The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was a regulatory agency in the United States created by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. The agency's original purpose was to regulate railroads to ensure fair rates, to eliminate rate discrimination, and to regulate other aspects of common carriers, including interstate bus lines and telephone companies. Congress expanded ICC authority to regulate other modes of commerce beginning in 1906. Throughout the 20th century, several of ICC's authorities were transferred to other federal agencies. The ICC was abolished in 1995, and its remaining functions were transferred to the Surface Transportation Board.
The Hepburn Act is a 1906 United States federal law that expanded the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and gave it the power to set maximum railroad rates. This led to the discontinuation of free passes to loyal shippers. In addition, the ICC could view the railroads' financial records, a task simplified by standardized bookkeeping systems. For any railroad that resisted, the ICC's conditions would remain in effect until the outcome of legislation said otherwise. By the Hepburn Act, the ICC's authority was extended to cover bridges, terminals, ferries, railroad sleeping cars, express companies and oil pipelines.
The Mann–Elkins Act, also called the Railway Rate Act of 1910, was a United States federal law that strengthened the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) over railroad rates. The law also expanded the ICC's jurisdiction to include regulation of telephone, telegraph and wireless companies, and created a commerce court.
The Communications Act of 1934 is a United States federal law signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on June 19, 1934, and codified as Chapter 5 of Title 47 of the United States Code, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. The act replaced the Federal Radio Commission with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). It also transferred regulation of interstate telephone services from the Interstate Commerce Commission to the FCC.
In the United States government, independent agencies are agencies that exist outside the federal executive departments and the Executive Office of the President. In a narrower sense, the term refers only to those independent agencies that, while considered part of the executive branch, have regulatory or rulemaking authority and are insulated from presidential control, usually because the president's power to dismiss the agency head or a member is limited.
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Federal Communications Commission had the power to issue regulations pertaining to associations between broadcasting networks and their affiliated stations, otherwise known as "chain networks." The case is important in the development of American administrative law.
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), is a case in the development of American administrative law.
United States federal administrative law encompasses statutes, regulations, rules, common law rulings, and directives issued by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Executive Office of the President, that together define the extent of powers and responsibilities held by administrative agencies of the United States government. The executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the U.S. federal government cannot always directly perform their constitutional responsibilities. Specialized powers are therefore delegated to an agency, board, or commission. These administrative governmental bodies oversee and monitor activities in complex areas, such as commercial aviation, medical device manufacturing, and securities markets.
In United States administrative law, an organic statute is a statute enacted by Congress that creates an administrative agency and defines its authorities and responsibilities. Organic statutes may also impose administrative procedures on an agency that differ from the Administrative Procedure Act. Any modifications to an agency’s statutory powers beyond those included in the organic statute are added by Congress in subsequent enabling statutes.
The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 is a United States federal law that was designed to regulate the railroad industry, particularly its monopolistic practices. The Act required that railroad rates be "reasonable and just," but did not empower the government to fix specific rates. It also required that railroads publicize shipping rates and prohibited short haul or long haul fare discrimination, a form of price discrimination against smaller markets, particularly farmers in Western or Southern Territory compared to the Official Eastern states. The Act created a federal regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which it charged with monitoring railroads to ensure that they complied with the new regulations.
Houston East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914), also known as the Shreveport Rate Case, was a decision of the United States Supreme Court expanding the power of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States. Justice Hughes's majority opinion stated that the federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce also allowed it to regulate purely intrastate commerce in cases where control of the former was not possible without control of the latter. Because the Supreme Court consolidated several related appeals, they are sometimes collectively known as the "Shreveport Rate Cases" although the Supreme Court issued only one ruling.
United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 337 U.S. 426 (1949), is a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States addressing several issues, including the judicial standard of one party's inability to sue itself, the ability of the United States government specifically to sue federally affiliated departments, and the ability of courts to determine legislative intent. While this decision did not have many broad implications, it did offer a more "common-sense" understanding of determining what constitutes a justiciable controversy.
United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court.
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that the members of SCRAP—five law students from the George Washington University Law School—had standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution to challenge a nationwide railroad freight rate increase approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). SCRAP was the first full-court consideration of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The Court also reversed the lower court decision that an injunction should be issued at the suspension stage of the ICC rate proceeding. The standing decision has retained its place as the high mark in the Court's standing jurisprudence.
George W. Bush & Sons Co. v. Malloy, 267 U.S. 317 (1925), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that the state statute under which the Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) issued certificates of public convenience and necessity to common carriers engaged in interstate commerce violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
The following is a brief history of the North American rail system, mainly through major changes to Class I railroads, the largest class by operating revenue.
The Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886), is a United States Supreme Court case concerning the power of states to set transportation charges of railroad companies. The Court held that the fixing of freight and passenger rates in railroad transportation was a permissible exercise of state police power.
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court interpreted the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA) as not allowing a gas supply company to unilaterally modify rates in a natural gas supply contract by filing a new rate schedule with the Federal Power Commission (FPC). Mobile Gas and its companion case Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Co. established the Mobile-Sierra presumption which holds that an electricity or natural gas supply rate established resulting from a freely negotiated contract is presumed to be "just and reasonable" and thus acceptable under the NGA or Federal Power Act (FPA).
Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court interpreted the Federal Power Act (FPA) as permitting the Federal Power Commission (FPC) to modify a rate specified in a contract between an electric utility and distribution company only upon a finding that the contract rate is unlawful because it adversely affects the public interest. Sierra Pacific and its companion case United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp. established the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, which holds that an electricity or natural gas supply rate established resulting from a freely negotiated contract is presumed to be "just and reasonable" and thus acceptable under the FPA or Natural Gas Act (NGA).
The major questions doctrine is a relatively new principle of statutory interpretation applied in United States administrative law cases which states that courts will presume that Congress does not delegate to executive agencies issues of major political or economic significance.
