International Association for the Semiotics of Law

International Roundtables for the Semiotics of Law (IRSL) is a philosophical society founded in 1987 whose purpose is to promote semiotic analysis of the law. The International Journal for the Semiotics of Law (Springer) is the leading international journal of legal semiotics. It publishes every year a Special Issue arising from IRSL.

The President of IRSL is Anne Wagner (Lille University – France) and her Associate President is Sarah Marusek (Hawai’I Hilo University - USA), with a decision to alternate, whenever possible, meeting (IRSL) between Europe and North America.

Our International Roundtable for the Semiotics of Law (IRSL) is a forum which aims at developing international multi-disciplinary networks; contributing to the teaching and research of the semiotics of law; and promoting any action susceptible to enhance the notoriety and the recognition of our discipline.

History of IRSL

The International Roundtable for the Semiotics of Law held its first annual meeting in 2002 after the merger of two pre-existing organisations, both driven by remarkable people, both interested in law and semiotics, but with different emphases in their theoretical approaches. Bernard Jackson was the key figure in the Greimasian oriented International Association for the Semiotics of Law (IASL), which held most of its meetings in Europe. The late Roberta Kevelson was the driving force behind the Round Table for Law and Semiotics, which, from 1997, held an annual conference in Reading, Pennsylvania. Roberta was a student of Charles Sanders Peirce, and aside from publishing several monographs on his work, edited an annual collection of papers from the Roundtable. In April of 2007, another tradition began when Prof. Desmond Manderson of McGill University delivered the first Roberta Kevelson memorial lecture on the semiotics of law in Amherst. In Europe, Bernard Jackson established the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law in 1987. Eric Landowski, the first editor, undertook the role for eight years, followed by Maarten Henket, Dragan Milovanovic and now Anne Wagner. Bernard continued to play a central role in the production, dissemination and invigoration of the journal, working closely with editors. The publication continues today with a greater international scope but with a clear, firm, yet interdisciplinary commitment to the ‘semiotic’.

The annual meetings for both former organisations were the occasions for incredibly intense discussions, fuelled by the exceptional energy of both Bernard Jackson and Roberta Kevelson. Both were innovators, were ‘movers’, were setting history, were defining the contours of a new discipline, the ‘semiotics of law’ and providing an occasion for many now established scholars in the field to start their careers in this field. Kevelson’s vision was a ‘roundtable’ of no more than 35 scholars who met in plenary sessions beginning on a Friday night and continuing into Sunday evening. This intimacy and intensity continues in the Roundtables today.

When Bernard Jackson transferred the publishing responsibility for the journal to Kluwer Academic Publishing Co, and Roberta passed away from a heart attack in 1998, both organisations felt their loss. After some hesitation, a collective decision was made to merge the organisations to take advantage of obvious opportunities and synergy. The new name – the International Roundtable for the Semiotics of Law – the decision to alternate meetings between Europe and North America and to keep the Journal as well as the annual publication of an edited volume dedicated to the semiotics of law, the commitment to ensuring the group had a truly international make-up, the alternating of the presidency of the organization between Europe, the Americas and Australia, all speak to the intention of the merger to respectfully integrate the two organisations, to preserve, protect and extend their spirit, each and vigour.

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law (Springer)

The International Journal for the Semiotics of Law is the leading international journal in Legal Semiotics worldwide.We are pathfinders in mapping the contours of Legal Semiotics. We provide a high quality blind peer-reviewing process to all the papers via our online submission platform with well-established expert reviewers from all over the world. Our boards reflect this vision and mission.

We welcome submissions in English or in French.

We bridge different fields of expertise to allow a percolation of experience and a sharing of this advanced knowledge from individual, collective and/or institutional fields of competence.

We publish original and high quality papers that should ideally critique, apply or otherwise engage with semiotics or related theory and models of analyses, or with rhetoric, history of political and legal discourses, philosophy of language, pragmatics, sociolinguistics, deconstruction and all types of semiotics analyses including visual semiotics. We also welcome submissions, which reflect on legal philosophy or legal theory, hermeneutics, the relation between psychoanalysis and language, the intersection between law and literature, as well as the relation between law and aesthetics.

