A lien is a form of security interest granted over an item of property to secure the payment of a debt or performance of some other obligation. The owner of the property, who grants the lien, is referred to as the lienee and the person who has the benefit of the lien is referred to as the lienor or lien holder.
Hypothec, sometimes tacit hypothec, is a term used in mixed legal systems to refer to an express or implied non-possessory real security over corporeal movable property. This real right in security operates by way of hypothecation, often arises by operation of law, and gives a creditor a preferential right to have claims paid out of the hypothecated property as last recourse when the debtor is in default. At common law it is equivalent to an American non-possessory lien or English legal charge.
A fraudulent conveyance, or fraudulent transfer, is an attempt to avoid debt by transferring money to another person or company. It is generally a civil, not a criminal matter, meaning that one cannot go to jail for it, but in some jurisdictions there is potential for criminal prosecution. It is generally treated as a civil cause of action that arises in debtor/creditor relations, particularly with reference to insolvent debtors. The cause of action is typically brought by creditors or by bankruptcy trustees.
A security interest is a legal right granted by a debtor to a creditor over the debtor's property which enables the creditor to have recourse to the property if the debtor defaults in making payment or otherwise performing the secured obligations. One of the most common examples of a security interest is a mortgage: When person, by the action of an expressed conveyance, pledges by a promise to pay a certain sum of money, with certain conditions, on a said date or dates for a said period, that action on the page with wet ink applied on the part of the one wishing the exchange creates the original funds and negotiable Instrument. That action of pledging conveys a promise binding upon the mortgagee which creates a face value upon the Instrument of the amount of currency being asked for in exchange. It is therein in good faith offered to the Bank in exchange for local currency from the Bank to buy a house. The particular country's Bank Acts usually requires the Banks to deliver such fund bearing negotiable instruments to the Countries Main Bank such as is the case in Canada. This creates a security interest in the land the house sits on for the Bank and they file a caveat at land titles on the house as evidence of that security interest. If the mortgagee fails to pay defaulting in his promise to repay the exchange, the bank then applies to the court to for-close on your property to eventually sell the house and apply the proceeds to the outstanding exchange.
Re Atkinson, Barbers' Company v Grose-Smith [1904] 2 Ch 160 is an English trusts law case, which lays down a rule of equity relating to the disposition by the trustees of an authorised mortgage security where the security forms part of a trust fund, and the beneficiaries of the trust fund include a tenant for life and a remainderman. Where the security is sold and the proceeds are insufficient to satisfy the principal and interest in full, it is necessary to determine the way in which the loss shall be shared as between the tenant for life and the remainderman. The sum realised by the sale must be apportioned between the life tenant and the remainderman in the proportion that the amount due for the arrears of interest bears to the amount due in respect of principal.
Devaynes v Noble (1816) 35 ER 781, best known for the claim contained in Clayton's case, created a rule, or rather common law presumption, in relation to the distribution of monies from a bank account. The rule is based upon the deceptively simple notion of first-in, first-out to determine the effect of payments from an account, and normally applies in English Law in the absence of evidence of any other intention. Payments are presumed to be appropriated to debts in the order in which the debts are incurred.
The Bishop's Castle Railway was begun in 1861, planned as a line from Craven Arms to Montgomery, thus linking the Shrewsbury to Hereford line to the Oswestry to Newtown line, linking Mid-Wales and Shrewsbury, with a branch line from Lydham to Bishop's Castle.
Central Railroad & Banking Co. of Ga. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885), was an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Middle district of Alabama in favor of the appellees, Pettus & Dawson and Watts & Sons, adjudging them entitled to the sum of, 161.21, and interest thereon at eight percent per annum from March 7, 1881, with lien, to secure its payment, upon the roadbed, depots, side tracks, turnouts, trestles, and bridges owned and used by the appellants, corporations of the State of Georgia, in operating the railroad formerly belonging to the Montgomery and West Point Railroad Company, an Alabama corporation, and which extends from Montgomery to West Point, with a branch from Opelika to Columbus. This property was directed to be exposed to sale unless within a given time the said amount was paid. This suit is the outgrowth of certain litigation in the courts of Alabama relating to the before-mentioned and other railroad property in which the appellants are interested.
