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Kevin James Murphy (born 1957) is a professor at the University of Southern California. Since 2006, Murphy has held the Kenneth L. Trefftzs Chair in Finance at the USC Marshall School of Business. [1] [2] He is also a Professor of Law at the USC Gould School of Law [3] and Professor of Economics at USC's College of Letters, Arts & Science. [4]
Before teaching at USC, Kevin Murphy was a professor at the Harvard Business School and the University of Rochester's William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration.
The Institute for Scientific Information's Web of Knowledge compiles a Highly Cited list composed of the most highly cited individuals within each of 21 broad subject categories; Kevin J. Murphy has been listed under Economics/Business since at least 2003. [5]
Kevin Murphy is a member of the American Economic Association and an associate editor of the Journal of Corporate Finance and Journal of Financial Economics. He received his PhD in Economics from the University of Chicago in 1984 and his BA, summa cum laude, from UCLA in 1979.
Murphy, Kevin.,Sandino, Tatiana. (2016) "Compensation Consultants and the Level, Composition and Complexity of CEO Pay".
Barron, Daniel.,Gibbons, Robert.,Gil, Ricard.,Murphy, Kevin. (2016) "Relational Adaptation under Reel Authority".
Jensen, Michael.,Murphy, Kevin.,Wruck, Eric. (2016) "CEO Pay and what to do about it: Restoring integrity into executive compensation and capital-market relations", Harvard Business School Press.
Murphy, Kevin.,Zabojnik, Jan. (2016) "Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs".
Murphy, Kevin. (2013) "Regulating Banking Bonuses in the European Union: A Case Study in Unintended Consequences", European Financial Management, 19, 631-657.
Murphy, Kevin. (2013) "Executive Compensation: Where we are, and how we got there", Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Elsevier Science North Holland, 4, 2A, 211-356.
Fernandes, Nuno.,Ferreira, Miguel.,Matos, Pedro.,Murphy, Kevin. (2013) "Are US CEOs Paid More? New International Evidence", Review of Financial Studies, 26, 323-367.
Conyon, Martin.,Fernandes, Nuno.,Ferreira, Miguel.,Matos, Pedro.,Murphy, Kevin. (2013) "The Executive Compensation Controversy: A Transatlantic Analysis ", Executive Remuneration and Employee Performance-Related Pay: A Transatlantic Perspective, Oxford University Press, 1, Part I, 8-115.
Boeri, Tito.,Lucifora, Claudio.,Murphy, Kevin. (2013) "Executive Remuneration and Employee Performance-Related Pay: A Transatlantic Perspective", Oxford University Press.
Murphy, Kevin. (2012) "Pay, Politics, and the Financial Crisis", Rethinking the Financial Crisis, Russell Sage Foundation, 12.
Murphy, Kevin. (2012) "The Politics of Pay: A Legislative History of Executive Compensation ", The Research Handbook on Executive Pay, Edward Elgar, 1.
Murphy, Kevin. (2012) "CEO Bonus Plans and How to Fix Them".
Baker, George.,Gibbons, Robert.,Murphy, Kevin. (2011) "Relational Adaptation".
Murphy, Kevin. (2010) "Executive Pay Restrictions for TARP Recipients: An Assessment".
Murphy, Kevin.,Sandino, Tatiana. (2010) "Executive Pay and "Independent" Compensation Consultants. Journal of Accounting and Economics 49 (3).", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49, 147-262.
Murphy, Kevin. (2009) "Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk".
Baker, George.,Gibbons, Robert.,Murphy, Kevin. (2008) "Strategic Alliances: Bridges Between 'Islands of Conscious Power'", Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 22, 146-163.
Lowry, Michelle.,Murphy, Kevin. (2007) "Executive Stock Options and IPO Underpricing", Journal of Financial Economics, 85, 39-65.
Murphy, Kevin.,Oyer, Paul. (2004) "Discretion in Executive Incentive Contracts", University of Southern California.