Living Signs of Law (Springer - law book series)

The series Living Signs of Law aims to delve into the diverse and innovative work within the field of law, specifically focusing on areas such as legal semiotics, hermeneutics, pragmatism, deconstructionism, interpretation, and history. It recognizes law as a complex system of signs that is constantly evolving and can have varying orientations, sometimes working independently and at other times conflicting with one another. Living Signs of Law seeks to explore how different perspectives on legal truth and legal culture can emerge within this dynamic and tension-filled system. The concept of law as “living signs” highlights its capacity to adapt to social changes while also creating alternative trajectories or means of change for more contemporary visions. However, certain lines of resistance may arise, hindering the process of change and resulting in inertia or slow transformation. These tensions within the system of legal signs reflect its non-homogeneous nature, influenced by internal and external forces that shape and divide it. The series aims to examine these forces and adjustment variables, providing a realistic and semiotically grounded understanding of the reality expressed through laws, statutes, decisions, and other legal activities. By exploring various trajectories and analyzing their relationships, the series seeks to reveal lines of evolutionary resistance or transformation within the field of law. It welcomes proposals that focus on semiotics or related theories and models of analysis, as well as topics such as rhetoric, political and legal discourse history, philosophy, pragmatics, sociolinguistics, deconstruction, and other types of semiotic analyses. Living Signs of Law aims to shed light on the dynamic nature of law and its diverse manifestations, providing a comprehensive exploration of legal signs, justice, hermeneutics, pragmatism, deconstructionism, interpretation, and history within the field of law, as well as examining the role of communication and representation in these processes.

Law and Visual Jurisprudence (Springer - law book series)

The Series Law and Visual Jurisprudence seeks to harness the diverse and innovative work within and across the boundaries of law, jurisprudence, and the visual in various contexts and manifestations. It seeks to bring together a range of diverse and at the same time cumulative research traditions related to these fields to identify fertile avenues for interdisciplinary research.

In our everyday lives, we experience law as a system of signs. Representations of legality are visually manifested in the materiality of things we see and spatially experience. Methodologically, aesthetic texts of legality semiotically emerge as examples of visual jurisprudence and illustrate the constitutive waltz between social governance, formal law, and materiality.

In its tangled relationship to regulation, the visual complexity of law is semiotically articulated as an ongoing process of meaning imbued with symbolism, memory, and cultural markers. Through a legal semiotics framework of symbolic articulation and analysis, the examination of law that happens in conjunction with the visual expands understandings of how law is crafted and takes root. Additionally, such an inquiry challenges the positivist view of law based within the courtroom as disciplinary spatial practices, the observation of everyday phenomenon, and the visible tethering of regulation to cultural understandings of legality generate a framework of visual jurisprudence. The Series seeks to enliven such frameworks as those in which law happens precisely without formal institutions of law and through which a visual-based methodology of law is crafted through everyday instances of ordinariness that contextualize the relationship between law, culture, and banality.

The Series welcomes proposals – be they edited collections or single-authored monographs – emphasizing the contingency and fluidity of legal concepts, stressing the existence of overlapping, competing and coexisting legal discourses, proposing critical approaches to law and the visual, identifying and discussing issues, proposing solutions to problems, offering analyses in areas such as legal semiotics, jurisprudence, and visual approaches to law.

TWO VISIONS OF LEGAL SEMIOTICS

1. Outline of Greimasian Semiotics (by Bernard Jackson)

Within legal semiotics a range of theoretical and methodo¬logical stances are to be found, one of the most important points of distinction amongst them being their views on reference. The semiotics of the Greimasian school is based upon a non-referential theory of meaning. It holds that meaning consists in relations within a particular system of signification, and does not depend upon a relationship of reference to the outside world. In this, it contrasts with the tradition of semiotics deriving, in modern times, from the work of C.S. Peirce. The claims of a legal semiotics inspired by Greimas (not all of which, of course, are unique to this particular tradition) may be summarised in the following propositions:

1 Law should not be considered as a set of reified norms, but rather as a communicative phenomenon, that is as messages and means of communication which actually circulate in the legal world (or worlds).

2 In explaining this construction of meaning (any meaning, not specifically legal meaning), a distinction is drawn between the “deep level” of signification, the “thematic level” and the “surface level” or “level of manifestation”. At the deep level we encounter “elementary structures of signification”, which are sometimes claimed to be universal, not only as between different types of discourse within a particular society, but also cross-culturally. These structures explain the minimum conditions for a discourse to bear any meaning at all; they are also necessary but insufficient parts of the explanation of what makes the meaning of a discourse “legal”. To complete that explanation, we need to attend to the particular ways in which the deep structures are invested at both the thematic level (the stock of internalised social knowledge, itself organised in narrative terms, or “narrative typifications of action”) and the surface level (“level of manifestation”, the sense data actually presented to us, including both the content of the text (or behaviour) and its manner of expression — whether oral or written). The methodologies used to approach these three levels are differents.

3 The deep level of discourse, i.e. the structure of meaning of sequences of sentences, is modeled upon the deep level of semantics, i.e. the structure of meaning of individual words in sentences, and consists in the interplay of two axes: the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic. We see here the influence of the structural tradition in linguistics, particularly Saussure and Hjelmslev.

