Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc | |
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Court | Supreme Court of California |
Full case name | William B. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc |
Decided | January 24, 1963 |
Citation(s) | Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57 [27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897] |
Case history | |
Prior action(s) | On appeal from the Superior Court of San Diego |
Court membership | |
Judge(s) sitting | Judge Roger J Traynor |
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc, was a California torts case in which the Supreme Court of California dealt with the torts regarding product liability and warranty breaches. The primary legal issue of the case was to determine whether a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. [1] The case was originally heard in a San Diego district court where the verdict was against the manufacturer. This verdict was appealed by the manufacturer to the Supreme Court of California which was presided by Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., and the opinion was delivered by Judge Roger J Traynor.
In 1955, the plaintiff, Mr William B Greenman received a Shopsmith, which is a power tool that can be used as a saw, drill and a lathe, as a Christmas gift from his wife. In 1957, he purchased the attachment to use the tool as a lathe and he used this attachment on several occasions with ease. However, on one such occasion, the attachment flew from the machine and hit him on the head, causing severe injuries. [2] Over ten months later, he presented a written notice to the retailer and manufacturer (Yuba Power Products, Inc) for breach of warranties and filed a complaint against both of them for damages on the grounds of breaches of warranties and for negligence.
In 1957, the plaintiff, Mr Greenman brought charges against Yuba Power Products, Inc and the retailer from where the Shopsmith was purchased, for breach of expressed and implied warranties and negligence. The case was heard in the Superior Court of San Diego County, by Judge Robert W Conyers and an appointed jury. The jury in the case found in favour of the retailer claiming that the evidence did not support negligence or any breach of warranties on the side of the retailer and also ruled that there was no evidence to support breach of implied warranties by the manufacturer. Consequently, the plaintiff submitted a cause of action for negligence against the manufacturer. Accordingly, the court did find in favour of the plaintiff against the manufacturer and awarded a damages of $65,000 to the plaintiff, but ruled in favour of the retailer against the plaintiff on the charge of breach of warranties. [3] The manufacturer appealed this judgement and the case was taken to the Supreme Court of California.
The evidence presented by the plaintiff in the preliminary trial primarily supported the negligence of the manufacturer and the inherent defects of the product. He brought in expert witnesses who testified that there were not enough set screws used to hold the various parts of the machine together and therefore, any regular vibrations would cause the tailstock of the lathe to move away from the wood, allowing it to fly from the lathe. With this information, the jury was able to reasonably conclude that the manufacture constructed the Shopsmith negligently. These witnesses also remarked how there were other efficient methods of fastening the parts of the machine, which could have prevented the injury if implemented. Besides witness testimonies, the plaintiff's case was also based on the proof that the injuries caused to him occurred while using the Shopsmith for its intended purpose and were not caused by an unforeseeable or inevitable action. [4]
The manufacturer's sole defence in this case was the timing of the plaintiff's complaint. The manufacturer argued that the period of ten and a half months that passed after the injury was beyond the reasonably permitted time to create a cause of action for breach of warranties. [5] To strengthen their argument, the defence brought up section 1769 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which states that a purchaser of a product must notify the manufacturer of a breach of warranty within a reasonable time period. Due to the plaintiff's inability to notify the manufacturer within such a time period, the defence argued that this complaint must be quashed. Additionally, the manufacturer also contested the ambiguous reasoning behind the judgement of the San Diego Court. The manufacturer argued that it was not certain whether the verdict was based on negligence or breach of warranties. [6] Due to this ambiguity, Yuba Power Products, Inc disputed the judgement and claimed that it was prejudicial in nature, as was the complaint breach of warranties filed by the plaintiff.
Judge Roger J Traynor led the judgement [7] with an analysis of section 1769 and its applicability in the case. To reach a decision on this issue, he considered the requirements of section 1769. He points out that while this legislation is made to protect sellers from undue delayed claims for damages, the personal injury that was inflicted in this case plays an important role in the determination of the judgement. Accordingly, since there was a personal injury to the plaintiff caused by a defective product, the cause of action for damages was not barred as per section 1769. Traynor went on to define the necessities to impose strict liability as per section 1732 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Traynor expressed that to impose strict liability on a manufacturer, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to establish an express warranty as per section 1732 and therefore there is no need for an explicit contract between the manufacturer and the buyer. It is here where the court held that “a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being”. [8] Given that the tool was used for its intended purpose, and still caused injury to the plaintiff, it stands that the manufacturer should be liable. Traynor concluded his judgement with an explanation of the purpose of imposing strict liability in a case such as this, stating that it must be ensured that the cost of injuries that occur due to a defective product must be borne by the manufacturer that introduces such a defective product into the market. To prove the manufacturer's strict liability, it was sufficient for the plaintiff to establish that he had injured himself while using the machine in the way in which it was intended and that such an injury was the result of a defect in the manufacturing of the product. Every judge on the bench concurred with Traynor's opinion and the judgement of the lower court was affirmed.