Hall, Brian.,Murphy, Kevin. (2003) "The Trouble with Stock Options", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17, 49-70.
Murphy, Kevin. (2003) "Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options", University of Chicago Law Review, 69, 847-869.
Murphy, Kevin. (2003) "Stock-Based Pay in New Economy Firms", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 34, 129-147.
Hall, Brian.,Murphy, Kevin. (2002) "Expensing will improve compensation decisions", Boston Globe.
Murphy, Kevin.,Gibbons, Robert.,Baker, George. (2002) "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 39-84.
Murphy, Kevin.,Hall, Brian. (2002) "Stock Options for Undiversified Executives", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33, 3-42.
Murphy, Kevin.,Conyon, Martin. (2002) "Stock-based executive compensation", Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity,Oxford University Press, 26, 625-646.
Baker, George.,Gibbons, Robert.,Murphy, Kevin. (2001) "Bringing the Market Inside the Firm", American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 92, 212-18.
Murphy, Kevin.,Hall, Brian. (2001) "Option Value Does Not Equal Option Cost", WorldatWork Journal, 10.
Murphy, Kevin. (2000) "Performance Standards in Incentive Contracts", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30, 245-78.
Conyon, Martin.,Murphy, Kevin. (2000) "The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the US and UK", Economic Journal, 110, F640-71.
Hall, Brian.,Murphy, Kevin. (2000) "Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options", American Economics Review Papers and Proceedings,90, 209-214.
Baker, George.,Gibbons, Robert.,Murphy, Kevin. (1999) "Informal Authority in Organizations", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 15, 56-73.
Murphy, Kevin. (1999) "Executive Compensation", Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier Science North Holland.
Hallock, Kevin.,Murphy, Kevin. (1999) "The Economics of Executive Compensation", Edward Elgar Publishing.
Baker, George.,Jensen, Michael.,Murphy, Kevin. (1998) "Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory", Journal of Finance, 43, 593-616.
Murphy, Kevin. (1998) "Executive Stock Options: An Economist's Perspective", American Compensation Association.
Murphy, Kevin. (1997) "Executive Compensation and the Modern Industrial Revolution", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15, 417-25.
Murphy, Kevin. (1997) "Disney Offers a Model for Executive Compensation", Los Angeles Business Journal.
Murphy, Kevin. (1997) "CEO Pay and Downsizing: The Social Consequences", American Compensation Association.
Murphy, Kevin. (1996) "Reporting Choice and the 1992 Proxy Disclosure Rules", Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, 11, 497-515.
Dial, Jay.,Murphy, Kevin. (1995) "Incentives, Downsizing, and Value Creation at General Dynamics", Journal of Financial Economics, 37, 261-314.
Murphy, Kevin. (1995) "Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation", University of Cincinnati Law Review, 63, 713-748.
Baker, George.,Gibbons, Robert.,Murphy, Kevin. (1994) "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1125-56.
Murphy, Kevin. (1994) "Governance, Behavior, and Performance of State and Corporate Pension Funds", Harvard University.
Jensen, Michael.,Murphy, Kevin. (1994) "Compensation at Lexerd Systems", Harvard Business School Press.
Murphy, Kevin. (1993) "Executive Compensation in Corporate America 1993", United Shareholders Association.
Murphy, Kevin.,Dial, Jay. (1993) "Compensation and Strategy and General Dynamics (A), (B)", Harvard Business School Press.
Murphy, Kevin.,Zimmerman, Jerold. (1993) "Financial Performance Surrounding CEO Turnover", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16, 273-315.
Murphy, Kevin. (1992) "Executive Compensation in Corporate America 1992", United Shareholders Association.
Gibbons, Robert.,Murphy, Kevin. (1992) "Does Executive Compensation Affect Investment?", Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 5.
Gibbons, Robert.,Murphy, Kevin. (1992) "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence", Journal of Political Economy, 100, 468-505.