4 The syntagmatic axis is the “semio-narrative” level, developed from the formal analysis of Russian folk-tales by Vladimir Propp. Every human action, for Greimas, begins with the establishment of a goal, which thereby institutes a semiotic object as “subject”. In realising the action, the subject will be helped or obstructed by other actions of other social actors. The desired action itself will be achieved, or not achieved. But it is a characteristic of human action that the sequence does not finish there. Man, as a thinking being, reflects upon past actions. As a consequence, the syntagmatic axis of Greimas concludes with the concept of recognition (or “sanction”). Human action (whether real or fictional) thus appears meaningful in terms of a basic (“narrative”) sequence, which consists in the setting of goals (“contract”), “performance” (or non-performance) of those goals, and “recognition” of that performance (or non-performance). These goals may be of any kind. It is particularly important in the present context to stress that they may include communicative goals: the advocate is institutionally set a goal of persuasion — but others equally set themselves such goals.

5 The paradigmatic axis (following Saussurean and Lévi-Straussian foundations) is more abstract. At every point on the syntagmatic axis, there are choices to be made. But such choices are limited to things which may be substitutable, one for the other. At each point in the narrative syntagm, there thus exist (conventionally-defined) semiotic constraints, as to what elements are substitutable for each other without altering the meaning of other elements in the syntagm. Greimasian semiotics represents these elements through a formal devise, the “carré sémiotique”, which has features both in common with and diverging from the square of classical logic. Like deontic logic, it provides an account of the relations between such concepts as duty, permission, prohibition; but it can also explain the sense relations contained in groups of concepts not explicable in terms of classical logic, such as the choice between marriage and cohabitation.

6 Both the narrative syntagm and narrative typifications of action are applicable not only to the content of a narrative (semantics), but also to the act of enunciation (or communication) of that narrative (pragmatics). This generates the concept of the “narrativisation of pragmatics”. The enunciation of messages is as much an action as anything else which human beings do. It is generally assumed to be meaningful action. We therefore have to ask whence derives its meaning. A Greimassian would suggest that there are necessary conditions for the attribution of such meaning, including the semio-narrative syntagm (“deep level”). But within any particular society or social group, what counts as a successful enunciation, and what type of enunciative meaning is attributed to it (assertion, threat, play, irony, etc.) are matters of internalised social knowledge (“thematic level”), as indeed are the signs (at the “level of manifestation”) of successful performance.

7 There is no “deep structure” in the Chomskyan sense peculiar to legal discourse. But by using the methodological tools provided by the general theory of signification of the Greimasian school, we may identify the specifically legal manifestations of these general structures. Legal discourse may manifest (by attributing to its actors) a particular set of actantial roles. And at the linguistic level of manifestation, it may prove distinctive in any of its syntactic, semantic and pragmatic dimensions. Law has its own groups of users, amongst whom signification is conveyed in particular ways.

8 There is a sociological dimension to the description of the semiotic specificity of law, particularly as represented in modern pragmatics. The linguistic features of different legal discourses cannot be studied in isolation from the use made of such discourses. When we study such uses, we have to identify the users of each form of discourse, and their particular purposes (which are often institutionally defined). Such groups are sometimes called “groupes sémiotiques” — networks of people who communicate messages to each other, using codes and other semiotic devices particular to those groups. It is this pragmatic dimension of semiotic analysis which provides both part of the description of, and an explanation of the significance of, the existence of a set of different legal discourses within what we call “the law”.

9 The semiotician does not take at face value the self-description of a phenomenon as “legal”. Such a self-description is no more than part of the message which the phenomenon conveys. What the semiotician perceives as presented to him or her is simply discourse (though not necessarily written or even linguistic discourse). It follows that s/he is not bound to accept that different discourses form a single set simply because each describes itself as “legal”. And in fact, the semiotician will analyse individually all those different types of discourse which are conventionally regarded as forming part of the legal system: legislation, jurisprudence, doctrine, as well as unofficial legal discourses such as lawyer-client conversations and indeed legal philosophy itself. Since Greimasian semiotics rejects the idea of extra-linguistic reference, it cannot conclude that all such discourses refer to the same thing, “the law”. Rather, each one makes internal claims (explicit or implicit) to refer to other “legal” discourses, but these claims are simply part of the message that each such discourse conveys. The extent to which this multiplicity of self-describing legal discourses do in fact form a single set will depend upon the outcome of a comparative analysis of their respective semiotic characteristics — and indeed of their comparison with other, non-legal discourses. We may, for example, find that lawyer-client discourse has more in common with that between doctor and patient than with other types of “legal” discourse. We may find that the means used to convey the message that a particular discourse is “legal” is entirely different when the discourse is between layman and layman, lawyer and lawyer, client and lawyer, lawyer and judge, etc.

