¬A→¬¬B)MP 4,5
7.(¬A→B)→(¬B→A)TH1* 6,1.

Compare TH17 with theorem TH5.

Theorem (TH18)  ((A→B)→B)→(¬A→B)

#wffreason
1.(A→B)→(¬B→(A→B))THEN-1
2.(¬B→¬A)→(A→B)TH16
3.(¬B→¬A)→(¬B→(A→B))TH1* 2,1
4.((¬B→¬A)→(¬B→(A→B)))→(¬B→(¬A→(A→B)))TH15
5.¬B→(¬A→(A→B))MP 3,4
6.(¬A→(A→B))→(¬(A→B)→A)TH17
7.¬B→(¬(A→B)→A)TH1* 5,6
8.(¬B→(¬(A→B)→A))→ ((¬B→¬(A→B))→(¬B→A))THEN-2
9.(¬B→¬(A→B))→(¬B→A)MP 7,8
10.((A→B)→B) → (¬B→¬(A→B))FRG-1
11.((A→B)→B)→(¬B→A)TH1* 10,9
12.(¬B→A)→(¬A→B)TH17
13.((A→B)→B)→(¬A→B)TH1* 11,12.

Theorem (TH19)  (A→C)→ ((B→C)→(((A→B)→B)→C))

#wffreason
1.¬A→(¬B→¬(¬A→¬¬B))TH10
2.B→¬¬BFRG-3
3.(B→¬¬B)→(¬A→(B→¬¬B))THEN-1
4.¬A→(B→¬¬B)MP 2,3
5.(¬A→(B→¬¬B))→((¬A→B)→(¬A→¬¬B))THEN-2
6.(¬A→B)→(¬A→¬¬B)MP 4,5
7.¬(¬A→¬¬B)→¬(¬A→B)FRG-1* 6
8.¬A→(¬B→¬(¬A→B))TH14* 1,7
9.((A→B)→B)→(¬A→B)TH18
10.¬(¬A→B)→¬((A→B)→B)FRG-1* 9
11.¬A→(¬B→¬((A→B)→B))TH14* 8,10
12.¬C→(¬A→(¬B→¬((A→B)→B)))THEN-1* 11
13.(¬C→¬A)→(¬C→(¬B→¬((A→B)→B)))THEN-2* 12
14.(¬C→(¬B→¬((A→B)→B))) → ((¬C→¬B)→(¬C→¬((A→B)→B)))THEN-2
15.(¬C→¬A)→ ((¬C→¬B)→(¬C→¬((A→B)→B)))TH1* 13,14
16.(A→C)→(¬C→¬A)FRG-1
17.(A→C)→((→C→¬B)→(¬C→¬((A→B)→B)))TH1* 16,15
18.(¬C→¬((A→B)→B))→(((A→B)→B)→C)TH16
19.(A→C)→ ((¬C→¬B)→(((A→B)→B)→C))TH14* 17,18
20.(B→C)→(¬C→¬B)FRG-1
21.((B→C)→(¬C→¬B))→

(((¬C→¬B)→ (((A→B)→B)→C) ) → ( (B→C) → (((A→B)→B)→C)))

TH1
22.((¬C→¬B)→ (((A→B)→B)→C) ) → ( (B→C) → (((A→B)→B)→C))MP 20,21
23.(A→C)→ ((B→C)→(((A→B)→B)→C))TH1* 19,22.

Note: A→((A→B)→B) (TH8), B→((A→B)→B) (TH9), and (A→C)→((B→C)→(((A→B)→B)→C)) (TH19), so ((A→B)→B) behaves just like A∨B. (Compare with axioms OR-1, OR-2, and OR-3.)

Theorem (TH20)  (A→¬A)→¬A

#wffreason
1.(A→A)→((A→¬A)→¬A)TH11
2.A→ATH7
3.(A→¬A)→¬AMP 2,1.

TH20 corresponds to axiom NOT-3 of standard PC, called "tertium non datur".

Theorem (TH21)  A→(¬A→B)

#wffreason
1.A→(¬A→¬¬B)TH2, with B := ~B
2.¬¬B→BFRG-2
3.A→(¬A→B)TH14* 1,2.

TH21 corresponds to axiom NOT-2 of standard PC, called "ex contradictione quodlibet".

All the axioms of standard PC have been derived from Frege's PC, after having let

Rule ($1)  $2

A∧B := ¬(A→¬B) and A∨B := (A→B)→B. These expressions are not unique, e.g. A∨B could also have been defined as (B→A)→A, ¬A→B, or ¬B→A. Notice, though, that the definition A∨B := (A→B)→B contains no negations. On the other hand, A∧B cannot be defined in terms of implication alone, without using negation.

In a sense, the expressions A∧B and A∨B can be thought of as "black boxes". Inside, these black boxes contain formulas made up only of implication and negation. The black boxes can contain anything, as long as when plugged into the AND-1 through AND-3 and OR-1 through OR-3 axioms of standard PC the axioms remain true. These axioms provide complete syntactic definitions of the conjunction and disjunction operators.

The next set of theorems will aim to find the remaining four axioms of Frege's PC within the "theorem-space" of standard PC, showing that the theory of Frege's PC is contained within the theory of standard PC.