Murphy, Kevin. (1992) "Performance Measurement and Appraisal: Motivating Managers to Identify and Reward Performance", Performance Measurement, Evaluation, and Incentives, Harvard Business School Press.
Murphy, Kevin. (1991) "Merck & Co., Inc. (A), (B), (C)", Harvard Business School Press.
Murphy, Kevin.,Jensen, Michael. (1990) "A New Survey of Executive Compensation: Full Survey and Technical Appendix to 'CEO Incentives - It's Not How Much You Pay but How", Simon School of Business, University of Rochester.
Jensen, Michael.,Murphy, Kevin. (1990) "CEO Incentives: It's Not How Much You Pay, But How", Harvard Business Review.
Jensen, Michael.,Murphy, Kevin. (1990) "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives", Journal of Political Economy, 98, 225-64.
Gibbons, Robert.,Murphy, Kevin. (1990) "Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers", Industrial and Labor Relations Review,43, 30S-51S.
Murphy, Kevin. (1989) "The Control and Performance of State-Owned Enterprises: Comment", Privatization and State-Owned Enterprises,Kluwer Academic, 59-68.
Murphy, Kevin. (1987) "Executive Compensation in Regulated Firms", William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration.
Murphy, Kevin. (1986) "Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts", RAND Journal of Economics, 17, 59-76.
Murphy, Kevin. (1986) "Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel They Get", Harvard Business Review, 64.
Murphy, Kevin. (1985) "Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Investigation", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, 11-42.
Murphy, Kevin. (1985) "Is Executive Compensation Related to Company Performance?", Rochester Management Review.
Jensen, Michael.,Murphy, Kevin. (1984) "Beware the Self-Serving Critics", New York Times. [6]
A chief executive officer (CEO), also known as a central executive officer (CEO), chief administrator officer (CAO), or just chief executive (CE), is one of a number of corporate executives charged with the management of an organization – especially an independent legal entity such as a company or nonprofit institution. CEOs find roles in a range of organizations, including public and private corporations, non-profit organizations and even some government organizations. The CEO of a corporation or company typically reports to the board of directors and is charged with maximizing the value of the business, which may include maximizing the share price, market share, revenues or another element. In the non-profit and government sector, CEOs typically aim at achieving outcomes related to the organization's mission, usually provided by legislation. CEOs are also frequently assigned the role of main manager of the organization and the highest-ranking officer in the C-suite.
Corporate governance is defined, described or delineated in diverse ways, depending on the writer's purpose. Writers focussed on a disciplinary interest or context often adopt narrow definitions that appear purpose-specific. Writers concerned with regulatory policy in relation to corporate governance practices often use broader structural descriptions. A broad (meta) definition that encompasses many adopted definitions is '“Corporate governance” describes the processes, structures, and mechanisms that influence the control and direction of corporations'.
Employee stock options (ESO) is a label that refers to compensation contracts between an employer and an employee that carries some characteristics of financial options.
In political science, supply chain management, and economics, the principal–agent problem, also known as agency dilemma or the agency problem, occurs when one person or entity is able to make decisions and/or take actions on behalf of, or that impact, another person or entity. This dilemma exists in circumstances where agents are motivated to act in their own best interests, which are contrary to those of their principals, and is an example of moral hazard. Issues also arise when companies have an incentive to become increasingly deferential to management that have ownership stakes. As shareholders are dis-incentived to intervene, there are fewer checks on management. Issues can also arise among different types of management.
Shareholder value is a business term, sometimes phrased as shareholder value maximization or as the shareholder value model, which implies that the ultimate measure of a company's success is the extent to which it enriches shareholders. It became prominent during the 1980s and 1990s along with the management principle value-based management or "managing for value".
Personnel economics has been defined as "the application of economic and mathematical approaches and econometric and statistical methods to traditional questions in human resources management". It is an area of applied micro labor economics, but there are a few key distinctions. One distinction, not always clearcut, is that studies in personnel economics deal with the personnel management within firms, and thus internal labor markets, while those in labor economics deal with labor markets as such, whether external or internal. In addition, personnel economics deals with issues related to both managerial-supervisory and non-supervisory workers.