See further B.S. Jackson, Making Sense in Law (Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications, 1995), ch.5, and for a more detailed and technical account, Semiotics and Legal Theory, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985; paperback ed. 1987, reprinted Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications, 1997.

2. Charles Peirce and the Semiotics of Law (by Charls Pearson)

Charles Peirce’s association with the semiotics of law began very early when he organized the Meta-physical Club. One of the original members was Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who later went on to become the greatest jurist who ever presided over the Supreme Court of the United States as its Chief Justice. In the Metaphysical Club, Holmes was indoctrinated by Peirce’s early development of logic, semiotics, and pragmatism stemming from about 1871, all of which he eagerly absorbed, and which became the foundation for his new approach to the solution of legal questions and changed the course of American jurisprudence forever. Later, Peirce made more direct contributions to the semiotics of law. But to evaluate them, we have to remember his distinction between intellectual matters and matters of great urgency. All of his direct contributions apply only to intellectual matters such as the relation of philosophy of law to meaning, pragmatism, semiotics, ethics, morality, and culture.

Peirce’s first direct contribution to the philosophy of law, and indeed, to all philosophy, was to formu-late a new theory of meaning placing emphasis on the relation between the future practical effects of our concepts and our disposition to action. He is probably best known for his Pragmatic Maxim which is often regarded as the founding of the philosophy of pragmatism. In reality, he was trying to develop a more powerful theory of meaning which cut a very fine line between calling all metaphysical con-cepts meaningless, as the French Positivists did, and assigning meaning to all metaphysical concepts, like the worst excesses of German Idealism. It is this stronger theory of meaning, stated by the Prag-matic Maxim, that is needed for a deeper understanding of the philosophy of law. In its mature formulation, the Pragmatic Maxim states:

In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception (CP 5.9: 1905).

Like the classic ambiguity, in the English languages, of process words between the action of the pro-cess and the result of the process, the concept of the law is ambiguous. If we define the law as the codification of the relations between Society and the Individual then the law is both a sign and a sign process . Thus a science of signs is essential for serious study of the law. This science of signs, called “semiotics”, was begun by Peirce. Semiotics was first mentioned by the ancient Greek medics, who studied methods of diagnosis by means of signs, and was first introduced into serious philosophy by St. Augustine as the foundation of his epistemology. But it was Peirce who discovered the triadic structure of the sign, and thereby opened semiotics up to development as a science. In order to apply his discovery of the importance of triadic relations, Peirce developed troth a logic, an algebra, and a geometry applicable to all relations. Using his relational logic, Peirce was able to develop a taxonom-ic science of semiotics. The essential triadic nature of the sign requires a three-dimensional space for the analysis of all sign relations . The American philosopher Charles Morris gave these their traditional names of “syntac-tic”, “pragmatic”, and “semantic” . An in-depth analysis of the properties and structure of each of these dimensions determines that it is the pragmatic dimension of the sign that relates most closely with analysis of the law . Peirce had originally begun the analysis of these pragmatic properties with his concepts of interpretant and interpretation, and his analysis of habit, community, interpreter, dy-namic interpretant, energetic interpretant, emotive interpretant, and the role that teleology plays in the pragmatic dimension of the sign.

Peirce’s semiotic taxonomy, i.e., sign categories, yield the best starting point for semiotic analysis of legal theory, especially his categories of dynamic interpretant (related to the social and behavioral context of the sign), energetic interpretant (related to the process of interpreting the sign), and emo-tive interpretant (related to the teleology of the sign).

Although Peirce concentrated most of his applications of semiotics and pragmatism on metaphysics, logic, and philosophy of science, his disciples, especially John Dewey, have used his methodology to develop the philosophy of ethics, morality, esthetics, and have extended this to the philosophy of law. However, more recently, philosophers such as James Liszka have stated that Peirce’s philosophy itself presents a better foundation for the development of these extensions and especially the philosophy of law. Finally, of all the competing modes of thought, such as Saussure’s semiologie, only Peirce’s taxonom-ic science of semiotics satisfies all of the empirical evidence, thus allowing it to serve as the starting point for the development of the “new science of semiotics” which claims the ability to explain eve-ry form of meaning, information, communication, representation, and interpretation. In the New Sci-ence of Semiotics, Peirce’s sign categories serve as the boundary conditions to all process category operator equations and their solutions, thus guaranteeing the ability of semiotics to rigorously analyze all legal processes.

External links

• International Journal for the Semiotics of Law website