Theorem (ST1)  A→A

#wffreason
1.(A→((A→A)→A))→((A→(A→A))→(A→A))THEN-2
2.A→((A→A)→A)THEN-1
3.(A→(A→A))→(A→A)MP 2,1
4.A→(A→A)THEN-1
5.A→AMP 4,3.

Theorem (ST2)  A→¬¬A

#wffreason
1.Ahypothesis
2.A→(¬A→A)THEN-1
3.¬A→AMP 1,2
4.¬A→¬AST1
5.(¬A→A)→((¬A→¬A)→¬¬A)NOT-1
6.(¬A→¬A)→¬¬AMP 3,5
7.¬¬AMP 4,6
8.A ⊢ ¬¬Asummary 1-7
9.A→¬¬ADT 8.

ST2 is axiom FRG-3 of Frege's PC.

Theorem (ST3)  B∨C→(¬C→B)

#wffreason
1.C→(¬C→B)NOT-2
2.B→(¬C→B)THEN-1
3.(B→(¬C→B))→ ((C→(¬C→B))→((B ∨ C)→(¬C→B)))OR-3
4.(C→(¬C→B))→((B ∨ C)→(¬C→B))MP 2,3
5.B∨C→(¬C→B)MP 1,4.

Theorem (ST4)  ¬¬A→A

#wffreason
1.A∨¬ANOT-3
2.(A∨¬A)→(¬¬A→A)ST3
3.¬¬A→AMP 1,2.

ST4 is axiom FRG-2 of Frege's PC.

Prove ST5: (A→(B→C))→(B→(A→C))

#wffreason
1.A→(B→C)hypothesis
2.Bhypothesis
3.Ahypothesis
4.B→CMP 3,1
5.CMP 2,4
6.A→(B→C), B, A ⊢ Csummary 1-5
7.A→(B→C), B ⊢ A→CDT 6
8.A→(B→C) ⊢ B→(A→C)DT 7
9.(A→(B→C)) → (B→(A→C))DT 8.

ST5 is axiom THEN-3 of Frege's PC.

Theorem (ST6)  (A→B)→(¬B→¬A)

#wffreason
1.A→Bhypothesis
2.¬Bhypothesis
3.¬B→(A→¬B)THEN-1
4.A→¬BMP 2,3
5.(A→B)→((A→¬B)→¬A)NOT-1
6.(A→¬B)→¬AMP 1,5
7.¬AMP 4,6
8.A→B, ¬B ⊢ ¬Asummary 1-7
9.A→B ⊢ ¬B→¬ADT 8
10.(A→B)→(¬B→¬A)DT 9.

ST6 is axiom FRG-1 of Frege's PC.

Each of Frege's axioms can be derived from the standard axioms, and each of the standard axioms can be derived from Frege's axioms. This means that the two sets of axioms are interdependent and there is no axiom in one set that is independent from the other set. Therefore, the two sets of axioms generate the same theory: Frege's PC is equivalent to standard PC.

(For if the theories should be different, then one of them should contain theorems not contained by the other theory. These theorems can be derived from their own theory's axiom set: but as has been shown this entire axiom set can be derived from the other theory's axiom set, which means that the given theorems can actually be derived solely from the other theory's axiom set, so that the given theorems also belong to the other theory. Contradiction: thus the two axiom sets span the same theorem-space. By construction: Any theorem derived from the standard axioms can be derived from Frege's axioms, and vice versa, by first proving as theorems the axioms of the other theory as shown above and then using those theorems as lemmas to derive the desired theorem.)

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Begriffsschrift is a book on logic by Gottlob Frege, published in 1879, and the formal system set out in that book.

In mathematical logic, a proof calculus or a proof system is built to prove statements.

In metalogic and metamathematics, Frege's theorem is a metatheorem that states that the Peano axioms of arithmetic can be derived in second-order logic from Hume's principle. It was first proven, informally, by Gottlob Frege in his 1884 Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik and proven more formally in his 1893 Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I. The theorem was re-discovered by Crispin Wright in the early 1980s and has since been the focus of significant work. It is at the core of the philosophy of mathematics known as neo-logicism.

Logic is the formal science of using reason and is considered a branch of both philosophy and mathematics and to a lesser extent computer science. Logic investigates and classifies the structure of statements and arguments, both through the study of formal systems of inference and the study of arguments in natural language. The scope of logic can therefore be very large, ranging from core topics such as the study of fallacies and paradoxes, to specialized analyses of reasoning such as probability, correct reasoning, and arguments involving causality. One of the aims of logic is to identify the correct and incorrect inferences. Logicians study the criteria for the evaluation of arguments.

In logic, especially mathematical logic, a Hilbert system, sometimes called Hilbert calculus, Hilbert-style deductive system or Hilbert–Ackermann system, is a type of system of formal deduction attributed to Gottlob Frege and David Hilbert. These deductive systems are most often studied for first-order logic, but are of interest for other logics as well.

In proof complexity, a Frege system is a propositional proof system whose proofs are sequences of formulas derived using a finite set of sound and implicationally complete inference rules. Frege systems are named after Gottlob Frege.

Logic The study of inference and truth

Logic is the systematic study of valid rules of inference, i.e. the relations that lead to the acceptance of one proposition on the basis of a set of other propositions (premises). More broadly, logic is the analysis and appraisal of arguments.

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