The judgements of legal cases form precedent or ratio decidendi which can be applied in later cases. Greenman v Yuba Power Products, Inc has shaped the judgements of several cases after it. The ratio decidendi or the theories that this case has enshrined within the legal system are as follows [9]
Section 1769 of the California Code of Civil Procedure deals with the rights of parties to a sale, but it does not state that notice must be given regarding the breach of warranties that arises from a contract of sale between two parties. These independent warranties are not imposed by the Sales Act, but rather through common law precedent that may have acknowledged them. The notice requirement of section 1769 of the California Code of Civil Procedure should not be accepted by the court as a dense in cases of product liability when the defective product has caused injury to the consumer. Affirmations of facts or promises made by a seller about a product can be considered as expressed warranties if these affirmations have been made to convince a buyer to purchase a product, and if the buyer purchases the product based on these claims.
Perhaps the primary ratio of this case is "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being". [10] This ratio has been extended to cover a wider range of products that can exhibit defective qualities. Strict liability is to be imposed on the manufacturer in cases where a consumer is injured by a defective problem. This is to ensure that the costs of injury is not forced onto the consumer, but rather is covered by the corporation that put the defective product in the market. Liability is not to be governed by the law of contract warranties, but by the law of torts. Therefore, rules made to govern warranties that were developed for commercial purposes cannot be invoked to determine a manufacturer's liability when their product has caused injury. To establish a manufacturer's liability in a product liability case, it is sufficient that the plaintiff proves that they were injured while using the product for its intended purpose.
This case has created several debates regarding law's protection of the consumer over the manufacturer and the difficulty for a defence in product liability cases. It has been pointed out that this case represents the plight of the non negligent manufacturer who faces lawsuits from the all powerful consumer. [11] The case has also brought about questions regarding the definition of negligence and the threshold of proof required to prove a manufacturer's liability for product negligence. [12] Another important legal implication of this case is the theory it created regarding defective products and its meaning, with the predominant argument revolving around the criteria necessary for a product to be considered a defective item. [13] With regard to the aspect of a defective product, following this case, there was a question as to the relative extent to which a product must be defective to be able to establish strict liability. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's decision in Greenman v Yuba Power Products was applied to the later case of Cronin v JBE Olson Corp., which further extended the definition of a defective product with respect to negligence to include design defects of a product as well, thereby increasing the burden on manufacturers in product liability cases. [14] Additionally, this case also sparked a debate regarding warranty claims and the intersection of contract and tort law in product liability cases. The nature of product liability cases which often include certain contracts, such as the warranties after sale and the contract of sale, creates the problem of ambiguity regarding legal jurisdiction. [15] It is in response to these issues that legal scholars have published work which detail the scope of warranty breach within product liability cases and the parameters necessary for a warranty breach to amount to strict liability. [16] Besides its impact on legal jurisprudence, the rationale and precedent set by Greenman v Yuba Power Products, Inc. has also aided the judgement of several cases that followed it. O'Neil v. Crane Co., an important California case in 2012 which dealt with product liability against an asbestos manufacturer whose product caused severe injuries to the plaintiff, cited Greenman in its judgement. [17] Greenman was also useful in the 1999 case of Hodges v. Superior Court, in which a plaintiff brought charges against a car manufacturer following a serious accident. [18]
Product liability is the area of law in which manufacturers, distributors, suppliers, retailers, and others who make products available to the public are held responsible for the injuries those products cause. Although the word "product" has broad connotations, product liability as an area of law is traditionally limited to products in the form of tangible personal property.
In law and insurance, a proximate cause is an event sufficiently related to an injury that the courts deem the event to be the cause of that injury. There are two types of causation in the law: cause-in-fact, and proximate cause. Cause-in-fact is determined by the "but for" test: But for the action, the result would not have happened. The action is a necessary condition, but may not be a sufficient condition, for the resulting injury. A few circumstances exist where the but-for test is ineffective. Since but-for causation is very easy to show, a second test is used to determine if an action is close enough to a harm in a "chain of events" to be legally valid. This test is called proximate cause. Proximate cause is a key principle of insurance and is concerned with how the loss or damage actually occurred. There are several competing theories of proximate cause. For an act to be deemed to cause a harm, both tests must be met; proximate cause is a legal limitation on cause-in-fact.
Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine in common law and Roman-Dutch law jurisdictions under which a court can infer negligence from the very nature of an accident or injury in the absence of direct evidence on how any defendant behaved in the context of tort litigation. Although specific criteria differ by jurisdiction, an action typically must satisfy the following elements of negligence: the existence of a duty of care, breach of appropriate standard of care, causation, and injury. In res ipsa loquitur, the existence of the first three elements is inferred from the existence of injury that does not ordinarily occur without negligence.