An agency cost is an economic concept that refers to the costs associated with the relationship between a "principal", and an "agent". The agent is given powers to make decisions on behalf of the principal. However, the two parties may have different incentives and the agent generally has more information. The principal cannot directly ensure that its agent is always acting in its best interests. This potential divergence in interests is what gives rise to agency costs.
Positive accounting is the branch of academic accounting research that seeks to explain and predict actual accounting practices. This contrasts with normative accounting, that seeks to derive and prescribe "optimal" accounting standards.
Michael Cole "Mike" Jensen is an American economist who works in the area of financial economics. Between 2000 and 2009 he worked for the Monitor Company Group, a strategy-consulting firm which became "Monitor Deloitte" in 2013. He holds the position of Jesse Isidor Straus Professor of Business Administration, Emeritus, at Harvard University.
Management is a type of labor with a special role of coordinating the activities of inputs and carrying out the contracts agreed among inputs, all of which can be characterized as "decision making". Managers usually face disciplinary forces by making themselves irreplaceable in a way that the company would lose without them. A manager has an incentive to invest the firm's resources in assets whose value is higher under him than under the best alternative manager, even when such investments are not value-maximizing.
Executive compensation is composed of both the financial compensation and other non-financial benefits received by an executive from their employing firm in return for their service. It is typically a mixture of fixed salary, variable performance-based bonuses and benefits and other perquisites all ideally configured to take into account government regulations, tax law, the desires of the organization and the executive.
Dhananjay "Dan" Gode is a Clinical Associate Professor of Accounting, Taxation, and Business law at New York University Stern School of Business. He teaches courses in corporate financial accounting, and also teaches for the TRIUM Global Executive MBA Program, an alliance of NYU Stern, the London School of Economics and HEC School of Management.
Jennifer N. Carpenter is an American finance academic best known for her pioneering research into executive stock options. Other interests include fund manager compensation, survivorship bias, corporate bonds, and option pricing. She has been published in numerous journals including the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, the Review of Financial Studies, and the Journal of Business.
Raffi Indjejikian is the Robert L. Dixon Collegiate Professor of Accounting at the Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan. His research is primarily focused on the development of models and theories illustrating the role of managerial accounting in decision-making through the basis of agency theory.
An electric utility is a company in the electric power industry that engages in electricity generation and distribution of electricity for sale generally in a regulated market. The electrical utility industry is a major provider of energy in most countries.
In the United States, the compensation of company executives is distinguished by the forms it takes and its dramatic rise over the past three decades. Within the last 30 years, executive compensation or pay has risen dramatically beyond what can be explained by changes in firm size, performance, and industry classification. This has received a wide range of criticism leveled against it.
David F. Larcker is an American academic and author. He is the James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting, and director of the Corporate Governance Research Initiative at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, senior faculty of The Arthur and Toni Rembi Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University, codirector of the Stanford Directors' Consortium Executive Program and Professor of Law, of Stanford Law School. He also serves as a trustee of the Wells Fargo Advantage Funds.
A founder CEO is an individual who establishes a company and holds its chief executive officer (CEO) position. If the firm's CEO is not a founder or the founder CEO is succeeded, the firm is said to be led by a non-founder CEO or successor CEO.
Alex Edmans is professor of finance at London Business School and the current Mercers' School Memorial Professor of Business at Gresham College. Since 2017 he has been the Managing Editor of the Review of Finance, the leading academic finance journal in Europe. He gave the TED talk What to Trust in a Post-Truth World, on confirmation bias and the importance of being discerning with evidence. In 2021 he was named Professor of the Year by Poets & Quants.
Rüdiger Fahlenbrach is a German economist specialised in finance. He is a professor of finance at EPFL and holds the Swiss Finance Institute Senior Research Chair.
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