Anderson County Commissioners v. Beal, 113 U.S. 227 (1885), was a United States Supreme Court case.
Pneumatic Gas Co. v. Berry, 113 U.S. 322 (1885), was a case regarding a decree whereby a director of a corporation can be released by that corporation of all claims, equitable or otherwise, arising out of transactions under a contract between the corporation and the director made in excess of its corporate powers is valid, if made in good faith and without fraud or concealment.
Morgan v. Hamlet, 113 U.S. 449 (1885), was a bill in equity filed by the appellants, September 3, 1879.
Provident Institution for Savings v. Mayor of Jersey City, 113 U.S. 506 (1885), was a bill in equity filed in the Court of Chancery of New Jersey by the appellant, to foreclose two mortgages given to it on a certain lot in Jersey City, New Jersey by Michael Nugent and wife, and another person.
Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U.S. 516 (1885), was an appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Wyoming regarding a bill charging that the collection of an illegal tax would involve the plaintiff in a multiplicity of suits as to the title of lots being laid out and sold, which would prevent their sale, and which would cloud the title to all his real estate, states a case for relief in equity.
Peugh v. Davis, 113 U.S. 542 (1885), was a suit in equity for redeeming unoccupied and unenclosed city lots from a mortgage, continued from a case brought to the high court during the October 1877 term, the question then was whether certain instruments of writing, made by Peugh to Davis constituted an absolute conveyance of lots in the District of Columbia or were in the nature of a mortgage security for loan of money. The court was of opinion that, on all the facts of the case, the latter was the true construction of the transaction between the parties. Respondent defended against complainant's claim to redeem by setting up that the alleged mortgage was an absolute conveyance. This being decided adversely, held that, in accounting as mortgagee in constructive possession, he was not liable for a temporary speculative rise in the value of the tract, which subsequently declined—both during the time of such possession.
California Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609 (1885), involved a bill that was filed by the appellant against the appellee complaining that the latter was infringing on a letters patent granted to one John J. Schillinger, and which had been assigned for the State of California to the complainant.
Flagg v. Walker, 113 U.S. 659 (1885), regards a case where the deeds for several parcels of land were transferred from Flagg, who was in financial difficulty, to Walker in return for paying off Flagg's debts and profits from the sale against a mortgage for other property owned by Flagg.
Fourth National Bank of St. Louis v. Stout, 113 U.S. 684 (1885), was a suit in equity begun by Stout, Mills & Co., judgment creditors of the Yeager Milling Company, to recover from the Fourth National Bank their pro rata share of certain property of the debtor company which was in the hands of the bank.
Boyer v. Boyer, 113 U.S. 689 (1885), was a suit in error brought in a state court of Pennsylvania for an injunction restraining the commissioners of Schuylkill County from levying a county tax for the year 1883 upon certain shares in the Pennsylvania National Bank, an association organized under the National Banking Act. The suit proceeds upon the ground that such levy violates the act of Congress prescribing conditions upon state taxation of national bank shares in this, that "other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens" of that county is exempted by the laws of Pennsylvania from such taxation. A demurrer to the bill was sustained and the suit was dismissed. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, that judgment was affirmed on the ground that the laws of the state under which the defendants sought to justify the taxation were not repugnant to the act of Congress.
Carter v. Burr, 113 U.S. 737 (1885), was a case regarding a promissory note that was held by the appellee which secured by mortgage of premises in the City of Washington, DC to the appellant, to decide whether other transactions regarding the property would pay this note, or if it would instead remain in force, along with the right to participate in the proceeds arising from a sale under the mortgage.
Commonwealth v. Tluchak, 166 Pa. Super. 16, 70 A.2d 657 (1950). Judge Reno wrote the opinion of the Court.