A tort is a civil wrong that causes a claimant to suffer loss or harm, resulting in legal liability for the person who commits the tortious act. Tort law can be contrasted with criminal law, which deals with criminal wrongs that are punishable by the state. While criminal law aims to punish individuals who commit crimes, tort law aims to compensate individuals who suffer harm as a result of the actions of others. Some wrongful acts, such as assault and battery, can result in both a civil lawsuit and a criminal prosecution in countries where the civil and criminal legal systems are separate. Tort law may also be contrasted with contract law, which provides civil remedies after breach of a duty that arises from a contract. Obligations in both tort and criminal law are more fundamental and are imposed regardless of whether the parties have a contract.
Punitive damages, or exemplary damages, are damages assessed in order to punish the defendant for outrageous conduct and/or to reform or deter the defendant and others from engaging in conduct similar to that which formed the basis of the lawsuit. Although the purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the plaintiff, the plaintiff will receive all or some of the punitive damages in award.
In criminal and civil law, strict liability is a standard of liability under which a person is legally responsible for the consequences flowing from an activity even in the absence of fault or criminal intent on the part of the defendant.
This article addresses torts in United States law. As such, it covers primarily common law. Moreover, it provides general rules, as individual states all have separate civil codes. There are three general categories of torts: intentional torts, negligence, and strict liability torts.
Assumption of risk is a defense, specifically an affirmative defense, in the law of torts, which bars or reduces a plaintiff's right to recovery against a negligent tortfeasor if the defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly assumed the risks at issue inherent to the dangerous activity in which the plaintiff was participating at the time of their injury.
In tort law, a duty of care is a legal obligation that is imposed on an individual, requiring adherence to a standard of reasonable care to avoid careless acts that could foreseeably harm others, and lead to claim in negligence. It is the first element that must be established to proceed with an action in negligence. The claimant must be able to show a duty of care imposed by law that the defendant has breached. In turn, breaching a duty may subject an individual to liability. The duty of care may be imposed by operation of law between individuals who have no current direct relationship but eventually become related in some manner, as defined by common law.
Roger John Traynor was the 23rd Chief Justice of California (1964–1970) and an associate justice of the Supreme Court of California from 1940 to 1964. Previously, he had served as a Deputy Attorney General of California under Earl Warren, and an Acting Dean and Professor of UC Berkeley School of Law. He is widely considered to be one of the most creative and influential judges and legal scholars of his time.
Tortious interference, also known as intentional interference with contractual relations, in the common law of torts, occurs when one person intentionally damages someone else's contractual or business relationships with a third party, causing economic harm. As an example, someone could use blackmail to induce a contractor into breaking a contract; they could threaten a supplier to prevent them from supplying goods or services to another party; or they could obstruct someone's ability to honor a contract with a client by deliberately refusing to deliver necessary goods.
Comparative responsibility is a doctrine of tort law that compares the fault of each party in a lawsuit for a single injury. Comparative responsibility may apply to intentional torts as well as negligence and encompasses the doctrine of comparative negligence.
Canadian tort law is composed of two parallel systems: a common law framework outside Québec and a civil law framework within Québec. Outside Québec, Canadian tort law originally derives from that of England and Wales but has developed distinctly since Canadian Confederation in 1867 and has been influenced by jurisprudence in other common law jurisdictions. Meanwhile, while private law as a whole in Québec was originally derived from that which existed in France at the time of Québec's annexation into the British Empire, it was overhauled and codified first in the Civil Code of Lower Canada and later in the current Civil Code of Quebec, which codifies most elements of tort law as part of its provisions on the broader law of obligations. As most aspects of tort law in Canada are the subject of provincial jurisdiction under the Canadian Constitution, tort law varies even between the country's common law provinces and territories.
In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an automobile manufacturer's attempt to use an express warranty that disclaimed an implied warranty of merchantability was invalid.
Economic loss is a term of art which refers to financial loss and damage suffered by a person which is seen only on a balance sheet and not as physical injury to person or property. There is a fundamental distinction between pure economic loss and consequential economic loss, as pure economic loss occurs independent of any physical damage to the person or property of the victim. It has also been suggested that this tort should be called "commercial loss" as injuries to person or property can be regarded as "economic".
The following outline is provided as an overview of and introduction to tort law in common law jurisdictions:
Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (1932) is a US tort law case regarding negligent misstatement, decided by Cardozo, C.J. It contained the now famous line on "floodgates" that the law should not admit "to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), was a decision of the Supreme Court of California involving an injury caused by an exploding bottle of Coca-Cola. It was an important case in the development of the common law of product liability in the United States, not so much for the actual majority opinion, but for the concurring opinion of California Supreme Court justice Roger Traynor.
Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918), is part of a progression of cases that influenced the products liability synthesis that emerged in the 1930s. These cases influenced Judge Cardozo's argument in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. that a person could be liable for a defective product to someone other than the immediate purchaser. This created the law of product liability.
Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1922), was a products liability case before the New York Court of Appeals. The Court held that a plaintiff cannot recover from a defendant based on implied warranty when she does not have contractual privity with him; thus, a plaintiff cannot recover from a defendant who sold her employer food unfit for consumption, because the defendant's implied warranty extended only to the employer.